---
title: "Are We Sleeping on a China-Philippines War?"
description: "When imagining a future conflict involving China, several likely scenarios spring to mind: an invasion of Taiwan, a border escalation with India, or a direct confrontation with the United States. But with Beijing’s increasing assertiveness, the number of potential flashpoints is steadily growing. Nowhere is this truer than in the Indo-Pacific, where many nations have been forced to accommodate China out of fear. But there is one Indo-Pacific outlier that has instead chosen a different approach. An approach that swaps accommodation for confrontation: the Philippines. Despite having previously leaned towards China under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines shifted course under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took over the reins in 2022. Since then, Manila has bolstered security ties with the US, pursued legal action over the South China Sea, and actively challenged Chinese provocations. All of which has earned the nation a special place on Beijing’s strategic target list. While everyone loves an underdog, in the arena of international affairs, a peaceful resolution is never guaranteed. With China in no mood to compromise, these mounting tensions could be leading to one incredibly unwelcome outcome: war.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- China claims 90% of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, a demarcation with no legal or historical basis.\n- Dramatic footage from August 2025 showed a Chinese warship colliding with a Chinese coast guard vessel while chasing a Philippine boat.\n- The US and the Philippines share a 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, granting US forces rotational access to nine military bases.\n- China’s military dominates with a $314 billion budget and over 2 million troops compared to the Philippines' $6.1 billion budget.\n- Philippine authorities flagged alleged Chinese meddling and disinformation campaigns in the May 2025 midterm local and national elections.\n- Beijing utilizes a gradual cabbage strategy to surround disputed maritime territory with layers of coast guard and fishing vessels.\n\n## The Geostrategic Importance of the South China Sea\n\nThe China-Philippine confrontation boils down to one very important flashpoint: the South China Sea. Roughly 3.5 million square kilometres in size, the South China Sea contains over 250 islands, atolls, and reefs. But what really matters is its grand geostrategic importance. For China, establishing a dominant position would represent a crucial step towards being able to puncture the First Island Chain, a strategic noose encircling the country composed of wary nations. Its existence threatens China’s maritime access, particularly in the event of a war. Considering the country’s export-led economic structure, from Beijing’s perspective, the need to loosen the rope is nothing short of existential. From the Philippines’ perspective, this body of water isn’t even known as the South China Sea. Instead, Manila calls it the West Philippine Sea, although the name change doesn’t mean it’s any less important. President Marcos Jr. outlined his country’s feelings at the May 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, when he proclaimed that: 'The life-giving waters of the West Philippine Sea flow in the blood of every Filipino. We cannot allow anyone to detach it from the totality of the maritime domain that renders our nation whole.' Unfortunately for Manila, Beijing is doing just that. China lays claim to no less than 90% of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, arguing that Chinese explorers were the first to venture into the waters. However, research by the Council on Geostrategy points out, this demarcation has no legal or historical basis. It is the product of misunderstandings and mistranslations by officials and private individuals in China during the 1930s. Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines all contest China’s claims. With territorial tensions simmering for decades, the dispute has been a slow-burning source of friction with occasional flare-ups.\n\n## Flashpoints and the War of Selfies in the Spratly Islands\n\nThere is little indication that these flames will die down anytime soon. Beijing’s overarching strategy involves using grey zone warfare to bully other claimants while avoiding open conflict. However, while China does not appear to want a war, a single misstep could easily set the entire region ablaze. Aside from those involving Taiwan, no other maritime disputes are more likely to be the trigger than those involving the Philippines. One of the biggest concerns is the Spratly Islands. Claimed in whole or part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, the archipelago is spread over a vast area in the central South China Sea. The naturally occurring land area is less than five square kilometres. While that may not sound like much, with the Spratlys sitting among some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, rich fishing grounds, and vast energy reserves, the islands are prime real estate. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan each occupy features within the Spratlys. While China has seven outposts, Vietnam has 21, the Philippines occupies nine, Malaysia possesses five, and Taiwan maintains a single island. One recent dispute occurred in the Spratlys in April 2025 when a Chinese state-run newspaper published photos showing military personnel posing with a national flag on Sandy Cay. The reef, which at just over 200 square metres is barely big enough to build a sandcastle, was subsequently visited by the Philippines Coast Guard a few days later for another photo op. The episode was named by some journalists as the 'war of selfies'. Another point of conflict in the Spratlys is found at Second Thomas Shoal, located 195 kilometres west of Palawan in the Philippines. In 1999, the Philippines deliberately ran aground a World War II-era ship called the BRP Sierra Madre onto the reef. The boat now acts as an outpost, with a small garrison of Philippine Marines stationed aboard ever since.\n\n## Blockades, the Cabbage Strategy, and Artificial Reefs\n\nUnsurprisingly, China was not impressed by Manila’s ingenuity. Most famously, in 2014, China maintained a three-week-long blockade of the Sierra Madre, forcing the Philippines to airdrop supplies to those stationed aboard. Although Manila’s actions resulted in Beijing ending the blockade, recent years have seen China amassing increasing numbers to harass resupply missions. Tactics such as ramming, loud sirens, blinding lights, and water cannons are regularly employed to assail Philippine vessels brave enough to enter the area. As the situation escalates and the Sierra Madre continues to rust away, the outpost’s longevity remains uncertain. And not just because the sea may yet reclaim it. Tensions spiked in August 2025 when a Chinese tugboat was spotted near the ship, fuelling speculation that Beijing might be preparing to tow it away. Although the Philippine Navy was quick to brush off the concerns and downplay the threat, the risk cannot be ruled out. Stranger things have happened at sea. Some 220 kilometres west of the Philippines' main island, Luzon, Scarborough Shoal marks another hotspot. Beijing seized the atoll from the Philippines in 2012 after a weeks-long standoff with the Philippines' navy eventually ended with the latter pulling back. Since then, China has maintained a constant and expanding patrol presence, enforcing a 22-kilometre exclusion zone through the same aggressive methods employed elsewhere. China’s coast guard and fishing vessels now dominate the area, preventing Philippine ships from entering the lagoon. The build-up of multiple layers of Chinese ships around disputed areas in the South China Sea is known as the cabbage strategy, a reference to the characteristically leafy layers of the vegetable. The Atlantic notes that a Chinese presence and de facto Chinese rights in disputed areas are built up gradually, in a series of provocations that are individually small enough to make forceful resistance politically difficult, but that collectively establish precedents and, over time, norms. One particularly striking dimension of this strategy has been the dredging of sediment to create and expand artificial reefs, effectively transforming them into military bases and strategic ports. This has been employed in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands to the northwest. In addition to demonstrating how China is mobilising its superior resources to maximum effect, these projects enable Beijing to consolidate its territorial claims, expand power-projection capabilities, and tighten control over fishing grounds and energy resources. As this process continues and the power imbalance grows, one wrong move could easily plunge the region into conflict.\n\n## Military Provocations and Rising Tensions at Sea\n\nGiven all outlined developments, the situation in the South China Sea remains highly precarious. But what makes it especially worrying is the way both Beijing and Manila are increasingly undertaking military actions to cement their claims. Every week, the Philippines sends reconnaissance flights near Scarborough Shoal to challenge China’s exclusion zones. There have been incidents where Chinese helicopters have deliberately flown within metres of Philippine planes, putting lives on both sides at risk. If that isn’t alarming enough, on the 11th of August 2025, dramatic footage was released showing a Chinese warship colliding with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel while chasing a Philippine patrol boat near Scarborough Shoal. Although the stricken Chinese vessel remained afloat, its entire bow was crumpled inward by the crash. At least three China Coast Guard personnel were on the bow at the time. While there has been no confirmation of any casualties, there is no guarantee that Beijing would be forthcoming with such information if there were. The situation has been a public relations nightmare. On the subject of public relations spins, it is worth noting that barely a drop of water enters the South China Sea these days without triggering aggressive rhetoric from Beijing. Following joint maritime exercises involving the US, Japan, and the Philippines in the latter's Exclusive Economic Zone in September 2025, the Chinese military came out swinging with a statement ironically asserting that 'We sternly warn the Philippine side to immediately stop provoking incidents and escalating tensions in the South China Sea, as well as bringing in external forces for backing such efforts that are destined to be futile.' Close calls in the South China Sea raise serious concerns about what would happen if one of these incidents caused a death directly as a result of another country's actions. While there have been no fatalities so far, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has warned that any Filipino deaths resulting from China's actions would be considered an act of war. Although these words could be designed to deter China rather than constituting an actual threat, with any war between the pair destined to have significant global implications, it is worthwhile examining how such a conflict could unfold.\n\n## The Asymmetric Reality of a Potential China-Philippines Conflict\n\nHow could the Philippines possibly stand up against the overwhelming power of the People's Liberation Army? The brutal reality is that it wouldn't. Just look at the matchup on paper. While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute put China's 2024 military budget at $314 billion, the Philippines' stood at just $6.1 billion. With China fielding the world’s largest military at roughly 2.04 million troops, compared with 143,000 for the Philippines, there is a similar disparity regarding personnel. The imbalance is also evident in their respective arsenals: China has three aircraft carriers, the Philippines has none; China has 5,000 main battle tanks, the Philippines has ten; and China has 1,025 military ships, whereas the Philippines has 134. In other words, this story is less David and Goliath, and more Goliath and the ant he stepped on en route to challenge David. Now, it is extremely unlikely that any China-Philippines War would involve either side using their full might. It is also improbable that such a conflict would involve a full-scale ground war. The costs outweigh the benefits to Beijing even if Xi Jinping believes he is guaranteed a victory. However, a limited campaign in which each side strikes the other’s outposts could be on the cards. Although a highly risky game, policymakers in Beijing may assess that their overwhelming military power could enable them to quickly achieve their strategic objectives before the United States intervenes. As for what that might look like, it is difficult to envision the fighting spilling onto the Philippine mainland as part of a Chinese campaign of broad territorial conquest. Doing so would be logistically complex, costly, and extremely dangerous given the presence of US forces. Operations, then, would likely be naval and air-focused, as well as highly localized, aiming to occupy or neutralize specific islands and outposts. With the technological sophistication of the People's Liberation Army, Beijing would likely rely on precision airstrikes to do the heavy lifting before any troop landings. Manila, meanwhile, would probably rely on defensive fortifications, asymmetric tactics like hit-and-run strikes or sea-denial operations, and swift diplomatic efforts to bring the US into the fight.\n\n## The United States Security Umbrella and Bilateral Agreements\n\nThe primary strategic card Manila is holding—the one factor that might make China hesitate to fully commit to a conflict—is the United States of America. The US and the Philippines are closely bound by several strategic agreements. Chief among them is the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, which obligates both nations to support each other if either is attacked by an external party. While the terms work both ways, the strategic dependence flows predominantly in one direction. Presently, the US has access to nine Philippine bases on a rotational basis: six air force bases, two army bases, and one naval base located in northern Luzon. Washington previously had access to five, before President Marcos Jr. reached an agreement with the Biden administration in February 2023 to provide access to an additional four. Other examples of Manila deepening security ties with the US include Washington announcing $500 million of military funding for the Philippines in July 2024, and a deal in November of the same year to allow classified information sharing between the pair. Any attempt to imagine what a conflict between Beijing and Manila would look like inevitably comes down to one question: would the United States truly intervene? Today, the answer is not entirely certain. Even beneath the US security umbrella, Philippine politicians worry about whether the current Trump administration would fully honour the Mutual Defence Treaty. If Washington is not prepared to intervene in the event of a conflict with China, the treaty's deterrence value significantly diminishes. It is widely noted that the Trump administration has frequently opted for a transactional foreign policy, contingent on limited interventionism and prioritizing economic concessions over traditional alliances. With little optimism about the US honouring international obligations, it is only natural that Manila remains deeply cautious.\n\n## Washington’s Assurances and Regional Spillover Risks\n\nDespite anxieties over US commitment, diplomatic rhetoric suggests a determination within at least parts of the Trump administration to support the Philippine cause. In January 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured Manila of America’s ironclad commitment to defending the Philippines in the face of growing Chinese aggression. US Secretary of Defence Pete Hesgeth echoed a similar position in July 2025 while hosting Marcos Jr. at the Pentagon. Hesgeth asserted that 'Our storied alliance has never been stronger or more essential than it is today. Together, we remain committed to the mutual defence treaty. And this pact extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.' By identifying the Indo-Pacific as its priority theatre, the US has sent a signal strong enough to make China think twice. The fact that Beijing has refrained from using lethal force in the South China Sea could be partly attributed to this deterrence. However, there is a chance that these assurances are largely posturing. After all, if, behind closed doors, Washington has no intention of coming to Manila's aid, it would still be in its interest to posture and deter China with hollow threats to kick the can down the road. The Philippines therefore needs to prepare for all potential contingencies, including a situation in which the United States does not come to the rescue. Furthermore, it is not only in the South China Sea where such a conflict could ignite. The Philippines has been particularly vocal when discussing the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Philippine Military Chief General Romeo Brawner recently stated that, 'If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved,' adding that 'we should have that mentality that we are already at war.' While a Taiwan scenario would obviously differ from a conflict breaking out directly between China and the Philippines, the risk underscores the likely role the Philippines will play in any future Indo-Pacific conflict involving China.\n\n## Gray Zone Warfare and Domestic Subversion\n\nWhere does this escalating situation end? In all likelihood, a continuation and expansion of the grey zone methods employed by China to harass the Philippines is to be expected. Beijing may soon introduce tactics utilized elsewhere into the Philippine equation. One example would be severing undersea cables to cut off communications and internet access, as seen in the Taiwan Strait. Another significant threat involves tampering with Philippine elections, a tactic China has been accused of deploying in Taiwan, Canada, and the US. Philippine authorities recently flagged alleged Chinese meddling in the May 2025 midterm local and national elections. According to officials, China-backed operations are actively spreading disinformation and divisive political discourse. Deputy Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives Paolo Ortega V has highlighted that this is foreign interference designed to infiltrate local politics, confuse the public, and weaken the country from the inside. By exploiting societal divisions, China could push to destabilize the Philippine government. This prospect appeared more plausible in light of recent unrest in Manila on the 21st of September 2025, when peaceful protests against corruption in flood control projects turned violent, resulting in mass arrests, burning police vehicles, and dozens of police officers injured by rock-hurling demonstrators. With domestic tensions already high, the conditions are ripe for Beijing to exploit. But conditions can escalate far beyond grey zone warfare and political subversion. When it comes to the South China Sea, there is a foreboding sense that, on the current trajectory, it is only a matter of time before an incident occurs that sparks a severe military confrontation. Whether the two sides can keep a lid on isolated clashes remains to be seen. Given the grave risks associated with a China-Philippine war developing into a broader Sino-American conflict, there must be sufficient diplomatic impetus to enable de-escalation if things risk getting fundamentally out of control.\n\n## The Global Axis and the Long Game of Geopolitics\n\nA localized war in the South China Sea would be economic suicide for all sides, which should theoretically add incentive to resolve things at the negotiating table. In fact, many more countries could be drawn in, with Australia, Japan, the UK, and other Western allies providing diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, or logistical assistance to the Philippines. Whereas Russia and potentially North Korea could step in to back China. While Moscow’s quagmire in Ukraine would likely reduce its role to a supportive one, Pyongyang’s willingness to provide boots on the ground to repel Ukrainian soldiers from Kursk suggests it could play a more direct part. Conflicts can be fought between countries despite the potentially catastrophic ramifications, as observed in 2025 with the limited wars between India and Pakistan in May, Thailand and Cambodia in July, as well as the 12-day war between Israel, the US, and Iran. But here’s the thing: Beijing doesn’t exactly need to risk it. In one-party states like China, strategic policy directions can be sustained for much longer periods. Leadership changes happen less often, and when they do, the successor comes from within the same party, ensuring a degree of continuity. At 72 years old, Xi Jinping could remain the leader of the Chinese Communist Party for years to come. Even if he were replaced tomorrow, his successor would likely hold similar views regarding China’s role and strategies in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, in democracies such as the Philippines, more frequent leadership changes often result in the country changing direction and heading toward a new vision. We have seen this in the contrasting stances on China taken by President Marcos Jr. and his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. While Beijing can play the long game, the Philippines’ current push to assert its rights in the South China Sea risks being undermined by a future administration that takes a softer line on China. Furthermore, even if the Philippines maintains its willpower to go toe-to-toe with China, determination might prove to be not enough. With China confident that its superior economic and military power will eventually bend its neighbour to its will, it would be useful for the Philippines to turn to the other claimants in the South China Sea to counter China. Although maritime security deals have been signed with Vietnam, strengthening ties further and seeking multinational cooperation with other claimants could be beneficial if done correctly. This could complement the country’s current alliances with extra-regional powers such as the US, Japan, and Australia through intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated patrols. Should a war kick off that sees Manila stand alone against Beijing, the sad reality is that the fall could be faster and more brutal than anyone could predict.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why does China claim most of the South China Sea?\n\nChina claims roughly 90 percent of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, arguing that Chinese explorers were the first to venture into those waters. Research by the Council on Geostrategy concludes this demarcation has no legal or historical basis and is the product of misunderstandings and mistranslations by officials and private individuals in China during the 1930s. From Beijing's strategic perspective, controlling the sea is also existential: it would allow China to break through the First Island Chain, the ring of wary nations that currently limits its maritime access.\n\n### What is the \"cabbage strategy\" China uses in the South China Sea?\n\nThe cabbage strategy refers to China's method of surrounding disputed maritime features with gradually expanding layers of coast guard and fishing vessels. Each individual step is small enough to make forceful resistance politically difficult, but over time the cumulative effect establishes Chinese de facto control and new norms. China has combined this approach with large-scale dredging to build and expand artificial reefs into military bases in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.\n\n### What happened at Second Thomas Shoal and why does it matter?\n\nIn 1999, the Philippines deliberately grounded a World War II-era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, on Second Thomas Shoal to serve as a permanent outpost garrisoned by Philippine Marines. China has since harassed resupply missions with water cannons, ramming, blinding lights, and sirens. In August 2025, a Chinese tugboat was spotted near the vessel, fuelling speculation that Beijing might attempt to tow it away, which would represent a major escalation.\n\n### Does the US–Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty actually protect the Philippines?\n\nThe 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty obliges both nations to support each other if attacked by an external party, and the US currently has rotational access to nine Philippine military bases. However, Philippine politicians worry about whether the Trump administration would fully honour the treaty, given its transactional foreign-policy approach. US Secretary of Defence Hegseth affirmed in July 2025 that the pact extends to armed attacks \"anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea,\" but whether these assurances are genuine or merely deterrence posturing remains uncertain.\n\n### How could a limited China-Philippines war unfold?\n\nA full-scale ground invasion of the Philippines would be logistically complex and extremely dangerous given US forces in the region, so operations would likely be naval and air-focused, targeting specific islands and outposts. China would probably rely on precision airstrikes before any troop landings, while the Philippines would use defensive fortifications, asymmetric hit-and-run tactics, and swift diplomatic efforts to draw the US into the fight. President Marcos Jr. has warned that any Filipino deaths caused directly by Chinese action would be considered an act of war.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [War is Coming. Europe isn't Ready.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/war-is-coming-europe-isnt-ready)\n- [North Korea’s Navy Shifts From Coastal Guard to Open‑Sea Threat](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/defense/north-korea-navy-shift-coastal-guard-open-sea-threat)\n- [America's New Fighter Jet, China's Invasion Ships, and More.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/americas-new-fighter-jet-chinas-invasion-ships-and-more)\n- [Is a Decades-Long Turkish War Finally Over? Abdullah Öcalan Calls for Peace.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-a-decades-long-turkish-war-finally-over-abdullah-calan-calls-for-peace)\n- [After Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia's Uncertain Future](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/after-nagorno-karabakh-armenias-uncertain-future)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/south-china-sea#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea%20is%20a%20semienclosed%20sea%20in%20the,almost%203.5%20million%20square%20kilometers>\n2. <https://therealnews.com/will-the-philippines-be-a-battleground-for-us-china-war>\n3. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan>\n4. <https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-103-resurgent-filipino-nationalism-amid-chinese-aggression-in-the-west-philippine-sea/>\n5. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/chinese-ships-crash-warship-coast-guard-south-china-sea>\n6. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/11/asia/south-china-sea-china-warship-collision-intl-hnk#:~:text=At%20least%20three%20China%20Coast,any%20casualties%20from%20the%20incident>\n7. <https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/the-south-china-sea-historical-and-legal-background/>\n8. <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea>\n9. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/11/whats-behind-escalating-china-philippines-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea>\n10. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-24/vietnam-steps-up-island-building-in-south-china-sea-says-csis>\n11. <https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf>\n12. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Scarborough-Shoal>\n13. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp3d4rz922do>\n14. <https://amti.csis.org/tracking-tensions-at-second-thomas-shoal/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%20two%20years,new%20outpost%20on%20Second%20Thomas>\n15. <https://san.com/cc/china-philippines-engage-in-war-of-selfies-on-disputed-south-china-sea-reef/>\n16. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-game/380789/>\n17. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2024-trends-world-military-expenditure-2024-encasv#:~:text=>\n18. <https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_China_vs_Philippines>\n19. <https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-phl/>\n20. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/07/02/filipino-military-pushes-naval-base-upgrades-fearing-chinese-spying/>\n21. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort#:~:text=During%20the%20Biden%20administration%2C%20Marcos,five%20previously%20agreed%2Dupon%20locations>\n22. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/18/philippines-us-sign-military-intelligence-sharing-deal-to-counter-china>\n23. <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-gain-access-bases-philippines-eye-china/story?id=96847125>\n24. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/30/us-hands-500m-military-aid-boost-to-philippines-amid-china-tensions>\n25. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/23/trump-administration-promises-ironclad-support-for-philippines-security>\n26. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-grand-bargain-philippines-caught-between-us-china>\n27. <https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/4250755/hegseth-philippine-president-meet-to-advance-deterrence-in-indo-pacific/>\n28. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/military-chief-says-philippines-inevitably-involved-if-taiwan-invaded>\n29. <https://maritimefairtrade.org/philippines-says-chinese-tugboat-seen-at-second-thomas-shoal-poses-no-immediate-threat/>\n30. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/iran-and-the-logic-of-limited-wars.html>\n31. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/vietnam-philippines-sign-deals-on-security-in-disputed-south-china-sea#:~:text=Vietnam%20and%20the%20Philippines%20have%20agreed%20to,claimed%20by%20Beijing%20almost%20in%20its%20entirety>\n32. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/videos/c62n2mm6ngjo>\n33. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwy3zy9jvd4o>\n34. <https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/philippine-authorities-call-out-alleged-chinese-election-interference/>\n35. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/14/chinas-military-warns-philippines-against-provocations-in-south-china-sea>\n\n[1]: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/south-china-sea#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea%20is%20a%20semienclosed%20sea%20in%20the,almost%203.5%20million%20square%20kilometers\n[2]: https://therealnews.com/will-the-philippines-be-a-battleground-for-us-china-war\n[3]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan\n[4]: https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-103-resurgent-filipino-nationalism-amid-chinese-aggression-in-the-west-philippine-sea/\n[5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/chinese-ships-crash-warship-coast-guard-south-china-sea\n[6]: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/11/asia/south-china-sea-china-warship-collision-intl-hnk#:~:text=At%20least%20three%20China%20Coast,any%20casualties%20from%20the%20incident\n[7]: https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/the-south-china-sea-historical-and-legal-background/\n[8]: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea\n[9]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/11/whats-behind-escalating-china-philippines-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea\n[10]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-24/vietnam-steps-up-island-building-in-south-china-sea-says-csis\n[11]: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf\n[12]: https://www.britannica.com/place/Scarborough-Shoal\n[13]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp3d4rz922do\n[14]: https://amti.csis.org/tracking-tensions-at-second-thomas-shoal/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%20two%20years,new%20outpost%20on%20Second%20Thomas\n[15]: https://san.com/cc/china-philippines-engage-in-war-of-selfies-on-disputed-south-china-sea-reef/\n[16]: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-game/380789/\n[17]: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2024-trends-world-military-expenditure-2024-encasv#:~:text=\n[18]: https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_China_vs_Philippines\n[19]: https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-phl/\n[20]: https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/07/02/filipino-military-pushes-naval-base-upgrades-fearing-chinese-spying/\n[21]: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort#:~:text=During%20the%20Biden%20administration%2C%20Marcos,five%20previously%20agreed%2Dupon%20locations\n[22]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/18/philippines-us-sign-military-intelligence-sharing-deal-to-counter-china\n[23]: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-gain-access-bases-philippines-eye-china/story?id=96847125\n[24]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/30/us-hands-500m-military-aid-boost-to-philippines-amid-china-tensions\n[25]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/23/trump-administration-promises-ironclad-support-for-philippines-security\n[26]: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-grand-bargain-philippines-caught-between-us-china\n[27]: https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/4250755/hegseth-philippine-president-meet-to-advance-deterrence-in-indo-pacific/\n[28]: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/military-chief-says-philippines-inevitably-involved-if-taiwan-invaded\n[29]: https://maritimefairtrade.org/philippines-says-chinese-tugboat-seen-at-second-thomas-shoal-poses-no-immediate-threat/\n[30]: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/iran-and-the-logic-of-limited-wars.html\n[31]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/vietnam-philippines-sign-deals-on-security-in-disputed-south-china-sea#:~:text=Vietnam%20and%20the%20Philippines%20have%20agreed%20to,claimed%20by%20Beijing%20almost%20in%20its%20entirety\n[32]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/videos/c62n2mm6ngjo\n[33]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwy3zy9jvd4o\n[34]: https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/philippine-authorities-call-out-alleged-chinese-election-interference/\n[35]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/14/chinas-military-warns-philippines-against-provocations-in-south-china-sea\n\n<!-- youtube:8TszXa5GsIw -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/china-philippines-south-china-sea-war-risk.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/china-philippines-south-china-sea-war-risk
datePublished: 2026-03-04
dateModified: 2026-03-04
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/8TszXa5GsIw/hero.jpg"
type: NewsArticle
contentHash: 598eca15dca40c92d598b90f661917aeda34579cca08718b0bea184bc816d79a
tokens: 8657
summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/china-philippines-south-china-sea-war-risk.md.summary.md
---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
When imagining a future conflict involving China, several likely scenarios spring to mind: an invasion of Taiwan, a border escalation with India, or a direct confrontation with the United States. But with Beijing’s increasing assertiveness, the number of potential flashpoints is steadily growing. Nowhere is this truer than in the Indo-Pacific, where many nations have been forced to accommodate China out of fear. But there is one Indo-Pacific outlier that has instead chosen a different approach. An approach that swaps accommodation for confrontation: the Philippines. Despite having previously leaned towards China under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines shifted course under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took over the reins in 2022. Since then, Manila has bolstered security ties with the US, pursued legal action over the South China Sea, and actively challenged Chinese provocations. All of which has earned the nation a special place on Beijing’s strategic target list. While everyone loves an underdog, in the arena of international affairs, a peaceful resolution is never guaranteed. With China in no mood to compromise, these mounting tensions could be leading to one incredibly unwelcome outcome: war.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- China claims 90% of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, a demarcation with no legal or historical basis.
- Dramatic footage from August 2025 showed a Chinese warship colliding with a Chinese coast guard vessel while chasing a Philippine boat.
- The US and the Philippines share a 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, granting US forces rotational access to nine military bases.
- China’s military dominates with a $314 billion budget and over 2 million troops compared to the Philippines' $6.1 billion budget.
- Philippine authorities flagged alleged Chinese meddling and disinformation campaigns in the May 2025 midterm local and national elections.
- Beijing utilizes a gradual cabbage strategy to surround disputed maritime territory with layers of coast guard and fishing vessels.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-geostrategic-importance-of-the-south-china-sea" -->
## The Geostrategic Importance of the South China Sea

The China-Philippine confrontation boils down to one very important flashpoint: the South China Sea. Roughly 3.5 million square kilometres in size, the South China Sea contains over 250 islands, atolls, and reefs. But what really matters is its grand geostrategic importance. For China, establishing a dominant position would represent a crucial step towards being able to puncture the First Island Chain, a strategic noose encircling the country composed of wary nations. Its existence threatens China’s maritime access, particularly in the event of a war. Considering the country’s export-led economic structure, from Beijing’s perspective, the need to loosen the rope is nothing short of existential. From the Philippines’ perspective, this body of water isn’t even known as the South China Sea. Instead, Manila calls it the West Philippine Sea, although the name change doesn’t mean it’s any less important. President Marcos Jr. outlined his country’s feelings at the May 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, when he proclaimed that: 'The life-giving waters of the West Philippine Sea flow in the blood of every Filipino. We cannot allow anyone to detach it from the totality of the maritime domain that renders our nation whole.' Unfortunately for Manila, Beijing is doing just that. China lays claim to no less than 90% of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, arguing that Chinese explorers were the first to venture into the waters. However, research by the Council on Geostrategy points out, this demarcation has no legal or historical basis. It is the product of misunderstandings and mistranslations by officials and private individuals in China during the 1930s. Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines all contest China’s claims. With territorial tensions simmering for decades, the dispute has been a slow-burning source of friction with occasional flare-ups.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-geostrategic-importance-of-the-south-china-sea" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="flashpoints-and-the-war-of-selfies-in-the-spratly-islands" -->
## Flashpoints and the War of Selfies in the Spratly Islands

There is little indication that these flames will die down anytime soon. Beijing’s overarching strategy involves using grey zone warfare to bully other claimants while avoiding open conflict. However, while China does not appear to want a war, a single misstep could easily set the entire region ablaze. Aside from those involving Taiwan, no other maritime disputes are more likely to be the trigger than those involving the Philippines. One of the biggest concerns is the Spratly Islands. Claimed in whole or part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, the archipelago is spread over a vast area in the central South China Sea. The naturally occurring land area is less than five square kilometres. While that may not sound like much, with the Spratlys sitting among some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, rich fishing grounds, and vast energy reserves, the islands are prime real estate. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan each occupy features within the Spratlys. While China has seven outposts, Vietnam has 21, the Philippines occupies nine, Malaysia possesses five, and Taiwan maintains a single island. One recent dispute occurred in the Spratlys in April 2025 when a Chinese state-run newspaper published photos showing military personnel posing with a national flag on Sandy Cay. The reef, which at just over 200 square metres is barely big enough to build a sandcastle, was subsequently visited by the Philippines Coast Guard a few days later for another photo op. The episode was named by some journalists as the 'war of selfies'. Another point of conflict in the Spratlys is found at Second Thomas Shoal, located 195 kilometres west of Palawan in the Philippines. In 1999, the Philippines deliberately ran aground a World War II-era ship called the BRP Sierra Madre onto the reef. The boat now acts as an outpost, with a small garrison of Philippine Marines stationed aboard ever since.

<!-- aeo:section end="flashpoints-and-the-war-of-selfies-in-the-spratly-islands" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="blockades-the-cabbage-strategy-and-artificial-reefs" -->
## Blockades, the Cabbage Strategy, and Artificial Reefs

Unsurprisingly, China was not impressed by Manila’s ingenuity. Most famously, in 2014, China maintained a three-week-long blockade of the Sierra Madre, forcing the Philippines to airdrop supplies to those stationed aboard. Although Manila’s actions resulted in Beijing ending the blockade, recent years have seen China amassing increasing numbers to harass resupply missions. Tactics such as ramming, loud sirens, blinding lights, and water cannons are regularly employed to assail Philippine vessels brave enough to enter the area. As the situation escalates and the Sierra Madre continues to rust away, the outpost’s longevity remains uncertain. And not just because the sea may yet reclaim it. Tensions spiked in August 2025 when a Chinese tugboat was spotted near the ship, fuelling speculation that Beijing might be preparing to tow it away. Although the Philippine Navy was quick to brush off the concerns and downplay the threat, the risk cannot be ruled out. Stranger things have happened at sea. Some 220 kilometres west of the Philippines' main island, Luzon, Scarborough Shoal marks another hotspot. Beijing seized the atoll from the Philippines in 2012 after a weeks-long standoff with the Philippines' navy eventually ended with the latter pulling back. Since then, China has maintained a constant and expanding patrol presence, enforcing a 22-kilometre exclusion zone through the same aggressive methods employed elsewhere. China’s coast guard and fishing vessels now dominate the area, preventing Philippine ships from entering the lagoon. The build-up of multiple layers of Chinese ships around disputed areas in the South China Sea is known as the cabbage strategy, a reference to the characteristically leafy layers of the vegetable. The Atlantic notes that a Chinese presence and de facto Chinese rights in disputed areas are built up gradually, in a series of provocations that are individually small enough to make forceful resistance politically difficult, but that collectively establish precedents and, over time, norms. One particularly striking dimension of this strategy has been the dredging of sediment to create and expand artificial reefs, effectively transforming them into military bases and strategic ports. This has been employed in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands to the northwest. In addition to demonstrating how China is mobilising its superior resources to maximum effect, these projects enable Beijing to consolidate its territorial claims, expand power-projection capabilities, and tighten control over fishing grounds and energy resources. As this process continues and the power imbalance grows, one wrong move could easily plunge the region into conflict.

<!-- aeo:section end="blockades-the-cabbage-strategy-and-artificial-reefs" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="military-provocations-and-rising-tensions-at-sea" -->
## Military Provocations and Rising Tensions at Sea

Given all outlined developments, the situation in the South China Sea remains highly precarious. But what makes it especially worrying is the way both Beijing and Manila are increasingly undertaking military actions to cement their claims. Every week, the Philippines sends reconnaissance flights near Scarborough Shoal to challenge China’s exclusion zones. There have been incidents where Chinese helicopters have deliberately flown within metres of Philippine planes, putting lives on both sides at risk. If that isn’t alarming enough, on the 11th of August 2025, dramatic footage was released showing a Chinese warship colliding with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel while chasing a Philippine patrol boat near Scarborough Shoal. Although the stricken Chinese vessel remained afloat, its entire bow was crumpled inward by the crash. At least three China Coast Guard personnel were on the bow at the time. While there has been no confirmation of any casualties, there is no guarantee that Beijing would be forthcoming with such information if there were. The situation has been a public relations nightmare. On the subject of public relations spins, it is worth noting that barely a drop of water enters the South China Sea these days without triggering aggressive rhetoric from Beijing. Following joint maritime exercises involving the US, Japan, and the Philippines in the latter's Exclusive Economic Zone in September 2025, the Chinese military came out swinging with a statement ironically asserting that 'We sternly warn the Philippine side to immediately stop provoking incidents and escalating tensions in the South China Sea, as well as bringing in external forces for backing such efforts that are destined to be futile.' Close calls in the South China Sea raise serious concerns about what would happen if one of these incidents caused a death directly as a result of another country's actions. While there have been no fatalities so far, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has warned that any Filipino deaths resulting from China's actions would be considered an act of war. Although these words could be designed to deter China rather than constituting an actual threat, with any war between the pair destined to have significant global implications, it is worthwhile examining how such a conflict could unfold.

<!-- aeo:section end="military-provocations-and-rising-tensions-at-sea" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-asymmetric-reality-of-a-potential-china-philippines-conflict" -->
## The Asymmetric Reality of a Potential China-Philippines Conflict

How could the Philippines possibly stand up against the overwhelming power of the People's Liberation Army? The brutal reality is that it wouldn't. Just look at the matchup on paper. While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute put China's 2024 military budget at $314 billion, the Philippines' stood at just $6.1 billion. With China fielding the world’s largest military at roughly 2.04 million troops, compared with 143,000 for the Philippines, there is a similar disparity regarding personnel. The imbalance is also evident in their respective arsenals: China has three aircraft carriers, the Philippines has none; China has 5,000 main battle tanks, the Philippines has ten; and China has 1,025 military ships, whereas the Philippines has 134. In other words, this story is less David and Goliath, and more Goliath and the ant he stepped on en route to challenge David. Now, it is extremely unlikely that any China-Philippines War would involve either side using their full might. It is also improbable that such a conflict would involve a full-scale ground war. The costs outweigh the benefits to Beijing even if Xi Jinping believes he is guaranteed a victory. However, a limited campaign in which each side strikes the other’s outposts could be on the cards. Although a highly risky game, policymakers in Beijing may assess that their overwhelming military power could enable them to quickly achieve their strategic objectives before the United States intervenes. As for what that might look like, it is difficult to envision the fighting spilling onto the Philippine mainland as part of a Chinese campaign of broad territorial conquest. Doing so would be logistically complex, costly, and extremely dangerous given the presence of US forces. Operations, then, would likely be naval and air-focused, as well as highly localized, aiming to occupy or neutralize specific islands and outposts. With the technological sophistication of the People's Liberation Army, Beijing would likely rely on precision airstrikes to do the heavy lifting before any troop landings. Manila, meanwhile, would probably rely on defensive fortifications, asymmetric tactics like hit-and-run strikes or sea-denial operations, and swift diplomatic efforts to bring the US into the fight.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-asymmetric-reality-of-a-potential-china-philippines-conflict" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-united-states-security-umbrella-and-bilateral-agreements" -->
## The United States Security Umbrella and Bilateral Agreements

The primary strategic card Manila is holding—the one factor that might make China hesitate to fully commit to a conflict—is the United States of America. The US and the Philippines are closely bound by several strategic agreements. Chief among them is the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, which obligates both nations to support each other if either is attacked by an external party. While the terms work both ways, the strategic dependence flows predominantly in one direction. Presently, the US has access to nine Philippine bases on a rotational basis: six air force bases, two army bases, and one naval base located in northern Luzon. Washington previously had access to five, before President Marcos Jr. reached an agreement with the Biden administration in February 2023 to provide access to an additional four. Other examples of Manila deepening security ties with the US include Washington announcing $500 million of military funding for the Philippines in July 2024, and a deal in November of the same year to allow classified information sharing between the pair. Any attempt to imagine what a conflict between Beijing and Manila would look like inevitably comes down to one question: would the United States truly intervene? Today, the answer is not entirely certain. Even beneath the US security umbrella, Philippine politicians worry about whether the current Trump administration would fully honour the Mutual Defence Treaty. If Washington is not prepared to intervene in the event of a conflict with China, the treaty's deterrence value significantly diminishes. It is widely noted that the Trump administration has frequently opted for a transactional foreign policy, contingent on limited interventionism and prioritizing economic concessions over traditional alliances. With little optimism about the US honouring international obligations, it is only natural that Manila remains deeply cautious.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-united-states-security-umbrella-and-bilateral-agreements" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="washington-s-assurances-and-regional-spillover-risks" -->
## Washington’s Assurances and Regional Spillover Risks

Despite anxieties over US commitment, diplomatic rhetoric suggests a determination within at least parts of the Trump administration to support the Philippine cause. In January 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured Manila of America’s ironclad commitment to defending the Philippines in the face of growing Chinese aggression. US Secretary of Defence Pete Hesgeth echoed a similar position in July 2025 while hosting Marcos Jr. at the Pentagon. Hesgeth asserted that 'Our storied alliance has never been stronger or more essential than it is today. Together, we remain committed to the mutual defence treaty. And this pact extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.' By identifying the Indo-Pacific as its priority theatre, the US has sent a signal strong enough to make China think twice. The fact that Beijing has refrained from using lethal force in the South China Sea could be partly attributed to this deterrence. However, there is a chance that these assurances are largely posturing. After all, if, behind closed doors, Washington has no intention of coming to Manila's aid, it would still be in its interest to posture and deter China with hollow threats to kick the can down the road. The Philippines therefore needs to prepare for all potential contingencies, including a situation in which the United States does not come to the rescue. Furthermore, it is not only in the South China Sea where such a conflict could ignite. The Philippines has been particularly vocal when discussing the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Philippine Military Chief General Romeo Brawner recently stated that, 'If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved,' adding that 'we should have that mentality that we are already at war.' While a Taiwan scenario would obviously differ from a conflict breaking out directly between China and the Philippines, the risk underscores the likely role the Philippines will play in any future Indo-Pacific conflict involving China.

<!-- aeo:section end="washington-s-assurances-and-regional-spillover-risks" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="gray-zone-warfare-and-domestic-subversion" -->
## Gray Zone Warfare and Domestic Subversion

Where does this escalating situation end? In all likelihood, a continuation and expansion of the grey zone methods employed by China to harass the Philippines is to be expected. Beijing may soon introduce tactics utilized elsewhere into the Philippine equation. One example would be severing undersea cables to cut off communications and internet access, as seen in the Taiwan Strait. Another significant threat involves tampering with Philippine elections, a tactic China has been accused of deploying in Taiwan, Canada, and the US. Philippine authorities recently flagged alleged Chinese meddling in the May 2025 midterm local and national elections. According to officials, China-backed operations are actively spreading disinformation and divisive political discourse. Deputy Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives Paolo Ortega V has highlighted that this is foreign interference designed to infiltrate local politics, confuse the public, and weaken the country from the inside. By exploiting societal divisions, China could push to destabilize the Philippine government. This prospect appeared more plausible in light of recent unrest in Manila on the 21st of September 2025, when peaceful protests against corruption in flood control projects turned violent, resulting in mass arrests, burning police vehicles, and dozens of police officers injured by rock-hurling demonstrators. With domestic tensions already high, the conditions are ripe for Beijing to exploit. But conditions can escalate far beyond grey zone warfare and political subversion. When it comes to the South China Sea, there is a foreboding sense that, on the current trajectory, it is only a matter of time before an incident occurs that sparks a severe military confrontation. Whether the two sides can keep a lid on isolated clashes remains to be seen. Given the grave risks associated with a China-Philippine war developing into a broader Sino-American conflict, there must be sufficient diplomatic impetus to enable de-escalation if things risk getting fundamentally out of control.

<!-- aeo:section end="gray-zone-warfare-and-domestic-subversion" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-global-axis-and-the-long-game-of-geopolitics" -->
## The Global Axis and the Long Game of Geopolitics

A localized war in the South China Sea would be economic suicide for all sides, which should theoretically add incentive to resolve things at the negotiating table. In fact, many more countries could be drawn in, with Australia, Japan, the UK, and other Western allies providing diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, or logistical assistance to the Philippines. Whereas Russia and potentially North Korea could step in to back China. While Moscow’s quagmire in Ukraine would likely reduce its role to a supportive one, Pyongyang’s willingness to provide boots on the ground to repel Ukrainian soldiers from Kursk suggests it could play a more direct part. Conflicts can be fought between countries despite the potentially catastrophic ramifications, as observed in 2025 with the limited wars between India and Pakistan in May, Thailand and Cambodia in July, as well as the 12-day war between Israel, the US, and Iran. But here’s the thing: Beijing doesn’t exactly need to risk it. In one-party states like China, strategic policy directions can be sustained for much longer periods. Leadership changes happen less often, and when they do, the successor comes from within the same party, ensuring a degree of continuity. At 72 years old, Xi Jinping could remain the leader of the Chinese Communist Party for years to come. Even if he were replaced tomorrow, his successor would likely hold similar views regarding China’s role and strategies in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, in democracies such as the Philippines, more frequent leadership changes often result in the country changing direction and heading toward a new vision. We have seen this in the contrasting stances on China taken by President Marcos Jr. and his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. While Beijing can play the long game, the Philippines’ current push to assert its rights in the South China Sea risks being undermined by a future administration that takes a softer line on China. Furthermore, even if the Philippines maintains its willpower to go toe-to-toe with China, determination might prove to be not enough. With China confident that its superior economic and military power will eventually bend its neighbour to its will, it would be useful for the Philippines to turn to the other claimants in the South China Sea to counter China. Although maritime security deals have been signed with Vietnam, strengthening ties further and seeking multinational cooperation with other claimants could be beneficial if done correctly. This could complement the country’s current alliances with extra-regional powers such as the US, Japan, and Australia through intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated patrols. Should a war kick off that sees Manila stand alone against Beijing, the sad reality is that the fall could be faster and more brutal than anyone could predict.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-global-axis-and-the-long-game-of-geopolitics" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why does China claim most of the South China Sea?

China claims roughly 90 percent of the South China Sea through its nine-dash line, arguing that Chinese explorers were the first to venture into those waters. Research by the Council on Geostrategy concludes this demarcation has no legal or historical basis and is the product of misunderstandings and mistranslations by officials and private individuals in China during the 1930s. From Beijing's strategic perspective, controlling the sea is also existential: it would allow China to break through the First Island Chain, the ring of wary nations that currently limits its maritime access.

### What is the "cabbage strategy" China uses in the South China Sea?

The cabbage strategy refers to China's method of surrounding disputed maritime features with gradually expanding layers of coast guard and fishing vessels. Each individual step is small enough to make forceful resistance politically difficult, but over time the cumulative effect establishes Chinese de facto control and new norms. China has combined this approach with large-scale dredging to build and expand artificial reefs into military bases in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

### What happened at Second Thomas Shoal and why does it matter?

In 1999, the Philippines deliberately grounded a World War II-era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, on Second Thomas Shoal to serve as a permanent outpost garrisoned by Philippine Marines. China has since harassed resupply missions with water cannons, ramming, blinding lights, and sirens. In August 2025, a Chinese tugboat was spotted near the vessel, fuelling speculation that Beijing might attempt to tow it away, which would represent a major escalation.

### Does the US–Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty actually protect the Philippines?

The 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty obliges both nations to support each other if attacked by an external party, and the US currently has rotational access to nine Philippine military bases. However, Philippine politicians worry about whether the Trump administration would fully honour the treaty, given its transactional foreign-policy approach. US Secretary of Defence Hegseth affirmed in July 2025 that the pact extends to armed attacks "anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea," but whether these assurances are genuine or merely deterrence posturing remains uncertain.

### How could a limited China-Philippines war unfold?

A full-scale ground invasion of the Philippines would be logistically complex and extremely dangerous given US forces in the region, so operations would likely be naval and air-focused, targeting specific islands and outposts. China would probably rely on precision airstrikes before any troop landings, while the Philippines would use defensive fortifications, asymmetric hit-and-run tactics, and swift diplomatic efforts to draw the US into the fight. President Marcos Jr. has warned that any Filipino deaths caused directly by Chinese action would be considered an act of war.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [War is Coming. Europe isn't Ready.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/war-is-coming-europe-isnt-ready)
- [North Korea’s Navy Shifts From Coastal Guard to Open‑Sea Threat](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/defense/north-korea-navy-shift-coastal-guard-open-sea-threat)
- [America's New Fighter Jet, China's Invasion Ships, and More.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/americas-new-fighter-jet-chinas-invasion-ships-and-more)
- [Is a Decades-Long Turkish War Finally Over? Abdullah Öcalan Calls for Peace.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-a-decades-long-turkish-war-finally-over-abdullah-calan-calls-for-peace)
- [After Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia's Uncertain Future](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/after-nagorno-karabakh-armenias-uncertain-future)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources
1. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/south-china-sea#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea%20is%20a%20semienclosed%20sea%20in%20the,almost%203.5%20million%20square%20kilometers>
2. <https://therealnews.com/will-the-philippines-be-a-battleground-for-us-china-war>
3. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan>
4. <https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-103-resurgent-filipino-nationalism-amid-chinese-aggression-in-the-west-philippine-sea/>
5. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/chinese-ships-crash-warship-coast-guard-south-china-sea>
6. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/11/asia/south-china-sea-china-warship-collision-intl-hnk#:~:text=At%20least%20three%20China%20Coast,any%20casualties%20from%20the%20incident>
7. <https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/the-south-china-sea-historical-and-legal-background/>
8. <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea>
9. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/11/whats-behind-escalating-china-philippines-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea>
10. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-24/vietnam-steps-up-island-building-in-south-china-sea-says-csis>
11. <https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf>
12. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Scarborough-Shoal>
13. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp3d4rz922do>
14. <https://amti.csis.org/tracking-tensions-at-second-thomas-shoal/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%20two%20years,new%20outpost%20on%20Second%20Thomas>
15. <https://san.com/cc/china-philippines-engage-in-war-of-selfies-on-disputed-south-china-sea-reef/>
16. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-game/380789/>
17. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2024-trends-world-military-expenditure-2024-encasv#:~:text=>
18. <https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_China_vs_Philippines>
19. <https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-phl/>
20. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/07/02/filipino-military-pushes-naval-base-upgrades-fearing-chinese-spying/>
21. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort#:~:text=During%20the%20Biden%20administration%2C%20Marcos,five%20previously%20agreed%2Dupon%20locations>
22. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/18/philippines-us-sign-military-intelligence-sharing-deal-to-counter-china>
23. <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-gain-access-bases-philippines-eye-china/story?id=96847125>
24. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/30/us-hands-500m-military-aid-boost-to-philippines-amid-china-tensions>
25. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/23/trump-administration-promises-ironclad-support-for-philippines-security>
26. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-grand-bargain-philippines-caught-between-us-china>
27. <https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/4250755/hegseth-philippine-president-meet-to-advance-deterrence-in-indo-pacific/>
28. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/military-chief-says-philippines-inevitably-involved-if-taiwan-invaded>
29. <https://maritimefairtrade.org/philippines-says-chinese-tugboat-seen-at-second-thomas-shoal-poses-no-immediate-threat/>
30. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/iran-and-the-logic-of-limited-wars.html>
31. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/vietnam-philippines-sign-deals-on-security-in-disputed-south-china-sea#:~:text=Vietnam%20and%20the%20Philippines%20have%20agreed%20to,claimed%20by%20Beijing%20almost%20in%20its%20entirety>
32. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/videos/c62n2mm6ngjo>
33. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwy3zy9jvd4o>
34. <https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/philippine-authorities-call-out-alleged-chinese-election-interference/>
35. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/14/chinas-military-warns-philippines-against-provocations-in-south-china-sea>

[1]: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/south-china-sea#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea%20is%20a%20semienclosed%20sea%20in%20the,almost%203.5%20million%20square%20kilometers
[2]: https://therealnews.com/will-the-philippines-be-a-battleground-for-us-china-war
[3]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan
[4]: https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-103-resurgent-filipino-nationalism-amid-chinese-aggression-in-the-west-philippine-sea/
[5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/chinese-ships-crash-warship-coast-guard-south-china-sea
[6]: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/11/asia/south-china-sea-china-warship-collision-intl-hnk#:~:text=At%20least%20three%20China%20Coast,any%20casualties%20from%20the%20incident
[7]: https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/the-south-china-sea-historical-and-legal-background/
[8]: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea
[9]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/11/whats-behind-escalating-china-philippines-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea
[10]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-24/vietnam-steps-up-island-building-in-south-china-sea-says-csis
[11]: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf
[12]: https://www.britannica.com/place/Scarborough-Shoal
[13]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp3d4rz922do
[14]: https://amti.csis.org/tracking-tensions-at-second-thomas-shoal/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%20two%20years,new%20outpost%20on%20Second%20Thomas
[15]: https://san.com/cc/china-philippines-engage-in-war-of-selfies-on-disputed-south-china-sea-reef/
[16]: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-game/380789/
[17]: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2024-trends-world-military-expenditure-2024-encasv#:~:text=
[18]: https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_China_vs_Philippines
[19]: https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-phl/
[20]: https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/07/02/filipino-military-pushes-naval-base-upgrades-fearing-chinese-spying/
[21]: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort#:~:text=During%20the%20Biden%20administration%2C%20Marcos,five%20previously%20agreed%2Dupon%20locations
[22]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/18/philippines-us-sign-military-intelligence-sharing-deal-to-counter-china
[23]: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-gain-access-bases-philippines-eye-china/story?id=96847125
[24]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/30/us-hands-500m-military-aid-boost-to-philippines-amid-china-tensions
[25]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/23/trump-administration-promises-ironclad-support-for-philippines-security
[26]: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-grand-bargain-philippines-caught-between-us-china
[27]: https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/4250755/hegseth-philippine-president-meet-to-advance-deterrence-in-indo-pacific/
[28]: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/military-chief-says-philippines-inevitably-involved-if-taiwan-invaded
[29]: https://maritimefairtrade.org/philippines-says-chinese-tugboat-seen-at-second-thomas-shoal-poses-no-immediate-threat/
[30]: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/iran-and-the-logic-of-limited-wars.html
[31]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/vietnam-philippines-sign-deals-on-security-in-disputed-south-china-sea#:~:text=Vietnam%20and%20the%20Philippines%20have%20agreed%20to,claimed%20by%20Beijing%20almost%20in%20its%20entirety
[32]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/videos/c62n2mm6ngjo
[33]: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwy3zy9jvd4o
[34]: https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/philippine-authorities-call-out-alleged-chinese-election-interference/
[35]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/14/chinas-military-warns-philippines-against-provocations-in-south-china-sea

&lt;!-- youtube:8TszXa5GsIw --&gt;
<!-- aeo:section end="sources" -->