---
title: "The Black Sea Grain Deal: Russia's Plan to Hold the World Hostage"
description: "If there is one thing Russian President Vladimir Putin likes, it is a good hostage. Informed by his days in the KGB, and now forming an instrumental part of his grand plan to seize the sovereign nation of Ukraine, Putin and his top brass in the Kremlin have been on a hostage-taking bender. Unprotected Ukrainian towns and villages, packed with civilians, are held hostage by Russian missiles to try and coerce Ukraine into standing down. Europe was held hostage by Russian oil ahead of the winter of 2022, in an unsuccessful attempt to get Europe to back off of their support of Ukraine. And the Ukrainian regions of Crimea and the Donbas have been held hostage for the better part of the last decade, in a long, slow play meant to either weaken Ukraine to the point of collapse, or force it to stand in opposition to a Russian army that, before March of 2022, nobody on the planet believed it could stand against. But Vladimir Putin has one hostage that grants him more leverage, bar none, than any other in his arsenal: the Black Sea grain initiative.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- Russia forced the Black Sea Grain Initiative to expire on July 17, 2023, after systematically reducing ship inspections from ten per day in October 2022 to two per day by May 2023.\n- Ukraine produces ten percent of the world's wheat, fifteen percent of corn, thirteen percent of barley, and over fifty percent of sunflower oil despite comprising less than half a percent of global population and landmass.\n- The World Food Programme shipped 725,000 metric tons of Ukrainian grain directly to Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other nations on the brink of starvation under the deal, with the UK estimating 61% went to low- and middle-income countries.\n- Russia exported a record 45.5 million metric tons of wheat during 2022-2023, with projections to exceed that by two million tons the following year, undermining its claims of being disadvantaged by the deal.\n- Retired Admiral James Stavridis proposed a NATO convoy plan using minesweepers, six frigates and destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and fighter jets to protect merchant ship groups of three to five vessels each.\n\n## The Black Sea Grain Initiative and Its Origins\n\nFirst negotiated in July 2022 between the UN, Turkey, and Russia, the grain initiative was supposed to ensure that Ukraine, one of the world's biggest producers of grain, could send its exports around the world even as war raged against Russia on land. The reasons for the deal were as simple as they were critical: Ukrainian wheat, corn, and sunflower oil are absolutely essential in keeping some of the poorest countries and regions around the world from starving. But ever since the deal was put into effect, Russia continually threatened its cancellation, until July 17, 2023, when Russia forced the deal to expire. With that act, Putin essentially took the entire undeveloped world hostage, with the implication being that the world can either find a peace in Ukraine that favors Russia, or watch millions of people starve. In July of 2022, Turkey was able to broker an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, with the help and endorsement of the United Nations, that would free up about 25 million tons of grain sitting in Ukraine and waiting for transfer, by allowing them to pass unmolested through the Black Sea, where Russia and Ukraine share a coastline. Russia would agree to the establishment of secure corridors for travel, refrain from attacking specific ports and grain storage areas, and abide by the directions of a Turkish control center managing the flow of ships in and out of the Black Sea. This deal was also good for Russia, another of the world's largest grain exporters, as well as a major producer of fertilizer. With the deal in place, sanctions against those Russian products were lifted, and they, too, were kept immune from the devastation of war.\n\n## Ukraine as the World's Bread Basket: A Global Lifeline\n\nUkraine has long held the informal title of \"the world's bread basket,\" and despite being home to less than half a percent of the global population, and taking up less than half a percent of the global landmass, Ukraine produces an entire ten percent of the world's wheat, plus fifteen percent of corn and thirteen percent of barley. Add to that the fact that Ukraine is responsible for over fifty percent of the world's sunflower oil production, and the idea of a \"surplus\" begins to be something of an understatement. With so much product to give away, and a relatively close proximity to many areas of the world that really need food, Ukraine has long been a key exporter of grains across the developing world. Egypt, Indonesia, and Bangladesh are among Ukraine's largest grain markets, but Ukraine also sends substantial amounts to Yemen, a country sitting on the precipice of mass starvation. Even though many developing nations in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa receive less grain than those major recipients, there are key points to remember. There are often fewer people in those other nations, meaning a smaller share of the export market; the place grain ends up when it leaves Ukraine is often not its final destination; and a relatively small proportion of Ukrainian grain means a lot more to people living on the edge of famine. Taking it away has a much greater consequence. This was immediately played out in the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when a blockade around critical Ukrainian port cities like Mariupol and Odessa made export shipments by sea impossible. Distracted by the existential crises of full-scale war, and with Ukrainian rail lines and their westward European partners unequipped to handle the mass flow of grain on short notice, Ukraine's exports were forced to grind to a halt. Wheat, corn, and barley prices skyrocketed around the world, a major inconvenience for richer nations, but a fact that meant poorer ones risked being unable to afford it at all.\n\n## Food Insecurity, Supply Lines, and the Access Problem\n\nWhen war broke out in Ukraine, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were already on the precipice of severe food insecurity, mostly owing to the significant collateral damage inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The problem has to do with the fact that food insecurity around the world is not a matter of supply shortages. There is enough grain to feed everyone on the planet, today, using grain that already exists, and there is enough surplus that even with Ukraine taken out of the equation, the ratio of grain to human mouths is still more than satisfactory to keep everyone fed. The real issues around food insecurity come down to access and availability. A whole mountain of corn and wheat in, say, Australia, means nothing if there are not enough ships, trucks, and fuel available to get it to the starving people of Yemen. Nor is that grain going to get to Yemen if Australia has been under the impression that it is supposed to be sending that grain to nearby Indonesia. Shifting the world's pre-existing supply lines on short notice is functionally impossible, and while it might have been nice for the global community to be a bit more proactive once it seemed as if a Russian invasion of Ukraine was inevitable, that did not happen. This is why it was so important to negotiate a grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, so that grain already earmarked for vulnerable populations, scheduled for pickup by cargo ships that cannot simply go across the world and take someone else's grain instead, could get to the places where it would soon be desperately needed.\n\n## The Deal's Success and Russia's Systematic Sabotage\n\nBy all accounts, the grain deal was a success for as long as it lasted. Agreed upon for stretches of four months at a time, it was renewed three times, with each successful renegotiation another small indicator that perhaps dialogue over grain exports could blossom into a broader, or even a war-ending discussion. The deal brought down the price of essential foods worldwide, the UK estimates that 61% of it went to low- and middle-income countries, and 725,000 metric tons of Ukrainian grain were sent by the World Food Programme directly to Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other nations that exist on the constant brink of starvation. That is only a small portion of the tens of millions of tons that Ukraine exported under the deal, but the critical factor is not the net quantity of grain being distributed. A kilo of grain makes a few loaves of bread in France. In Yemen, it keeps a child alive till next week. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was not fated to last forever. Russia began dragging its feet on ship inspections, which Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey perform jointly on every ship in order to make sure that they are only carrying grain. While the UN had the capacity to check as many as forty ships daily, Russia lowered the overall total from ten a day in October of 2022, to two a day in May of 2023. This badly diminished the amount of grain that Ukraine could move, while Russian ships passed unmolested, reaping the rewards of the side of the deal that benefited Moscow. Russia also seized on export patterns that saw large amounts of Ukrainian grain sent to China, while less than the intended amount reached poorer countries, taking these numbers out of context to claim that the grain was being misused and shipped to high-income countries when in reality, reorganizing the world's global supply lines is not that simple. By midsummer 2023, reeling from an unsuccessful winter offensive, desperately scrambling to make preparations for a Ukrainian counteroffensive, and dealing with the aftermath of a coup attempt by the paramilitary organization known as the Wagner Group, Russia appeared to decide that it was time to stop playing nice with Ukraine's exports.\n\n## Russia's Real Motives: Record Exports, Revenue, and Military Leverage\n\nChafing under sanctions and shipping regulations, as well as skepticism from many of Russia's former Western customers, the Russian grain industry did not thrive in the way that Ukraine's did under the deal. Russian exports of ammonia through a Ukrainian port never resumed as scheduled, although this was a direct result of damage to their pipeline in battles with Ukraine. Add that to the fact that Ukraine was still getting paid to sell the goods they exported, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative must have been seen in Moscow as being unnecessarily generous. Despite efforts by the United Nations to intervene, Vladimir Putin had already made up his mind, and after rejecting last-minute efforts to ease Russia's stated concerns, the deal expired without renewal in mid-July 2023. Russia's rationale for ending the deal may have been somewhat manufactured, particularly on account of just how successful the 2022–2023 trade year was for Moscow. During that year, Russia exported a full 45.5 million metric tons of wheat, an all-time record, and projections for the following trade year suggested that they would break that record by another two million tons. That is not just grain production—that is grain exports, meaning that Russia has buyers for all that product. As for the real reasons Russia decided to pull out of the deal, there is one relatively simple explanation: taking Ukrainian grain out of the market, while causing a global panic, raises the price of grain by a lot, and if Russia still has buyers for all this grain, it is an opportunity to jack up their own prices and get some additional revenue flowing in. This revenue can be sent straight to a war effort that badly needs some extra coin, and such a blatant manipulation of grain prices could be the influx Russia needs to get itself back on track. The military benefits of locking down the Black Sea can also be taken into account. Russia has increasingly targeted the port city of Odessa after the deal expired, a decision perhaps informed partially because Odessa does not appear to be under the umbrella of either of Ukraine's Patriot missile systems, but also because of the incredible economic power of that port.\n\n## Global Leverage and the Politics of Starvation\n\nMost important of all is the global leverage that Russia has acquired. It is impossible to know for sure, but the biggest benefit Russia sees in cutting off grain supply to the developing world is that now, the United Nations and the global west have to beg Russia to allow shipments to resume. When faced with those sorts of requests, Russia is then able to make demands: recognize claims to Crimea and the Donbas, do not send F-16s or advanced tanks to Ukraine, or make other concessions that the rest of the world would dismiss out of hand—until, and unless, the lives of millions of hungry people are on the line. Although the global price of grain may stabilize before too long, countries where grain is already scarce or where stockpiles do not exist are going to see their own domestic grain prices go through the roof. In countries where many people do not have the money for that grain, hunger and then starvation immediately become an urgent threat, at a time when global conflicts and rising droughts are already reducing the meager crop yields that developing countries could use to offset the shortage. This is not so simple as just rerouting surplus grain from other parts of the world to go to the places that need it most. The solution is that simple, but the process it takes to make that happen is incredibly difficult and frustratingly slow in practice. Under Russia's new rule in the Black Sea, any and all ships leaving Ukrainian ports are viewed as legitimate military targets, no matter what they are carrying or whose flag they fly. Increased military pressure on the city of Odessa, including frequent air attacks, have made it too risky for shipping countries to try and do business in the area. Russia has begun directly attacking Ukraine's grain stores, and according to the UN, the grain that has already been lost could have fed as many as sixty-six million people for a day, making the prospect of any further escalation potentially devastating in the long term.\n\n## Calling Russia's Bluff: Civilian Ships Test the Blockade\n\nIn addition to the diplomatic wheeling and dealing currently going on between Ukraine, Russia, and the member nations of NATO, there is also another, more ad-hoc effort going on in the Black Sea. According to global ship-tracking organizations, bulk carriers and other vessels located in the Black Sea have begun to call Russia's bluff, not by making a headlong dash to Odessa right away, but by dropping anchor, with their transponders on, closer and closer to Ukraine's territorial waters. Their intent appears to be to probe forward and see what response comes, and their early forays just over the line of Ukraine's territory appear not to have earned the hellfire that Vladimir Putin promised. A few days later, on July 31, 2023, three civilian cargo ships decided to go for it. On that day, one ship registered under Israel, one under Greece, and one under a joint Turkish and Georgian registration, joined together and made a dash for one of Ukraine's grain ports on the delta of the Danube River, situated relatively close to Romania's territorial waters, but far enough, and anchored for long enough, that they clearly violated Russia's warnings against passage. These ships still sail today, with the subtext being that Russia is either unwilling, or unable to interdict the ships or attack them outright. This may have had something to do with the several NATO warplanes that flew over the ships as they passed, and the nearby Eurofighter and F-16 fighter jets stationed in Romania, but even still, the journey took place with all three cargo ships' transponders on. The crew members onboard must have been nervous, but in the end, they got away scot-free for what Russia has claimed is a grievous transgression. A nearby Russian warship, the corvette dubbed the Sergey Kotov, took no action to intervene. Like anything else in this war, even small signals are signals nonetheless.\n\n## Alternate Routes, NATO Convoys, and the Danube Option\n\nThe first question is how else Ukraine can either force a return to the negotiating table, or get grain out some other way. Ukraine can try to make up some of the difference by sending grain by rail, westward to Europe, but this is a much less efficient process and allows the shipment of far less grain. It has also generated backlash from countries like Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, who have expressed that they are already inundated with Ukrainian grain, to the detriment of their own domestic agriculture. One solution may lie on Ukraine's Danube River, where ships could conceivably sail a direct voyage to Romania's own port cities and then leave through there. Ukraine already sends about two million metric tons of grain a month through that route, and the Ukrainian Grain Association claims it could double that transfer rate in the next few months. While Russia has jurisdiction within its own territorial waters in the Black Sea, and can functionally do whatever it wants in international and Ukrainian waters, it cannot violate the territorial waters of Romania without royally antagonizing a country that happens to be a member of NATO. From there, neighboring Bulgaria is also a NATO member, and so is Turkey, a country that controls passage through the Bosporus Strait and the wider Mediterranean Sea. By using the Danube and then hugging close to the coastline once ships emerge into the Black Sea, Ukrainian grain could conceivably be transferred to and kept under the control of NATO partners, although this would take a massive logistical effort. There is also the potential to organize convoys, in which merchant ships are protected by NATO warships as a clear deterrent to Russia. Convoys could either reflag merchant vessels to indicate that they are under the protection of NATO member nations, or surround the vessels with well-armed ships. Russia is generally viewed as being highly unlikely to take military action against a NATO target, especially considering how much trouble they are having keeping the smaller nation of Ukraine away from NATO membership, so this solution is among those that seem more likely to succeed.\n\n## Admiral Stavridis's Convoy Plan and Ukraine's Retaliatory Strikes\n\nOne clear vision comes from retired Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy, who contributed a potential plan to the Washington Post immediately following the dissolution of the grain deal. According to Stavridis, any operation to protect ships in the Black Sea would have to take place independent from the United Nations, since Russia holds veto power on the UN Security Council. Instead, an intervention could come from either NATO or from a coalition of nations who choose to opt into a convoying operation. Most likely, any Black Sea convoys would rely on two key naval assets: a group of minesweepers, instrumental in clearing out the sea mines Russia has laid around Ukrainian ports, and a group of six large warships, a combination of frigates and destroyers. Stavridis lays out one potential approach: bundle merchant ships into groups of three to five, with a pair of warships armed with guided missiles assigned to each group. In the air, surveillance planes would keep constant watch over the water for any incoming Russian ships, especially from the Black Sea Fleet, while fighter aircraft maintain a state of readiness to quickly intercept and deal with any attacks that come by air. Add in satellite overwatch and a good bit of diplomatic pressure, and Ukraine's grain might be able to get in and out unmolested. Of course, this plan would come with considerable risk—it would inherently put NATO warships in direct opposition to a lot of Russian heavy weapons, meaning that one trigger-happy fighter pilot or one rogue ship commander could start an escalation of force. Then there is another option, one Ukraine is already taking: retaliatory attacks on Russian sea targets, with the intent of pushing Russian forces in the area into a defensive posture and deterring them from coming close to Ukrainian territorial waters. On August 5, 2023, Ukrainian naval drones attacked a Russian naval base on the Black Sea, damaging an amphibious landing ship called the Olenogorsky Gornyak so badly that, according to Ukraine, it would be unable to fulfill its duties. Ukraine has also attacked bridges around the isthmus of Crimea, possibly in an attempt to get Russia to circle the wagons around its annexed territory rather than spread themselves too thin.\n\n## The Stakes: A World That Cannot Afford to Wait\n\nEach option for restoring grain exports also has a cost. In Ukraine, farmers need to know how much seed to sow at the start of the growing season, and if they under-sow their fields anticipating a lack of resolution, but trade starts up again, there is a real possibility that Ukraine will have only a fraction of its usual exportable grain available. But sow too much, and if the world does not reach a resolution, then millions of tons of the stuff will rot in Ukraine at a loss equivalent to billions of dollars. Then there is the question of what to do with the world's shipping vessels—subsidize them and encourage them to hang out on the fringes of the Black Sea, ready to swoop in at a moment's notice, or send them elsewhere, and restructure global supply lines however possible. It is a series of trade-offs where every cost gives Russia more leverage than they already had. Making matters worse, China, a major recipient of Ukrainian grain, appears to be disinterested in pressuring Russia to resume the deal, willing to take the pain of potential shortages rather than do the West's work in negotiations. It is a small element of a much larger initiative to bring Russia into China's growing coalition around the world, and as Xi Jinping apparently sees it, there is more to gain by supporting Putin than by feeding the rest of the world—or even his own people. Whatever the world's eventual solution, one thing remains abundantly clear: the longer the Black Sea Grain Initiative goes unrenewed, and the longer Ukraine's precious cargo is kept in storage or held up in port, the more people around the world are going to be at risk of food insecurity, malnutrition, or even starvation. In a world where logistical supply is so baked in, so firmly pre-established, that grain around the world will rot and be wasted before a ship can even come pick it up, there is no immediate alternative for Ukraine's exports. All indications are, the world will have to learn to keep its most vulnerable people fed without the dictator's help.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative and why was it created?\n\nNegotiated in July 2022 between the UN, Turkey, and Russia, the Black Sea Grain Initiative established secure corridors allowing Ukraine to export grain through the Black Sea despite the ongoing war. It was created because Ukrainian wheat, corn, and sunflower oil are essential to keeping some of the world's poorest nations from starving, and the Russian blockade of ports like Odessa had driven global grain prices sharply higher.\n\n### Why did Russia end the grain deal in July 2023?\n\nRussia systematically sabotaged the deal by slowing ship inspections from ten per day in October 2022 to two per day by May 2023, strangling Ukraine's export capacity while Russian ships continued unmolested. Russia formally let the deal expire on July 17, 2023, with the real motive appearing to be profit: taking Ukrainian grain off the market created a global panic that raised grain prices, letting Russia earn more revenue from its own record exports of 45.5 million metric tons.\n\n### How much of the world's food supply does Ukraine actually produce?\n\nDespite comprising less than half a percent of global population and landmass, Ukraine produces ten percent of the world's wheat, fifteen percent of its corn, thirteen percent of its barley, and over fifty percent of its sunflower oil. The UK estimated that 61 percent of grain shipped under the deal went to low- and middle-income countries, and the World Food Programme sent 725,000 metric tons directly to nations like Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.\n\n### What leverage does Russia gain by blocking Ukrainian grain exports?\n\nWith grain off the market, Russia can demand diplomatic concessions — recognition of its claims to Crimea and the Donbas, restrictions on Western weapons deliveries, or other accommodations — in exchange for allowing shipments to resume. Countries where grain is already scarce face domestic price spikes and the threat of starvation, giving Moscow effective hostage leverage over the entire developing world and the international institutions that support it.\n\n### What alternatives exist for getting Ukrainian grain out without Russia's cooperation?\n\nUkraine can ship grain westward by rail to Europe, though this is far less efficient and has generated backlash from Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. The Danube River route to Romanian ports is more promising; Ukraine already moved about two million metric tons per month that way and could potentially double the rate. Retired Admiral James Stavridis also proposed NATO-escorted convoys in the Black Sea using minesweepers, six frigates and destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and fighter jets to protect groups of three to five merchant ships.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth-1bmuupct)\n- [Russia's Energy War Loss: A Geopolitical Analysis](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/russia-energy-war-loss-geopolitical-analysis)\n- [Ukraine's Sea Drones are Getting Crazy](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraines-sea-drones-are-getting-crazy)\n- [How Russia Gaslights the World: Putin's Decades-Long Campaign of Denial and Disinformation](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/how-russia-gaslights-the-world-putin-denial-disinformation)\n- [Ukraine's Deep Strike Campaign: Crippling Russia's Oil Refining Capacity](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraines-deep-strike-campaign-crippling-russias-oil-refining-capacity)\n\n## 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<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/17/black-sea-grain-initiative-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-russia-s-termination-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/>\n21. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/black-sea-grain-deal-expire-monday-if-russia-quits-2023-07-17/>\n22. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/17/russia-ukraine-black-sea-grain-deal-all-you-need-to-know>\n23. <https://www.passblue.com/2023/05/08/where-are-ukraines-grains-actually-going-across-the-world/>\n24. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/>\n25. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61759692>\n26. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1333847/ukrainian-agricultural-exports-via-the-black-sea-by-country/>\n27. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/five-european-countries-will-extend-ban-on-ukraines-grain>\n\n[1]: https://www.wfpusa.org/drivers-of-hunger/#:~:text=The%20Cause%20of%20Hunger%20is,%E2%80%93%20worst%20of%20all%20%E2%80%93%20conflict\n[2]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1048452\n[3]: https://time.com/6295062/ukraine-russia-grain-deal/\n[4]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse\n[5]: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative\n[6]: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements\n[7]: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vQD_V0AnKWLHzgF0CxQ3EhgpiYdLcbl4AyoP4znvSYI/edit#gid=0\n[8]: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1S4BoVtWis1ytE-6ALRaoCovHrmsjuZUHQaiu7uTNEDE/edit#gid=0\n[9]: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/China-not-expected-to-push-Russian-return-to-Black-Sea-grain-deal\n[10]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139497\n[11]: https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-us-grain-karabakh/32535675.html\n[12]: https://www.usaid.gov/fact-sheet/food-security/black-sea-grain-initiative\n[13]: https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/04/europe/ukraine-sea-drone-russian-warship-black-sea-intl/index.html\n[14]: https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:30.7/centery:43.8/zoom:7\n[15]: https://apnews.com/article/black-sea-grain-shipments-ukraine-russia-war-3e79b0842ca97c96e73b824d0e621722\n[16]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/07/31/nato-planes-watched-as-three-civilian-ships-ran-russias-naval-blockade-of-ukraine/?sh=5173cb871b72\n[17]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/07/25/nato-convoys-can-protect-ukraine-s-grain-harvest-from-putin/541a151e-2aa3-11ee-a948-a5b8a9b62d84_story.html\n[18]: https://unctad.org/news/black-sea-grain-initiative-what-it-and-why-its-important-world\n[19]: https://www.state.gov/russias-suspension-of-participation-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/\n[20]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/17/black-sea-grain-initiative-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-russia-s-termination-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/\n[21]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/black-sea-grain-deal-expire-monday-if-russia-quits-2023-07-17/\n[22]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/17/russia-ukraine-black-sea-grain-deal-all-you-need-to-know\n[23]: https://www.passblue.com/2023/05/08/where-are-ukraines-grains-actually-going-across-the-world/\n[24]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/\n[25]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61759692\n[26]: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1333847/ukrainian-agricultural-exports-via-the-black-sea-by-country/\n[27]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/five-european-countries-will-extend-ban-on-ukraines-grain\n\n<!-- youtube:iVtqy8Pg5HI -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/black-sea-grain-deal-russia-plan-hold-world-hostage.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/black-sea-grain-deal-russia-plan-hold-world-hostage
datePublished: 2026-03-04
dateModified: 2026-03-04
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/iVtqy8Pg5HI/hero.jpg"
type: NewsArticle
contentHash: 7b079f774a70d70c0afa7fd881288935adb6126e62252894ce37893dc726cb74
tokens: 7921
summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/black-sea-grain-deal-russia-plan-hold-world-hostage.md.summary.md
---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
If there is one thing Russian President Vladimir Putin likes, it is a good hostage. Informed by his days in the KGB, and now forming an instrumental part of his grand plan to seize the sovereign nation of Ukraine, Putin and his top brass in the Kremlin have been on a hostage-taking bender. Unprotected Ukrainian towns and villages, packed with civilians, are held hostage by Russian missiles to try and coerce Ukraine into standing down. Europe was held hostage by Russian oil ahead of the winter of 2022, in an unsuccessful attempt to get Europe to back off of their support of Ukraine. And the Ukrainian regions of Crimea and the Donbas have been held hostage for the better part of the last decade, in a long, slow play meant to either weaken Ukraine to the point of collapse, or force it to stand in opposition to a Russian army that, before March of 2022, nobody on the planet believed it could stand against. But Vladimir Putin has one hostage that grants him more leverage, bar none, than any other in his arsenal: the Black Sea grain initiative.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- Russia forced the Black Sea Grain Initiative to expire on July 17, 2023, after systematically reducing ship inspections from ten per day in October 2022 to two per day by May 2023.
- Ukraine produces ten percent of the world's wheat, fifteen percent of corn, thirteen percent of barley, and over fifty percent of sunflower oil despite comprising less than half a percent of global population and landmass.
- The World Food Programme shipped 725,000 metric tons of Ukrainian grain directly to Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other nations on the brink of starvation under the deal, with the UK estimating 61% went to low- and middle-income countries.
- Russia exported a record 45.5 million metric tons of wheat during 2022-2023, with projections to exceed that by two million tons the following year, undermining its claims of being disadvantaged by the deal.
- Retired Admiral James Stavridis proposed a NATO convoy plan using minesweepers, six frigates and destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and fighter jets to protect merchant ship groups of three to five vessels each.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-black-sea-grain-initiative-and-its-origins" -->
## The Black Sea Grain Initiative and Its Origins

First negotiated in July 2022 between the UN, Turkey, and Russia, the grain initiative was supposed to ensure that Ukraine, one of the world's biggest producers of grain, could send its exports around the world even as war raged against Russia on land. The reasons for the deal were as simple as they were critical: Ukrainian wheat, corn, and sunflower oil are absolutely essential in keeping some of the poorest countries and regions around the world from starving. But ever since the deal was put into effect, Russia continually threatened its cancellation, until July 17, 2023, when Russia forced the deal to expire. With that act, Putin essentially took the entire undeveloped world hostage, with the implication being that the world can either find a peace in Ukraine that favors Russia, or watch millions of people starve. In July of 2022, Turkey was able to broker an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, with the help and endorsement of the United Nations, that would free up about 25 million tons of grain sitting in Ukraine and waiting for transfer, by allowing them to pass unmolested through the Black Sea, where Russia and Ukraine share a coastline. Russia would agree to the establishment of secure corridors for travel, refrain from attacking specific ports and grain storage areas, and abide by the directions of a Turkish control center managing the flow of ships in and out of the Black Sea. This deal was also good for Russia, another of the world's largest grain exporters, as well as a major producer of fertilizer. With the deal in place, sanctions against those Russian products were lifted, and they, too, were kept immune from the devastation of war.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-black-sea-grain-initiative-and-its-origins" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="ukraine-as-the-world-s-bread-basket-a-global-lifeline" -->
## Ukraine as the World's Bread Basket: A Global Lifeline

Ukraine has long held the informal title of "the world's bread basket," and despite being home to less than half a percent of the global population, and taking up less than half a percent of the global landmass, Ukraine produces an entire ten percent of the world's wheat, plus fifteen percent of corn and thirteen percent of barley. Add to that the fact that Ukraine is responsible for over fifty percent of the world's sunflower oil production, and the idea of a "surplus" begins to be something of an understatement. With so much product to give away, and a relatively close proximity to many areas of the world that really need food, Ukraine has long been a key exporter of grains across the developing world. Egypt, Indonesia, and Bangladesh are among Ukraine's largest grain markets, but Ukraine also sends substantial amounts to Yemen, a country sitting on the precipice of mass starvation. Even though many developing nations in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa receive less grain than those major recipients, there are key points to remember. There are often fewer people in those other nations, meaning a smaller share of the export market; the place grain ends up when it leaves Ukraine is often not its final destination; and a relatively small proportion of Ukrainian grain means a lot more to people living on the edge of famine. Taking it away has a much greater consequence. This was immediately played out in the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when a blockade around critical Ukrainian port cities like Mariupol and Odessa made export shipments by sea impossible. Distracted by the existential crises of full-scale war, and with Ukrainian rail lines and their westward European partners unequipped to handle the mass flow of grain on short notice, Ukraine's exports were forced to grind to a halt. Wheat, corn, and barley prices skyrocketed around the world, a major inconvenience for richer nations, but a fact that meant poorer ones risked being unable to afford it at all.

<!-- aeo:section end="ukraine-as-the-world-s-bread-basket-a-global-lifeline" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="food-insecurity-supply-lines-and-the-access-problem" -->
## Food Insecurity, Supply Lines, and the Access Problem

When war broke out in Ukraine, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were already on the precipice of severe food insecurity, mostly owing to the significant collateral damage inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The problem has to do with the fact that food insecurity around the world is not a matter of supply shortages. There is enough grain to feed everyone on the planet, today, using grain that already exists, and there is enough surplus that even with Ukraine taken out of the equation, the ratio of grain to human mouths is still more than satisfactory to keep everyone fed. The real issues around food insecurity come down to access and availability. A whole mountain of corn and wheat in, say, Australia, means nothing if there are not enough ships, trucks, and fuel available to get it to the starving people of Yemen. Nor is that grain going to get to Yemen if Australia has been under the impression that it is supposed to be sending that grain to nearby Indonesia. Shifting the world's pre-existing supply lines on short notice is functionally impossible, and while it might have been nice for the global community to be a bit more proactive once it seemed as if a Russian invasion of Ukraine was inevitable, that did not happen. This is why it was so important to negotiate a grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, so that grain already earmarked for vulnerable populations, scheduled for pickup by cargo ships that cannot simply go across the world and take someone else's grain instead, could get to the places where it would soon be desperately needed.

<!-- aeo:section end="food-insecurity-supply-lines-and-the-access-problem" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-deal-s-success-and-russia-s-systematic-sabotage" -->
## The Deal's Success and Russia's Systematic Sabotage

By all accounts, the grain deal was a success for as long as it lasted. Agreed upon for stretches of four months at a time, it was renewed three times, with each successful renegotiation another small indicator that perhaps dialogue over grain exports could blossom into a broader, or even a war-ending discussion. The deal brought down the price of essential foods worldwide, the UK estimates that 61% of it went to low- and middle-income countries, and 725,000 metric tons of Ukrainian grain were sent by the World Food Programme directly to Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other nations that exist on the constant brink of starvation. That is only a small portion of the tens of millions of tons that Ukraine exported under the deal, but the critical factor is not the net quantity of grain being distributed. A kilo of grain makes a few loaves of bread in France. In Yemen, it keeps a child alive till next week. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was not fated to last forever. Russia began dragging its feet on ship inspections, which Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey perform jointly on every ship in order to make sure that they are only carrying grain. While the UN had the capacity to check as many as forty ships daily, Russia lowered the overall total from ten a day in October of 2022, to two a day in May of 2023. This badly diminished the amount of grain that Ukraine could move, while Russian ships passed unmolested, reaping the rewards of the side of the deal that benefited Moscow. Russia also seized on export patterns that saw large amounts of Ukrainian grain sent to China, while less than the intended amount reached poorer countries, taking these numbers out of context to claim that the grain was being misused and shipped to high-income countries when in reality, reorganizing the world's global supply lines is not that simple. By midsummer 2023, reeling from an unsuccessful winter offensive, desperately scrambling to make preparations for a Ukrainian counteroffensive, and dealing with the aftermath of a coup attempt by the paramilitary organization known as the Wagner Group, Russia appeared to decide that it was time to stop playing nice with Ukraine's exports.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-deal-s-success-and-russia-s-systematic-sabotage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="russia-s-real-motives-record-exports-revenue-and-military-levera" -->
## Russia's Real Motives: Record Exports, Revenue, and Military Leverage

Chafing under sanctions and shipping regulations, as well as skepticism from many of Russia's former Western customers, the Russian grain industry did not thrive in the way that Ukraine's did under the deal. Russian exports of ammonia through a Ukrainian port never resumed as scheduled, although this was a direct result of damage to their pipeline in battles with Ukraine. Add that to the fact that Ukraine was still getting paid to sell the goods they exported, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative must have been seen in Moscow as being unnecessarily generous. Despite efforts by the United Nations to intervene, Vladimir Putin had already made up his mind, and after rejecting last-minute efforts to ease Russia's stated concerns, the deal expired without renewal in mid-July 2023. Russia's rationale for ending the deal may have been somewhat manufactured, particularly on account of just how successful the 2022–2023 trade year was for Moscow. During that year, Russia exported a full 45.5 million metric tons of wheat, an all-time record, and projections for the following trade year suggested that they would break that record by another two million tons. That is not just grain production—that is grain exports, meaning that Russia has buyers for all that product. As for the real reasons Russia decided to pull out of the deal, there is one relatively simple explanation: taking Ukrainian grain out of the market, while causing a global panic, raises the price of grain by a lot, and if Russia still has buyers for all this grain, it is an opportunity to jack up their own prices and get some additional revenue flowing in. This revenue can be sent straight to a war effort that badly needs some extra coin, and such a blatant manipulation of grain prices could be the influx Russia needs to get itself back on track. The military benefits of locking down the Black Sea can also be taken into account. Russia has increasingly targeted the port city of Odessa after the deal expired, a decision perhaps informed partially because Odessa does not appear to be under the umbrella of either of Ukraine's Patriot missile systems, but also because of the incredible economic power of that port.

<!-- aeo:section end="russia-s-real-motives-record-exports-revenue-and-military-levera" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="global-leverage-and-the-politics-of-starvation" -->
## Global Leverage and the Politics of Starvation

Most important of all is the global leverage that Russia has acquired. It is impossible to know for sure, but the biggest benefit Russia sees in cutting off grain supply to the developing world is that now, the United Nations and the global west have to beg Russia to allow shipments to resume. When faced with those sorts of requests, Russia is then able to make demands: recognize claims to Crimea and the Donbas, do not send F-16s or advanced tanks to Ukraine, or make other concessions that the rest of the world would dismiss out of hand—until, and unless, the lives of millions of hungry people are on the line. Although the global price of grain may stabilize before too long, countries where grain is already scarce or where stockpiles do not exist are going to see their own domestic grain prices go through the roof. In countries where many people do not have the money for that grain, hunger and then starvation immediately become an urgent threat, at a time when global conflicts and rising droughts are already reducing the meager crop yields that developing countries could use to offset the shortage. This is not so simple as just rerouting surplus grain from other parts of the world to go to the places that need it most. The solution is that simple, but the process it takes to make that happen is incredibly difficult and frustratingly slow in practice. Under Russia's new rule in the Black Sea, any and all ships leaving Ukrainian ports are viewed as legitimate military targets, no matter what they are carrying or whose flag they fly. Increased military pressure on the city of Odessa, including frequent air attacks, have made it too risky for shipping countries to try and do business in the area. Russia has begun directly attacking Ukraine's grain stores, and according to the UN, the grain that has already been lost could have fed as many as sixty-six million people for a day, making the prospect of any further escalation potentially devastating in the long term.

<!-- aeo:section end="global-leverage-and-the-politics-of-starvation" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="calling-russia-s-bluff-civilian-ships-test-the-blockade" -->
## Calling Russia's Bluff: Civilian Ships Test the Blockade

In addition to the diplomatic wheeling and dealing currently going on between Ukraine, Russia, and the member nations of NATO, there is also another, more ad-hoc effort going on in the Black Sea. According to global ship-tracking organizations, bulk carriers and other vessels located in the Black Sea have begun to call Russia's bluff, not by making a headlong dash to Odessa right away, but by dropping anchor, with their transponders on, closer and closer to Ukraine's territorial waters. Their intent appears to be to probe forward and see what response comes, and their early forays just over the line of Ukraine's territory appear not to have earned the hellfire that Vladimir Putin promised. A few days later, on July 31, 2023, three civilian cargo ships decided to go for it. On that day, one ship registered under Israel, one under Greece, and one under a joint Turkish and Georgian registration, joined together and made a dash for one of Ukraine's grain ports on the delta of the Danube River, situated relatively close to Romania's territorial waters, but far enough, and anchored for long enough, that they clearly violated Russia's warnings against passage. These ships still sail today, with the subtext being that Russia is either unwilling, or unable to interdict the ships or attack them outright. This may have had something to do with the several NATO warplanes that flew over the ships as they passed, and the nearby Eurofighter and F-16 fighter jets stationed in Romania, but even still, the journey took place with all three cargo ships' transponders on. The crew members onboard must have been nervous, but in the end, they got away scot-free for what Russia has claimed is a grievous transgression. A nearby Russian warship, the corvette dubbed the Sergey Kotov, took no action to intervene. Like anything else in this war, even small signals are signals nonetheless.

<!-- aeo:section end="calling-russia-s-bluff-civilian-ships-test-the-blockade" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="alternate-routes-nato-convoys-and-the-danube-option" -->
## Alternate Routes, NATO Convoys, and the Danube Option

The first question is how else Ukraine can either force a return to the negotiating table, or get grain out some other way. Ukraine can try to make up some of the difference by sending grain by rail, westward to Europe, but this is a much less efficient process and allows the shipment of far less grain. It has also generated backlash from countries like Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, who have expressed that they are already inundated with Ukrainian grain, to the detriment of their own domestic agriculture. One solution may lie on Ukraine's Danube River, where ships could conceivably sail a direct voyage to Romania's own port cities and then leave through there. Ukraine already sends about two million metric tons of grain a month through that route, and the Ukrainian Grain Association claims it could double that transfer rate in the next few months. While Russia has jurisdiction within its own territorial waters in the Black Sea, and can functionally do whatever it wants in international and Ukrainian waters, it cannot violate the territorial waters of Romania without royally antagonizing a country that happens to be a member of NATO. From there, neighboring Bulgaria is also a NATO member, and so is Turkey, a country that controls passage through the Bosporus Strait and the wider Mediterranean Sea. By using the Danube and then hugging close to the coastline once ships emerge into the Black Sea, Ukrainian grain could conceivably be transferred to and kept under the control of NATO partners, although this would take a massive logistical effort. There is also the potential to organize convoys, in which merchant ships are protected by NATO warships as a clear deterrent to Russia. Convoys could either reflag merchant vessels to indicate that they are under the protection of NATO member nations, or surround the vessels with well-armed ships. Russia is generally viewed as being highly unlikely to take military action against a NATO target, especially considering how much trouble they are having keeping the smaller nation of Ukraine away from NATO membership, so this solution is among those that seem more likely to succeed.

<!-- aeo:section end="alternate-routes-nato-convoys-and-the-danube-option" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="admiral-stavridis-s-convoy-plan-and-ukraine-s-retaliatory-strike" -->
## Admiral Stavridis's Convoy Plan and Ukraine's Retaliatory Strikes

One clear vision comes from retired Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy, who contributed a potential plan to the Washington Post immediately following the dissolution of the grain deal. According to Stavridis, any operation to protect ships in the Black Sea would have to take place independent from the United Nations, since Russia holds veto power on the UN Security Council. Instead, an intervention could come from either NATO or from a coalition of nations who choose to opt into a convoying operation. Most likely, any Black Sea convoys would rely on two key naval assets: a group of minesweepers, instrumental in clearing out the sea mines Russia has laid around Ukrainian ports, and a group of six large warships, a combination of frigates and destroyers. Stavridis lays out one potential approach: bundle merchant ships into groups of three to five, with a pair of warships armed with guided missiles assigned to each group. In the air, surveillance planes would keep constant watch over the water for any incoming Russian ships, especially from the Black Sea Fleet, while fighter aircraft maintain a state of readiness to quickly intercept and deal with any attacks that come by air. Add in satellite overwatch and a good bit of diplomatic pressure, and Ukraine's grain might be able to get in and out unmolested. Of course, this plan would come with considerable risk—it would inherently put NATO warships in direct opposition to a lot of Russian heavy weapons, meaning that one trigger-happy fighter pilot or one rogue ship commander could start an escalation of force. Then there is another option, one Ukraine is already taking: retaliatory attacks on Russian sea targets, with the intent of pushing Russian forces in the area into a defensive posture and deterring them from coming close to Ukrainian territorial waters. On August 5, 2023, Ukrainian naval drones attacked a Russian naval base on the Black Sea, damaging an amphibious landing ship called the Olenogorsky Gornyak so badly that, according to Ukraine, it would be unable to fulfill its duties. Ukraine has also attacked bridges around the isthmus of Crimea, possibly in an attempt to get Russia to circle the wagons around its annexed territory rather than spread themselves too thin.

<!-- aeo:section end="admiral-stavridis-s-convoy-plan-and-ukraine-s-retaliatory-strike" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-stakes-a-world-that-cannot-afford-to-wait" -->
## The Stakes: A World That Cannot Afford to Wait

Each option for restoring grain exports also has a cost. In Ukraine, farmers need to know how much seed to sow at the start of the growing season, and if they under-sow their fields anticipating a lack of resolution, but trade starts up again, there is a real possibility that Ukraine will have only a fraction of its usual exportable grain available. But sow too much, and if the world does not reach a resolution, then millions of tons of the stuff will rot in Ukraine at a loss equivalent to billions of dollars. Then there is the question of what to do with the world's shipping vessels—subsidize them and encourage them to hang out on the fringes of the Black Sea, ready to swoop in at a moment's notice, or send them elsewhere, and restructure global supply lines however possible. It is a series of trade-offs where every cost gives Russia more leverage than they already had. Making matters worse, China, a major recipient of Ukrainian grain, appears to be disinterested in pressuring Russia to resume the deal, willing to take the pain of potential shortages rather than do the West's work in negotiations. It is a small element of a much larger initiative to bring Russia into China's growing coalition around the world, and as Xi Jinping apparently sees it, there is more to gain by supporting Putin than by feeding the rest of the world—or even his own people. Whatever the world's eventual solution, one thing remains abundantly clear: the longer the Black Sea Grain Initiative goes unrenewed, and the longer Ukraine's precious cargo is kept in storage or held up in port, the more people around the world are going to be at risk of food insecurity, malnutrition, or even starvation. In a world where logistical supply is so baked in, so firmly pre-established, that grain around the world will rot and be wasted before a ship can even come pick it up, there is no immediate alternative for Ukraine's exports. All indications are, the world will have to learn to keep its most vulnerable people fed without the dictator's help.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-stakes-a-world-that-cannot-afford-to-wait" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative and why was it created?

Negotiated in July 2022 between the UN, Turkey, and Russia, the Black Sea Grain Initiative established secure corridors allowing Ukraine to export grain through the Black Sea despite the ongoing war. It was created because Ukrainian wheat, corn, and sunflower oil are essential to keeping some of the world's poorest nations from starving, and the Russian blockade of ports like Odessa had driven global grain prices sharply higher.

### Why did Russia end the grain deal in July 2023?

Russia systematically sabotaged the deal by slowing ship inspections from ten per day in October 2022 to two per day by May 2023, strangling Ukraine's export capacity while Russian ships continued unmolested. Russia formally let the deal expire on July 17, 2023, with the real motive appearing to be profit: taking Ukrainian grain off the market created a global panic that raised grain prices, letting Russia earn more revenue from its own record exports of 45.5 million metric tons.

### How much of the world's food supply does Ukraine actually produce?

Despite comprising less than half a percent of global population and landmass, Ukraine produces ten percent of the world's wheat, fifteen percent of its corn, thirteen percent of its barley, and over fifty percent of its sunflower oil. The UK estimated that 61 percent of grain shipped under the deal went to low- and middle-income countries, and the World Food Programme sent 725,000 metric tons directly to nations like Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

### What leverage does Russia gain by blocking Ukrainian grain exports?

With grain off the market, Russia can demand diplomatic concessions — recognition of its claims to Crimea and the Donbas, restrictions on Western weapons deliveries, or other accommodations — in exchange for allowing shipments to resume. Countries where grain is already scarce face domestic price spikes and the threat of starvation, giving Moscow effective hostage leverage over the entire developing world and the international institutions that support it.

### What alternatives exist for getting Ukrainian grain out without Russia's cooperation?

Ukraine can ship grain westward by rail to Europe, though this is far less efficient and has generated backlash from Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. The Danube River route to Romanian ports is more promising; Ukraine already moved about two million metric tons per month that way and could potentially double the rate. Retired Admiral James Stavridis also proposed NATO-escorted convoys in the Black Sea using minesweepers, six frigates and destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and fighter jets to protect groups of three to five merchant ships.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth-1bmuupct)
- [Russia's Energy War Loss: A Geopolitical Analysis](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/russia-energy-war-loss-geopolitical-analysis)
- [Ukraine's Sea Drones are Getting Crazy](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraines-sea-drones-are-getting-crazy)
- [How Russia Gaslights the World: Putin's Decades-Long Campaign of Denial and Disinformation](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/how-russia-gaslights-the-world-putin-denial-disinformation)
- [Ukraine's Deep Strike Campaign: Crippling Russia's Oil Refining Capacity](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraines-deep-strike-campaign-crippling-russias-oil-refining-capacity)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources
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[1]: https://www.wfpusa.org/drivers-of-hunger/#:~:text=The%20Cause%20of%20Hunger%20is,%E2%80%93%20worst%20of%20all%20%E2%80%93%20conflict
[2]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1048452
[3]: https://time.com/6295062/ukraine-russia-grain-deal/
[4]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse
[5]: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative
[6]: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements
[7]: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vQD_V0AnKWLHzgF0CxQ3EhgpiYdLcbl4AyoP4znvSYI/edit#gid=0
[8]: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1S4BoVtWis1ytE-6ALRaoCovHrmsjuZUHQaiu7uTNEDE/edit#gid=0
[9]: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/China-not-expected-to-push-Russian-return-to-Black-Sea-grain-deal
[10]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139497
[11]: https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-us-grain-karabakh/32535675.html
[12]: https://www.usaid.gov/fact-sheet/food-security/black-sea-grain-initiative
[13]: https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/04/europe/ukraine-sea-drone-russian-warship-black-sea-intl/index.html
[14]: https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:30.7/centery:43.8/zoom:7
[15]: https://apnews.com/article/black-sea-grain-shipments-ukraine-russia-war-3e79b0842ca97c96e73b824d0e621722
[16]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/07/31/nato-planes-watched-as-three-civilian-ships-ran-russias-naval-blockade-of-ukraine/?sh=5173cb871b72
[17]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/07/25/nato-convoys-can-protect-ukraine-s-grain-harvest-from-putin/541a151e-2aa3-11ee-a948-a5b8a9b62d84_story.html
[18]: https://unctad.org/news/black-sea-grain-initiative-what-it-and-why-its-important-world
[19]: https://www.state.gov/russias-suspension-of-participation-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/
[20]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/17/black-sea-grain-initiative-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-russia-s-termination-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/
[21]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/black-sea-grain-deal-expire-monday-if-russia-quits-2023-07-17/
[22]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/17/russia-ukraine-black-sea-grain-deal-all-you-need-to-know
[23]: https://www.passblue.com/2023/05/08/where-are-ukraines-grains-actually-going-across-the-world/
[24]: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/
[25]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61759692
[26]: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1333847/ukrainian-agricultural-exports-via-the-black-sea-by-country/
[27]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/five-european-countries-will-extend-ban-on-ukraines-grain

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