--- title: "Is Armed Intervention in Haiti Inevitable?" description: "By rights, Haiti should not be a subject of wartime analysis. No formal war is currently taking place there, and no civil conflict rages. But while Haiti may not suffer the same problems as Ukraine, Yemen, or Syria, that does not mean it is at peace. Ever since the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the Caribbean nation has been swamped beneath an ever-growing tsunami of violence — violence that has seen armed gangs seal off the capital and occupy 60 percent of its territory. Kidnapping, murder, and sexual violence have become so commonplace that people cannot leave their homes. In October 2022, the Haitian government did something highly controversial: it begged the international community for an armed intervention. In the months since, that controversy has only increased. On one side are those who argue that a short incursion is the quickest way to restore order and let ordinary Haitians resume their lives. On the other are those who see it not as a solution, but the gateway to a military quagmire.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- On October 8 2022 Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers formally requested international armed intervention in Haiti\n- Up to 200 gangs now control roughly 60 percent of Port-au-Prince, equipped with military-grade weaponry and blockading 1.5 million residents\n- Between January and October 2022 over 1100 civilians were kidnapped for ransom and nearly 2400 people were killed or disappeared in the capital\n- The G9 gang's two-month seizure of Varreux Terminal in autumn 2022 cut fuel supplies and triggered a cholera outbreak reaching 10000 cases by year's end\n- All three previous US interventions in Haiti in 1915, 1994, and 2004 became prolonged and controversial, while the UN's MINUSTAH mission from 2004 to 2019 accidentally imported cholera killing over 9000\n- The proposed rapid action force would deploy just 2500 special forces personnel to secure ports airports and roads rather than directly fighting gangs\n\n## The Broken State: Political Collapse and Humanitarian Catastrophe\n\nAs surprise requests go, they don't come much more surprising than the one made by Haiti's government on October 8, 2022. Signed by Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers, it implored the international community to send an armed force into Haiti to restore order. Not doing so, Henry asserted, would risk \"a major humanitarian crisis.\" The prospect of an armed intervention remains very much alive. The Biden White House is trying to gather a coalition of willing nations from the Americas. There has been talk of Brazilian involvement, Canadian, and the Dominican Republic — which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti — has demanded action. But the key question is: why is Haiti in a position where its own government is calling for a foreign force to enter its territory? The answer lies in a series of interlocking crises that, on their surface, seem distinct but really have a single root cause — political collapse. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was gunned down in his residence, in an assassination so brazen it shocked the world. Yet the president's murder was only the latest twist in an already twisted story. Prior to Moïse's death, Haiti had not held a single election since the much-delayed presidential vote of 2016. A 2019 deadline for parliamentary elections had sailed by without anyone visiting a polling station. Instead, President Moïse had used his time to hollow out institutions and amass power. His death left a vacuum at the heart of an already creaking system. It was into this vacuum that Ariel Henry stepped. Appointed by Moïse just days before the president was killed, Henry's legitimacy was immediately in question. With no sitting members, parliament could not confirm his appointment. Nor was he elected, meaning he could not claim his own mandate. When Henry was elevated to acting president after Moïse's death and then canceled the already-delayed elections, it turned a political Three Mile Island into a metaphorical Chernobyl. As 2022 got underway, Haiti was being led by an unelected leader heading a weak, hollowed-out state, in which a mere ten senators — out of 30 — could still claim an electoral mandate. Political paralysis alone is not usually enough to trigger calls for armed intervention. Belgium famously went over 650 days without a functioning government in the late 2010s without ever begging its neighbors to send in the tanks. The difference is that Belgium's political crisis saw local government still fulfilling basic functions. Haiti's saw the state effectively vanish. In Port-au-Prince, a lack of sanitation has meant trash piling knee-high in the streets. Across the nation, stopped food deliveries mean up to 4.7 million face acute hunger — over 40 percent of Haiti's total population. Of them, as many as 20,000 are in danger of starving to death. Then, in September 2022, state subsidies on fuel were slashed, pushing people deeper into desperation. Haiti does not have a functioning electrical grid. People rely on generators for power and pumping clean water — generators they can only afford to run on heavily subsidized fuel. With water pumps unable to run, people were forced to start drinking contaminated water, leading to an explosion of cholera. By the end of 2022, 10,000 cases had been recorded.\n\n## Gang Warfare: 200 Armed Groups and a Capital Under Siege\n\nLike many nations, Haiti has long had issues with armed gangs. But the collapse of state authority has turned what was once a pressing problem into a national nightmare. The Haitian state receded, and up to 200 gangs moved in to replace it, many of them equipped with military-grade weaponry. By mid-2022, they had taken control of the roads leading from Port-au-Prince, effectively blockading 1.5 million people in the capital. The land around the Parliament building was seized, becoming a no-go zone. All told, some 60 percent of the Haitian capital is now ruled by gangs. With their arrival has come a tidal wave of violence. In the first six months of 2022, nearly 1,000 people were murdered in Port-au-Prince. The third quarter was even worse. Between June and September, another 1,377 were killed or disappeared — including 500 who died in vicious battles to control the capital's roads. Kidnappings likewise surged. From January to October alone, over 1,100 civilians were snatched for ransom. Things got so bad that many now simply stay home or sleep at work to avoid going on the streets. That enforced lack of movement has had dire consequences. Trapped by fear, Haiti's people have been unable to leave their homes to buy food or even visit hospitals when ill. There are reports of families having to choose whether to take their sick children to a doctor and risk getting kidnapped, or stay home and risk their child dying of cholera. At the same time, the gangs have stopped shipments of basic supplies from entering neighborhoods, exacerbating already dire conditions. Across a single week in July, armed gangs descended on the Cité Soleil slum and wreaked havoc. The door-to-door massacre saw perhaps 300 killed, with many more wounded. Nearly 4,000 fled the slum. With nowhere to go, they were forced to simply sleep in makeshift tents on the hard ground of a nearby plaza — a shanty town of despair right in the heart of Haiti's capital. As the gangs' power has increased, they have turned increasingly to sexual assault as a terror weapon. The massacre in Cité Soleil was accompanied by the mass rape of at least 50 women and girls. The National Human Rights Defence Network recorded 20 cases of mothers being raped in front of their children. This was not an isolated incident but part of a deliberate strategy to inflict humiliation on anyone who might cross the gangs. There are reports of gang members filming themselves raping women in the streets in broad daylight and sharing the footage on social media. That broad daylight element shows the complete impunity these men feel — not simply because they are the ones with the guns, but because the gangs are entwined with Haiti's institutions. The National Human Rights Defence Network notes most gangs have serving police officers among their members, with some even using police cruisers to carry out kidnappings. Port-au-Prince's worst gang — G9 — is run by an ex-policeman: Jimmy \"Barbecue\" Cherizier. Many gangs also have ties to Haiti's political elite. In both government and opposition, wealthy patrons use these armed groups as a thermostat for the nation, turning the white heat of violence up or down as it suits them. These politicians force judges to turn a blind eye to even the most horrific abuses. Yet it is not as simple as the elites merely controlling the gangs. As their power has grown, the question of who is controlling whom has gotten more complex. Rather than one sponsoring the other, it might make more sense to think of them as toxically co-dependent.\n\n## A Cry for Help: From Varreux Terminal to the United Nations\n\nIt was the blockade of Varreux Terminal that did it. In September 2022, the G9 gang seized control of the terminal building — the main one in Port-au-Prince, through which fuel for the city's generators normally flows. For two months in autumn 2022, nothing flowed out of that terminal. Overrun by Jimmy \"Barbecue\" Cherizier's men, it ceased to function. The New York Times correspondent noted that by taking the terminal, G9 had \"put the entire country in a choke hold.\" The shutdown that followed saw Haiti tiptoe to the brink. It was during this period that cholera took off again, triggering the current outbreak. Faced with out-of-control gangs and a collapsing state, October 8 is the day Ariel Henry made his call for help. Although Haitian police managed to retake the terminal in November, that call has yet to be rescinded. If anything, pleas for intervention have only grown louder. On December 11, President Luis Abinader of neighboring Dominican Republic joined the chorus, telling the Financial Times: \"The international community needs to be more responsible... If it's really concerned about Haiti, it needs to go and help there.\" Ten days later, UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed urged countries to consider Haiti's request for armed help. By then the ball was already rolling. Mid-October saw two of Haiti's biggest neighbors — the United States and Mexico — draft and sponsor a joint UN resolution on militarily supporting Henry's government. Not long after, the US joined with Canada to unveil sanctions against two elites said to be linked to the gangs, including the sitting president of the Haitian senate. For the US, this flurry of activity has an obvious endgame: to prevent what White House officials have privately called the government's biggest nightmare — a wave of small boats carrying tens of thousands of desperate refugees to American shores. Haiti lies less than 700 miles, or around 1,100 kilometers, from Miami. Every year the US Coast Guard intercepts boats carrying Haitians, but 2022 saw an explosion. Between October 2021 and September 2022, over 7,000 Haitians were detained at sea — a number four and a half times bigger than the previous 12 months. Washington's fear is that a total collapse in Haiti would act as a multiplier all over again.\n\n## History of Failed Interventions: From 1915 to MINUSTAH\n\nThe Biden White House has still not committed to sending troops, and perhaps with good reason. None of America's previous three interventions in Haiti played out as they were supposed to. American forces entered Haiti in 1915, 1994, and 2004. In all three cases, the goal was to restore order. In all three cases, things soon wound up getting unbelievably complicated. Taking place in the wake of a different presidential assassination, the 1915 intervention ultimately saw the US occupy Haiti for over 19 years — an era that left a traumatic legacy. The twin interventions in 1994 and 2004 were likewise difficult, with America initially entering Haiti to undo a military coup and put deposed president Jean-Bertrand Aristide back in power, before returning ten years later to take him away into exile — a move Aristide later called kidnapping. As well as fanning turmoil in Haiti, something all three interventions have in common is that they wound up damaging America's reputation. Hence the current hesitation about adding a fourth intervention. But it is not as if anyone else has a good track record. From 2004 to 2019, the UN kept its own multilateral force in Haiti. Known as MINUSTAH and led by Brazil, it likewise became embroiled in damaging controversies. The biggest of all was the accidental importation of cholera, leading to an outbreak that killed over 9,000 Haitians. But MINUSTAH troops were also accused of the sexual abuse of local women and girls. All this is why everyone — from ordinary Haitians to generals in the Pentagon — are very wary of armed intervention. It has been over three months since Ariel Henry made his plea, and still no foreign troops have arrived.\n\n## What a New Intervention Might Look Like\n\nThanks to semi-recent interventions in the Middle East, it is easy to assume that going into Haiti would be a gung-ho mission involving airstrikes on gang hideouts and troops storming beaches. If an armed coalition does enter Haiti, however, it is unlikely to look anything like that. Rather, the plan would probably hew closer to what UN Secretary-General António Guterres described as deploying a \"rapid action force.\" Consisting of special forces personnel from multiple nations, this rapid action force would not operate under an official UN mandate, although it would have the body's blessing. Designed to be nimble, it would have few members, with US officials suggesting a total of 2,500 elite soldiers involved. The mission would not involve attacking buildings or fighting in core gangland territory. Instead: to secure Haiti's ports and airports and take control of vital roads that would allow the rapid distribution of food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. The idea would be to not even try crushing the gangs, but instead provide relief to the suffering population — to allow the movement of goods to alleviate hunger and illness while forcing open channels that would get the economy moving again. This, in turn, should open up enough room for ordinary Haitians to begin living their lives once more — to go to work or take their kids to school without worrying they might be killed or kidnapped on the way. Reporter Nick Kristof summed it up: \"Success in Haiti is going to be measured by enough tranquility that people can live their lives.\" It is a tempting vision, but one that currently faces problems — not least who could lead it. With the UN's name still mud in Haiti, there needs to be a country willing to take the front role, to take charge of things like planning, control, and command. Even without its tortured history with Haiti, the United States is currently too distracted by the war in Ukraine and the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to commit to a mission in the Caribbean. Mexico originally approached Brazil to provide the raw muscle, but in November 2022 the government ruled out taking the leadership role. Canada, with Trudeau's government yet to categorically refuse heading an intervention, remains in contention — but Ottawa is not exactly brimming with enthusiasm, preferring to focus on sanctions against politicians tied to Haiti's gangs. Some are pushing for an alternative: letting the Haitian National Police lead the charge. Floated in Politico magazine by former US Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley, this plan would involve doing for Haiti what the Pentagon is currently doing for Ukraine — provide weapons, equipment, and intelligence without resorting to boots on the ground. The idea would be to take a support role, giving the HNP the tools and training they need to clear the gangs from strategic points on their own. Unfortunately, it is a plan that would require heavy investment. The HNP has been gutted in recent years, its entire national force reduced to just 12,000. By contrast, New York City alone has a police force of 35,000. The HNP is having to police an additional 3 million people with about a third of the manpower. Then there are the issues of corruption and gang infiltration. If the US could spend $83 billion training and equipping Afghanistan's forces just to have them crumble, the chances of Haiti's police transforming into an elite fighting unit able to defeat the gangs are uncertain.\n\n## Divisions Within Haiti and the Danger of Quagmire\n\nFrom the outside, it is easy to see the gang-led chaos and Prime Minister Ariel Henry begging for help and assume things are straightforward — that Haiti is divided into those working with the gangs and those backing Henry's call for intervention. The reality is that huge chasms exist between different parts of Haitian civil society. And failing to get all groups backing intervention is the most surefire way to create a quagmire. Perhaps the biggest chasm of all is the one between Ariel Henry and his government and the opposition group known as Montana Accord. Made up of political parties and civil society groups that oppose Henry's rule, Montana Accord is extremely influential and extremely against having foreign troops enter Haiti. Their primary reasoning is that this Haitian crisis needs a Haitian solution — one that comes from the country's streets, rather than being imposed by an outside power. But they are also worried that military intervention could be used by Henry to illegitimately cling to power. He is unelected, demonstrably weak, and only still in power because he canceled elections. If the global community sends in soldiers to restore order at Henry's invitation, they would de facto be propping up his rule at a time when most Haitians are sick of him. It is not for nothing that tens of thousands took to the streets of Port-au-Prince to protest Henry's call for help last October. Even if the opposition were to somehow reach an agreement with Henry, problems would still remain — not least in defining exactly what victory will look like. It is all very well planning to commit only 2,500 troops toward a clearly defined goal like taking control of ports and reopening roads, but what happens after that is done? UN Secretary-General Guterres suggested to the Security Council that the next step would be a smaller international force to back up the Haiti National Police. But how long would that last? And is anyone willing to commit to the open-ended program of funding and training needed to stop the gangs from rebuilding once foreign forces leave? At the back of everyone's mind is the fear that this limited incursion could easily turn into a multi-year occupation with no end in sight. The best thing to do would be to use an intervention to tackle the root causes of Haiti's violence: the political and business elite who supply and work with the gangs. Dismantling this class of gangsters would certainly improve Haitian society. But, as seen in Iraq, it is not easy to just sweep away a powerful elite — especially when that elite has lots of money and armed men at its disposal. Nor is it likely that new elections will solve anything. Gangs use their influence to make people in poorer districts of Port-au-Prince vote the way their patron wants them to. Rather than a cleansing, a new vote may just shuffle the same old, corrupt elite without really changing anything. Going after the gangs directly is also off the cards, as they are embedded deep within local communities. Any attempt to storm gang strongholds could result in a lot of local young men getting killed — and there is no better way to turn a civilian population against you than to start killing their sons or ransacking their homes. That is where things stand: a whole lot of bad options for anyone who leads an intervention into Haiti, but also the extreme likelihood of ever-increasing violence and brutality if the world simply sits back and does nothing. Each path holds potential for trouble, and acting without thinking is guaranteed to make things worse.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why did Haiti's government formally request armed intervention in October 2022?\n\nPrime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers signed a request on October 8, 2022, after gang violence had become catastrophic. Up to 200 gangs controlled roughly 60 percent of Port-au-Prince, over 1,100 civilians had been kidnapped for ransom in the first ten months of the year, and the G9 gang's two-month seizure of the Varreux Terminal had cut fuel supplies to the entire city, triggering a cholera outbreak that reached 10,000 cases by year's end.\n\n### What makes Ariel Henry's legitimacy controversial?\n\nHenry was appointed by President Jovenel Moïse just days before the president's assassination in July 2021. With no sitting parliament able to confirm the appointment, and with subsequent elections canceled, he holds power without an electoral mandate. His decision to invite foreign troops prompted tens of thousands of Haitians to protest in Port-au-Prince, and the influential opposition Montana Accord argues that a foreign military presence would effectively prop up an unelected leader.\n\n### What track record do previous international interventions in Haiti have?\n\nAll three US interventions — in 1915, 1994, and 2004 — became prolonged and controversial. The 1915 intervention turned into a 19-year occupation. The UN's MINUSTAH mission from 2004 to 2019, led by Brazil, accidentally imported cholera that killed over 9,000 Haitians and faced allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers. This history is a central reason why military planners, Haitian civilians, and foreign governments are deeply wary of another intervention.\n\n### What would a new intervention actually look like?\n\nRather than airstrikes or direct combat with gangs, the proposed plan calls for roughly 2,500 special forces personnel operating without a formal UN mandate but with UN blessing. Their mission would be to secure ports, airports, and vital roads to allow the rapid delivery of food, water, fuel, and medical supplies — restoring enough order for ordinary Haitians to resume daily life — rather than attempting to dismantle gang strongholds directly.\n\n### What are the main dangers of a prolonged intervention turning into a quagmire?\n\nThe core risk is that a limited mission could expand without a clear exit. Gangs are deeply embedded in local communities, making direct assaults costly and potentially alienating civilians. The underlying problem — wealthy political and business elites who fund and use the gangs — would not be solved by securing roads. Without addressing those root causes and building a functional Haitian National Police, international forces could face years of occupation with no path to stable withdrawal, mirroring the difficulties seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Haiti Has Collapsed: What Happens Next?](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/haiti-has-collapsed-what-happens-next)\n- [El Salvador's Brutal War on Gangs: Victory or Human Rights Crisis?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/el-salvador-war-on-gangs-victory-or-human-rights-crisis)\n- [Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-kenyas-haiti-intervention-in-danger-of-falling-apart)\n- [South Sudan Is Sliding into War: How the World's Youngest Nation Faces Collapse in 2025](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-sliding-into-war-2025-civil-war-crisis)\n- [Mozambique Is Burning: How Cabo Delgado Became One of the World's Worst Forgotten Conflicts](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/mozambique-cabo-delgado-insurgency-isis-crisis-explained)\n\n## Sources\n1. \n2. \n3. \n4. \n5. \n6. \n7. \n\n[1]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/haiti/haiti-needs-help?check_logged_in=1\n[2]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63707429\n[3]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/world/americas/haiti-gangs-foreign-intervention.html\n[4]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/08/podcasts/the-daily/haiti-violence-intervention.html?showTranscript=1\n[5]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/2/after-year-of-unprecedented-crises-what-next-for-haiti\n[6]: https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-going-to-invade-haiti\n[7]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/opinion/america-haiti-international-intervention.html\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/armed-intervention-haiti-gang-violence-crisis.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/armed-intervention-haiti-gang-violence-crisis datePublished: 2026-03-04 dateModified: 2026-03-04 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/OJtzh3S1JXw/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: 7ee55e384f8037e6bdd89811f3f854d836b3a8e79f3f8aecaf5099a04cd358b2 tokens: 6281 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/armed-intervention-haiti-gang-violence-crisis.md.summary.md --- By rights, Haiti should not be a subject of wartime analysis. No formal war is currently taking place there, and no civil conflict rages. But while Haiti may not suffer the same problems as Ukraine, Yemen, or Syria, that does not mean it is at peace. Ever since the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the Caribbean nation has been swamped beneath an ever-growing tsunami of violence — violence that has seen armed gangs seal off the capital and occupy 60 percent of its territory. Kidnapping, murder, and sexual violence have become so commonplace that people cannot leave their homes. In October 2022, the Haitian government did something highly controversial: it begged the international community for an armed intervention. In the months since, that controversy has only increased. On one side are those who argue that a short incursion is the quickest way to restore order and let ordinary Haitians resume their lives. On the other are those who see it not as a solution, but the gateway to a military quagmire. ## Key Takeaways - On October 8 2022 Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers formally requested international armed intervention in Haiti - Up to 200 gangs now control roughly 60 percent of Port-au-Prince, equipped with military-grade weaponry and blockading 1.5 million residents - Between January and October 2022 over 1100 civilians were kidnapped for ransom and nearly 2400 people were killed or disappeared in the capital - The G9 gang's two-month seizure of Varreux Terminal in autumn 2022 cut fuel supplies and triggered a cholera outbreak reaching 10000 cases by year's end - All three previous US interventions in Haiti in 1915, 1994, and 2004 became prolonged and controversial, while the UN's MINUSTAH mission from 2004 to 2019 accidentally imported cholera killing over 9000 - The proposed rapid action force would deploy just 2500 special forces personnel to secure ports airports and roads rather than directly fighting gangs ## The Broken State: Political Collapse and Humanitarian Catastrophe As surprise requests go, they don't come much more surprising than the one made by Haiti's government on October 8, 2022. Signed by Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers, it implored the international community to send an armed force into Haiti to restore order. Not doing so, Henry asserted, would risk "a major humanitarian crisis." The prospect of an armed intervention remains very much alive. The Biden White House is trying to gather a coalition of willing nations from the Americas. There has been talk of Brazilian involvement, Canadian, and the Dominican Republic — which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti — has demanded action. But the key question is: why is Haiti in a position where its own government is calling for a foreign force to enter its territory? The answer lies in a series of interlocking crises that, on their surface, seem distinct but really have a single root cause — political collapse. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was gunned down in his residence, in an assassination so brazen it shocked the world. Yet the president's murder was only the latest twist in an already twisted story. Prior to Moïse's death, Haiti had not held a single election since the much-delayed presidential vote of 2016. A 2019 deadline for parliamentary elections had sailed by without anyone visiting a polling station. Instead, President Moïse had used his time to hollow out institutions and amass power. His death left a vacuum at the heart of an already creaking system. It was into this vacuum that Ariel Henry stepped. Appointed by Moïse just days before the president was killed, Henry's legitimacy was immediately in question. With no sitting members, parliament could not confirm his appointment. Nor was he elected, meaning he could not claim his own mandate. When Henry was elevated to acting president after Moïse's death and then canceled the already-delayed elections, it turned a political Three Mile Island into a metaphorical Chernobyl. As 2022 got underway, Haiti was being led by an unelected leader heading a weak, hollowed-out state, in which a mere ten senators — out of 30 — could still claim an electoral mandate. Political paralysis alone is not usually enough to trigger calls for armed intervention. Belgium famously went over 650 days without a functioning government in the late 2010s without ever begging its neighbors to send in the tanks. The difference is that Belgium's political crisis saw local government still fulfilling basic functions. Haiti's saw the state effectively vanish. In Port-au-Prince, a lack of sanitation has meant trash piling knee-high in the streets. Across the nation, stopped food deliveries mean up to 4.7 million face acute hunger — over 40 percent of Haiti's total population. Of them, as many as 20,000 are in danger of starving to death. Then, in September 2022, state subsidies on fuel were slashed, pushing people deeper into desperation. Haiti does not have a functioning electrical grid. People rely on generators for power and pumping clean water — generators they can only afford to run on heavily subsidized fuel. With water pumps unable to run, people were forced to start drinking contaminated water, leading to an explosion of cholera. By the end of 2022, 10,000 cases had been recorded. ## Gang Warfare: 200 Armed Groups and a Capital Under Siege Like many nations, Haiti has long had issues with armed gangs. But the collapse of state authority has turned what was once a pressing problem into a national nightmare. The Haitian state receded, and up to 200 gangs moved in to replace it, many of them equipped with military-grade weaponry. By mid-2022, they had taken control of the roads leading from Port-au-Prince, effectively blockading 1.5 million people in the capital. The land around the Parliament building was seized, becoming a no-go zone. All told, some 60 percent of the Haitian capital is now ruled by gangs. With their arrival has come a tidal wave of violence. In the first six months of 2022, nearly 1,000 people were murdered in Port-au-Prince. The third quarter was even worse. Between June and September, another 1,377 were killed or disappeared — including 500 who died in vicious battles to control the capital's roads. Kidnappings likewise surged. From January to October alone, over 1,100 civilians were snatched for ransom. Things got so bad that many now simply stay home or sleep at work to avoid going on the streets. That enforced lack of movement has had dire consequences. Trapped by fear, Haiti's people have been unable to leave their homes to buy food or even visit hospitals when ill. There are reports of families having to choose whether to take their sick children to a doctor and risk getting kidnapped, or stay home and risk their child dying of cholera. At the same time, the gangs have stopped shipments of basic supplies from entering neighborhoods, exacerbating already dire conditions. Across a single week in July, armed gangs descended on the Cité Soleil slum and wreaked havoc. The door-to-door massacre saw perhaps 300 killed, with many more wounded. Nearly 4,000 fled the slum. With nowhere to go, they were forced to simply sleep in makeshift tents on the hard ground of a nearby plaza — a shanty town of despair right in the heart of Haiti's capital. As the gangs' power has increased, they have turned increasingly to sexual assault as a terror weapon. The massacre in Cité Soleil was accompanied by the mass rape of at least 50 women and girls. The National Human Rights Defence Network recorded 20 cases of mothers being raped in front of their children. This was not an isolated incident but part of a deliberate strategy to inflict humiliation on anyone who might cross the gangs. There are reports of gang members filming themselves raping women in the streets in broad daylight and sharing the footage on social media. That broad daylight element shows the complete impunity these men feel — not simply because they are the ones with the guns, but because the gangs are entwined with Haiti's institutions. The National Human Rights Defence Network notes most gangs have serving police officers among their members, with some even using police cruisers to carry out kidnappings. Port-au-Prince's worst gang — G9 — is run by an ex-policeman: Jimmy "Barbecue" Cherizier. Many gangs also have ties to Haiti's political elite. In both government and opposition, wealthy patrons use these armed groups as a thermostat for the nation, turning the white heat of violence up or down as it suits them. These politicians force judges to turn a blind eye to even the most horrific abuses. Yet it is not as simple as the elites merely controlling the gangs. As their power has grown, the question of who is controlling whom has gotten more complex. Rather than one sponsoring the other, it might make more sense to think of them as toxically co-dependent. ## A Cry for Help: From Varreux Terminal to the United Nations It was the blockade of Varreux Terminal that did it. In September 2022, the G9 gang seized control of the terminal building — the main one in Port-au-Prince, through which fuel for the city's generators normally flows. For two months in autumn 2022, nothing flowed out of that terminal. Overrun by Jimmy "Barbecue" Cherizier's men, it ceased to function. The New York Times correspondent noted that by taking the terminal, G9 had "put the entire country in a choke hold." The shutdown that followed saw Haiti tiptoe to the brink. It was during this period that cholera took off again, triggering the current outbreak. Faced with out-of-control gangs and a collapsing state, October 8 is the day Ariel Henry made his call for help. Although Haitian police managed to retake the terminal in November, that call has yet to be rescinded. If anything, pleas for intervention have only grown louder. On December 11, President Luis Abinader of neighboring Dominican Republic joined the chorus, telling the Financial Times: "The international community needs to be more responsible... If it's really concerned about Haiti, it needs to go and help there." Ten days later, UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed urged countries to consider Haiti's request for armed help. By then the ball was already rolling. Mid-October saw two of Haiti's biggest neighbors — the United States and Mexico — draft and sponsor a joint UN resolution on militarily supporting Henry's government. Not long after, the US joined with Canada to unveil sanctions against two elites said to be linked to the gangs, including the sitting president of the Haitian senate. For the US, this flurry of activity has an obvious endgame: to prevent what White House officials have privately called the government's biggest nightmare — a wave of small boats carrying tens of thousands of desperate refugees to American shores. Haiti lies less than 700 miles, or around 1,100 kilometers, from Miami. Every year the US Coast Guard intercepts boats carrying Haitians, but 2022 saw an explosion. Between October 2021 and September 2022, over 7,000 Haitians were detained at sea — a number four and a half times bigger than the previous 12 months. Washington's fear is that a total collapse in Haiti would act as a multiplier all over again. ## History of Failed Interventions: From 1915 to MINUSTAH The Biden White House has still not committed to sending troops, and perhaps with good reason. None of America's previous three interventions in Haiti played out as they were supposed to. American forces entered Haiti in 1915, 1994, and 2004. In all three cases, the goal was to restore order. In all three cases, things soon wound up getting unbelievably complicated. Taking place in the wake of a different presidential assassination, the 1915 intervention ultimately saw the US occupy Haiti for over 19 years — an era that left a traumatic legacy. The twin interventions in 1994 and 2004 were likewise difficult, with America initially entering Haiti to undo a military coup and put deposed president Jean-Bertrand Aristide back in power, before returning ten years later to take him away into exile — a move Aristide later called kidnapping. As well as fanning turmoil in Haiti, something all three interventions have in common is that they wound up damaging America's reputation. Hence the current hesitation about adding a fourth intervention. But it is not as if anyone else has a good track record. From 2004 to 2019, the UN kept its own multilateral force in Haiti. Known as MINUSTAH and led by Brazil, it likewise became embroiled in damaging controversies. The biggest of all was the accidental importation of cholera, leading to an outbreak that killed over 9,000 Haitians. But MINUSTAH troops were also accused of the sexual abuse of local women and girls. All this is why everyone — from ordinary Haitians to generals in the Pentagon — are very wary of armed intervention. It has been over three months since Ariel Henry made his plea, and still no foreign troops have arrived. ## What a New Intervention Might Look Like Thanks to semi-recent interventions in the Middle East, it is easy to assume that going into Haiti would be a gung-ho mission involving airstrikes on gang hideouts and troops storming beaches. If an armed coalition does enter Haiti, however, it is unlikely to look anything like that. Rather, the plan would probably hew closer to what UN Secretary-General António Guterres described as deploying a "rapid action force." Consisting of special forces personnel from multiple nations, this rapid action force would not operate under an official UN mandate, although it would have the body's blessing. Designed to be nimble, it would have few members, with US officials suggesting a total of 2,500 elite soldiers involved. The mission would not involve attacking buildings or fighting in core gangland territory. Instead: to secure Haiti's ports and airports and take control of vital roads that would allow the rapid distribution of food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. The idea would be to not even try crushing the gangs, but instead provide relief to the suffering population — to allow the movement of goods to alleviate hunger and illness while forcing open channels that would get the economy moving again. This, in turn, should open up enough room for ordinary Haitians to begin living their lives once more — to go to work or take their kids to school without worrying they might be killed or kidnapped on the way. Reporter Nick Kristof summed it up: "Success in Haiti is going to be measured by enough tranquility that people can live their lives." It is a tempting vision, but one that currently faces problems — not least who could lead it. With the UN's name still mud in Haiti, there needs to be a country willing to take the front role, to take charge of things like planning, control, and command. Even without its tortured history with Haiti, the United States is currently too distracted by the war in Ukraine and the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to commit to a mission in the Caribbean. Mexico originally approached Brazil to provide the raw muscle, but in November 2022 the government ruled out taking the leadership role. Canada, with Trudeau's government yet to categorically refuse heading an intervention, remains in contention — but Ottawa is not exactly brimming with enthusiasm, preferring to focus on sanctions against politicians tied to Haiti's gangs. Some are pushing for an alternative: letting the Haitian National Police lead the charge. Floated in Politico magazine by former US Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley, this plan would involve doing for Haiti what the Pentagon is currently doing for Ukraine — provide weapons, equipment, and intelligence without resorting to boots on the ground. The idea would be to take a support role, giving the HNP the tools and training they need to clear the gangs from strategic points on their own. Unfortunately, it is a plan that would require heavy investment. The HNP has been gutted in recent years, its entire national force reduced to just 12,000. By contrast, New York City alone has a police force of 35,000. The HNP is having to police an additional 3 million people with about a third of the manpower. Then there are the issues of corruption and gang infiltration. If the US could spend $83 billion training and equipping Afghanistan's forces just to have them crumble, the chances of Haiti's police transforming into an elite fighting unit able to defeat the gangs are uncertain. ## Divisions Within Haiti and the Danger of Quagmire From the outside, it is easy to see the gang-led chaos and Prime Minister Ariel Henry begging for help and assume things are straightforward — that Haiti is divided into those working with the gangs and those backing Henry's call for intervention. The reality is that huge chasms exist between different parts of Haitian civil society. And failing to get all groups backing intervention is the most surefire way to create a quagmire. Perhaps the biggest chasm of all is the one between Ariel Henry and his government and the opposition group known as Montana Accord. Made up of political parties and civil society groups that oppose Henry's rule, Montana Accord is extremely influential and extremely against having foreign troops enter Haiti. Their primary reasoning is that this Haitian crisis needs a Haitian solution — one that comes from the country's streets, rather than being imposed by an outside power. But they are also worried that military intervention could be used by Henry to illegitimately cling to power. He is unelected, demonstrably weak, and only still in power because he canceled elections. If the global community sends in soldiers to restore order at Henry's invitation, they would de facto be propping up his rule at a time when most Haitians are sick of him. It is not for nothing that tens of thousands took to the streets of Port-au-Prince to protest Henry's call for help last October. Even if the opposition were to somehow reach an agreement with Henry, problems would still remain — not least in defining exactly what victory will look like. It is all very well planning to commit only 2,500 troops toward a clearly defined goal like taking control of ports and reopening roads, but what happens after that is done? UN Secretary-General Guterres suggested to the Security Council that the next step would be a smaller international force to back up the Haiti National Police. But how long would that last? And is anyone willing to commit to the open-ended program of funding and training needed to stop the gangs from rebuilding once foreign forces leave? At the back of everyone's mind is the fear that this limited incursion could easily turn into a multi-year occupation with no end in sight. The best thing to do would be to use an intervention to tackle the root causes of Haiti's violence: the political and business elite who supply and work with the gangs. Dismantling this class of gangsters would certainly improve Haitian society. But, as seen in Iraq, it is not easy to just sweep away a powerful elite — especially when that elite has lots of money and armed men at its disposal. Nor is it likely that new elections will solve anything. Gangs use their influence to make people in poorer districts of Port-au-Prince vote the way their patron wants them to. Rather than a cleansing, a new vote may just shuffle the same old, corrupt elite without really changing anything. Going after the gangs directly is also off the cards, as they are embedded deep within local communities. Any attempt to storm gang strongholds could result in a lot of local young men getting killed — and there is no better way to turn a civilian population against you than to start killing their sons or ransacking their homes. That is where things stand: a whole lot of bad options for anyone who leads an intervention into Haiti, but also the extreme likelihood of ever-increasing violence and brutality if the world simply sits back and does nothing. Each path holds potential for trouble, and acting without thinking is guaranteed to make things worse. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### Why did Haiti's government formally request armed intervention in October 2022? Prime Minister Ariel Henry and 18 cabinet ministers signed a request on October 8, 2022, after gang violence had become catastrophic. Up to 200 gangs controlled roughly 60 percent of Port-au-Prince, over 1,100 civilians had been kidnapped for ransom in the first ten months of the year, and the G9 gang's two-month seizure of the Varreux Terminal had cut fuel supplies to the entire city, triggering a cholera outbreak that reached 10,000 cases by year's end. ### What makes Ariel Henry's legitimacy controversial? Henry was appointed by President Jovenel Moïse just days before the president's assassination in July 2021. With no sitting parliament able to confirm the appointment, and with subsequent elections canceled, he holds power without an electoral mandate. His decision to invite foreign troops prompted tens of thousands of Haitians to protest in Port-au-Prince, and the influential opposition Montana Accord argues that a foreign military presence would effectively prop up an unelected leader. ### What track record do previous international interventions in Haiti have? All three US interventions — in 1915, 1994, and 2004 — became prolonged and controversial. The 1915 intervention turned into a 19-year occupation. The UN's MINUSTAH mission from 2004 to 2019, led by Brazil, accidentally imported cholera that killed over 9,000 Haitians and faced allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers. This history is a central reason why military planners, Haitian civilians, and foreign governments are deeply wary of another intervention. ### What would a new intervention actually look like? Rather than airstrikes or direct combat with gangs, the proposed plan calls for roughly 2,500 special forces personnel operating without a formal UN mandate but with UN blessing. Their mission would be to secure ports, airports, and vital roads to allow the rapid delivery of food, water, fuel, and medical supplies — restoring enough order for ordinary Haitians to resume daily life — rather than attempting to dismantle gang strongholds directly. ### What are the main dangers of a prolonged intervention turning into a quagmire? The core risk is that a limited mission could expand without a clear exit. Gangs are deeply embedded in local communities, making direct assaults costly and potentially alienating civilians. The underlying problem — wealthy political and business elites who fund and use the gangs — would not be solved by securing roads. Without addressing those root causes and building a functional Haitian National Police, international forces could face years of occupation with no path to stable withdrawal, mirroring the difficulties seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. ## Related Coverage - [Haiti Has Collapsed: What Happens Next?](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/haiti-has-collapsed-what-happens-next) - [El Salvador's Brutal War on Gangs: Victory or Human Rights Crisis?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/el-salvador-war-on-gangs-victory-or-human-rights-crisis) - [Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-kenyas-haiti-intervention-in-danger-of-falling-apart) - [South Sudan Is Sliding into War: How the World's Youngest Nation Faces Collapse in 2025](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-sliding-into-war-2025-civil-war-crisis) - [Mozambique Is Burning: How Cabo Delgado Became One of the World's Worst Forgotten Conflicts](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/mozambique-cabo-delgado-insurgency-isis-crisis-explained) ## Sources 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. [1]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/haiti/haiti-needs-help?check_logged_in=1 [2]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63707429 [3]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/world/americas/haiti-gangs-foreign-intervention.html [4]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/08/podcasts/the-daily/haiti-violence-intervention.html?showTranscript=1 [5]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/2/after-year-of-unprecedented-crises-what-next-for-haiti [6]: https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-going-to-invade-haiti [7]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/opinion/america-haiti-international-intervention.html <!-- youtube:OJtzh3S1JXw -->