---
title: "The Houthi Rebels Are Getting Much More Dangerous — Here's Why"
description: "The Red Sea is under siege. A critical maritime shipping route that has long been absolutely essential to global trade, the Red Sea, as well as the nearby Gulf of Aden, have been blockaded for nearly six months by a military force that can wreak havoc across the water without deploying a single ship. The perpetrators behind the blockade are the Houthi rebel organization, a powerful and growing movement inside the coastal Arab nation of Yemen that counts among its allies not just Yemeni civilians, but the powerful nearby nation of Iran. As war rages across the occupied territory of Gaza on the shores of the Mediterranean, the Houthis have chosen to make their own bold play in solidarity with their, and Iran's, mutual ally, the Hamas organization. They have done this not by sending troops or weapons to the Gaza Strip, but by launching a campaign of maritime terror right off the Houthis' own coast, where hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of global trade is right there for the taking. Now, after almost six months of practice, the Houthis are forcing the rest of the world to acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: they are getting a lot more dangerous. What started off as a shocking but ultimately just annoying stream of harassment, hemmed in by naval warships and doing most of its damage through insurance prices, has now evolved into a campaign that can claim foreign lives and send ships to the bottom of the ocean. Global sailors, industries, and nations alike are being forced to ask the same difficult question: Can the Houthi rebels still be reined in, or are they just getting started?\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- The Rubymar, struck by two Houthi anti-ship missiles on February 18, 2024, became the first vessel sunk in the Houthi Red Sea campaign after taking on water and sinking on March 2nd.\n- Three sailors died aboard the True Confidence on March 6, 2024 — two Filipinos and one Vietnamese — marking the first fatalities from a Houthi strike on a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden.\n- The Houthis now field radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles with at least 800-kilometer range, plus ballistic missiles with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms.\n- American airstrikes in February revealed Houthi possession of unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vessels, marking a significant expansion of their naval drone capabilities.\n- Several undersea telecommunications cables handling over 90 percent of Europe-Asia data traffic were damaged in early March 2024 off the Yemeni coast, with the cause still under investigation.\n- The Houthis represent the first land-based non-state actor in history to impose a partial naval blockade on a major global shipping route without deploying conventional naval vessels.\n\n## The Houthi Movement and the Axis of Resistance\n\nThe Houthi rebels, or more accurately the Houthi movement, have been a major force inside Yemen for several years now — a Shia Islamist political movement that primarily draws its local support from a Shia branch called the Zaidis, but has received significant financial, military, and logistical support from the nation of Iran. The Houthis have worked for a while to take over Yemen, and they have been largely successful, now controlling the nation's capital Sana'a, a long stretch of coast along the Red Sea, and quite a sizeable proportion of Yemen's overall landmass. They are among the more successful members of an informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance, a network of predominantly Shia Islamist organizations that each draw their support primarily from Iran. Alongside the Houthis are recognizable names like Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, plus a whole range of militias in Syria and Iraq, and the official Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad. When a fellow member of the Axis of Resistance came under attack — as the Hamas organization rather predictably did in Israel after launching a massive terrorist attack and retreating back into Gaza — the Houthis decided to step up and work to influence the outcome of the conflict. Their first military moves came just twelve days after Hamas' attack, when the Houthis launched three land-attack cruise missiles and a handful of drones, meant to fly past Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan and strike Israel. That first barrage was shot down by a US naval destroyer, the USS Carney, which has since racked up a score shooting down Houthi missiles and drones. For the next little while, the Houthis would fire occasional attacks toward Israel, shoot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone, and, according to Israel, launch one particular missile that was intercepted while above the Earth's atmosphere — thus notching humanity's first instance of space warfare. But although they caused a bit of a stir, the Houthis were not really able to move the needle in the Gaza conflict, and none of their attacks were successful. The Houthis then decided to switch targets.\n\n## The Pivot to Maritime Targets and the Red Sea Status Quo\n\nSeeing that Israeli air defense and Western ships could see their projectiles coming and deal with them, the Houthis decided to pivot toward a target much closer to home. Over the next few months, the Houthis would launch barrage after barrage of attacks toward maritime targets on the Red Sea: container ships, bulk carriers, and even military vessels. Some of the Houthi missiles and drones would hit their targets, causing international outcry and a panic among shipping companies, and although the Houthis initially claimed they would only target Israeli vessels, it became clear very quickly that their real list of targets was much longer. The global response would be severe, but not debilitating. An American-led air campaign destroyed some, but not all, offensive warfare capabilities on Houthi territory, and an international coalition of naval forces, although a bit less powerful or global than initially intended, was largely able to intercept Houthi missiles and drones so that, at worst, they caused only minor damage to commercial vessels. Global trade organizations became very nervous, but not paralyzed, and despite some rather massive insurance hikes, many companies continued sending traffic through the Red Sea instead of going all the way around Africa to make the crossing from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. But that calculus started to change on the evening of February 18, 2024, when a pair of Houthi anti-ship missiles scored direct hits on a ship called the Rubymar. It was a bulk carrier hauling about 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer from the United Arab Emirates to Belarus. Owned by a British company but flying the flag of Belize and operated by a company from Lebanon, it had a multinational crew on board: Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, and Filipinos, 24 people in total. The ship was hit once against its hull, close to the engine room, and once on its deck.\n\n## The Sinking of the Rubymar\n\nAll hands aboard the Rubymar were evacuated safely, and they have since been able to get back home, but the ship itself was not so lucky. As the evacuation went on, it became clear that the Rubymar was taking on water. A shipping advisory urged other vessels to keep their distance, and over the next few days, images continued to show the Rubymar in more and more dire trouble. First, the images showed the ship's stern hanging low in the water; then it looked as if a small section of the stern, just before the bridge, was underwater; then more and more of the ship was claimed by the sea in what appeared to be a losing battle. Initial plans to tow the Rubymar to port were eventually abandoned after none of the nearby countries would agree to receive it. Then, while the ship was still clearly in a bad way but not quite below the water yet, something happened. According to British maritime security firm Ambrey, there was an unspecified incident involving the Rubymar on Friday, March 1st, in which several Yemenis were harmed. Satellite images have since revealed small boats operating around the Rubymar, although who they belonged to was unclear. More likely than not, though, it was the Houthis coming back to finish the job; according to space company Maxar Technologies, satellite images taken after the incident revealed new blast damage on the Rubymar, with the small boats gone. A day later, on Saturday, March 2nd, the Rubymar was reported sunk, and subsequent aerial photographs have clearly shown the Rubymar's bow, name and all, lingering beneath the surface of the waves. On a practical level, the sinking of the Rubymar would pose challenges regardless of how or why it sank into the sea. Global environmental advocates are warning that the ship, which has already leaked an 18-mile oil slick into the Red Sea, will now set off an ecological bomb against the coral reefs of the nearby waters, courtesy of those 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer on board. It is also a massive underwater obstacle for other ships, which risk hitting it as they pass by if they are not careful. But from a wartime perspective, the sinking of the Rubymar is important for another reason. The Houthi rebels, after months regarded as a nuisance bunch of hooligans taking potshots from the seashore, have now scored a land-to-ship kill. Granted, the world has known for a little while that such a strike was technically possible. The Houthis have been deploying explosive drones and both cruise and ballistic missiles, and as the old adage goes, play with fire and somebody is going to get burned. But the fact remains that this major threshold was not one that the Houthis were necessarily expected to cross, and after a few dozen American airstrikes and a couple of supply-ship interceptions that found Iranian-supplied weaponry, the Red Sea had been settling into an uncomfortable but tolerable rhythm. With the sinking of the Rubymar, the calm on the Red Sea was shattered — finally matching a peace that was shattered months ago.\n\n## A Deadly Accuracy: Escalation After the Rubymar\n\nIn the wake of the strike on the Rubymar, and especially after it sunk, the ball was in the Houthis' court. Would the organization proudly claim responsibility and take the sunken ship as their cue to declare victory and withdraw to rebuild their missile stockpiles? Would they freeze up, realizing all of a sudden that things had gotten real, and try to minimize responsibility for an act that crossed from harassment into devastation? Or would they be forced to duck and cover, weathering a wave of international airstrikes that made the prior rounds look tame by comparison? The answer was none of the above. Rather than cower or resort to bluster, the Houthis decided to celebrate their victory with another hit of the launch button — and another, and another. They had already claimed the sinking of the Rubymar, falsely, on the day that it was struck, and around that same time they had taken credit for attacks on two other ships, both owned by the United States. One of those ships, the Navis Fortuna, was struck directly by a one-way attack drone, although it was still able to continue on its journey. The other, the Sea Champion, was targeted by two missiles, and though those missiles did not impact the ship directly, they exploded within a few meters of the ship and were able to cause damage. Another ship, the Danish tanker Torm Thor, reported a near miss from a Houthi missile — a near miss even despite the fact that that ship had a military escort. Numerous other drones and missiles were intercepted by US and European warships in the following several days, although a German warship also erroneously targeted a US drone at one point before realizing its mistake. In the air, the Houthis struck down another American Reaper drone with a surface-to-air missile, and while US retaliatory strikes hit Houthi missiles near or even inside Yemen, including ones hit on March 5th that were deemed ready to launch, it was unclear how much of an impact even those strikes would have. But even with coalition defenses heightened, the Houthis scored another direct hit. This time, the strike came on Monday, March 4th, against the container ship MSC Sky II. Flagged under the nation of Liberia and traveling from Singapore to the African coastal nation of Djibouti, the Sky II was hit in the Gulf of Aden. It was struck by an anti-ship missile, one of two that targeted it, and while no casualties were reported, the hit was severe enough to cause a fire. Notably, neither Djibouti, nor Singapore, nor Liberia, nor the ship's owner nation, Switzerland, have had much of anything to do with the Gaza conflict — yet another indicator that the Houthis are targeting ships indiscriminately, running contrary to the claim that their goal is to deter foreign nations from supporting Israel in Gaza. The Sky II has since arrived in Djibouti for evaluation. In the weeks following the hit on the Rubymar, the Houthis' rate of missile and drone launches declined somewhat. But at the same time, their consistent ability to get closer and closer to their targets suggests that the Houthis' targeting and attack practices are improving — meaning that even if fewer strikes are being launched, the actual threat posed by the Houthis is still growing.\n\n## Vulnerable Ships and the Question of Fatalities\n\nNow that it had become clear that the Houthis could score direct hits on commercial vessels, the next question about their capabilities was even more serious: could they kill people? To answer that question requires understanding what sorts of ships transit the Red Sea. Although the waterway hosts a wide range of vessels, the majority fall into three basic categories: container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers. Generally speaking, these are very large ships, anywhere from 120 meters long for smaller container ships, all the way to upward of 370 meters — 1,200 feet — or even longer for some of the world's biggest vessels. They have incredible carrying capacity, they sit high up out of the water even when fully loaded, and they are both slow and hard to maneuver, meaning that essentially they are sitting ducks on the water. While vessels like these can have as few as half a dozen crew if they are on the smaller side, most carry somewhere between twenty and thirty crew members, and a handful of security guards — perhaps two on the low end, to six on the high end. As far as the danger factors at play aboard these ships, the personnel themselves are usually concentrated in and around the ship's bridge, which is typically, although not always, oriented toward the stern of the ship. A few crew members and security guards might be operating elsewhere on the ship at any given time, but by and large, everybody is going to be toward wherever the bridge is located. The engine room is around that same area; if the engines are damaged, the ship will be unable to move or otherwise will have a hard time doing it. Fuel is stored within the hull, and while it is unlikely to ignite if struck by a missile directly, it is much more likely to spread across the ocean in vast spills and slicks if given a means to escape its fuel tanks. Just as important is what a ship is carrying onboard; by example, the Rubymar's cargo of fertilizer was volatile and considered capable of detonation if hit with the force that a direct missile strike could achieve. On top of all that, any disabled ship is subject to be lashed by bad weather, and ships are a known target for pirates and hijackers — something the Houthis themselves have proven capable of doing, including in a hijacking of a ship called the Galaxy Leader early in their current campaign. So yes, if the Houthis are capable of scoring direct hits on ships like the Rubymar and sinking them, then they are capable of killing people aboard these vessels as well. That is largely a matter of where on a ship a given missile or drone hits, and if they are capable of hitting the ship at all, then they are bound to hit crewed areas sooner or later. As for who could be killed — that is a complete crapshoot. Trade vessels can be owned by a company from one nation, operated by a company from somewhere else, leased by a company from a third nation, and sent to complete a job between a fourth nation and a fifth nation, all the while carrying cargo that was placed on it in nation number six. The people onboard will often be citizens of completely unrelated countries, speaking several languages and hailing from multiple continents. Not only might the Houthis not know or care where a ship technically hails from, but they are seemingly okay with taking the risk that a wide range of global nations could be impacted, including both friends and foes, if their strikes cause fatalities.\n\n## An Expanding Arsenal: Iranian Missiles, Drones, and Sea Warfare\n\nEven the fact that the Houthis are now doing consistent, real damage to trade vessels does not completely do justice to how quickly the rebel group is expanding its capabilities. Although not much is known about how the Houthis plan attacks or receive their weapons — largely owing to a decision by Western nations to disengage their intelligence networks from Yemen's long civil war across the last decade — the rebel organization today is a lot more dangerous than it used to be. One particular evolution comes in what the group can launch from its own territory, including both its anti-ship weapons and the weapons it deploys in its own defense. The Houthis have run through or discarded their older arsenals of obsolete Soviet missiles, and slightly better but still old and pretty ineffective Chinese ones. The ones they still do have are much more useful for military parades to boost morale than they are for any actual attacks. Instead, the Houthis now fill their stocks with radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles, estimated to have a range of at least 800 kilometers, and several Chinese missile models, also reproduced and transferred to the Houthis by Iran. They have also got ballistic missiles, including two models with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms — which is enough to punch a pretty massive hole through the hulls of most Red Sea vessels. They have even modified surface-to-air missiles, most likely captured from the internationally recognized Yemeni military, for use in ship attacks as well. Their drones, while much less effective in hitting sea targets, are still invaluable for drawing fire from coalition warships, engaging in swarm attacks to disguise the flight of more dangerous missiles, and potentially being steered much more precisely to hit certain parts of a ship. The Houthis' land-to-air defenses have proved repeatedly capable of shooting down American Reaper drones, courtesy of their own air defense systems. While those air defenses have not been capable of hitting American manned warplanes, they have been instrumental in limiting just how much aerial intelligence data the US and other nations can collect, while they are still trying to make up for the deficit in on-the-ground human intelligence assets. Beyond their air capabilities, American airstrikes have revealed a new weapon for the Houthis: sea drones. While they have long been considered a niche, almost theoretical element of drone warfare, naval drones have made a massive impact in Ukraine's arsenal over the past two years, being used against Russian targets in the Black Sea. According to American press after an airstrike in February, the Houthis are believed to now have naval drone capabilities too: both unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs). Although the US was able to destroy a couple of them, the much more important takeaway from those airstrikes was that the Houthis did have sea drones in their arsenal — something that, if they have got one, almost certainly indicates that they have got plenty more.\n\n## Sea Drones and the Threat to Undersea Cables\n\nBoth USVs and UUVs would represent a major evolution for the Houthis and would make their arsenal far more dangerous to Red Sea shipping than it already is. Surface drones typically sit low in the water and can attack either individually or in swarms, very hard to see or hit even in the best conditions. When attacking at night, painted black on top, they can be almost impossible to see even for military ships with the spotlights and personnel to search for them — let alone commercial vessels. And international military vessels in Red Sea waters might want to help, but these surface drones are hardly visible on radar. Undersea drones are even harder to detect, and because neither USVs nor UUVs have to be aerodynamic or obey the other demands that would make them flyable missiles, they can instead be packed with much heavier explosives. Because they sit at or below the water line, they are far more optimized toward creating the kind of ship damage that will lead directly to sunk vessels. Perhaps worst of all, since they do not need to stay airborne or even stay powered, they can be shut off and allowed to drift as if they were any other piece of sea pollution, before being reactivated as vulnerable merchant ships pass right within their range. Unsurprisingly, sea drones have been a dreaded but rather obvious next step for the Houthis for some time, and now that that threshold has been crossed, it is only a matter of time before these drones start popping up in interceptions or even successful attacks. And with new capabilities come new targets. In early March of 2024, news emerged that several critical undersea cables running through the Red Sea, just off the Yemeni coast, had been damaged or even severed under unclear circumstances. That portion of the Red Sea hosts about a dozen such cables, thick bundles of glass fibers with roughly the width of a garden hose, and despite how small and how few of them there are, they happen to handle over 90 percent of all telecommunications data between Europe and Asia. One company, Seacom, which provides communications to African nations, noticed that its line running from Kenya to Egypt through the Red Sea had stopped working, while a Hong Kong-based company, HGC Global Communications, found that two of its own cables — responsible for 25% of global data traffic in the area — had also been knocked out. If these cables were indeed cut by the Houthi rebels, as many news sources and analysts around the world have speculated, then there is not yet any proof. The cables could have easily been snagged by a dragging anchor, or affected by something geological or otherwise not man-made happening on the seafloor. They are easy to damage, with an average of 100 broken sea lines each year out of roughly 500 running underwater. Usually, marine accidents are responsible. But they also could have very easily been sabotaged — especially with, say, a heavily explosives-laden UUV that may or may not be in the Houthi arsenal. The cables have not yet been recovered and inspected, an operation that will need to clear red tape from inside Yemen in order to move forward, and with the earliest estimates on when that work can take place being as far away as April, it is not likely clear answers will come anytime soon. The Houthis have denied targeting the cables and have instead blamed British and American strikes. In the US, White House national security adviser John Kirby has relayed that the US has assessed that the dragging anchor of the Rubymar was responsible for severing the cables. That said, any consensus that the Rubymar's anchor was the cause of the problem will take a while to establish, and with Houthi boats believed to have been active around the ship — and thus the sea cables — before it sunk, it is hard to definitively conclude that a simple dragging anchor was the only factor at play. An attack on the sea cables would be directly in line with the Houthis' demonstrated modus operandi so far in their campaign. The Houthis have, thus far, been all about actions that impose costs to the world for not stopping the violence in Gaza — something that compromising large portions of the world's flow of data would certainly accomplish. That is something Yemen's internationally recognized government realized and started warning the world about several weeks ago. And even if the Houthis did not know where the sea cables were located previously, and might not have planned or even known to attack them — well, now they have been found with a good deal of accuracy, under a part of the Red Sea that is already in the Houthis' crosshairs.\n\n## First Fatalities: The Strike on the True Confidence\n\nWith the situation in the Red Sea getting worse and worse, the last few weeks had turned into a countdown until the first seemingly inevitable Houthi strike to claim the lives of people aboard vessels transiting the Red Sea. On March 6, 2024, that countdown clock ran down to zero. The strike took place not in the Red Sea, but the Gulf of Aden, about fifty nautical miles from the port city of Aden on the Yemeni coast. The target was a Greek- and Liberian-owned ship, the True Confidence, flying the flag of Barbados. A bulk carrier loaded with steel, making the journey from China's Jiangsu province to Saudi Arabia's port city of Jeddah, the ship was crewed by twenty people: one person from India, four from Vietnam, and fifteen from the Philippines, accompanied by two armed guards from Sri Lanka and a third from Nepal. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations agency, the ship had been contacted by radio in the minutes before the strike by a group calling itself the Yemeni navy, and it was told to change course. Shortly afterward, the ship was struck by a ballistic missile launched from Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen, hitting the ship's stern and significantly damaging its bridge and accommodations section. A fire broke out onboard, and twenty-one members of the crew were rescued via helicopter from life rafts near the ship, including several who were critically injured. Naval vessels from America and India took part in the rescue operation. Three crew members were confirmed dead — two hailing from the Philippines and one from Vietnam. Four others among the crew are known to be wounded, including three in critical condition. The names of the dead have not yet been released. The attack drew quick condemnation from most of the world, including calls from the United Nations for the Houthis to end their campaign against international shipping. The Houthis refused. Houthi military spokesman and Brigadier General Yahya Saree said in a pre-recorded message: \"The Yemeni armed forces persist in upholding their religious, moral and humanitarian duties in supporting the oppressed Palestinian people, and their operations in the Red and Arab Seas will not stop until the aggression stops and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted.\" The True Confidence is believed to be adrift and burning in open water on a trajectory away from land, with the future of any potential salvage or recovery operations still unclear. The injured crew who survived the attack have been transferred to Djibouti for urgent medical treatment.\n\n## A New Normal: Impunity, Costs, and the Limits of Intervention\n\nThe US carried out airstrikes against missiles being readied for launch in Yemen in the hours following the incident, but there has been no effort to engage in specific reprisal for the deaths of the three sailors — and there is not likely to be. At this juncture, any doubt that the Houthis can score major hits and kill international sailors on the Red Sea has been erased, and replaced by a grim awareness that this is the threat ships face when moving through the area. The price of insuring a ship for travel through the Red Sea already got more expensive after the Rubymar was sunk, and those rates are likely to go up more and more, driving even more traffic out of the Red Sea. Not only that, but shipping companies now must consider whether it is worth risking the lives of the sailors onboard their ships in order to shave a couple of weeks off transit times. While some companies will no doubt make that decision based simply on the costs incurred by crew deaths, others will prefer to change their own shipping routes rather than put real people in danger. All the while, no global nation seems to have any desire to put boots on the ground in Yemen and embroil itself in another long, costly war, least of all against the Houthis, who have the manpower, the arms, and the expertise to be very dangerous adversaries in a direct conflict on Yemeni soil. Nor does any world nation wish to directly inherit Yemen's ongoing humanitarian crisis, where millions of people are displaced and on the brink of famine. Engage in a military operation in Yemen, sow even more carnage across the country, and millions of starving mouths will need to be fed. At present, a direct intervention seems as unlikely as it has ever been, leaving nations like the US and the UK to conduct occasional airstrikes at any missiles or drones the Houthis happen to leave out within range of satellite imagery. With the deaths of these sailors, with the sinking of one ship and quite possibly the loss of another, comes another hard reality: the Houthi campaign is working. While the nations of the world have their rationale for not intervening more directly, the fact that the Houthis can continue their strikes with impunity is itself a sign of just how effective they have been at achieving exactly the mission they set out to complete. Global shipping is deterred from the Red Sea, and although the full extent of how much emptier the Red Sea is going to get after this latest crisis remains to be seen, the waterway will get a whole lot quieter than it has been.\n\n## Global Costs and the Houthis' Impact on Modern Warfare\n\nThe world is feeling the cost of the Houthi campaign, and while those costs are currently being felt by shipping companies and organizations who need to ship goods across global waters, they will soon be offset — at least in part — onto people everywhere. That will be true not just for people who live under governments that have supported Israel, but under governments who have condemned Israel too. And above all else, there is the solemn understanding that for ships that do choose to cross the Red Sea, and for crews who do choose to serve onboard, there is now a very real possibility that they are going to die on the way, killed as a second- or third-order repercussion of a conflict that never had anything to do with them. Then there is the Houthis' impact on war itself. What the Houthis have already achieved, nefarious though it may be, is nonetheless a historic evolution in terms of what militant groups can accomplish. Never before has a land-based, non-state actor been able to impose a naval blockade — even a partial one — without the use of any naval vessels beyond perhaps a couple of dinghies with militants riding on them. The fact that the Houthis have not only smashed through that barrier, but done it in a way that has threatened shipping, commerce, and people's lives all across the globe, marks a transition to a type of warfare that is popping up more and more often. In Ukraine, in Sudan, in Myanmar, in Iraq and Syria, and in other flashpoints around the world, smaller military or non-state forces have been able to use expendable, single-strike technology — cheaply manufactured in high numbers — to impose major costs and losses on an adversary that would traditionally have been regarded as much more formidable. In a broad sense, the Houthis are changing the nature of modern warfare. As the Houthi campaign progresses, the hope is that the worst is already behind: that the three civilian deaths in the Red Sea, and the deaths of Yemeni innocents caught in the crossfire between the Houthis and coalition air power, will be the only ones, and that this great ticking time bomb can be defused. But at present, it seems as if the writing is on the wall, and what that writing spells out is not encouraging. In all likelihood, this Houthi campaign will get worse before it gets better. Ships will not stop transiting the Red Sea, at least not yet, but it is abundantly clear that the Houthis are getting better and better at targeting the ships that do pass by, both with their land-to-sea missiles and drones, and with an expanding arsenal that gets more dangerous every day. Where this path ultimately ends, no one can yet say, but where it seems to be headed now gives precious little reason for optimism.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What was the significance of the Rubymar sinking?\n\nThe Rubymar, struck by two Houthi anti-ship missiles on February 18, 2024, became the first vessel sunk in the Houthi Red Sea campaign after taking on water and sinking on March 2nd. Its sinking marked a threshold moment: the Houthis had crossed from harassment into a land-to-ship kill, proving capable of actually sending commercial vessels to the bottom of the ocean and triggering major concern about the ecological impact of its 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer cargo.\n\n### How did the Houthis expand their arsenal beyond conventional missiles?\n\nAmerican airstrikes in February 2024 revealed that the Houthis possessed both unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs), marking a significant evolution beyond their land-to-sea missiles and drones. They had also replaced older Soviet and Chinese missile stocks with radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles with an estimated range of at least 800 kilometers, plus ballistic missiles with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms.\n\n### Who were the first sailors killed in the Houthi campaign, and what happened?\n\nOn March 6, 2024, three crew members of the bulk carrier True Confidence died after the ship was struck by a Houthi ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden — two Filipinos and one Vietnamese national. The missile hit the stern, severely damaging the bridge and accommodations section and causing a fire; 21 survivors were rescued by US and Indian naval vessels from life rafts, and several were critically injured.\n\n### Why are undersea telecommunications cables in the Red Sea considered at risk?\n\nSeveral critical cables running off the Yemeni coast in early March 2024 were damaged under unclear circumstances, affecting over 90 percent of telecommunications data flowing between Europe and Asia. While the US assessed that the dragging anchor of the sinking Rubymar may have been responsible, analysts noted that the Houthis' newly revealed UUV capability — explosive-laden drones that can drift silently and be reactivated — could also be used to sabotage cables, making attribution difficult to determine definitively.\n\n### What makes the Houthi campaign historically significant in terms of warfare?\n\nThe Houthis became the first land-based, non-state actor in history to impose a partial naval blockade on a major global shipping route without deploying conventional naval vessels. Operating exclusively from Yemeni soil using missiles, drones, and now sea drones, they disrupted hundreds of billions of dollars in global trade, raised insurance rates sharply, and demonstrated that cheap expendable strike technology can allow a non-state force to project power far beyond what traditional military analysis would have expected.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Where Are Iran's Proxy Forces? Why the Axis of Resistance Has Left Tehran to Face Israel Alone](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/iran-proxy-forces-axis-of-resistance-collapse-israel)\n- [The UAE is in MASSIVE Trouble.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-in-massive-trouble)\n- [Houthi Rebels Sink Two Ships in Red Sea as Ukraine Expands Anti-Russia Operations in Africa](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/houthi-rebels-sink-ships-red-sea-ukraine-africa-operations)\n- [The Israel-Iran War Could Get Much Worse: Critical Red Lines and Escalation Scenarios](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/israel-iran-war-escalation-red-lines-analysis)\n- [UAE's Regional Proxy Network Collapses: Middle East Realignment Against Abu Dhabi](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-proxy-network-collapse-middle-east-realignment)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis#:~:text=The%20Houthis%20are%20a%20large,before%20being%20overthrown%20in%201962>\n2. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/>\n3. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911>\n4. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/middleeast/houthi-yemen-red-sea-attacks.html>\n5. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940>\n6. <https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/>\n7. <https://apnews.com/article/us-airstrikes-yemen-houthi-rebels-cd92d4a9f9f514dc58db6b3bd722e006>\n8. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/>\n9. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/attacks-on-ships-and-u-s-drones-show-houthis-can-still-fight-despite-airstrikes>\n10. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68337027>\n11. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68363692>\n12. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-19/houthi-hit-ship-rubymar-was-struck-in-engine-room-manager-says?embedded-checkout=true>\n13. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/19/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news/houthi-ship-crew-rubymar?smid=url-share&utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2024Feb20&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief>\n14. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/19/houthi-attack-rubymar-ship-yemen/>\n15. <https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1759636773813068138>\n16. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ambrey-says-it-has-reports-another-incident-involving-rubymar-cargo-ship-2024-03-01/>\n17. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ship-recently-hit-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea-1st-vessel-lost-in-conflict>\n18. <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-rubymar-sinks-red-sea-fb64a490ce935756337ee3606e15d093>\n19. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/2/rubymar-cargo-ship-earlier-hit-by-houthis-has-sunk-yemeni-government-says>\n20. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea>\n21. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240303-cargo-ship-sunk-by-houthi-strike-poses-environmental-risk-says-us-military>\n22. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ship-attacked-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea/>\n23. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/05/sinking-of-rubymar-in-red-sea-poses-grave-environmental-risks-experts-warn>\n24. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68457445>\n25. <https://www.ft.com/content/90c55ef3-90e6-4f68-af8a-aafe87f8744b>\n26. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-owned-ship-reports-missile-attack-off-yemen-ambrey-says-2024-02-19/>\n27. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/20/politics/us-drone-yemen-houthis/index.html>\n28. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-yemens-houthis-ballistic-missile-misses-us-tanker-torm-thor-2024-02-26/>\n29. <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-hits-houthi-missiles-after-latest-attack-on-ship/7514090.html>\n30. <https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/>\n31. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-04/container-ship-tackles-fire-after-suffering-explosion-off-yemen?embedded-checkout=true>\n32. <https://www.barrons.com/news/msc-confirms-container-ship-hit-by-missile-off-yemen-0df2f7c4?refsec=topics_afp-news>\n33. <https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/100#:~:text=No%20hazard%20beyond%20that%20of%20ordinary%20combustible%20material.&text=Will%20not%20burn%20under%20typical%20fire%20conditions.&text=Capable%20of%20detonation%20or%20explosive,heated%20under%20confinement%20before%20initiation.&text=Possesses%20oxidizing%20properties>\n34. <https://www.wired.com/story/container-ships-use-super-dirty-fuel-that-needs-to-change/>\n35. <https://www.businessinsider.com/cargo-ship-living-quarters-pictures-tour-youtube-video-2021-11>\n36. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/>\n37. <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/>\n38. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-support-houthi-air-defenses-yemen>\n39. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/18/world/middleeast/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone.html>\n40. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/unmanned-houthi-submarines-pose-new-threat-us-warships/story?id=107343473>\n41. <https://news.usni.org/2024/02/19/houthi-lethal-underwater-drones-adds-new-threat-to-red-sea>\n42. <https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone-red-sea>\n43. <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-red-sea-israel-hamas-6ac2a1bf5032ed0531258816907cfe2c>\n44. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/business/red-sea-middle-east-conflict.html>\n45. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houthis-ship-cutting-red-sea-telecommunications-cables/>\n46. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68478828>\n47. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/03/04/four-fiber-optic-cables-damaged-in-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/?sh=4071e71a55b1>\n48. <https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-undersea-cables-yemen-houthi-rebels-attacks-b53051f61a41bd6b357860bbf0b0860a>\n49. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240306-bulk-carrier-hit-by-missile-from-yemen-crew-says-three-dead>\n50. <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-attacks-us-israel-palestinians-gaza-89c5440d9943216a787b39912bd969e0>\n51. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07>\n52. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695>\n53. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/least-2-killed-shipping-vessel-first-fatal-houthi-attack-start-israel-rcna142106>\n54. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/houthis-strike-ship-in-gulf-of-aden-yemen>\n55. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-missing-bulk-carrier-off-yemen-after-incident-reported-shipping-source-2024-03-06/>\n\n[1]: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis#:~:text=The%20Houthis%20are%20a%20large,before%20being%20overthrown%20in%201962\n[2]: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/\n[3]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911\n[4]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/middleeast/houthi-yemen-red-sea-attacks.html\n[5]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940\n[6]: https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/\n[7]: https://apnews.com/article/us-airstrikes-yemen-houthi-rebels-cd92d4a9f9f514dc58db6b3bd722e006\n[8]: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/\n[9]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/attacks-on-ships-and-u-s-drones-show-houthis-can-still-fight-despite-airstrikes\n[10]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68337027\n[11]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68363692\n[12]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-19/houthi-hit-ship-rubymar-was-struck-in-engine-room-manager-says?embedded-checkout=true\n[13]: https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/19/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news/houthi-ship-crew-rubymar?smid=url-share&utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2024Feb20&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief\n[14]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/19/houthi-attack-rubymar-ship-yemen/\n[15]: https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1759636773813068138\n[16]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ambrey-says-it-has-reports-another-incident-involving-rubymar-cargo-ship-2024-03-01/\n[17]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ship-recently-hit-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea-1st-vessel-lost-in-conflict\n[18]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-rubymar-sinks-red-sea-fb64a490ce935756337ee3606e15d093\n[19]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/2/rubymar-cargo-ship-earlier-hit-by-houthis-has-sunk-yemeni-government-says\n[20]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea\n[21]: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240303-cargo-ship-sunk-by-houthi-strike-poses-environmental-risk-says-us-military\n[22]: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ship-attacked-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea/\n[23]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/05/sinking-of-rubymar-in-red-sea-poses-grave-environmental-risks-experts-warn\n[24]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68457445\n[25]: https://www.ft.com/content/90c55ef3-90e6-4f68-af8a-aafe87f8744b\n[26]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-owned-ship-reports-missile-attack-off-yemen-ambrey-says-2024-02-19/\n[27]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/20/politics/us-drone-yemen-houthis/index.html\n[28]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-yemens-houthis-ballistic-missile-misses-us-tanker-torm-thor-2024-02-26/\n[29]: https://www.voanews.com/a/us-hits-houthi-missiles-after-latest-attack-on-ship/7514090.html\n[30]: https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/\n[31]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-04/container-ship-tackles-fire-after-suffering-explosion-off-yemen?embedded-checkout=true\n[32]: https://www.barrons.com/news/msc-confirms-container-ship-hit-by-missile-off-yemen-0df2f7c4?refsec=topics_afp-news\n[33]: https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/100#:~:text=No%20hazard%20beyond%20that%20of%20ordinary%20combustible%20material.&text=Will%20not%20burn%20under%20typical%20fire%20conditions.&text=Capable%20of%20detonation%20or%20explosive,heated%20under%20confinement%20before%20initiation.&text=Possesses%20oxidizing%20properties\n[34]: https://www.wired.com/story/container-ships-use-super-dirty-fuel-that-needs-to-change/\n[35]: https://www.businessinsider.com/cargo-ship-living-quarters-pictures-tour-youtube-video-2021-11\n[36]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/\n[37]: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/\n[38]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-support-houthi-air-defenses-yemen\n[39]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/18/world/middleeast/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone.html\n[40]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/unmanned-houthi-submarines-pose-new-threat-us-warships/story?id=107343473\n[41]: https://news.usni.org/2024/02/19/houthi-lethal-underwater-drones-adds-new-threat-to-red-sea\n[42]: https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone-red-sea\n[43]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-red-sea-israel-hamas-6ac2a1bf5032ed0531258816907cfe2c\n[44]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/business/red-sea-middle-east-conflict.html\n[45]: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houthis-ship-cutting-red-sea-telecommunications-cables/\n[46]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68478828\n[47]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/03/04/four-fiber-optic-cables-damaged-in-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/?sh=4071e71a55b1\n[48]: https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-undersea-cables-yemen-houthi-rebels-attacks-b53051f61a41bd6b357860bbf0b0860a\n[49]: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240306-bulk-carrier-hit-by-missile-from-yemen-crew-says-three-dead\n[50]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-attacks-us-israel-palestinians-gaza-89c5440d9943216a787b39912bd969e0\n[51]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07\n[52]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695\n[53]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/least-2-killed-shipping-vessel-first-fatal-houthi-attack-start-israel-rcna142106\n[54]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/houthis-strike-ship-in-gulf-of-aden-yemen\n[55]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-missing-bulk-carrier-off-yemen-after-incident-reported-shipping-source-2024-03-06/\n\n<!-- youtube:y_7id0Oi0cw -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthi-rebels-getting-more-dangerous.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthi-rebels-getting-more-dangerous
datePublished: 2026-03-04
dateModified: 2026-03-04
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/y_7id0Oi0cw/hero.png"
type: NewsArticle
contentHash: a28e123ac90d203091db4abbf612afb761261608bad89f9ea58a7bd57984ca82
tokens: 12103
summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthi-rebels-getting-more-dangerous.md.summary.md
---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
The Red Sea is under siege. A critical maritime shipping route that has long been absolutely essential to global trade, the Red Sea, as well as the nearby Gulf of Aden, have been blockaded for nearly six months by a military force that can wreak havoc across the water without deploying a single ship. The perpetrators behind the blockade are the Houthi rebel organization, a powerful and growing movement inside the coastal Arab nation of Yemen that counts among its allies not just Yemeni civilians, but the powerful nearby nation of Iran. As war rages across the occupied territory of Gaza on the shores of the Mediterranean, the Houthis have chosen to make their own bold play in solidarity with their, and Iran's, mutual ally, the Hamas organization. They have done this not by sending troops or weapons to the Gaza Strip, but by launching a campaign of maritime terror right off the Houthis' own coast, where hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of global trade is right there for the taking. Now, after almost six months of practice, the Houthis are forcing the rest of the world to acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: they are getting a lot more dangerous. What started off as a shocking but ultimately just annoying stream of harassment, hemmed in by naval warships and doing most of its damage through insurance prices, has now evolved into a campaign that can claim foreign lives and send ships to the bottom of the ocean. Global sailors, industries, and nations alike are being forced to ask the same difficult question: Can the Houthi rebels still be reined in, or are they just getting started?

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- The Rubymar, struck by two Houthi anti-ship missiles on February 18, 2024, became the first vessel sunk in the Houthi Red Sea campaign after taking on water and sinking on March 2nd.
- Three sailors died aboard the True Confidence on March 6, 2024 — two Filipinos and one Vietnamese — marking the first fatalities from a Houthi strike on a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden.
- The Houthis now field radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles with at least 800-kilometer range, plus ballistic missiles with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms.
- American airstrikes in February revealed Houthi possession of unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vessels, marking a significant expansion of their naval drone capabilities.
- Several undersea telecommunications cables handling over 90 percent of Europe-Asia data traffic were damaged in early March 2024 off the Yemeni coast, with the cause still under investigation.
- The Houthis represent the first land-based non-state actor in history to impose a partial naval blockade on a major global shipping route without deploying conventional naval vessels.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-houthi-movement-and-the-axis-of-resistance" -->
## The Houthi Movement and the Axis of Resistance

The Houthi rebels, or more accurately the Houthi movement, have been a major force inside Yemen for several years now — a Shia Islamist political movement that primarily draws its local support from a Shia branch called the Zaidis, but has received significant financial, military, and logistical support from the nation of Iran. The Houthis have worked for a while to take over Yemen, and they have been largely successful, now controlling the nation's capital Sana'a, a long stretch of coast along the Red Sea, and quite a sizeable proportion of Yemen's overall landmass. They are among the more successful members of an informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance, a network of predominantly Shia Islamist organizations that each draw their support primarily from Iran. Alongside the Houthis are recognizable names like Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, plus a whole range of militias in Syria and Iraq, and the official Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad. When a fellow member of the Axis of Resistance came under attack — as the Hamas organization rather predictably did in Israel after launching a massive terrorist attack and retreating back into Gaza — the Houthis decided to step up and work to influence the outcome of the conflict. Their first military moves came just twelve days after Hamas' attack, when the Houthis launched three land-attack cruise missiles and a handful of drones, meant to fly past Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan and strike Israel. That first barrage was shot down by a US naval destroyer, the USS Carney, which has since racked up a score shooting down Houthi missiles and drones. For the next little while, the Houthis would fire occasional attacks toward Israel, shoot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone, and, according to Israel, launch one particular missile that was intercepted while above the Earth's atmosphere — thus notching humanity's first instance of space warfare. But although they caused a bit of a stir, the Houthis were not really able to move the needle in the Gaza conflict, and none of their attacks were successful. The Houthis then decided to switch targets.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-houthi-movement-and-the-axis-of-resistance" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-pivot-to-maritime-targets-and-the-red-sea-status-quo" -->
## The Pivot to Maritime Targets and the Red Sea Status Quo

Seeing that Israeli air defense and Western ships could see their projectiles coming and deal with them, the Houthis decided to pivot toward a target much closer to home. Over the next few months, the Houthis would launch barrage after barrage of attacks toward maritime targets on the Red Sea: container ships, bulk carriers, and even military vessels. Some of the Houthi missiles and drones would hit their targets, causing international outcry and a panic among shipping companies, and although the Houthis initially claimed they would only target Israeli vessels, it became clear very quickly that their real list of targets was much longer. The global response would be severe, but not debilitating. An American-led air campaign destroyed some, but not all, offensive warfare capabilities on Houthi territory, and an international coalition of naval forces, although a bit less powerful or global than initially intended, was largely able to intercept Houthi missiles and drones so that, at worst, they caused only minor damage to commercial vessels. Global trade organizations became very nervous, but not paralyzed, and despite some rather massive insurance hikes, many companies continued sending traffic through the Red Sea instead of going all the way around Africa to make the crossing from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. But that calculus started to change on the evening of February 18, 2024, when a pair of Houthi anti-ship missiles scored direct hits on a ship called the Rubymar. It was a bulk carrier hauling about 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer from the United Arab Emirates to Belarus. Owned by a British company but flying the flag of Belize and operated by a company from Lebanon, it had a multinational crew on board: Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, and Filipinos, 24 people in total. The ship was hit once against its hull, close to the engine room, and once on its deck.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-pivot-to-maritime-targets-and-the-red-sea-status-quo" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-sinking-of-the-rubymar" -->
## The Sinking of the Rubymar

All hands aboard the Rubymar were evacuated safely, and they have since been able to get back home, but the ship itself was not so lucky. As the evacuation went on, it became clear that the Rubymar was taking on water. A shipping advisory urged other vessels to keep their distance, and over the next few days, images continued to show the Rubymar in more and more dire trouble. First, the images showed the ship's stern hanging low in the water; then it looked as if a small section of the stern, just before the bridge, was underwater; then more and more of the ship was claimed by the sea in what appeared to be a losing battle. Initial plans to tow the Rubymar to port were eventually abandoned after none of the nearby countries would agree to receive it. Then, while the ship was still clearly in a bad way but not quite below the water yet, something happened. According to British maritime security firm Ambrey, there was an unspecified incident involving the Rubymar on Friday, March 1st, in which several Yemenis were harmed. Satellite images have since revealed small boats operating around the Rubymar, although who they belonged to was unclear. More likely than not, though, it was the Houthis coming back to finish the job; according to space company Maxar Technologies, satellite images taken after the incident revealed new blast damage on the Rubymar, with the small boats gone. A day later, on Saturday, March 2nd, the Rubymar was reported sunk, and subsequent aerial photographs have clearly shown the Rubymar's bow, name and all, lingering beneath the surface of the waves. On a practical level, the sinking of the Rubymar would pose challenges regardless of how or why it sank into the sea. Global environmental advocates are warning that the ship, which has already leaked an 18-mile oil slick into the Red Sea, will now set off an ecological bomb against the coral reefs of the nearby waters, courtesy of those 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer on board. It is also a massive underwater obstacle for other ships, which risk hitting it as they pass by if they are not careful. But from a wartime perspective, the sinking of the Rubymar is important for another reason. The Houthi rebels, after months regarded as a nuisance bunch of hooligans taking potshots from the seashore, have now scored a land-to-ship kill. Granted, the world has known for a little while that such a strike was technically possible. The Houthis have been deploying explosive drones and both cruise and ballistic missiles, and as the old adage goes, play with fire and somebody is going to get burned. But the fact remains that this major threshold was not one that the Houthis were necessarily expected to cross, and after a few dozen American airstrikes and a couple of supply-ship interceptions that found Iranian-supplied weaponry, the Red Sea had been settling into an uncomfortable but tolerable rhythm. With the sinking of the Rubymar, the calm on the Red Sea was shattered — finally matching a peace that was shattered months ago.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-sinking-of-the-rubymar" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="a-deadly-accuracy-escalation-after-the-rubymar" -->
## A Deadly Accuracy: Escalation After the Rubymar

In the wake of the strike on the Rubymar, and especially after it sunk, the ball was in the Houthis' court. Would the organization proudly claim responsibility and take the sunken ship as their cue to declare victory and withdraw to rebuild their missile stockpiles? Would they freeze up, realizing all of a sudden that things had gotten real, and try to minimize responsibility for an act that crossed from harassment into devastation? Or would they be forced to duck and cover, weathering a wave of international airstrikes that made the prior rounds look tame by comparison? The answer was none of the above. Rather than cower or resort to bluster, the Houthis decided to celebrate their victory with another hit of the launch button — and another, and another. They had already claimed the sinking of the Rubymar, falsely, on the day that it was struck, and around that same time they had taken credit for attacks on two other ships, both owned by the United States. One of those ships, the Navis Fortuna, was struck directly by a one-way attack drone, although it was still able to continue on its journey. The other, the Sea Champion, was targeted by two missiles, and though those missiles did not impact the ship directly, they exploded within a few meters of the ship and were able to cause damage. Another ship, the Danish tanker Torm Thor, reported a near miss from a Houthi missile — a near miss even despite the fact that that ship had a military escort. Numerous other drones and missiles were intercepted by US and European warships in the following several days, although a German warship also erroneously targeted a US drone at one point before realizing its mistake. In the air, the Houthis struck down another American Reaper drone with a surface-to-air missile, and while US retaliatory strikes hit Houthi missiles near or even inside Yemen, including ones hit on March 5th that were deemed ready to launch, it was unclear how much of an impact even those strikes would have. But even with coalition defenses heightened, the Houthis scored another direct hit. This time, the strike came on Monday, March 4th, against the container ship MSC Sky II. Flagged under the nation of Liberia and traveling from Singapore to the African coastal nation of Djibouti, the Sky II was hit in the Gulf of Aden. It was struck by an anti-ship missile, one of two that targeted it, and while no casualties were reported, the hit was severe enough to cause a fire. Notably, neither Djibouti, nor Singapore, nor Liberia, nor the ship's owner nation, Switzerland, have had much of anything to do with the Gaza conflict — yet another indicator that the Houthis are targeting ships indiscriminately, running contrary to the claim that their goal is to deter foreign nations from supporting Israel in Gaza. The Sky II has since arrived in Djibouti for evaluation. In the weeks following the hit on the Rubymar, the Houthis' rate of missile and drone launches declined somewhat. But at the same time, their consistent ability to get closer and closer to their targets suggests that the Houthis' targeting and attack practices are improving — meaning that even if fewer strikes are being launched, the actual threat posed by the Houthis is still growing.

<!-- aeo:section end="a-deadly-accuracy-escalation-after-the-rubymar" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="vulnerable-ships-and-the-question-of-fatalities" -->
## Vulnerable Ships and the Question of Fatalities

Now that it had become clear that the Houthis could score direct hits on commercial vessels, the next question about their capabilities was even more serious: could they kill people? To answer that question requires understanding what sorts of ships transit the Red Sea. Although the waterway hosts a wide range of vessels, the majority fall into three basic categories: container ships, bulk carriers, and tankers. Generally speaking, these are very large ships, anywhere from 120 meters long for smaller container ships, all the way to upward of 370 meters — 1,200 feet — or even longer for some of the world's biggest vessels. They have incredible carrying capacity, they sit high up out of the water even when fully loaded, and they are both slow and hard to maneuver, meaning that essentially they are sitting ducks on the water. While vessels like these can have as few as half a dozen crew if they are on the smaller side, most carry somewhere between twenty and thirty crew members, and a handful of security guards — perhaps two on the low end, to six on the high end. As far as the danger factors at play aboard these ships, the personnel themselves are usually concentrated in and around the ship's bridge, which is typically, although not always, oriented toward the stern of the ship. A few crew members and security guards might be operating elsewhere on the ship at any given time, but by and large, everybody is going to be toward wherever the bridge is located. The engine room is around that same area; if the engines are damaged, the ship will be unable to move or otherwise will have a hard time doing it. Fuel is stored within the hull, and while it is unlikely to ignite if struck by a missile directly, it is much more likely to spread across the ocean in vast spills and slicks if given a means to escape its fuel tanks. Just as important is what a ship is carrying onboard; by example, the Rubymar's cargo of fertilizer was volatile and considered capable of detonation if hit with the force that a direct missile strike could achieve. On top of all that, any disabled ship is subject to be lashed by bad weather, and ships are a known target for pirates and hijackers — something the Houthis themselves have proven capable of doing, including in a hijacking of a ship called the Galaxy Leader early in their current campaign. So yes, if the Houthis are capable of scoring direct hits on ships like the Rubymar and sinking them, then they are capable of killing people aboard these vessels as well. That is largely a matter of where on a ship a given missile or drone hits, and if they are capable of hitting the ship at all, then they are bound to hit crewed areas sooner or later. As for who could be killed — that is a complete crapshoot. Trade vessels can be owned by a company from one nation, operated by a company from somewhere else, leased by a company from a third nation, and sent to complete a job between a fourth nation and a fifth nation, all the while carrying cargo that was placed on it in nation number six. The people onboard will often be citizens of completely unrelated countries, speaking several languages and hailing from multiple continents. Not only might the Houthis not know or care where a ship technically hails from, but they are seemingly okay with taking the risk that a wide range of global nations could be impacted, including both friends and foes, if their strikes cause fatalities.

<!-- aeo:section end="vulnerable-ships-and-the-question-of-fatalities" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="an-expanding-arsenal-iranian-missiles-drones-and-sea-warfare" -->
## An Expanding Arsenal: Iranian Missiles, Drones, and Sea Warfare

Even the fact that the Houthis are now doing consistent, real damage to trade vessels does not completely do justice to how quickly the rebel group is expanding its capabilities. Although not much is known about how the Houthis plan attacks or receive their weapons — largely owing to a decision by Western nations to disengage their intelligence networks from Yemen's long civil war across the last decade — the rebel organization today is a lot more dangerous than it used to be. One particular evolution comes in what the group can launch from its own territory, including both its anti-ship weapons and the weapons it deploys in its own defense. The Houthis have run through or discarded their older arsenals of obsolete Soviet missiles, and slightly better but still old and pretty ineffective Chinese ones. The ones they still do have are much more useful for military parades to boost morale than they are for any actual attacks. Instead, the Houthis now fill their stocks with radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles, estimated to have a range of at least 800 kilometers, and several Chinese missile models, also reproduced and transferred to the Houthis by Iran. They have also got ballistic missiles, including two models with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms — which is enough to punch a pretty massive hole through the hulls of most Red Sea vessels. They have even modified surface-to-air missiles, most likely captured from the internationally recognized Yemeni military, for use in ship attacks as well. Their drones, while much less effective in hitting sea targets, are still invaluable for drawing fire from coalition warships, engaging in swarm attacks to disguise the flight of more dangerous missiles, and potentially being steered much more precisely to hit certain parts of a ship. The Houthis' land-to-air defenses have proved repeatedly capable of shooting down American Reaper drones, courtesy of their own air defense systems. While those air defenses have not been capable of hitting American manned warplanes, they have been instrumental in limiting just how much aerial intelligence data the US and other nations can collect, while they are still trying to make up for the deficit in on-the-ground human intelligence assets. Beyond their air capabilities, American airstrikes have revealed a new weapon for the Houthis: sea drones. While they have long been considered a niche, almost theoretical element of drone warfare, naval drones have made a massive impact in Ukraine's arsenal over the past two years, being used against Russian targets in the Black Sea. According to American press after an airstrike in February, the Houthis are believed to now have naval drone capabilities too: both unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs). Although the US was able to destroy a couple of them, the much more important takeaway from those airstrikes was that the Houthis did have sea drones in their arsenal — something that, if they have got one, almost certainly indicates that they have got plenty more.

<!-- aeo:section end="an-expanding-arsenal-iranian-missiles-drones-and-sea-warfare" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sea-drones-and-the-threat-to-undersea-cables" -->
## Sea Drones and the Threat to Undersea Cables

Both USVs and UUVs would represent a major evolution for the Houthis and would make their arsenal far more dangerous to Red Sea shipping than it already is. Surface drones typically sit low in the water and can attack either individually or in swarms, very hard to see or hit even in the best conditions. When attacking at night, painted black on top, they can be almost impossible to see even for military ships with the spotlights and personnel to search for them — let alone commercial vessels. And international military vessels in Red Sea waters might want to help, but these surface drones are hardly visible on radar. Undersea drones are even harder to detect, and because neither USVs nor UUVs have to be aerodynamic or obey the other demands that would make them flyable missiles, they can instead be packed with much heavier explosives. Because they sit at or below the water line, they are far more optimized toward creating the kind of ship damage that will lead directly to sunk vessels. Perhaps worst of all, since they do not need to stay airborne or even stay powered, they can be shut off and allowed to drift as if they were any other piece of sea pollution, before being reactivated as vulnerable merchant ships pass right within their range. Unsurprisingly, sea drones have been a dreaded but rather obvious next step for the Houthis for some time, and now that that threshold has been crossed, it is only a matter of time before these drones start popping up in interceptions or even successful attacks. And with new capabilities come new targets. In early March of 2024, news emerged that several critical undersea cables running through the Red Sea, just off the Yemeni coast, had been damaged or even severed under unclear circumstances. That portion of the Red Sea hosts about a dozen such cables, thick bundles of glass fibers with roughly the width of a garden hose, and despite how small and how few of them there are, they happen to handle over 90 percent of all telecommunications data between Europe and Asia. One company, Seacom, which provides communications to African nations, noticed that its line running from Kenya to Egypt through the Red Sea had stopped working, while a Hong Kong-based company, HGC Global Communications, found that two of its own cables — responsible for 25% of global data traffic in the area — had also been knocked out. If these cables were indeed cut by the Houthi rebels, as many news sources and analysts around the world have speculated, then there is not yet any proof. The cables could have easily been snagged by a dragging anchor, or affected by something geological or otherwise not man-made happening on the seafloor. They are easy to damage, with an average of 100 broken sea lines each year out of roughly 500 running underwater. Usually, marine accidents are responsible. But they also could have very easily been sabotaged — especially with, say, a heavily explosives-laden UUV that may or may not be in the Houthi arsenal. The cables have not yet been recovered and inspected, an operation that will need to clear red tape from inside Yemen in order to move forward, and with the earliest estimates on when that work can take place being as far away as April, it is not likely clear answers will come anytime soon. The Houthis have denied targeting the cables and have instead blamed British and American strikes. In the US, White House national security adviser John Kirby has relayed that the US has assessed that the dragging anchor of the Rubymar was responsible for severing the cables. That said, any consensus that the Rubymar's anchor was the cause of the problem will take a while to establish, and with Houthi boats believed to have been active around the ship — and thus the sea cables — before it sunk, it is hard to definitively conclude that a simple dragging anchor was the only factor at play. An attack on the sea cables would be directly in line with the Houthis' demonstrated modus operandi so far in their campaign. The Houthis have, thus far, been all about actions that impose costs to the world for not stopping the violence in Gaza — something that compromising large portions of the world's flow of data would certainly accomplish. That is something Yemen's internationally recognized government realized and started warning the world about several weeks ago. And even if the Houthis did not know where the sea cables were located previously, and might not have planned or even known to attack them — well, now they have been found with a good deal of accuracy, under a part of the Red Sea that is already in the Houthis' crosshairs.

<!-- aeo:section end="sea-drones-and-the-threat-to-undersea-cables" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="first-fatalities-the-strike-on-the-true-confidence" -->
## First Fatalities: The Strike on the True Confidence

With the situation in the Red Sea getting worse and worse, the last few weeks had turned into a countdown until the first seemingly inevitable Houthi strike to claim the lives of people aboard vessels transiting the Red Sea. On March 6, 2024, that countdown clock ran down to zero. The strike took place not in the Red Sea, but the Gulf of Aden, about fifty nautical miles from the port city of Aden on the Yemeni coast. The target was a Greek- and Liberian-owned ship, the True Confidence, flying the flag of Barbados. A bulk carrier loaded with steel, making the journey from China's Jiangsu province to Saudi Arabia's port city of Jeddah, the ship was crewed by twenty people: one person from India, four from Vietnam, and fifteen from the Philippines, accompanied by two armed guards from Sri Lanka and a third from Nepal. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations agency, the ship had been contacted by radio in the minutes before the strike by a group calling itself the Yemeni navy, and it was told to change course. Shortly afterward, the ship was struck by a ballistic missile launched from Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen, hitting the ship's stern and significantly damaging its bridge and accommodations section. A fire broke out onboard, and twenty-one members of the crew were rescued via helicopter from life rafts near the ship, including several who were critically injured. Naval vessels from America and India took part in the rescue operation. Three crew members were confirmed dead — two hailing from the Philippines and one from Vietnam. Four others among the crew are known to be wounded, including three in critical condition. The names of the dead have not yet been released. The attack drew quick condemnation from most of the world, including calls from the United Nations for the Houthis to end their campaign against international shipping. The Houthis refused. Houthi military spokesman and Brigadier General Yahya Saree said in a pre-recorded message: "The Yemeni armed forces persist in upholding their religious, moral and humanitarian duties in supporting the oppressed Palestinian people, and their operations in the Red and Arab Seas will not stop until the aggression stops and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted." The True Confidence is believed to be adrift and burning in open water on a trajectory away from land, with the future of any potential salvage or recovery operations still unclear. The injured crew who survived the attack have been transferred to Djibouti for urgent medical treatment.

<!-- aeo:section end="first-fatalities-the-strike-on-the-true-confidence" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="a-new-normal-impunity-costs-and-the-limits-of-intervention" -->
## A New Normal: Impunity, Costs, and the Limits of Intervention

The US carried out airstrikes against missiles being readied for launch in Yemen in the hours following the incident, but there has been no effort to engage in specific reprisal for the deaths of the three sailors — and there is not likely to be. At this juncture, any doubt that the Houthis can score major hits and kill international sailors on the Red Sea has been erased, and replaced by a grim awareness that this is the threat ships face when moving through the area. The price of insuring a ship for travel through the Red Sea already got more expensive after the Rubymar was sunk, and those rates are likely to go up more and more, driving even more traffic out of the Red Sea. Not only that, but shipping companies now must consider whether it is worth risking the lives of the sailors onboard their ships in order to shave a couple of weeks off transit times. While some companies will no doubt make that decision based simply on the costs incurred by crew deaths, others will prefer to change their own shipping routes rather than put real people in danger. All the while, no global nation seems to have any desire to put boots on the ground in Yemen and embroil itself in another long, costly war, least of all against the Houthis, who have the manpower, the arms, and the expertise to be very dangerous adversaries in a direct conflict on Yemeni soil. Nor does any world nation wish to directly inherit Yemen's ongoing humanitarian crisis, where millions of people are displaced and on the brink of famine. Engage in a military operation in Yemen, sow even more carnage across the country, and millions of starving mouths will need to be fed. At present, a direct intervention seems as unlikely as it has ever been, leaving nations like the US and the UK to conduct occasional airstrikes at any missiles or drones the Houthis happen to leave out within range of satellite imagery. With the deaths of these sailors, with the sinking of one ship and quite possibly the loss of another, comes another hard reality: the Houthi campaign is working. While the nations of the world have their rationale for not intervening more directly, the fact that the Houthis can continue their strikes with impunity is itself a sign of just how effective they have been at achieving exactly the mission they set out to complete. Global shipping is deterred from the Red Sea, and although the full extent of how much emptier the Red Sea is going to get after this latest crisis remains to be seen, the waterway will get a whole lot quieter than it has been.

<!-- aeo:section end="a-new-normal-impunity-costs-and-the-limits-of-intervention" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="global-costs-and-the-houthis-impact-on-modern-warfare" -->
## Global Costs and the Houthis' Impact on Modern Warfare

The world is feeling the cost of the Houthi campaign, and while those costs are currently being felt by shipping companies and organizations who need to ship goods across global waters, they will soon be offset — at least in part — onto people everywhere. That will be true not just for people who live under governments that have supported Israel, but under governments who have condemned Israel too. And above all else, there is the solemn understanding that for ships that do choose to cross the Red Sea, and for crews who do choose to serve onboard, there is now a very real possibility that they are going to die on the way, killed as a second- or third-order repercussion of a conflict that never had anything to do with them. Then there is the Houthis' impact on war itself. What the Houthis have already achieved, nefarious though it may be, is nonetheless a historic evolution in terms of what militant groups can accomplish. Never before has a land-based, non-state actor been able to impose a naval blockade — even a partial one — without the use of any naval vessels beyond perhaps a couple of dinghies with militants riding on them. The fact that the Houthis have not only smashed through that barrier, but done it in a way that has threatened shipping, commerce, and people's lives all across the globe, marks a transition to a type of warfare that is popping up more and more often. In Ukraine, in Sudan, in Myanmar, in Iraq and Syria, and in other flashpoints around the world, smaller military or non-state forces have been able to use expendable, single-strike technology — cheaply manufactured in high numbers — to impose major costs and losses on an adversary that would traditionally have been regarded as much more formidable. In a broad sense, the Houthis are changing the nature of modern warfare. As the Houthi campaign progresses, the hope is that the worst is already behind: that the three civilian deaths in the Red Sea, and the deaths of Yemeni innocents caught in the crossfire between the Houthis and coalition air power, will be the only ones, and that this great ticking time bomb can be defused. But at present, it seems as if the writing is on the wall, and what that writing spells out is not encouraging. In all likelihood, this Houthi campaign will get worse before it gets better. Ships will not stop transiting the Red Sea, at least not yet, but it is abundantly clear that the Houthis are getting better and better at targeting the ships that do pass by, both with their land-to-sea missiles and drones, and with an expanding arsenal that gets more dangerous every day. Where this path ultimately ends, no one can yet say, but where it seems to be headed now gives precious little reason for optimism.

<!-- aeo:section end="global-costs-and-the-houthis-impact-on-modern-warfare" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What was the significance of the Rubymar sinking?

The Rubymar, struck by two Houthi anti-ship missiles on February 18, 2024, became the first vessel sunk in the Houthi Red Sea campaign after taking on water and sinking on March 2nd. Its sinking marked a threshold moment: the Houthis had crossed from harassment into a land-to-ship kill, proving capable of actually sending commercial vessels to the bottom of the ocean and triggering major concern about the ecological impact of its 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer cargo.

### How did the Houthis expand their arsenal beyond conventional missiles?

American airstrikes in February 2024 revealed that the Houthis possessed both unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs), marking a significant evolution beyond their land-to-sea missiles and drones. They had also replaced older Soviet and Chinese missile stocks with radar- and infrared-capable Iranian missiles with an estimated range of at least 800 kilometers, plus ballistic missiles with anti-ship warheads of at least 300 kilograms.

### Who were the first sailors killed in the Houthi campaign, and what happened?

On March 6, 2024, three crew members of the bulk carrier True Confidence died after the ship was struck by a Houthi ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden — two Filipinos and one Vietnamese national. The missile hit the stern, severely damaging the bridge and accommodations section and causing a fire; 21 survivors were rescued by US and Indian naval vessels from life rafts, and several were critically injured.

### Why are undersea telecommunications cables in the Red Sea considered at risk?

Several critical cables running off the Yemeni coast in early March 2024 were damaged under unclear circumstances, affecting over 90 percent of telecommunications data flowing between Europe and Asia. While the US assessed that the dragging anchor of the sinking Rubymar may have been responsible, analysts noted that the Houthis' newly revealed UUV capability — explosive-laden drones that can drift silently and be reactivated — could also be used to sabotage cables, making attribution difficult to determine definitively.

### What makes the Houthi campaign historically significant in terms of warfare?

The Houthis became the first land-based, non-state actor in history to impose a partial naval blockade on a major global shipping route without deploying conventional naval vessels. Operating exclusively from Yemeni soil using missiles, drones, and now sea drones, they disrupted hundreds of billions of dollars in global trade, raised insurance rates sharply, and demonstrated that cheap expendable strike technology can allow a non-state force to project power far beyond what traditional military analysis would have expected.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [Where Are Iran's Proxy Forces? Why the Axis of Resistance Has Left Tehran to Face Israel Alone](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/iran-proxy-forces-axis-of-resistance-collapse-israel)
- [The UAE is in MASSIVE Trouble.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-in-massive-trouble)
- [Houthi Rebels Sink Two Ships in Red Sea as Ukraine Expands Anti-Russia Operations in Africa](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/houthi-rebels-sink-ships-red-sea-ukraine-africa-operations)
- [The Israel-Iran War Could Get Much Worse: Critical Red Lines and Escalation Scenarios](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/israel-iran-war-escalation-red-lines-analysis)
- [UAE's Regional Proxy Network Collapses: Middle East Realignment Against Abu Dhabi](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-proxy-network-collapse-middle-east-realignment)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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30. <https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/>
31. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-04/container-ship-tackles-fire-after-suffering-explosion-off-yemen?embedded-checkout=true>
32. <https://www.barrons.com/news/msc-confirms-container-ship-hit-by-missile-off-yemen-0df2f7c4?refsec=topics_afp-news>
33. <https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/100#:~:text=No%20hazard%20beyond%20that%20of%20ordinary%20combustible%20material.&text=Will%20not%20burn%20under%20typical%20fire%20conditions.&text=Capable%20of%20detonation%20or%20explosive,heated%20under%20confinement%20before%20initiation.&text=Possesses%20oxidizing%20properties>
34. <https://www.wired.com/story/container-ships-use-super-dirty-fuel-that-needs-to-change/>
35. <https://www.businessinsider.com/cargo-ship-living-quarters-pictures-tour-youtube-video-2021-11>
36. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/>
37. <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/>
38. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-support-houthi-air-defenses-yemen>
39. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/18/world/middleeast/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone.html>
40. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/unmanned-houthi-submarines-pose-new-threat-us-warships/story?id=107343473>
41. <https://news.usni.org/2024/02/19/houthi-lethal-underwater-drones-adds-new-threat-to-red-sea>
42. <https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone-red-sea>
43. <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-red-sea-israel-hamas-6ac2a1bf5032ed0531258816907cfe2c>
44. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/business/red-sea-middle-east-conflict.html>
45. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houthis-ship-cutting-red-sea-telecommunications-cables/>
46. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68478828>
47. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/03/04/four-fiber-optic-cables-damaged-in-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/?sh=4071e71a55b1>
48. <https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-undersea-cables-yemen-houthi-rebels-attacks-b53051f61a41bd6b357860bbf0b0860a>
49. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240306-bulk-carrier-hit-by-missile-from-yemen-crew-says-three-dead>
50. <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-attacks-us-israel-palestinians-gaza-89c5440d9943216a787b39912bd969e0>
51. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07>
52. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695>
53. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/least-2-killed-shipping-vessel-first-fatal-houthi-attack-start-israel-rcna142106>
54. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/houthis-strike-ship-in-gulf-of-aden-yemen>
55. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-missing-bulk-carrier-off-yemen-after-incident-reported-shipping-source-2024-03-06/>

[1]: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis#:~:text=The%20Houthis%20are%20a%20large,before%20being%20overthrown%20in%201962
[2]: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/
[3]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911
[4]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/middleeast/houthi-yemen-red-sea-attacks.html
[5]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940
[6]: https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/
[7]: https://apnews.com/article/us-airstrikes-yemen-houthi-rebels-cd92d4a9f9f514dc58db6b3bd722e006
[8]: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/
[9]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/attacks-on-ships-and-u-s-drones-show-houthis-can-still-fight-despite-airstrikes
[10]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68337027
[11]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68363692
[12]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-19/houthi-hit-ship-rubymar-was-struck-in-engine-room-manager-says?embedded-checkout=true
[13]: https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/19/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news/houthi-ship-crew-rubymar?smid=url-share&utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2024Feb20&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief
[14]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/19/houthi-attack-rubymar-ship-yemen/
[15]: https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1759636773813068138
[16]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ambrey-says-it-has-reports-another-incident-involving-rubymar-cargo-ship-2024-03-01/
[17]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ship-recently-hit-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea-1st-vessel-lost-in-conflict
[18]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-rubymar-sinks-red-sea-fb64a490ce935756337ee3606e15d093
[19]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/2/rubymar-cargo-ship-earlier-hit-by-houthis-has-sunk-yemeni-government-says
[20]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea
[21]: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240303-cargo-ship-sunk-by-houthi-strike-poses-environmental-risk-says-us-military
[22]: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ship-attacked-by-yemens-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-the-red-sea/
[23]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/05/sinking-of-rubymar-in-red-sea-poses-grave-environmental-risks-experts-warn
[24]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68457445
[25]: https://www.ft.com/content/90c55ef3-90e6-4f68-af8a-aafe87f8744b
[26]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-owned-ship-reports-missile-attack-off-yemen-ambrey-says-2024-02-19/
[27]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/20/politics/us-drone-yemen-houthis/index.html
[28]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-yemens-houthis-ballistic-missile-misses-us-tanker-torm-thor-2024-02-26/
[29]: https://www.voanews.com/a/us-hits-houthi-missiles-after-latest-attack-on-ship/7514090.html
[30]: https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/
[31]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-04/container-ship-tackles-fire-after-suffering-explosion-off-yemen?embedded-checkout=true
[32]: https://www.barrons.com/news/msc-confirms-container-ship-hit-by-missile-off-yemen-0df2f7c4?refsec=topics_afp-news
[33]: https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/100#:~:text=No%20hazard%20beyond%20that%20of%20ordinary%20combustible%20material.&text=Will%20not%20burn%20under%20typical%20fire%20conditions.&text=Capable%20of%20detonation%20or%20explosive,heated%20under%20confinement%20before%20initiation.&text=Possesses%20oxidizing%20properties
[34]: https://www.wired.com/story/container-ships-use-super-dirty-fuel-that-needs-to-change/
[35]: https://www.businessinsider.com/cargo-ship-living-quarters-pictures-tour-youtube-video-2021-11
[36]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/
[37]: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/
[38]: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-support-houthi-air-defenses-yemen
[39]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/18/world/middleeast/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone.html
[40]: https://abcnews.go.com/International/unmanned-houthi-submarines-pose-new-threat-us-warships/story?id=107343473
[41]: https://news.usni.org/2024/02/19/houthi-lethal-underwater-drones-adds-new-threat-to-red-sea
[42]: https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/us-houthi-strike-underwater-drone-red-sea
[43]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-red-sea-israel-hamas-6ac2a1bf5032ed0531258816907cfe2c
[44]: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/business/red-sea-middle-east-conflict.html
[45]: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houthis-ship-cutting-red-sea-telecommunications-cables/
[46]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68478828
[47]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/03/04/four-fiber-optic-cables-damaged-in-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/?sh=4071e71a55b1
[48]: https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-undersea-cables-yemen-houthi-rebels-attacks-b53051f61a41bd6b357860bbf0b0860a
[49]: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240306-bulk-carrier-hit-by-missile-from-yemen-crew-says-three-dead
[50]: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-attacks-us-israel-palestinians-gaza-89c5440d9943216a787b39912bd969e0
[51]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07
[52]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695
[53]: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/least-2-killed-shipping-vessel-first-fatal-houthi-attack-start-israel-rcna142106
[54]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/houthis-strike-ship-in-gulf-of-aden-yemen
[55]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-missing-bulk-carrier-off-yemen-after-incident-reported-shipping-source-2024-03-06/

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