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title: "America’s Middle East Peace Plan: A Framework to End the Israel-Hamas War"
description: "On Friday, May 31, President of the United States Joseph Biden made a surprise announcement. Speaking from a podium at the State Dining Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., Biden first made a brief statement on the thirty-four felony convictions of his predecessor and political rival, former President Donald Trump, and then he turned to the true focus of his remarks. The topic on the president’s mind was neither a border crisis, nor a campus protest, nor an aid package, anti-trust suit, or his son’s then-upcoming trial; it was the Israel-Hamas War. Over some eleven minutes, Biden put forward America’s first comprehensive proposal to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the subsequent days, Biden’s proposal has been met with a mix of full-throated endorsement by some, dismay by others, and outrage by those who consider America’s idea of a peace to be both unacceptable and unsustainable. What has become abundantly clear is that this particular proposal is not going away anytime soon—and that, in fact, it may be the Middle East’s best shot at a drawdown since the current war began.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- President Biden proposed a three-stage peace plan on May 31 to secure a permanent ceasefire and the release of all hostages.\n- The plan mandates an initial six-week ceasefire with an exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners and a surge of 600 aid trucks daily.\n- Phase two requires the complete withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza and the return of all remaining living hostages, including soldiers.\n- The ongoing IDF offensive in Rafah has displaced an estimated one million people, complicating diplomatic efforts amid a severe humanitarian crisis.\n- Israel's war cabinet faces severe internal fracturing, with right-wing ministers threatening to dissolve the government if the peace deal is accepted.\n\n## The Three-Stage Framework for Ceasefire and Reconstruction\n\nThe proposal put forth by Washington on the thirty-first of May was presented as a culmination of months of work behind the scenes. As Biden described it, the plan presented was an effort to reach a \"durable end\" to the war, over and above the efforts to establish temporary ceasefires that have largely failed to materialize. Per Biden, the plan is fundamentally an Israeli one, a comprehensive offer that leads to a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and ultimately, the conclusion of the war. The plan, laid out in three stages, had allegedly been transmitted to Hamas before being presented in full to the global audience. Stage one is set to last for a period of six weeks, upon the mutual agreement of Israel and Hamas to enter into the accord. It includes a complete ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, and the release of a subset of the Israeli hostages still held in Gaza: women, the elderly, and the wounded. American hostages would be released as well, and most likely brought back to the United States if they chose to make the journey and could do so in stable condition. In exchange for the release of those hostages, Israel would release hundreds of Palestinians held prisoner in Israel, maintaining a relative consistency in the rate of exchange in prisoner swaps and releases between Israel and Hamas. Israel would withdraw its forces from all populated areas of Gaza—a distinction that Biden declined to clarify in exact terms. Some, but not all remains of hostages who died in Hamas captivity would be returned. Also during the first stage of the plan, reconstruction and aid-rehabilitation efforts would begin across Gaza. That includes a surge of desperately needed humanitarian aid, at a rate of 600 aid trucks allowed into Gaza per day, every day. For perspective, that figure is greater than the estimated 500 aid trucks per day considered a requirement to fulfill the food, water, medical, fuel, and supply needs of Gaza’s roughly 2.3 million inhabitants. With those 600 trucks per day would come a safe and reliable distribution infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of temporary housing units. During that same time, Gazan civilians would be able to return to what remains of their communities and, in many cases, the shell or rubble of their former homes. Parallel to the prisoner exchange and reconstruction efforts, phase one of the ceasefire would be treated as a critical window for Hamas and Israel to agree on the terms of phase two. To ensure that the two parties do not regress out of the first stage of a ceasefire once it begins, phase one includes additional terms to extend past its initially allotted span of six weeks, so long as Israel and Hamas are mutually engaged in negotiations to eventually progress to stage two. When the second stage does kick off, it will include terms for the release of all remaining living hostages. That includes soldiers, particularly men, of the Israel Defense Force or IDF, that Hamas has thus far been loath to see returned to the custody of their home nation. In exchange, the IDF and other Israeli forces will agree to a full withdrawal of troops from Gaza. At this stage, the temporary ceasefire of phase one would be regarded instead as a \"cessation of hostilities permanently\", as Biden quoted directly from what he stated was Israel’s proposal. Per the American president, this second-phase ceasefire would likely include additional terms and details not yet negotiated, including stipulations and caveats by Israel aimed at protecting its own interests. At the conclusion of phase two, although Biden does not state it directly, it is strongly implied that Gaza would return—at least in a functional sense—to its status as a blockaded and encircled, but not technically occupied territory within its pre-October-2023 geographical limits. Finally, phase three is the least clearly defined at this time, consisting of the implementation of a far larger, but as-yet-unspecified reconstruction plan for Gaza. As for who would be responsible for the implementation of this reconstruction plan, how extensive the reconstruction would be, and whether reconstruction is done in coordination with Hamas-affiliated organizations or a non-Hamas-affiliated successor, all of that has not yet been clarified. At this stage of the ceasefire process, Israel would expect to receive any and all remains of hostages that had not yet been returned at a prior stage of the ceasefire. It is unclear whether current expectations would include the signing of a peace accord during stage three, the implementation of a non-Hamas leadership structure in Gaza, any recognition of explicitly-outlined autonomy or even sovereignty for Palestine, or any of the other long-anticipated political changes that both sides of the war hope to eventually put into effect.\n\n## Addressing Israeli Security and Regional Normalization\n\nAfter he outlined the three stages of the plan, Biden delved into what Washington considers to be the critical barriers in the way of Israel accepting a deal. In response to anticipated Israeli skepticism that an offer could ever be made with Hamas, Biden emphasized that the IDF has thoroughly devastated the Hamas organization, to the point that a copycat attack, on the scale of the October 7, 2023 terror attack that saw the Israel-Hamas War commence in force, would now be functionally impossible. The security risk presented by Hamas has, in Biden’s telling, been nullified. The president continued, stating: “I know there are those in Israel who will not agree with this plan and will call for the war to continue indefinitely. Some are even in the government coalition. And they’ve made it clear: They want to occupy Gaza, they want to keep fighting for years, and the hostages are not a priority to them. I’ve urged the leadership in Israel to stand behind this deal, despite whatever pressure comes.” Concluding his overture to the Israeli public, Biden emphasized the risks that may arise if \"this moment is lost.\" Pursuing an unclear and undefined idea of total victory in Gaza is an approach that is likely to see Israel bogged down in the war, drained of both the lives of its soldiers and its economic resources, in a fruitless endeavor that is likely to isolate Israel further while failing to either defeat Hamas or bring home hostages still in Gaza. Concluding the address, Biden emphasized the United States’ commitment to both the safety and security of Israel, and the humanitarian reconstruction of Gaza, threading a difficult political line within his own starkly divided nation. He implicitly offered substantial US aid in rebuilding the education, medical, and other human infrastructure that has been destroyed thus far in the war, but also strongly implied that the United States would continue to engage in arms deals to supply Israel with defense and warfighting equipment, while guaranteeing Israel that if Hamas were to fail in fulfilling its commitments, the IDF would be welcome to return to its military operations. He evoked the prospect of calmed tensions on Israel’s northern border, where the Hamas-allied Hezbollah organization has been all too willing to continue trading fire with the IDF since the Israel-Hamas war began. Biden called back to the prospect of Israeli normalization of its relations with Saudi Arabia, a massive and potentially region-changing effort that went on hold once the war began—and one that many international analysts suggest may have been the motivating factor that led Iran-backed Hamas to attack Israel at large scale last October. With Israel able to better engage in regional security agreements, Biden stressed that Israel’s security would be enhanced far better than it would be by continuing to prosecute its counteroffensive against Hamas, while the people of Gaza would regain the opportunity to pursue a future \"of self-determination, dignity, security, and freedom.\" By the time the address was finished, the peace plan was laid out in stark detail: three stages, each progressing toward a more enduring state of peace. Each side of the war, having expressed its commitment both behind closed doors and on the world stage toward reaching a peace of some kind, would now have an opportunity to demonstrate their dedication to that peace, while also having their bluff called in a way that could not be ignored. Both sides were assured flexibility in their capacity to push for new inclusions or exclusions from the deal if need be, alongside the continual engagement of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar as mediators. The human cost of not securing a ceasefire, the prospect of a continuation of a war that has seen thousands of children killed and countless lives shattered both in Israel and Palestine, was brought back fully into view.\n\n## The Devastating Status Quo in Gaza and Rafah\n\nBy 1:42 in the afternoon on May 31, Biden's address was closed out; the gauntlet had been thrown down, and now, it was up to Israel and Hamas to decide what would come next. The situation is as follows: the Israel-Hamas War is no longer the piecemeal disassembly of the entire Gaza territory, but a continued military offensive against remnants of Hamas in the south, while the north teeters on the brink of utter collapse. The bulk of the ongoing violence in Gaza is happening in the southern city of Rafah. There, Israel states that it is carrying out limited operations in the eastern part of the city, and pushing its forces into the central district to expand its offensive, in what it would like to present as a relatively constrained fashion. In recent days, heavy fighting has even popped up in Rafah's western reaches, including the district of Tel al-Sultan, while IDF soldiers in central Rafah have allegedly found weapons depots, rocket launchers, and tunnels. The fighting has been ongoing for about a month, after Israel initially launched its Rafah assault on May 6, and since then, an estimated one million people have been displaced from the city. Many of the people who had previously lived there had been internally displaced from elsewhere in Gaza—most of them more than once, and some upward of half a dozen times. Israel considered an invasion of Rafah to be worth its while, alleging that four Hamas battalions were hiding out in the city, protecting what remains of their leadership and likely maintaining control of its remaining hostages as human shields. With Israel attacking targets in several parts of the city, civilians have been caught in the crossfire at large scale, as has been the case throughout Israel’s brutal counteroffensive. Many displaced people have been caught up in airstrikes, shelling, and shooting. In the area immediately around Rafah where civilians are taking shelter, conditions are exceptionally grim, in squalid camps where food, water, and shelter are surged in by aid organizations when possible, but are often absent. Elsewhere in Gaza, the situation is not much better. Hamas has circled out of the southern enclaves where it was believed to be hiding, with organized contingents popping back up in northern cities and other places that the IDF had designated as being cleared. That turn of events runs counter to the expectations that the Israeli government had set out for this stage of the war, but it has been largely unsurprising to international diplomats and analysts, who have observed in Hamas the capacity to become a long, unkillable insurgency in the mold of the Al-Qaeda or Islamic State of the 2010s. While Israel continues to claim that it can destroy Hamas within Gaza, that already-unlikely promise has become less believable by the day. The IDF has had to surge troops back into some areas it had expected to leave, while marking out other zones as being in need of a circle back before Hamas can truly be declared defeated. The status quo in Gaza is devastating, and it has been punctuated by sudden outbursts of violence that somehow manage to be worse. On the Hamas side, the organization proved as recently as the twenty-sixth of May that it could still threaten Israelis in their own homes, firing a barrage of rockets out of Gaza that set off air raid sirens as far away as Tel Aviv. Although the rockets scored no known hits, they marked Hamas’ first rocket attack since January, and the news that Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system had brought them down came less as a sign that Israel was still impervious to rockets, and more as a sign that rocket attacks may be just as much a part of Israel’s future as its past. A few hours later, on May 27, the IDF shocked the world yet again via an airstrike on a camp for displaced people in Rafah. In that incident, a fire spread among tents in Tal al-Sultan after a large explosion, eventually leaving forty-five people dead, including women and children. The IDF indicated that it had killed two senior members of Hamas, but even Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu had to take to the airwaves to acknowledge the civilian tragedy that had taken place. Earlier in May, even Israel's main international backer, the United States, was forced to acknowledge that Israel likely used American-supplied weapons in ways that directly breached international humanitarian law. All that, despite the fact that the US simultaneously resolved to continue supplying Israel with equipment and munitions indefinitely. The plight of the people caught in the middle—people from both Gaza and Israel who did not take an active or voluntary role in the violence—remains central to the conflict. While news in early May that the United Nations had revised down its casualty counts prompted a brief moment of hope that the situation in Gaza might not have been so apocalyptically terrible as was once believed, that hope was dashed before long. Rather than revise down the count at all, the United Nations later clarified that it had begun to differentiate the number of people, and particularly the number of women and children, who had been killed and were identifiable, from the number that had been killed but either had not yet been identified, or simply could not be. The death toll remains unchanged above 35,000, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs specifying on May 6 that at least 14,500 children and 9,500 women had been killed. According to data published two days later, just barely under 7,800 children and 5,000 women, plus 10,000 men and nearly 2,000 elderly, had been identified, with the rest unknown. On Israel's side, news continues to trickle out that fewer hostages may still be alive than the Israeli public had hoped. After a previous round of ceasefire talks fell apart partially because Hamas stated that it didn’t have the number of living hostages Israel wanted to have released, news broke on June 3 that four more hostages previously thought alive had perished months prior. Those were four Israeli men, one a British dual citizen, and all between the ages of 51 and 85, who were believed to have died in the same place during Israel's operations in Khan Younis. Finally, although aid has been able to move into Gaza in recent days, parts of the northern section of the territory are believed to be in a state of famine—something that the restrictions on humanitarian access makes it exceptionally difficult to evaluate. Nor is there any real way out; Egypt's border crossing to Rafah remains closed, and Egypt's foreign minister told the press on June 3 that it is likely to remain closed, unless Israel relinquishes control of the border crossing and hands it back to a Palestinian administration.\n\n## Political Fractures and Shifting International Support\n\nThe fragile war cabinet that has been guiding the nation through this conflict has begun to show serious signs of fracturing. One especially prominent minister, Benny Gantz, proposed on Thursday, May 30, that Israel’s parliament be dissolved. That move served as a direct challenge to President Netanyahu, even if the measure was unlikely to be taken up by the parliament for consideration and even less likely to pass. Gantz has spent a month pushing an ultimatum that Netanyahu build and agree to a so-called “day after” plan, laying out a process to handle the aftermath of the war, and Gantz has threatened to quit Netanyahu’s war coalition if that does not happen. Given Gantz’s position as one of Netanyahu’s greatest political rivals, that would be an especially meaningful gesture. Although it would not crumble Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, it would place him at the mercy of a far-right faction within Israel, without which Netanyahu certainly could not hold on. Across the Atlantic, President Biden has followed up his peace plan by addressing a long-held rumor that Netanyahu’s continual engagement in the Israel-Hamas War is a matter of self-preservation. In an interview with Time Magazine done prior to his public announcement, Biden responded to a question on whether he believes Netanyahu’s prolonging of the war is a political survival tactic by stating in part: “I’m not going to comment on that. There is every reason for people to draw that conclusion.” Asked after the transcript of that interview was released, Biden's national security spokesman, John Kirby, confirmed that the Commander-in-Chief's answer remained unchanged. Finally, it has become clear that Israel's support among European nations is dropping faster than ever. On the fourth of June, Slovenia became the fourth nation in recent days to formally recognize a Palestinian state, a decision that was confirmed overwhelmingly by the national parliament. Slovenia joined Spain, Norway, and Ireland, all of which had chosen to recognize a Palestinian state, not Israeli statehood, a few days prior. Collectively, the four became the first European nations to recognize Palestine since Sweden did so in 2014, with the only other six EU nations that recognize Palestine all having done so back in 1988. Norway, for the record, is not part of the EU, but tends to politically align with it anyhow. The Israeli government has been quick to lash out at each of the nations who recently made the jump, but if anything, Europe has been emboldened by the change. The EU's chief of foreign policy, Josep Borrell, has indicated his newfound support for the International Criminal Court as it seeks a warrant for the arrests of both Benjamin Netanyahu and high-ranking members of Hamas. The news broke of the US president's new peace proposal, and it cascaded down upon both an Israeli government and a Gazan population that have found themselves in dire straits.\n\n## Internal Israeli Reactions and the Hamas Response\n\nWith Hamas battered but morphing into a long-term insurgency, Israel fractured and increasingly isolated, and Gazan civilians enduring famine, airstrikes, and displacement depending on who and where they are, the Biden plan certainly did not get a unanimous reaction. On the side of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu’s response was an optimistic one at first. In the wake of Biden’s statement, Netanyahu reaffirmed that Israel will not conclude its war until all hostages are returned, and until Hamas is no longer able to either fight or govern, but he emphasized that according to the plan Biden described, Israel would be able to fulfill those objectives while bringing about a peace. Netanyahu’s chief foreign policy adviser reaffirmed Israel’s endorsement of the plan, stating to the Sunday Times that it was \"a deal we agreed to — it’s not a good deal, but we dearly want the hostages released, all of them.\" Meanwhile, Netanyahu publicly received what is most likely a carrot-and-the-stick offer from Washington behind closed doors: a bipartisan invitation to make an address to both houses of the US Congress, giving him an opportunity to speak directly to American lawmakers and granting him a sole record as the first foreign leader ever to make an address to the full Congress four times in his career. Inside Netanyahu’s cabinet and his governing coalition, however, other power players reacted with profound opposition. Netanyahu's finance minister, a far-right Religious Zionist Party chairman named Bezalel Smotrich, vowed that he would \"not be part of a government that agrees to the proposed outline and ends the war without destroying Hamas.\" Smotrich's close ally, Jewish Power Party leader and national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, derided the plan as a \"victory for terrorism\" and threatened to dissolve Netanyahu's government, echoing the threats made from across the aisle by Benny Gantz just weeks prior. The news was not all bad for the peace plan; Yair Lapid, a prominent leftist opposition leader, vowed to throw his support behind the deal if Israel's far right chose to undermine it, providing a critical pathway for Netanyahu to stand behind the deal without immediately watching his governing mandate fall apart. Lapid's genuine support would almost certainly mean that a deal would pass the Knesset. But between the two major factions that Netanyahu is partnering with trying to pull him in opposite directions, and the leader of the opposition offering what Netanyahu likely sees as a deal with the devil, he is in a very difficult spot. Whether Netanyahu is open to the idea of passing the proposal through Lapid or not, numerous parties both within Israel and outside of it have focused on one critical problem with the deal as currently described: it does not actually include a mechanism to ensure that Hamas will not rule over Gaza in the future. In a practical sense, it is not hard to see why that stipulation would be left out; this is a deal that Washington wants Hamas to agree to, and it is tough to see a world in which Hamas signs up to be dismantled by Israel. Without any mechanism to eliminate Hamas, the organization would still be the most powerful player inside of Gaza upon the war’s end. Israel’s Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, emphasized that issue while giving a statement to the Israeli press: “We will not accept the rule of Hamas in Gaza at any stage in any process aimed at ending the war.” Hamas officials emphasized that they had no intent to either disband voluntarily, or allow themselves to be removed by force. The organization indicated in the immediate aftermath of Biden’s announcement that it viewed the proposal \"positively and in a constructive manner,\" although further details on any steps Hamas intended on taking to participate in the peace process were unknown at that time. That response is in keeping with what Biden had suggested Hamas had been indicating behind closed doors, looking genuinely to secure a ceasefire. As Biden himself had said, “This deal is an opportunity to prove whether they really mean it.” Hamas was urged after the address to accept the deal from a range of foreign sources who both support and oppose the organization. The group's main backer, Iran, has unsurprisingly not offered a full-throated endorsement of the plan, but reports suggest that for Hamas itself, the situation is more complicated. One day after Biden's address, senior official Mahmoud Mardawi told Qatari television that Hamas had not yet received details of the proposal, asserting that no agreement can be reached before the demand for the withdrawal of the occupation army and a ceasefire is met. In the days following Hamas' initial endorsement of the idea, the organization appears to have begun adding its own stipulations. According to a senior official from the group speaking during a press conference on Tuesday, June 4: \"We cannot agree to an agreement that doesn't secure, guarantee, and ensure a permanent ceasefire, a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and completing a real serious swap deal accordingly.\" Hamas is not particularly interested in the distinction between a temporary, phase-one ceasefire and a permanent ceasefire in phase two; it wants the permanent ceasefire, the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a full-scale prisoner swap, all as initial terms for the ceasefire to even go into effect. On the one hand, that could be taken as good news: Hamas wants a complete and total end to the violence, and is willing to do its part to achieve that. The trouble, though, is that if Hamas has any understanding of its adversary that is even the slightest bit realistic, then it already understands full well that those terms will be a non-starter for the Israeli government. Hamas has cited its skepticism that Israel is really interested in a peace plan, with a spokesman claiming that Israel only wants one phase where it takes all its hostages, then it resumes its aggression. Asking Israel to accept an immediate, permanent ceasefire and withdrawal will almost certainly cause Israel to walk away from the negotiating table.\n\n## Historical Context: Normalization and Strategic Incentives\n\nIn order to understand why Hamas would make such demands anyway, one clue comes from the unique set of decision-making incentives and issues that Hamas faces. Hamas is not particularly well-liked in Israel, which makes a territorial claim over Gaza that Hamas can dispute all it wants, but functionally speaking, it cannot resist. Hamas and its tendencies toward overt acts of terrorism have been tolerated for a generation in the Middle East, by nations who are loath to recognize or work with Israel, and who accept Hamas as the only organization with the political standing inside Gaza to represent the plight of Gazan Palestinians. But in the years, and then the span of a few months leading up to the October 7 attack, a range of Middle Eastern nations began to normalize relations with Israel—and the biggest and most powerful of them all, Saudi Arabia, was on the brink of doing so too. Although it is not confirmed for certain, a wide range of international experts on the Israel-Hamas War agree that this normalization process may well have been a motivating factor not just for Hamas to launch its October 7 attack, but to continue provoking the Israeli military even after the IDF rolled tanks up and down the Gaza Strip. The thinking goes as follows: Israel really did not like Hamas, these other nations either supported Hamas or endorsed it, but if those nations were coming to new agreements with Israel, then Israel had all the power in the world to solicit their support and credibility in the Arab world in order to work together and find a long-term alternative for Gazan governance that did not involve Hamas. Not only that, but with much of the Middle East working together, the supply lines and smuggling routes Hamas used to secure weapons, supplies, and funding from Iran could be cut off far easier. If normalization was Israel and Saudi Arabia's goal, then the extinguishing of Hamas was likely to be a mutually agreeable price. What could Hamas do to upset that balance, to buy itself time, and to turn the tides of Middle East change back in its favor? It could launch a massive terror attack against Israel, knowing that the retaliation it faced would be nothing short of apocalyptic. At the expense of a few thousand foot soldiers willing to die for the cause, plus tens of thousands of civilians that Hamas was apathetic to anyhow, Hamas could martyr the whole of Gaza in front of the Middle East, showing those other nations the malevolence that they insisted Israel had within it. Hamas could continue to fight back, hide hostages, and take IDF lives for as long as it took for the rest of the Middle East to get the message and come back to their defense. Per a wide range of experts on the conflict, that is precisely what Hamas did, and it is this peculiar and twisted set of incentives that are likely to guide its thinking now. If Hamas does engage in a multi-step peace process, where unclear terms can be defined as the process moves along, then it is likely to be the party in negotiations with the least leverage, especially after it has given back the hostages Israel wants most. If Israeli troops are still parked on Gazan soil as the reconstruction effort proceeds, then it is likely all too easy for Hamas to see a future in which Israel presents the people of Gaza with what Gazans see as a better alternative for governance, offers to wipe out the Hamas organization that put them in the crossfire, and gets approval from a war-weary population that wishes never to experience this war again. All that holds true, in part because Hamas is an organization that Israel and its partners badly want gone—but also, in part, because even within Gaza, the group keeps the support of its people largely because they have no other option. The organization used to have the genuine support of a majority of Gazan Palestinians, as a popular militant organization that used terror tactics to fight against Israeli occupation of Gaza, and in 2006, it formed a government in Gaza on the back of a popular vote within the territory. But since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza unilaterally, with no legislative or presidential votes in the territory since 2008, and with no recourse for ordinary Gazans to create social change against a group with the weapons, manpower, and Iranian backing it needs to essentially hold its population hostage if need be. While government ministries within Gaza do exist at the pleasure of Hamas, and with its support and backing, those organizations are largely technocratic, and for the most part, Hamas does not care much to interfere with their day-to-day operations if they do not get in the leadership’s way. The militant wing of Hamas has been free to keep its authority over Gaza as it sees fit, but the group’s popularity has starkly declined, meaning that the civil servants who could prop up a post-reconstruction Gazan government are largely going to be Hamas-affiliated only in name. Palestinian polls conducted in 2024 still do indicate that Hamas has considerable support within Gaza. It is important to recognize, however, that those are polls taken in an environment where Hamas was still fighting against a nation responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Present a stable offramp to the rest of Gaza, and offer it alongside a comprehensive reconstruction effort and the backing of a large portion of the Middle East, and the idea that Hamas is Gaza’s only option could very rapidly fall apart. By insisting on terms that Hamas knows will be unacceptable to Israel, the organization chooses proactively to stand in the way of a potential peace.\n\n## Implications and the Path Forward for the Peace Accord\n\nInternationally, Biden's three-stage plan has garnered wide support from US allies and those who wish to see an end to the conflict. The leaders of the G7 bloc of major democracies, including Germany, the UK, Japan, Italy, France, and Canada alongside America, fully endorsed the proposal. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres threw his strong support behind the initiative, while America is actively seeking the support of the UN Security Council, an organization that also seats Russia and China and where the US has often been the sole dissenter on resolutions that would reflect poorly on Israel. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have been mum on the issue. Qatar, Hamas' chief negotiating liaison, has emphasized its support for the deal, but also its focus on creating the political conditions to found a sovereign Palestinian state. The two endorsements of the plan that matter most, that of Israel and that of Hamas, remain unconfirmed. This leaves the geopolitical reality highly uncertain. Ascertaining whether the peace plan can succeed starts by accounting for the hard realities that both Israel and Hamas face on the ground. First, there is the cold truth underpinning Israel's ultimate military objective: that no matter how badly the IDF may want to wipe out Hamas entirely, that simply is not going to happen. Nations as strong, or even stronger than Israel, have long attempted to wipe out asymmetric insurgencies, including on their own sovereign territory, but history shows time and time again that it is all but impossible, especially when an insurgency is seen as a local defender and can draw strong local support. Furthermore, Israel does not appear likely to rescue its hostages through military means; in the Israel-Hamas War thus far, ceasefires have been far more effective at actually getting hostages back than kinetic operations. In that sense, the peace plan could tangibly serve Israel's interests in the long run, not least because it would result in the release of hostages. It provides Israel an alternative to its stated objectives, allowing the nation to circumvent the long, and probably quite costly counterinsurgency it would face if it pursued complete eradication. While Israel could conceivably spend enough munitions and pursue the war long enough to eliminate every combatant, that would require leaving Gaza almost entirely devoid of human life, risking global pariah status in the process. However, it is not simple for Israel to just accept the peace deal, as it ignores many of the political realities Netanyahu faces inside his own government. Breaking ties with hard-right factions leaves him at the mercy of powerful rivals, while rejecting the deal risks alienating center-right allies. If Israel does accept the premise that Hamas cannot be wiped out, it implicitly accepts one of two situations. Option one is that even if a non-Hamas organization is established for negotiations, Hamas will retain power and leverage inside Gaza, entrenching itself further. Option two is that a Gaza without Hamas would still leave a massive power vacuum, with no guarantee that another violent organization like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad would not emerge. On the other side, the potential problems waiting for Gaza's civilians are severe. Chief among those problems is the plan's relative vagueness about what an Israeli withdrawal would actually look like. Stage one calls for a withdrawal from \"all populated areas of Gaza\"—but whether that includes bombed-out ruins where people fled months ago remains unclear. It raises the question of whether hundreds of thousands of Gazans will remain displaced for the long term. The details of reconstruction are similarly fraught. In his address, Biden stated that civilians would return to their homes and neighborhoods in all areas of Gaza, including in the north. But that process could take years depending on how arrangements proceed. If Gazans return to their former homes quickly, they will find them uninhabitable, and rebuilding physical infrastructure may be prolonged simply because there are so many people in the way. If Gazans do not go home until they are rebuilt, the intervening years will be spent in crowded, ill-equipped refugee encampments. Looming over it all is the question of Palestinian statehood. While omitted from the proposal, the idea of Palestinian sovereignty is practically guaranteed to factor into whether Hamas is willing to consider the deal, and will be pushed heavily by international actors. Finally, there is the grim reality that the peace plan still fails to account for the broader geopolitical landscape. The role of Iran is not accounted for, nor is any mechanism to ensure Iranian support for a good-faith effort. Hezbollah’s potential incentives to escalate the conflict or lure Israel into further fighting are also overlooked. Amidst the challenges, there are glimmers of hope. Washington’s own statements imply that there is more going on behind closed doors than either Israel or Hamas publicly admits. Biden's direct address to Israeli politicians strongly opposed to the plan may be a tacit nod to decision-makers to place trust in the US rather than in fragile governing coalitions. It remains a profound hope that both Israel and Hamas can act upon that opportunity before yet another chance to secure peace is wasted.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What are the three stages of Biden's Middle East peace plan?\n\nStage one lasts six weeks and includes a complete ceasefire, the release of women, elderly, and wounded Israeli hostages alongside American hostages, a reciprocal release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, an Israeli withdrawal from populated areas of Gaza, and a surge of 600 humanitarian aid trucks per day. Stage two requires the release of all remaining living hostages — including IDF soldiers — and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, at which point the ceasefire would become a permanent cessation of hostilities. Stage three covers a large-scale but as-yet-unspecified reconstruction plan for Gaza and the return of any remaining hostage remains.\n\n### How did Israel's political coalition react to the proposed deal?\n\nNetanyahu's initial response was cautiously optimistic, with his foreign policy adviser confirming Israel had agreed to the outline. However, far-right coalition partners reacted with outrage: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich vowed he would not be part of a government that ends the war without destroying Hamas, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir called the plan a \"victory for terrorism\" and threatened to dissolve the government. Opposition leader Yair Lapid offered to back the deal, creating a potential parliamentary path for Netanyahu that would require crossing the aisle.\n\n### What were Hamas's conditions for accepting the deal?\n\nHamas initially received the proposal \"positively and in a constructive manner,\" but subsequently insisted on guarantees of a permanent ceasefire, a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and a full prisoner swap as preconditions rather than phase-two outcomes. A senior Hamas official stated: \"We cannot agree to an agreement that doesn't secure, guarantee, and ensure a permanent ceasefire, a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and completing a real serious swap deal accordingly.\" These demands were widely seen as a non-starter for the Israeli government.\n\n### What was the humanitarian situation in Gaza and Rafah at the time the plan was announced?\n\nIsrael had been conducting a military offensive in Rafah since May 6, displacing an estimated one million people from the city. The UN reported at least 14,500 children and 9,500 women killed, with the total death toll above 35,000 and parts of northern Gaza believed to be in a state of famine. Egypt's Rafah border crossing remained closed, four additional hostages were confirmed dead in Hamas captivity, and Hamas fired rockets that reached Tel Aviv for the first time since January.\n\n### Why might Hamas have strategic reasons to block a peace deal?\n\nThe article argues that Hamas faces an existential risk from normalization between Israel and Arab states — particularly a potential Saudi-Israeli deal that was nearly complete before October 7, 2023. By triggering a massive Israeli military response in Gaza, Hamas martyred its population in front of the Arab world, stalling normalization. Accepting a phased deal where it first surrenders hostages and then faces the question of post-war governance would leave Hamas in its weakest negotiating position, potentially allowing Israel and regional partners to present Gazans with an alternative governance structure while Hamas is at its most vulnerable.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Armenia and Azerbaijan Finalize Historic Peace Deal After Decades of Conflict](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/armenia-azerbaijan-historic-peace-deal-2025)\n- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth)\n- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth-1bmuupct)\n- [America’s Middle East Peace Plan: Can It End the War?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/americas-middle-east-peace-plan-can-it-end-the-war)\n- [Is a Decades-Long Turkish War Finally Over? Abdullah Öcalan Calls for Peace.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-a-decades-long-turkish-war-finally-over-abdullah-calan-calls-for-peace)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-middle-east-2/>\n2. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-battles-hamas-northern-gaza-jabaliya-regrouped-rafah-blinken-rcna151919>\n3. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-rafah-2f603675195f80c73c593020398ed72a>\n4. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68984999>\n5. <https://apnews.com/article/us-israel-gaza-war-nsm-international-law-c83b6f39ce2799e5d2c473a337e2f857>\n6. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kkqkngnedo>\n7. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckrr0e3y29po>\n8. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/rocket-fire-by-hamas-from-gaza-sets-off-air-raid-sirens-in-tel-aviv-for-first-time-in-months>\n9. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gaza-death-toll-ocha-un-confusion-anger-rcna151934>\n10. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/heres-real-problem-uns-revised-gaza-death-toll>\n11. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/03/trade-convoys-squeezing-out-gaza-aid-humanitarian-organisations-say>\n12. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/famine-possibly-underway-northern-gaza-despite-recent-aid-110830549>\n13. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-06-03-2024-d31eda4128b438739d69dda0d4f7f72b>\n14. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/four-israeli-hostages-died-hamas-custody-rcna155231>\n15. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrrng3l6jro>\n16. <https://time.com/6984968/joe-biden-transcript-2024-interview/>\n17. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/04/biden-netanyahu-ceasefire-israel-gaza-war?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other>\n18. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-crossroads-over-challenge-netanyahu-2024-05-31/>\n19. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-moves-dissolve-parliament-statement-2024-05-30/>\n20. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/04/israel-government-war-cabinet-netanyahu/>\n21. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/spains-prime-minister-cabinet-recognize-palestinian-state-eu-110600247>\n22. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovenia-becomes-latest-eu-country-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-06-04/>\n23. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/slovenia-lawmakers-convene-vote-recognition-palestinian-state-110817580#:~:text=More%20than%20140%20countries%20recognize,thirds%20of%20the%20United%20Nations>\n24. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote>\n25. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-wants-israel-commit-permanent-ceasefire-full-withdrawal-gaza-2024-06-04/#:~:text=CAIRO%2C%20June%204%20>\n26. <https://www.barrons.com/news/us-expects-israel-to-accept-gaza-peace-plan-if-hamas-does-4a7e4e6e>\n27. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas#:~:text=Hamas%20has%20a%20host%20of,Gaza%20and%20the%20West%20Bank>\n28. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/how-hamas-ends-gaza#:~:text=A%20March%202024%20opinion%20poll,indirectly%20build%20sympathy%20for%20Hamas>\n29. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hamas-what-to-know-about-its-origins-leaders-and-funding>\n30. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cw8860gn1nwo>\n31. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-gaza-israel-plan-end-war-cease-fire-hostages-rcna154945>\n32. <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/31/g-s1-2320/biden-israel-hamas-ceasefire-proposal>\n33. <https://www.nbcnews.com/video/biden-announces-new-middle-east-cease-fire-proposal-212031557698>\n34. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/netanyahu-aide-israel-agreed-biden-cease-fire-plan-gaza-rcna155075>\n35. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-no-gaza-ceasefire-until-hamas-destroyed-2024-06-01/>\n36. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/31/politics/biden-middle-east-remarks/index.html>\n37. <https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-leaders-fully-endorse-bidens-gaza-peace-plan-2024-06-03/>\n38. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/israel-says-biden-s-latest-gaza-peace-plan-is-only-part-of-story>\n39. <https://www.ft.com/content/5716d8d3-241c-4f8b-abf0-7be8fc335a0e>\n40. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/02/middleeast/israeli-ministers-biden-ceasefire-plan-intl/index.html>\n41. <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-urges-security-council-support-cease-fire-plan-110803051>\n42. <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation-world/story/2024-06-03/biden-takes-a-big-swing-at-hostage-for-truce-deal-puts-onus-on-israeli-hamas-officials-to-step-up>\n43. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240601-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-hamas-says-israel-s-gaza-ceasefire-plan-positive>\n44. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-05-28-2024-20df7de040cec3396a2febe481e4fe72#:~:text=Fighting%20in%20Rafah%20has%20caused,says>\n45. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/02/children-die-malnutrition-rafah-famine-gaza-israeli-troops-aid-strip>\n46. <https://www.reuters.com/world/rafah-border-crossing-cant-reopen-unless-israeli-forces-quit-gaza-side-egypt-2024-06-03/>\n47. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-israels-leaders-cant-or-wont-say-about-bidens-ceasefire-announcement>\n48. <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/biden-takes-big-swing-hostage-truce-deal-puts-110795682>\n49. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/524759/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/US-urges-UN-Security-Council-to-support-ceasefire-.aspx>\n50. <https://www.npr.org/2024/06/03/nx-s1-4983932/the-state-of-hamas-as-it-reasserts-itself-in-the-north-in-a-weakened-form>\n51. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-defeated#:~:text=Implementing%20the%20set%20of%20political,risky%2C%20and%20could%20well%20fail>\n52. <https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438>\n\n[1]: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-middle-east-2/\n[2]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-battles-hamas-northern-gaza-jabaliya-regrouped-rafah-blinken-rcna151919\n[3]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-rafah-2f603675195f80c73c593020398ed72a\n[4]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68984999\n[5]: https://apnews.com/article/us-israel-gaza-war-nsm-international-law-c83b6f39ce2799e5d2c473a337e2f857\n[6]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kkqkngnedo\n[7]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckrr0e3y29po\n[8]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/rocket-fire-by-hamas-from-gaza-sets-off-air-raid-sirens-in-tel-aviv-for-first-time-in-months\n[9]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gaza-death-toll-ocha-un-confusion-anger-rcna151934\n[10]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/heres-real-problem-uns-revised-gaza-death-toll\n[11]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/03/trade-convoys-squeezing-out-gaza-aid-humanitarian-organisations-say\n[12]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/famine-possibly-underway-northern-gaza-despite-recent-aid-110830549\n[13]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-06-03-2024-d31eda4128b438739d69dda0d4f7f72b\n[14]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/four-israeli-hostages-died-hamas-custody-rcna155231\n[15]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrrng3l6jro\n[16]: https://time.com/6984968/joe-biden-transcript-2024-interview/\n[17]: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/04/biden-netanyahu-ceasefire-israel-gaza-war?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other\n[18]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-crossroads-over-challenge-netanyahu-2024-05-31/\n[19]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-moves-dissolve-parliament-statement-2024-05-30/\n[20]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/04/israel-government-war-cabinet-netanyahu/\n[21]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/spains-prime-minister-cabinet-recognize-palestinian-state-eu-110600247\n[22]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovenia-becomes-latest-eu-country-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-06-04/\n[23]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/slovenia-lawmakers-convene-vote-recognition-palestinian-state-110817580#:~:text=More%20than%20140%20countries%20recognize,thirds%20of%20the%20United%20Nations\n[24]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote\n[25]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-wants-israel-commit-permanent-ceasefire-full-withdrawal-gaza-2024-06-04/#:~:text=CAIRO%2C%20June%204%20\n[26]: https://www.barrons.com/news/us-expects-israel-to-accept-gaza-peace-plan-if-hamas-does-4a7e4e6e\n[27]: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas#:~:text=Hamas%20has%20a%20host%20of,Gaza%20and%20the%20West%20Bank\n[28]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/how-hamas-ends-gaza#:~:text=A%20March%202024%20opinion%20poll,indirectly%20build%20sympathy%20for%20Hamas\n[29]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hamas-what-to-know-about-its-origins-leaders-and-funding\n[30]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cw8860gn1nwo\n[31]: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-gaza-israel-plan-end-war-cease-fire-hostages-rcna154945\n[32]: https://www.npr.org/2024/05/31/g-s1-2320/biden-israel-hamas-ceasefire-proposal\n[33]: https://www.nbcnews.com/video/biden-announces-new-middle-east-cease-fire-proposal-212031557698\n[34]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/netanyahu-aide-israel-agreed-biden-cease-fire-plan-gaza-rcna155075\n[35]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-no-gaza-ceasefire-until-hamas-destroyed-2024-06-01/\n[36]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/31/politics/biden-middle-east-remarks/index.html\n[37]: https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-leaders-fully-endorse-bidens-gaza-peace-plan-2024-06-03/\n[38]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/israel-says-biden-s-latest-gaza-peace-plan-is-only-part-of-story\n[39]: https://www.ft.com/content/5716d8d3-241c-4f8b-abf0-7be8fc335a0e\n[40]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/02/middleeast/israeli-ministers-biden-ceasefire-plan-intl/index.html\n[41]: https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-urges-security-council-support-cease-fire-plan-110803051\n[42]: https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation-world/story/2024-06-03/biden-takes-a-big-swing-at-hostage-for-truce-deal-puts-onus-on-israeli-hamas-officials-to-step-up\n[43]: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240601-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-hamas-says-israel-s-gaza-ceasefire-plan-positive\n[44]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-05-28-2024-20df7de040cec3396a2febe481e4fe72#:~:text=Fighting%20in%20Rafah%20has%20caused,says\n[45]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/02/children-die-malnutrition-rafah-famine-gaza-israeli-troops-aid-strip\n[46]: https://www.reuters.com/world/rafah-border-crossing-cant-reopen-unless-israeli-forces-quit-gaza-side-egypt-2024-06-03/\n[47]: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-israels-leaders-cant-or-wont-say-about-bidens-ceasefire-announcement\n[48]: https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/biden-takes-big-swing-hostage-truce-deal-puts-110795682\n[49]: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/524759/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/US-urges-UN-Security-Council-to-support-ceasefire-.aspx\n[50]: https://www.npr.org/2024/06/03/nx-s1-4983932/the-state-of-hamas-as-it-reasserts-itself-in-the-north-in-a-weakened-form\n[51]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-defeated#:~:text=Implementing%20the%20set%20of%20political,risky%2C%20and%20could%20well%20fail\n[52]: https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438\n\n<!-- youtube:JIiW0lwDgA8 -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/america-middle-east-peace-plan-israel-hamas-war.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/america-middle-east-peace-plan-israel-hamas-war
datePublished: 2026-03-04
dateModified: 2026-03-04
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/JIiW0lwDgA8/hero.jpg"
type: NewsArticle
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tokens: 13398
summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/america-middle-east-peace-plan-israel-hamas-war.md.summary.md
---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
On Friday, May 31, President of the United States Joseph Biden made a surprise announcement. Speaking from a podium at the State Dining Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., Biden first made a brief statement on the thirty-four felony convictions of his predecessor and political rival, former President Donald Trump, and then he turned to the true focus of his remarks. The topic on the president’s mind was neither a border crisis, nor a campus protest, nor an aid package, anti-trust suit, or his son’s then-upcoming trial; it was the Israel-Hamas War. Over some eleven minutes, Biden put forward America’s first comprehensive proposal to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the subsequent days, Biden’s proposal has been met with a mix of full-throated endorsement by some, dismay by others, and outrage by those who consider America’s idea of a peace to be both unacceptable and unsustainable. What has become abundantly clear is that this particular proposal is not going away anytime soon—and that, in fact, it may be the Middle East’s best shot at a drawdown since the current war began.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- President Biden proposed a three-stage peace plan on May 31 to secure a permanent ceasefire and the release of all hostages.
- The plan mandates an initial six-week ceasefire with an exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners and a surge of 600 aid trucks daily.
- Phase two requires the complete withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza and the return of all remaining living hostages, including soldiers.
- The ongoing IDF offensive in Rafah has displaced an estimated one million people, complicating diplomatic efforts amid a severe humanitarian crisis.
- Israel's war cabinet faces severe internal fracturing, with right-wing ministers threatening to dissolve the government if the peace deal is accepted.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-three-stage-framework-for-ceasefire-and-reconstruction" -->
## The Three-Stage Framework for Ceasefire and Reconstruction

The proposal put forth by Washington on the thirty-first of May was presented as a culmination of months of work behind the scenes. As Biden described it, the plan presented was an effort to reach a "durable end" to the war, over and above the efforts to establish temporary ceasefires that have largely failed to materialize. Per Biden, the plan is fundamentally an Israeli one, a comprehensive offer that leads to a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and ultimately, the conclusion of the war. The plan, laid out in three stages, had allegedly been transmitted to Hamas before being presented in full to the global audience. Stage one is set to last for a period of six weeks, upon the mutual agreement of Israel and Hamas to enter into the accord. It includes a complete ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, and the release of a subset of the Israeli hostages still held in Gaza: women, the elderly, and the wounded. American hostages would be released as well, and most likely brought back to the United States if they chose to make the journey and could do so in stable condition. In exchange for the release of those hostages, Israel would release hundreds of Palestinians held prisoner in Israel, maintaining a relative consistency in the rate of exchange in prisoner swaps and releases between Israel and Hamas. Israel would withdraw its forces from all populated areas of Gaza—a distinction that Biden declined to clarify in exact terms. Some, but not all remains of hostages who died in Hamas captivity would be returned. Also during the first stage of the plan, reconstruction and aid-rehabilitation efforts would begin across Gaza. That includes a surge of desperately needed humanitarian aid, at a rate of 600 aid trucks allowed into Gaza per day, every day. For perspective, that figure is greater than the estimated 500 aid trucks per day considered a requirement to fulfill the food, water, medical, fuel, and supply needs of Gaza’s roughly 2.3 million inhabitants. With those 600 trucks per day would come a safe and reliable distribution infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of temporary housing units. During that same time, Gazan civilians would be able to return to what remains of their communities and, in many cases, the shell or rubble of their former homes. Parallel to the prisoner exchange and reconstruction efforts, phase one of the ceasefire would be treated as a critical window for Hamas and Israel to agree on the terms of phase two. To ensure that the two parties do not regress out of the first stage of a ceasefire once it begins, phase one includes additional terms to extend past its initially allotted span of six weeks, so long as Israel and Hamas are mutually engaged in negotiations to eventually progress to stage two. When the second stage does kick off, it will include terms for the release of all remaining living hostages. That includes soldiers, particularly men, of the Israel Defense Force or IDF, that Hamas has thus far been loath to see returned to the custody of their home nation. In exchange, the IDF and other Israeli forces will agree to a full withdrawal of troops from Gaza. At this stage, the temporary ceasefire of phase one would be regarded instead as a "cessation of hostilities permanently", as Biden quoted directly from what he stated was Israel’s proposal. Per the American president, this second-phase ceasefire would likely include additional terms and details not yet negotiated, including stipulations and caveats by Israel aimed at protecting its own interests. At the conclusion of phase two, although Biden does not state it directly, it is strongly implied that Gaza would return—at least in a functional sense—to its status as a blockaded and encircled, but not technically occupied territory within its pre-October-2023 geographical limits. Finally, phase three is the least clearly defined at this time, consisting of the implementation of a far larger, but as-yet-unspecified reconstruction plan for Gaza. As for who would be responsible for the implementation of this reconstruction plan, how extensive the reconstruction would be, and whether reconstruction is done in coordination with Hamas-affiliated organizations or a non-Hamas-affiliated successor, all of that has not yet been clarified. At this stage of the ceasefire process, Israel would expect to receive any and all remains of hostages that had not yet been returned at a prior stage of the ceasefire. It is unclear whether current expectations would include the signing of a peace accord during stage three, the implementation of a non-Hamas leadership structure in Gaza, any recognition of explicitly-outlined autonomy or even sovereignty for Palestine, or any of the other long-anticipated political changes that both sides of the war hope to eventually put into effect.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-three-stage-framework-for-ceasefire-and-reconstruction" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="addressing-israeli-security-and-regional-normalization" -->
## Addressing Israeli Security and Regional Normalization

After he outlined the three stages of the plan, Biden delved into what Washington considers to be the critical barriers in the way of Israel accepting a deal. In response to anticipated Israeli skepticism that an offer could ever be made with Hamas, Biden emphasized that the IDF has thoroughly devastated the Hamas organization, to the point that a copycat attack, on the scale of the October 7, 2023 terror attack that saw the Israel-Hamas War commence in force, would now be functionally impossible. The security risk presented by Hamas has, in Biden’s telling, been nullified. The president continued, stating: “I know there are those in Israel who will not agree with this plan and will call for the war to continue indefinitely. Some are even in the government coalition. And they’ve made it clear: They want to occupy Gaza, they want to keep fighting for years, and the hostages are not a priority to them. I’ve urged the leadership in Israel to stand behind this deal, despite whatever pressure comes.” Concluding his overture to the Israeli public, Biden emphasized the risks that may arise if "this moment is lost." Pursuing an unclear and undefined idea of total victory in Gaza is an approach that is likely to see Israel bogged down in the war, drained of both the lives of its soldiers and its economic resources, in a fruitless endeavor that is likely to isolate Israel further while failing to either defeat Hamas or bring home hostages still in Gaza. Concluding the address, Biden emphasized the United States’ commitment to both the safety and security of Israel, and the humanitarian reconstruction of Gaza, threading a difficult political line within his own starkly divided nation. He implicitly offered substantial US aid in rebuilding the education, medical, and other human infrastructure that has been destroyed thus far in the war, but also strongly implied that the United States would continue to engage in arms deals to supply Israel with defense and warfighting equipment, while guaranteeing Israel that if Hamas were to fail in fulfilling its commitments, the IDF would be welcome to return to its military operations. He evoked the prospect of calmed tensions on Israel’s northern border, where the Hamas-allied Hezbollah organization has been all too willing to continue trading fire with the IDF since the Israel-Hamas war began. Biden called back to the prospect of Israeli normalization of its relations with Saudi Arabia, a massive and potentially region-changing effort that went on hold once the war began—and one that many international analysts suggest may have been the motivating factor that led Iran-backed Hamas to attack Israel at large scale last October. With Israel able to better engage in regional security agreements, Biden stressed that Israel’s security would be enhanced far better than it would be by continuing to prosecute its counteroffensive against Hamas, while the people of Gaza would regain the opportunity to pursue a future "of self-determination, dignity, security, and freedom." By the time the address was finished, the peace plan was laid out in stark detail: three stages, each progressing toward a more enduring state of peace. Each side of the war, having expressed its commitment both behind closed doors and on the world stage toward reaching a peace of some kind, would now have an opportunity to demonstrate their dedication to that peace, while also having their bluff called in a way that could not be ignored. Both sides were assured flexibility in their capacity to push for new inclusions or exclusions from the deal if need be, alongside the continual engagement of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar as mediators. The human cost of not securing a ceasefire, the prospect of a continuation of a war that has seen thousands of children killed and countless lives shattered both in Israel and Palestine, was brought back fully into view.

<!-- aeo:section end="addressing-israeli-security-and-regional-normalization" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-devastating-status-quo-in-gaza-and-rafah" -->
## The Devastating Status Quo in Gaza and Rafah

By 1:42 in the afternoon on May 31, Biden's address was closed out; the gauntlet had been thrown down, and now, it was up to Israel and Hamas to decide what would come next. The situation is as follows: the Israel-Hamas War is no longer the piecemeal disassembly of the entire Gaza territory, but a continued military offensive against remnants of Hamas in the south, while the north teeters on the brink of utter collapse. The bulk of the ongoing violence in Gaza is happening in the southern city of Rafah. There, Israel states that it is carrying out limited operations in the eastern part of the city, and pushing its forces into the central district to expand its offensive, in what it would like to present as a relatively constrained fashion. In recent days, heavy fighting has even popped up in Rafah's western reaches, including the district of Tel al-Sultan, while IDF soldiers in central Rafah have allegedly found weapons depots, rocket launchers, and tunnels. The fighting has been ongoing for about a month, after Israel initially launched its Rafah assault on May 6, and since then, an estimated one million people have been displaced from the city. Many of the people who had previously lived there had been internally displaced from elsewhere in Gaza—most of them more than once, and some upward of half a dozen times. Israel considered an invasion of Rafah to be worth its while, alleging that four Hamas battalions were hiding out in the city, protecting what remains of their leadership and likely maintaining control of its remaining hostages as human shields. With Israel attacking targets in several parts of the city, civilians have been caught in the crossfire at large scale, as has been the case throughout Israel’s brutal counteroffensive. Many displaced people have been caught up in airstrikes, shelling, and shooting. In the area immediately around Rafah where civilians are taking shelter, conditions are exceptionally grim, in squalid camps where food, water, and shelter are surged in by aid organizations when possible, but are often absent. Elsewhere in Gaza, the situation is not much better. Hamas has circled out of the southern enclaves where it was believed to be hiding, with organized contingents popping back up in northern cities and other places that the IDF had designated as being cleared. That turn of events runs counter to the expectations that the Israeli government had set out for this stage of the war, but it has been largely unsurprising to international diplomats and analysts, who have observed in Hamas the capacity to become a long, unkillable insurgency in the mold of the Al-Qaeda or Islamic State of the 2010s. While Israel continues to claim that it can destroy Hamas within Gaza, that already-unlikely promise has become less believable by the day. The IDF has had to surge troops back into some areas it had expected to leave, while marking out other zones as being in need of a circle back before Hamas can truly be declared defeated. The status quo in Gaza is devastating, and it has been punctuated by sudden outbursts of violence that somehow manage to be worse. On the Hamas side, the organization proved as recently as the twenty-sixth of May that it could still threaten Israelis in their own homes, firing a barrage of rockets out of Gaza that set off air raid sirens as far away as Tel Aviv. Although the rockets scored no known hits, they marked Hamas’ first rocket attack since January, and the news that Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system had brought them down came less as a sign that Israel was still impervious to rockets, and more as a sign that rocket attacks may be just as much a part of Israel’s future as its past. A few hours later, on May 27, the IDF shocked the world yet again via an airstrike on a camp for displaced people in Rafah. In that incident, a fire spread among tents in Tal al-Sultan after a large explosion, eventually leaving forty-five people dead, including women and children. The IDF indicated that it had killed two senior members of Hamas, but even Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu had to take to the airwaves to acknowledge the civilian tragedy that had taken place. Earlier in May, even Israel's main international backer, the United States, was forced to acknowledge that Israel likely used American-supplied weapons in ways that directly breached international humanitarian law. All that, despite the fact that the US simultaneously resolved to continue supplying Israel with equipment and munitions indefinitely. The plight of the people caught in the middle—people from both Gaza and Israel who did not take an active or voluntary role in the violence—remains central to the conflict. While news in early May that the United Nations had revised down its casualty counts prompted a brief moment of hope that the situation in Gaza might not have been so apocalyptically terrible as was once believed, that hope was dashed before long. Rather than revise down the count at all, the United Nations later clarified that it had begun to differentiate the number of people, and particularly the number of women and children, who had been killed and were identifiable, from the number that had been killed but either had not yet been identified, or simply could not be. The death toll remains unchanged above 35,000, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs specifying on May 6 that at least 14,500 children and 9,500 women had been killed. According to data published two days later, just barely under 7,800 children and 5,000 women, plus 10,000 men and nearly 2,000 elderly, had been identified, with the rest unknown. On Israel's side, news continues to trickle out that fewer hostages may still be alive than the Israeli public had hoped. After a previous round of ceasefire talks fell apart partially because Hamas stated that it didn’t have the number of living hostages Israel wanted to have released, news broke on June 3 that four more hostages previously thought alive had perished months prior. Those were four Israeli men, one a British dual citizen, and all between the ages of 51 and 85, who were believed to have died in the same place during Israel's operations in Khan Younis. Finally, although aid has been able to move into Gaza in recent days, parts of the northern section of the territory are believed to be in a state of famine—something that the restrictions on humanitarian access makes it exceptionally difficult to evaluate. Nor is there any real way out; Egypt's border crossing to Rafah remains closed, and Egypt's foreign minister told the press on June 3 that it is likely to remain closed, unless Israel relinquishes control of the border crossing and hands it back to a Palestinian administration.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-devastating-status-quo-in-gaza-and-rafah" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="political-fractures-and-shifting-international-support" -->
## Political Fractures and Shifting International Support

The fragile war cabinet that has been guiding the nation through this conflict has begun to show serious signs of fracturing. One especially prominent minister, Benny Gantz, proposed on Thursday, May 30, that Israel’s parliament be dissolved. That move served as a direct challenge to President Netanyahu, even if the measure was unlikely to be taken up by the parliament for consideration and even less likely to pass. Gantz has spent a month pushing an ultimatum that Netanyahu build and agree to a so-called “day after” plan, laying out a process to handle the aftermath of the war, and Gantz has threatened to quit Netanyahu’s war coalition if that does not happen. Given Gantz’s position as one of Netanyahu’s greatest political rivals, that would be an especially meaningful gesture. Although it would not crumble Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, it would place him at the mercy of a far-right faction within Israel, without which Netanyahu certainly could not hold on. Across the Atlantic, President Biden has followed up his peace plan by addressing a long-held rumor that Netanyahu’s continual engagement in the Israel-Hamas War is a matter of self-preservation. In an interview with Time Magazine done prior to his public announcement, Biden responded to a question on whether he believes Netanyahu’s prolonging of the war is a political survival tactic by stating in part: “I’m not going to comment on that. There is every reason for people to draw that conclusion.” Asked after the transcript of that interview was released, Biden's national security spokesman, John Kirby, confirmed that the Commander-in-Chief's answer remained unchanged. Finally, it has become clear that Israel's support among European nations is dropping faster than ever. On the fourth of June, Slovenia became the fourth nation in recent days to formally recognize a Palestinian state, a decision that was confirmed overwhelmingly by the national parliament. Slovenia joined Spain, Norway, and Ireland, all of which had chosen to recognize a Palestinian state, not Israeli statehood, a few days prior. Collectively, the four became the first European nations to recognize Palestine since Sweden did so in 2014, with the only other six EU nations that recognize Palestine all having done so back in 1988. Norway, for the record, is not part of the EU, but tends to politically align with it anyhow. The Israeli government has been quick to lash out at each of the nations who recently made the jump, but if anything, Europe has been emboldened by the change. The EU's chief of foreign policy, Josep Borrell, has indicated his newfound support for the International Criminal Court as it seeks a warrant for the arrests of both Benjamin Netanyahu and high-ranking members of Hamas. The news broke of the US president's new peace proposal, and it cascaded down upon both an Israeli government and a Gazan population that have found themselves in dire straits.

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<!-- aeo:section start="internal-israeli-reactions-and-the-hamas-response" -->
## Internal Israeli Reactions and the Hamas Response

With Hamas battered but morphing into a long-term insurgency, Israel fractured and increasingly isolated, and Gazan civilians enduring famine, airstrikes, and displacement depending on who and where they are, the Biden plan certainly did not get a unanimous reaction. On the side of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu’s response was an optimistic one at first. In the wake of Biden’s statement, Netanyahu reaffirmed that Israel will not conclude its war until all hostages are returned, and until Hamas is no longer able to either fight or govern, but he emphasized that according to the plan Biden described, Israel would be able to fulfill those objectives while bringing about a peace. Netanyahu’s chief foreign policy adviser reaffirmed Israel’s endorsement of the plan, stating to the Sunday Times that it was "a deal we agreed to — it’s not a good deal, but we dearly want the hostages released, all of them." Meanwhile, Netanyahu publicly received what is most likely a carrot-and-the-stick offer from Washington behind closed doors: a bipartisan invitation to make an address to both houses of the US Congress, giving him an opportunity to speak directly to American lawmakers and granting him a sole record as the first foreign leader ever to make an address to the full Congress four times in his career. Inside Netanyahu’s cabinet and his governing coalition, however, other power players reacted with profound opposition. Netanyahu's finance minister, a far-right Religious Zionist Party chairman named Bezalel Smotrich, vowed that he would "not be part of a government that agrees to the proposed outline and ends the war without destroying Hamas." Smotrich's close ally, Jewish Power Party leader and national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, derided the plan as a "victory for terrorism" and threatened to dissolve Netanyahu's government, echoing the threats made from across the aisle by Benny Gantz just weeks prior. The news was not all bad for the peace plan; Yair Lapid, a prominent leftist opposition leader, vowed to throw his support behind the deal if Israel's far right chose to undermine it, providing a critical pathway for Netanyahu to stand behind the deal without immediately watching his governing mandate fall apart. Lapid's genuine support would almost certainly mean that a deal would pass the Knesset. But between the two major factions that Netanyahu is partnering with trying to pull him in opposite directions, and the leader of the opposition offering what Netanyahu likely sees as a deal with the devil, he is in a very difficult spot. Whether Netanyahu is open to the idea of passing the proposal through Lapid or not, numerous parties both within Israel and outside of it have focused on one critical problem with the deal as currently described: it does not actually include a mechanism to ensure that Hamas will not rule over Gaza in the future. In a practical sense, it is not hard to see why that stipulation would be left out; this is a deal that Washington wants Hamas to agree to, and it is tough to see a world in which Hamas signs up to be dismantled by Israel. Without any mechanism to eliminate Hamas, the organization would still be the most powerful player inside of Gaza upon the war’s end. Israel’s Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, emphasized that issue while giving a statement to the Israeli press: “We will not accept the rule of Hamas in Gaza at any stage in any process aimed at ending the war.” Hamas officials emphasized that they had no intent to either disband voluntarily, or allow themselves to be removed by force. The organization indicated in the immediate aftermath of Biden’s announcement that it viewed the proposal "positively and in a constructive manner," although further details on any steps Hamas intended on taking to participate in the peace process were unknown at that time. That response is in keeping with what Biden had suggested Hamas had been indicating behind closed doors, looking genuinely to secure a ceasefire. As Biden himself had said, “This deal is an opportunity to prove whether they really mean it.” Hamas was urged after the address to accept the deal from a range of foreign sources who both support and oppose the organization. The group's main backer, Iran, has unsurprisingly not offered a full-throated endorsement of the plan, but reports suggest that for Hamas itself, the situation is more complicated. One day after Biden's address, senior official Mahmoud Mardawi told Qatari television that Hamas had not yet received details of the proposal, asserting that no agreement can be reached before the demand for the withdrawal of the occupation army and a ceasefire is met. In the days following Hamas' initial endorsement of the idea, the organization appears to have begun adding its own stipulations. According to a senior official from the group speaking during a press conference on Tuesday, June 4: "We cannot agree to an agreement that doesn't secure, guarantee, and ensure a permanent ceasefire, a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and completing a real serious swap deal accordingly." Hamas is not particularly interested in the distinction between a temporary, phase-one ceasefire and a permanent ceasefire in phase two; it wants the permanent ceasefire, the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a full-scale prisoner swap, all as initial terms for the ceasefire to even go into effect. On the one hand, that could be taken as good news: Hamas wants a complete and total end to the violence, and is willing to do its part to achieve that. The trouble, though, is that if Hamas has any understanding of its adversary that is even the slightest bit realistic, then it already understands full well that those terms will be a non-starter for the Israeli government. Hamas has cited its skepticism that Israel is really interested in a peace plan, with a spokesman claiming that Israel only wants one phase where it takes all its hostages, then it resumes its aggression. Asking Israel to accept an immediate, permanent ceasefire and withdrawal will almost certainly cause Israel to walk away from the negotiating table.

<!-- aeo:section end="internal-israeli-reactions-and-the-hamas-response" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="historical-context-normalization-and-strategic-incentives" -->
## Historical Context: Normalization and Strategic Incentives

In order to understand why Hamas would make such demands anyway, one clue comes from the unique set of decision-making incentives and issues that Hamas faces. Hamas is not particularly well-liked in Israel, which makes a territorial claim over Gaza that Hamas can dispute all it wants, but functionally speaking, it cannot resist. Hamas and its tendencies toward overt acts of terrorism have been tolerated for a generation in the Middle East, by nations who are loath to recognize or work with Israel, and who accept Hamas as the only organization with the political standing inside Gaza to represent the plight of Gazan Palestinians. But in the years, and then the span of a few months leading up to the October 7 attack, a range of Middle Eastern nations began to normalize relations with Israel—and the biggest and most powerful of them all, Saudi Arabia, was on the brink of doing so too. Although it is not confirmed for certain, a wide range of international experts on the Israel-Hamas War agree that this normalization process may well have been a motivating factor not just for Hamas to launch its October 7 attack, but to continue provoking the Israeli military even after the IDF rolled tanks up and down the Gaza Strip. The thinking goes as follows: Israel really did not like Hamas, these other nations either supported Hamas or endorsed it, but if those nations were coming to new agreements with Israel, then Israel had all the power in the world to solicit their support and credibility in the Arab world in order to work together and find a long-term alternative for Gazan governance that did not involve Hamas. Not only that, but with much of the Middle East working together, the supply lines and smuggling routes Hamas used to secure weapons, supplies, and funding from Iran could be cut off far easier. If normalization was Israel and Saudi Arabia's goal, then the extinguishing of Hamas was likely to be a mutually agreeable price. What could Hamas do to upset that balance, to buy itself time, and to turn the tides of Middle East change back in its favor? It could launch a massive terror attack against Israel, knowing that the retaliation it faced would be nothing short of apocalyptic. At the expense of a few thousand foot soldiers willing to die for the cause, plus tens of thousands of civilians that Hamas was apathetic to anyhow, Hamas could martyr the whole of Gaza in front of the Middle East, showing those other nations the malevolence that they insisted Israel had within it. Hamas could continue to fight back, hide hostages, and take IDF lives for as long as it took for the rest of the Middle East to get the message and come back to their defense. Per a wide range of experts on the conflict, that is precisely what Hamas did, and it is this peculiar and twisted set of incentives that are likely to guide its thinking now. If Hamas does engage in a multi-step peace process, where unclear terms can be defined as the process moves along, then it is likely to be the party in negotiations with the least leverage, especially after it has given back the hostages Israel wants most. If Israeli troops are still parked on Gazan soil as the reconstruction effort proceeds, then it is likely all too easy for Hamas to see a future in which Israel presents the people of Gaza with what Gazans see as a better alternative for governance, offers to wipe out the Hamas organization that put them in the crossfire, and gets approval from a war-weary population that wishes never to experience this war again. All that holds true, in part because Hamas is an organization that Israel and its partners badly want gone—but also, in part, because even within Gaza, the group keeps the support of its people largely because they have no other option. The organization used to have the genuine support of a majority of Gazan Palestinians, as a popular militant organization that used terror tactics to fight against Israeli occupation of Gaza, and in 2006, it formed a government in Gaza on the back of a popular vote within the territory. But since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza unilaterally, with no legislative or presidential votes in the territory since 2008, and with no recourse for ordinary Gazans to create social change against a group with the weapons, manpower, and Iranian backing it needs to essentially hold its population hostage if need be. While government ministries within Gaza do exist at the pleasure of Hamas, and with its support and backing, those organizations are largely technocratic, and for the most part, Hamas does not care much to interfere with their day-to-day operations if they do not get in the leadership’s way. The militant wing of Hamas has been free to keep its authority over Gaza as it sees fit, but the group’s popularity has starkly declined, meaning that the civil servants who could prop up a post-reconstruction Gazan government are largely going to be Hamas-affiliated only in name. Palestinian polls conducted in 2024 still do indicate that Hamas has considerable support within Gaza. It is important to recognize, however, that those are polls taken in an environment where Hamas was still fighting against a nation responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Present a stable offramp to the rest of Gaza, and offer it alongside a comprehensive reconstruction effort and the backing of a large portion of the Middle East, and the idea that Hamas is Gaza’s only option could very rapidly fall apart. By insisting on terms that Hamas knows will be unacceptable to Israel, the organization chooses proactively to stand in the way of a potential peace.

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<!-- aeo:section start="implications-and-the-path-forward-for-the-peace-accord" -->
## Implications and the Path Forward for the Peace Accord

Internationally, Biden's three-stage plan has garnered wide support from US allies and those who wish to see an end to the conflict. The leaders of the G7 bloc of major democracies, including Germany, the UK, Japan, Italy, France, and Canada alongside America, fully endorsed the proposal. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres threw his strong support behind the initiative, while America is actively seeking the support of the UN Security Council, an organization that also seats Russia and China and where the US has often been the sole dissenter on resolutions that would reflect poorly on Israel. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have been mum on the issue. Qatar, Hamas' chief negotiating liaison, has emphasized its support for the deal, but also its focus on creating the political conditions to found a sovereign Palestinian state. The two endorsements of the plan that matter most, that of Israel and that of Hamas, remain unconfirmed. This leaves the geopolitical reality highly uncertain. Ascertaining whether the peace plan can succeed starts by accounting for the hard realities that both Israel and Hamas face on the ground. First, there is the cold truth underpinning Israel's ultimate military objective: that no matter how badly the IDF may want to wipe out Hamas entirely, that simply is not going to happen. Nations as strong, or even stronger than Israel, have long attempted to wipe out asymmetric insurgencies, including on their own sovereign territory, but history shows time and time again that it is all but impossible, especially when an insurgency is seen as a local defender and can draw strong local support. Furthermore, Israel does not appear likely to rescue its hostages through military means; in the Israel-Hamas War thus far, ceasefires have been far more effective at actually getting hostages back than kinetic operations. In that sense, the peace plan could tangibly serve Israel's interests in the long run, not least because it would result in the release of hostages. It provides Israel an alternative to its stated objectives, allowing the nation to circumvent the long, and probably quite costly counterinsurgency it would face if it pursued complete eradication. While Israel could conceivably spend enough munitions and pursue the war long enough to eliminate every combatant, that would require leaving Gaza almost entirely devoid of human life, risking global pariah status in the process. However, it is not simple for Israel to just accept the peace deal, as it ignores many of the political realities Netanyahu faces inside his own government. Breaking ties with hard-right factions leaves him at the mercy of powerful rivals, while rejecting the deal risks alienating center-right allies. If Israel does accept the premise that Hamas cannot be wiped out, it implicitly accepts one of two situations. Option one is that even if a non-Hamas organization is established for negotiations, Hamas will retain power and leverage inside Gaza, entrenching itself further. Option two is that a Gaza without Hamas would still leave a massive power vacuum, with no guarantee that another violent organization like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad would not emerge. On the other side, the potential problems waiting for Gaza's civilians are severe. Chief among those problems is the plan's relative vagueness about what an Israeli withdrawal would actually look like. Stage one calls for a withdrawal from "all populated areas of Gaza"—but whether that includes bombed-out ruins where people fled months ago remains unclear. It raises the question of whether hundreds of thousands of Gazans will remain displaced for the long term. The details of reconstruction are similarly fraught. In his address, Biden stated that civilians would return to their homes and neighborhoods in all areas of Gaza, including in the north. But that process could take years depending on how arrangements proceed. If Gazans return to their former homes quickly, they will find them uninhabitable, and rebuilding physical infrastructure may be prolonged simply because there are so many people in the way. If Gazans do not go home until they are rebuilt, the intervening years will be spent in crowded, ill-equipped refugee encampments. Looming over it all is the question of Palestinian statehood. While omitted from the proposal, the idea of Palestinian sovereignty is practically guaranteed to factor into whether Hamas is willing to consider the deal, and will be pushed heavily by international actors. Finally, there is the grim reality that the peace plan still fails to account for the broader geopolitical landscape. The role of Iran is not accounted for, nor is any mechanism to ensure Iranian support for a good-faith effort. Hezbollah’s potential incentives to escalate the conflict or lure Israel into further fighting are also overlooked. Amidst the challenges, there are glimmers of hope. Washington’s own statements imply that there is more going on behind closed doors than either Israel or Hamas publicly admits. Biden's direct address to Israeli politicians strongly opposed to the plan may be a tacit nod to decision-makers to place trust in the US rather than in fragile governing coalitions. It remains a profound hope that both Israel and Hamas can act upon that opportunity before yet another chance to secure peace is wasted.

<!-- aeo:section end="implications-and-the-path-forward-for-the-peace-accord" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What are the three stages of Biden's Middle East peace plan?

Stage one lasts six weeks and includes a complete ceasefire, the release of women, elderly, and wounded Israeli hostages alongside American hostages, a reciprocal release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, an Israeli withdrawal from populated areas of Gaza, and a surge of 600 humanitarian aid trucks per day. Stage two requires the release of all remaining living hostages — including IDF soldiers — and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, at which point the ceasefire would become a permanent cessation of hostilities. Stage three covers a large-scale but as-yet-unspecified reconstruction plan for Gaza and the return of any remaining hostage remains.

### How did Israel's political coalition react to the proposed deal?

Netanyahu's initial response was cautiously optimistic, with his foreign policy adviser confirming Israel had agreed to the outline. However, far-right coalition partners reacted with outrage: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich vowed he would not be part of a government that ends the war without destroying Hamas, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir called the plan a "victory for terrorism" and threatened to dissolve the government. Opposition leader Yair Lapid offered to back the deal, creating a potential parliamentary path for Netanyahu that would require crossing the aisle.

### What were Hamas's conditions for accepting the deal?

Hamas initially received the proposal "positively and in a constructive manner," but subsequently insisted on guarantees of a permanent ceasefire, a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and a full prisoner swap as preconditions rather than phase-two outcomes. A senior Hamas official stated: "We cannot agree to an agreement that doesn't secure, guarantee, and ensure a permanent ceasefire, a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and completing a real serious swap deal accordingly." These demands were widely seen as a non-starter for the Israeli government.

### What was the humanitarian situation in Gaza and Rafah at the time the plan was announced?

Israel had been conducting a military offensive in Rafah since May 6, displacing an estimated one million people from the city. The UN reported at least 14,500 children and 9,500 women killed, with the total death toll above 35,000 and parts of northern Gaza believed to be in a state of famine. Egypt's Rafah border crossing remained closed, four additional hostages were confirmed dead in Hamas captivity, and Hamas fired rockets that reached Tel Aviv for the first time since January.

### Why might Hamas have strategic reasons to block a peace deal?

The article argues that Hamas faces an existential risk from normalization between Israel and Arab states — particularly a potential Saudi-Israeli deal that was nearly complete before October 7, 2023. By triggering a massive Israeli military response in Gaza, Hamas martyred its population in front of the Arab world, stalling normalization. Accepting a phased deal where it first surrenders hostages and then faces the question of post-war governance would leave Hamas in its weakest negotiating position, potentially allowing Israel and regional partners to present Gazans with an alternative governance structure while Hamas is at its most vulnerable.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [Armenia and Azerbaijan Finalize Historic Peace Deal After Decades of Conflict](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/armenia-azerbaijan-historic-peace-deal-2025)
- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth)
- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth-1bmuupct)
- [America’s Middle East Peace Plan: Can It End the War?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/americas-middle-east-peace-plan-can-it-end-the-war)
- [Is a Decades-Long Turkish War Finally Over? Abdullah Öcalan Calls for Peace.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-a-decades-long-turkish-war-finally-over-abdullah-calan-calls-for-peace)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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11. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/03/trade-convoys-squeezing-out-gaza-aid-humanitarian-organisations-say>
12. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/famine-possibly-underway-northern-gaza-despite-recent-aid-110830549>
13. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-06-03-2024-d31eda4128b438739d69dda0d4f7f72b>
14. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/four-israeli-hostages-died-hamas-custody-rcna155231>
15. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrrng3l6jro>
16. <https://time.com/6984968/joe-biden-transcript-2024-interview/>
17. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/04/biden-netanyahu-ceasefire-israel-gaza-war?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other>
18. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-crossroads-over-challenge-netanyahu-2024-05-31/>
19. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-moves-dissolve-parliament-statement-2024-05-30/>
20. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/04/israel-government-war-cabinet-netanyahu/>
21. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/spains-prime-minister-cabinet-recognize-palestinian-state-eu-110600247>
22. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovenia-becomes-latest-eu-country-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-06-04/>
23. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/slovenia-lawmakers-convene-vote-recognition-palestinian-state-110817580#:~:text=More%20than%20140%20countries%20recognize,thirds%20of%20the%20United%20Nations>
24. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote>
25. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-wants-israel-commit-permanent-ceasefire-full-withdrawal-gaza-2024-06-04/#:~:text=CAIRO%2C%20June%204%20>
26. <https://www.barrons.com/news/us-expects-israel-to-accept-gaza-peace-plan-if-hamas-does-4a7e4e6e>
27. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas#:~:text=Hamas%20has%20a%20host%20of,Gaza%20and%20the%20West%20Bank>
28. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/how-hamas-ends-gaza#:~:text=A%20March%202024%20opinion%20poll,indirectly%20build%20sympathy%20for%20Hamas>
29. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hamas-what-to-know-about-its-origins-leaders-and-funding>
30. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cw8860gn1nwo>
31. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-gaza-israel-plan-end-war-cease-fire-hostages-rcna154945>
32. <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/31/g-s1-2320/biden-israel-hamas-ceasefire-proposal>
33. <https://www.nbcnews.com/video/biden-announces-new-middle-east-cease-fire-proposal-212031557698>
34. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/netanyahu-aide-israel-agreed-biden-cease-fire-plan-gaza-rcna155075>
35. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-no-gaza-ceasefire-until-hamas-destroyed-2024-06-01/>
36. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/31/politics/biden-middle-east-remarks/index.html>
37. <https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-leaders-fully-endorse-bidens-gaza-peace-plan-2024-06-03/>
38. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/israel-says-biden-s-latest-gaza-peace-plan-is-only-part-of-story>
39. <https://www.ft.com/content/5716d8d3-241c-4f8b-abf0-7be8fc335a0e>
40. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/02/middleeast/israeli-ministers-biden-ceasefire-plan-intl/index.html>
41. <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-urges-security-council-support-cease-fire-plan-110803051>
42. <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation-world/story/2024-06-03/biden-takes-a-big-swing-at-hostage-for-truce-deal-puts-onus-on-israeli-hamas-officials-to-step-up>
43. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240601-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-hamas-says-israel-s-gaza-ceasefire-plan-positive>
44. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-05-28-2024-20df7de040cec3396a2febe481e4fe72#:~:text=Fighting%20in%20Rafah%20has%20caused,says>
45. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/02/children-die-malnutrition-rafah-famine-gaza-israeli-troops-aid-strip>
46. <https://www.reuters.com/world/rafah-border-crossing-cant-reopen-unless-israeli-forces-quit-gaza-side-egypt-2024-06-03/>
47. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-israels-leaders-cant-or-wont-say-about-bidens-ceasefire-announcement>
48. <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/biden-takes-big-swing-hostage-truce-deal-puts-110795682>
49. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/524759/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/US-urges-UN-Security-Council-to-support-ceasefire-.aspx>
50. <https://www.npr.org/2024/06/03/nx-s1-4983932/the-state-of-hamas-as-it-reasserts-itself-in-the-north-in-a-weakened-form>
51. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-defeated#:~:text=Implementing%20the%20set%20of%20political,risky%2C%20and%20could%20well%20fail>
52. <https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438>

[1]: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-middle-east-2/
[2]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-battles-hamas-northern-gaza-jabaliya-regrouped-rafah-blinken-rcna151919
[3]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-rafah-2f603675195f80c73c593020398ed72a
[4]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68984999
[5]: https://apnews.com/article/us-israel-gaza-war-nsm-international-law-c83b6f39ce2799e5d2c473a337e2f857
[6]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kkqkngnedo
[7]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckrr0e3y29po
[8]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/rocket-fire-by-hamas-from-gaza-sets-off-air-raid-sirens-in-tel-aviv-for-first-time-in-months
[9]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gaza-death-toll-ocha-un-confusion-anger-rcna151934
[10]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/heres-real-problem-uns-revised-gaza-death-toll
[11]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/03/trade-convoys-squeezing-out-gaza-aid-humanitarian-organisations-say
[12]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/famine-possibly-underway-northern-gaza-despite-recent-aid-110830549
[13]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-06-03-2024-d31eda4128b438739d69dda0d4f7f72b
[14]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/four-israeli-hostages-died-hamas-custody-rcna155231
[15]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrrng3l6jro
[16]: https://time.com/6984968/joe-biden-transcript-2024-interview/
[17]: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/04/biden-netanyahu-ceasefire-israel-gaza-war?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
[18]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-crossroads-over-challenge-netanyahu-2024-05-31/
[19]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-gantz-moves-dissolve-parliament-statement-2024-05-30/
[20]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/04/israel-government-war-cabinet-netanyahu/
[21]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/spains-prime-minister-cabinet-recognize-palestinian-state-eu-110600247
[22]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovenia-becomes-latest-eu-country-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-06-04/
[23]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/slovenia-lawmakers-convene-vote-recognition-palestinian-state-110817580#:~:text=More%20than%20140%20countries%20recognize,thirds%20of%20the%20United%20Nations
[24]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote
[25]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-wants-israel-commit-permanent-ceasefire-full-withdrawal-gaza-2024-06-04/#:~:text=CAIRO%2C%20June%204%20
[26]: https://www.barrons.com/news/us-expects-israel-to-accept-gaza-peace-plan-if-hamas-does-4a7e4e6e
[27]: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas#:~:text=Hamas%20has%20a%20host%20of,Gaza%20and%20the%20West%20Bank
[28]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/how-hamas-ends-gaza#:~:text=A%20March%202024%20opinion%20poll,indirectly%20build%20sympathy%20for%20Hamas
[29]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hamas-what-to-know-about-its-origins-leaders-and-funding
[30]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cw8860gn1nwo
[31]: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-gaza-israel-plan-end-war-cease-fire-hostages-rcna154945
[32]: https://www.npr.org/2024/05/31/g-s1-2320/biden-israel-hamas-ceasefire-proposal
[33]: https://www.nbcnews.com/video/biden-announces-new-middle-east-cease-fire-proposal-212031557698
[34]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/netanyahu-aide-israel-agreed-biden-cease-fire-plan-gaza-rcna155075
[35]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-no-gaza-ceasefire-until-hamas-destroyed-2024-06-01/
[36]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/31/politics/biden-middle-east-remarks/index.html
[37]: https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-leaders-fully-endorse-bidens-gaza-peace-plan-2024-06-03/
[38]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/israel-says-biden-s-latest-gaza-peace-plan-is-only-part-of-story
[39]: https://www.ft.com/content/5716d8d3-241c-4f8b-abf0-7be8fc335a0e
[40]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/02/middleeast/israeli-ministers-biden-ceasefire-plan-intl/index.html
[41]: https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-urges-security-council-support-cease-fire-plan-110803051
[42]: https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation-world/story/2024-06-03/biden-takes-a-big-swing-at-hostage-for-truce-deal-puts-onus-on-israeli-hamas-officials-to-step-up
[43]: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240601-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-hamas-says-israel-s-gaza-ceasefire-plan-positive
[44]: https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-05-28-2024-20df7de040cec3396a2febe481e4fe72#:~:text=Fighting%20in%20Rafah%20has%20caused,says
[45]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/02/children-die-malnutrition-rafah-famine-gaza-israeli-troops-aid-strip
[46]: https://www.reuters.com/world/rafah-border-crossing-cant-reopen-unless-israeli-forces-quit-gaza-side-egypt-2024-06-03/
[47]: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-israels-leaders-cant-or-wont-say-about-bidens-ceasefire-announcement
[48]: https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/biden-takes-big-swing-hostage-truce-deal-puts-110795682
[49]: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/524759/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/US-urges-UN-Security-Council-to-support-ceasefire-.aspx
[50]: https://www.npr.org/2024/06/03/nx-s1-4983932/the-state-of-hamas-as-it-reasserts-itself-in-the-north-in-a-weakened-form
[51]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-defeated#:~:text=Implementing%20the%20set%20of%20political,risky%2C%20and%20could%20well%20fail
[52]: https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438

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