--- title: "The Houthis Enter the Iran War: A New Front and a Buried Ground Plan" description: "Just before the weekend, on a Friday night, we put out a video about how much the Houthis could tip the scales if they decided to enter the Iran war. Apparently someone in Houthi high command was watching, because the very next day the group threw its hat into the ring. And with that, all hell once again broke loose in the Middle East.\n\nWhile it is still early hours in terms of what the Houthis' grand plan is, none of the signs so far are exactly good. The group is almost the perfect complement to the regime in Tehran. Where Iran can close the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis' position in Yemen means they could potentially also shut down Red Sea shipping, a move that would pile even more pressure on the global economy.\n\nBeyond the Houthis entering the chat, this weekend brought confirmation that there had been a secret ground component of this war all along: Kurdish fighters, backed by Mossad, with the goal of pushing all the way to Tehran. Suffice it to say, things did not go according to plan.\n\nSlightly over a month into the Iran war, the picture is one of widening fronts, a collapsed regime-change gambit, and a fragile diplomatic process that may not be real at all.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- The Houthis formally entered the war on Saturday, firing ballistic missiles and then cruise missiles and drones at southern Israel; all were intercepted with no casualties, but the real threat is their potential closure of the Bab al-Mandeb strait.\n- The Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer chokepoint, has become close to indispensable now that the Strait of Hormuz sits in semi-closure; nearly six million barrels of oil a day transit the corridor, and Goldman Sachs warns prices could blow past the 2008 high of $147.50 a barrel if flows stay depressed.\n- A secret Mossad plan to use tens of thousands of Iranian Kurdish fighters as a ground force — pushing all the way to Tehran — collapsed after media leaks, withheld assurances, and Turkish pressure, leaving the coalition without a viable regime-change path.\n- Trump's claimed US-Iran negotiations are disputed by both Iran and a senior House Democrat, while the extended April 6th deadline, 2,500 Marines in theater, and the 82nd Airborne en route signal that military escalation remains very much on the table.\n- Iran's governance has fractured between President Pezeshkian and the IRGC, Supreme Leader Khamenei has not been seen since the war's opening strikes, and in Lebanon Iran's ambassador is defying an expulsion order backed by Hezbollah and Amal.\n\n## Late to the Party: The Houthis Open a Second Front\n\nThe Houthis are here. Just last Friday, WarFronts released an episode covering what the group could do if it went all-in on the Iran war, and to severely understate the case, it is not great for the rest of the world.\n\nSaturday marked their formal entry. Ballistic missiles aimed at what they described as \"sensitive military positions\" in southern Israel triggered sirens across Beersheba, followed by a second wave of cruise missiles and drones hours later. All of these were fully intercepted, with no casualties or damage reported on the Israeli side. Sunday, by contrast, was quiet, with no additional launches or claims from Houthi media. That put the all-out war scenario from the earlier episode off to the side, at least for now.\n\nThe concern that rippled through nearly every capital in the world had almost nothing to do with the missiles themselves and far more to do with the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and what happens to the global oil supply if the Houthis decide to shut it down.\n\n## The Bab al-Mandeb: A Chokepoint Turned Indispensable\n\nSo far, the Houthis have not moved to close the strait. Dozens of tankers were still transiting the Red Sea daily at the time of recording, early on a Monday. But the Red Sea matters for global trade in the best of times, and with the Strait of Hormuz in a state of semi-closure for weeks, it matters a great deal more.\n\nThe way Hormuz was shut down is worth understanding, because Iran did not have to physically blockade it or lay a single mine. The threat of launching on tankers, backed by the fact that they did launch on one in the early days of the war, was enough to effectively close the whole thing. Within days, the risk was so high that most ship owners simply stopped sailing.\n\nThat turned the Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer gap between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, into something close to indispensable. Saudi Arabia has maxed out its East-West Petroline at seven million barrels a day to push crude across the peninsula to Red Sea ports. Egyptian oil is funneling through pipelines to the Mediterranean, and coastal refineries are pumping out hundreds of thousands of barrels of diesel and jet fuel for Europe and North America. Nearly six million barrels a day are now transiting the strait, and that volume was growing.\n\n## The Nuclear Option: What Closing the Strait Would Mean\n\nThe Houthis know exactly what that corridor is worth, because they have already demonstrated they can bring it to a halt. Their 2023 to 2025 campaign against Red Sea shipping drove major carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, collapsed Suez Canal traffic from 70 ships a day to under 30, and surged insurance premiums twentyfold, all without shutting the strait entirely.\n\nToday, roughly 30 tankers near the Saudi port of Yanbu are already within their strike range. Elisabeth Kendall at Cambridge called a simultaneous closure of both chokepoints \"a nightmare scenario\" that would \"disrupt, if not cripple, trade toward Europe.\" Goldman Sachs has warned that if flows stay depressed for another two months, oil prices could blow past the 2008 all-time high of $147.50 a barrel.\n\nThat scenario has not materialized yet. The Houthis' deputy information minister, Mohammed Mansour, said on Saturday that the group is \"conducting this battle in stages,\" and that closing the strait is \"among our options.\" It amounts to the geopolitical equivalent of: that is a nice shipping route you have there; be a shame if something happened to it.\n\nThe Houthis are not guaranteed to use that option. Unlike the attacks of a few years ago, the Red Sea now carries newfound importance not just for the United States and Israel, but for most of the world. Closing it really would be the closest thing to a nuclear option the group has, and once you cross that line, there is no uncrossing it. Analysts at various think tanks agree that while they cannot rule out such a move, Bab al-Mandeb is more valuable as a threat than as a weapon, especially given the years-long back-and-forth the Houthis have had with Saudi Arabia.\n\n## Negotiations That May Not Exist\n\nThe question of the strait leads to what has allegedly been happening between the White House and Iran. As a quick recap: last Monday, Trump posted on Truth Social claiming \"very good and productive conversations\" with Iran and announced a pause on strikes against their energy infrastructure until the end of the day on Friday. That deadline has again been extended, now through April 6th, and it remains very much up in the air whether he will make good on it the third time around.\n\nThere was always something a little off about the negotiations Trump described. For one, they were remarkably well timed, announced right before markets opened with a deadline after markets closed for the weekend. That timing looked all the more suspicious because Iran has steadfastly denied the entire time that any such negotiations took place, across every layer of government, from the more political class like Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to the IRGC itself.\n\nA bit more clarity arrived when US Representative Jim Himes, the top-ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, went on CBS's \"Face the Nation\" and did not mince his words. Speaking about Trump, Himes declared: \"Last Sunday, he realized, 'I've got a financial cataclysm in the market,' so he just made that statement up.\"\n\nThat claim cannot be independently verified, and there may be more going on behind the scenes than members of the House know. There are indirect channels at the very least; Pakistan has emerged as something of a would-be peacemaker, hosting several regional powers for talks over the weekend. But Himes's quote still stands out. What is left is a diplomatic process real enough to point to, but, as far as anyone can see, nowhere near advanced enough to produce results. The current deadline, April 6th at 8:00 p.m. Eastern, appears to be the next indicator of where things head from here.\n\n## The Best Laid Plans: A Secret Kurdish Ground Force\n\nGoing into this war, there was considerable debate in analyst circles about whether the coalition could topple the Islamic Republic through an air campaign alone. It was a genuine uncertainty. Analysts skewed slightly toward skepticism, but this was uncharted territory: the country had just carried out a barbaric crackdown on its own people, killing an estimated 36,500 over the span of 48 hours. The United States and Israel together field, quite literally, the most advanced weapon systems on Earth, and were clear they were bringing what they thought would be needed. Had technology, precision strikes, and drone warfare advanced to the point where such a mission could, at least theoretically, succeed?\n\nOn the other side of the argument, regime change from the air alone is almost unheard of, in no small part because bombing campaigns can only do so much to change the situation on the ground. Trump's thinking largely seemed to be that the previous \"forever wars\" in the Middle East, which he had himself complained about, needlessly committed boots on the ground, and that he could deliver something more effective.\n\nOver the weekend, a fascinating insight emerged into what Washington and Jerusalem had up their sleeves on the ground. Israel's Channel 12 aired a detailed investigative report confirming that Mossad had spent years developing a plan to use Kurdish fighters as the ground force the air campaign could not provide. Tens of thousands of armed fighters from a coalition of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would cross the Iran-Iraq border under massive US and Israeli air cover in the war's opening days, link up with Kurdish networks inside the country, and push deep into Iran to ignite a broader uprising. This was not a provincial plan to set up shop in Kurdish-dominated areas. The plan was to go \"all the way to Tehran.\"\n\n## How the Ground Plan Came Apart\n\nMossad chief David Barnea reportedly briefed Netanyahu directly before the operation kicked off and traveled to Washington to pitch it to Trump's team in January. Netanyahu was an enthusiastic backer; this was the low-footprint regime-change operation he had been dreaming of. According to the report, it was also an influential factor in convincing Trump to greenlight the February 28th strikes. IDF military intelligence was skeptical from the start, giving it slim chances of success, though the report noted that if things did kick off, they were confident \"the Kurds would do their part.\"\n\nThe CIA went into overdrive as the strikes began. Trump was on the phone with Kurdish leaders, US and Israeli jets were hammering Iranian security forces and Basij sites in the northwest to clear the corridor, and there were reports that some fighters had begun limited cross-border operations.\n\nThis remains a breaking story that military historians will likely study for years. But from what can be told so far, the full-scale invasion never launched, in no small part because the Kurdish factions wanted assurances that were not coming: a no-fly zone overhead, ground support to ensure their fighters would not become cannon fodder for the IRGC, and political commitments an administration unwilling to promise enough never made.\n\nOn March 4th, Fox News broke the story that thousands of Iraqi Kurds had launched a ground offensive into Iran. The Kurdish groups were horrified the operation had been made public, and whatever momentum existed collapsed almost immediately. Iran reinforced the northwest border, Erdogan pressured Trump to shut the whole thing down, and the Kurds, who got burned by Trump back in 2019 when he pulled out of Syria and left them without support, would not go an inch further.\n\n## After Plan A: Boots on the Ground?\n\nSo if Plan A collapsed, what is left? That is the million-dollar question. By all indications, the picture returns to the extended April 6th deadline, as vague as that might be. Unlike past deadlines, though, when this one rolls around there will be significant numbers of US forces in theater. Roughly 2,500 Marines arrived on Friday, the 82nd Airborne are en route, and the Pentagon is reportedly weighing another 10,000 on top of that.\n\nFor context, that is still a fraction of the 250,000 troops that invaded Iraq, but it is unclear whether that distinction will matter much in public perception. A slight majority of Americans have opposed the war since day one, yet it has not been top-of-mind for many; fewer than 20 percent told CNN they cared \"a great deal.\" After years of military operations, bombing the Middle East is not exactly new. Republicans, for their part, have consistently backed it, with more than 80 percent expressing support.\n\nAny form of invasion would be a completely different situation. Trump is the president who ran on \"peace through strength\" and \"no new wars.\" Pivoting from that to an air campaign against Iran is one thing. Escalating to a full, boots-on-the-ground operation, especially after explicitly guaranteeing it would not involve such a deployment, is something else entirely. With the midterms looming, it would be one enormous gamble to take.\n\n## The Wreckage: Cracks Inside Tehran\n\nIt is against this backdrop that a tension between President Pezeshkian, remarkably out of the headlines since this war broke out, and the Revolutionary Guards broke into the open this weekend.\n\nOpposition outlet Iran International, citing sources inside the regime, reported on Saturday that Pezeshkian has continuously criticized the IRGC's policy of escalating attacks across the region and has demanded that control of the government be returned to the civilian side. Defense Minister General Ahmad Vahidi rejected this outright and turned the blame back on Pezeshkian, accusing his administration of failing to implement structural reforms before the war to ensure stability throughout the country.\n\nIf the report is to be believed, the Islamic Republic's governance structure has descended into a finger-pointing competition between the civilian and IRGC-linked parts of the government. That is not entirely new; they previously clashed in early March when Pezeshkian apologized to his neighbors for the attacks, which angered the Guards and prompted them to launch even more strikes to send a clear message.\n\nNetanyahu, speaking at IDF Northern Command in Safed, framed all of this as vindication that the campaign is working, citing \"visible cracks in the terror regime in Tehran.\" Whether that is intelligence assessment, political messaging, or some combination depends on whom you ask. But the leak is significant because it offers a fresh look at the way Iran is, or is not, being governed.\n\nGiven widespread uncertainty about the whereabouts and health of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public or on video since reportedly being injured in the war's opening strikes, the question of who actually holds the reins in Tehran remains unclear. Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf has emerged as one potential candidate trying to hold things together, but even he cannot paper over a government where nobody is sure who is in charge.\n\n## Lebanon: A Sovereignty Test in Beirut\n\nAnd yet, for all of that internal chaos, Tehran is still finding the bandwidth to project power abroad. Lebanon's government had set a deadline of March 29th for Iran's ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, to leave the country, declaring him \"persona non grata.\" Sheibani did not just ignore the deadline; he rejected it outright, with staff informing the AFP that he had no plans to leave, in direct defiance of Beirut's orders.\n\nThis showdown may seem inconsequential given that it concerns one man, but it will determine much of what is to come for Lebanon. Tehran has long viewed Lebanon as being \"in their pocket\" through the influence Hezbollah and their Shia allies, the Amal party, hold over the country. Even with a literal war raging back home, Tehran is making a stand here, betting that the Lebanese state will not have it in them to unify and expel the ambassador, showing who is really in charge when push comes to shove.\n\nThey may have a point. Hezbollah's decision to support the ambassador staying may be no surprise, but Amal has backed his continued presence as well, boycotting the cabinet meeting where the expulsion was to be discussed in an attempt to freeze the process entirely. An Iranian diplomatic source told the AFP the ambassador \"will not leave Lebanon, in accordance with the wishes of the speaker of parliament Nabih Berri and of Hezbollah.\"\n\nThat gap between what the state officially enacts on paper and what it can actually enforce is the story of modern Lebanon in a nutshell, and it is especially unfortunate given the initial progress the state made in early March. The Lebanese state did implement the expulsion legally; Foreign Minister Raggi intentionally went around Berri to avoid Amal's stalling. Under the Vienna Convention, a foreign minister can declare an ambassador persona non grata on his own authority, with no cabinet vote, no parliamentary sign-off, and no input from a Speaker required. And yet the ambassador remains on Lebanese soil.\n\n## The Quiet Escalation in the South\n\nWhile that played out in Beirut, the IDF has been busy pushing deeper into southern Lebanon. Netanyahu ordered the 146th Division to push the \"buffer zone\" deeper, explicitly closer to the Litani, and actually expanded evacuation zones north of the Litani, which has no historical precedent.\n\nThis is not a full-scale Israeli invasion just yet, but it is another step in that direction. While much of the world has its eyes busy a few countries to the east, the assault on Lebanon may wind up being one of the most consequential acts of the entire war. Only time will tell how the standoff plays out, but if Lebanon wants to demonstrate that it is a sovereign country, it is clear what has to follow.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### How did the Houthis formally enter the Iran war?\n\nOn Saturday, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at what they described as \"sensitive military positions\" in southern Israel, triggering sirens across Beersheba, then followed hours later with a second wave of cruise missiles and drones. All were fully intercepted, with no casualties or damage reported on the Israeli side. Sunday was quiet, with no further launches or claims.\n\n### Why is the Bab al-Mandeb strait so important right now?\n\nWith the Strait of Hormuz in semi-closure, the Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer gap between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, has become close to indispensable. Nearly six million barrels of oil a day now transit the strait as Saudi Arabia maxes out its Petroline and Egypt routes crude through pipelines to the Mediterranean. Goldman Sachs has warned that if flows stay depressed for another two months, oil prices could blow past the 2008 all-time high of $147.50 a barrel.\n\n### What was the secret Mossad-Kurdish ground plan and why did it collapse?\n\nIsrael's Channel 12 reported that Mossad spent years developing a plan to use tens of thousands of Iranian Kurdish opposition fighters as the ground force the air campaign lacked, pushing \"all the way to Tehran.\" The full-scale invasion never launched because the Kurdish factions wanted assurances — a no-fly zone, ground support, and political commitments — that were not forthcoming. Fox News leaking the operation publicly, combined with Turkish pressure on Trump and memories of the 2019 Syria withdrawal, caused the plan to collapse almost immediately.\n\n### Are the US-Iran negotiations real?\n\nIt is disputed. Trump claimed \"very good and productive conversations\" and paused strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, with the deadline now extended to April 6th. Iran has denied any negotiations across all layers of government. Representative Jim Himes, the top-ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, alleged on CBS that Trump \"made that statement up\" to calm markets, though that claim cannot be independently verified.\n\n### What is the standoff over Iran's ambassador in Lebanon?\n\nLebanon declared Iran's ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, persona non grata with a March 29th deadline to leave, but he rejected it outright and remains in the country. Hezbollah and Amal both back his stay, with Amal boycotting the relevant cabinet meeting to freeze the process. The expulsion was legally enacted by Foreign Minister Raggi under the Vienna Convention without a cabinet vote, yet the state has been unable to enforce it, illustrating who really holds power in Lebanon.\n\n## Sources\n\n1. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/media-leaks-misjudgments-and-lack-of-trust-doomed-plan-for-kurdish-invasion-to-help-bring-down-irans-regime-report/\n2. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jim-himes-trump-lying-iran-egotiations/\n3. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/as-war-on-iran-enters-second-month-yemens-houthis-open-new-front\n4. https://www.timesofisrael.com/yemens-iran-backed-houthis-threaten-to-join-war-our-fingers-are-on-the-trigger/\n5. https://fortune.com/2026/03/28/saudi-arabia-east-west-oil-pipeline-strait-hormuz-bypass-7-million-barrels-yanbu-red-sea/\n6. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147965/Red-Sea-war-risk-rates-see-huge-jump-in-wake-of-Yemen-airstrikes\n7. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/houthis-open-new-front-in-iran-war-will-yemeni-group-block-bab-al-mandeb\n8. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/20/goldman-sachs-oil-price-iran-war.html\n9. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-extending-pause-strikes-iran-energy-plants-april-6/\n10. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/will-the-houthis-join-the-iran-war/\n11. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-03-29/pakistan-hosts-regional-powers-for-iran-talks-with-focus-on-hormuz-proposals\n12. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601255198\n13. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-march-28-2026/\n14. https://yalibnan.com/2026/03/23/israels-mossad-thought-it-could-ignite-rebellion-inside-iran-that-hasnt-happened/\n15. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/fox-news-reports-thousands-iraqi-235931999.html\n16. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8710/\n17. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-uss-tripoli-centcom-middle-east-arrive-iran/\n18. https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2026-03-27/82nd-airborne-10000-troops-iran-21196096.html\n19. https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2026-03-25/82nd-airborne-iran-deployment-21175729.html\n20. https://maristpoll.marist.edu/polls/war-with-iran-march-2026/\n21. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-dominates-cpac-poll-conservatives-rally-behind-agenda-back-iran-action\n22. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/artc-pezeshkian-clashes-with-irgc-over-iran-s-war-strategy-and-economy-report\n23. https://www.timesofisrael.com/pezeshkian-apologizes-for-attacks-on-gulf-neighbors-even-as-iran-forces-step-up-strikes/\n24. https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-says-israel-to-expand-south-lebanon-buffer-zone-as-idf-pushes-deeper-into-territory/\n25. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/25/lebanon-declares-iranian-ambassador-designate-persona-non-grata-before-iranian-missile-explodes-over-lebanese-airspace/\n26. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/03/29/iran-s-ambassador-won-t-leave-lebanon-despite-expulsion-diplomatic-source-says\n27. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/source-irans-ambassador-will-defy-lebanon-expulsion-order-wont-leave-country-today/\n28. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/lebanon-declares-iranian-ambassador-designate-persona-non-grata-before-iranian-missile-explodes-over-lebanese-airspace.php\n29. https://www.jns.org/israel-news/idf-orders-southern-lebanon-residents-north-of-zahrani-river\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthis-entered-iran-war.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthis-entered-iran-war datePublished: 2026-06-02 dateModified: 2026-06-02 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/m2NJsmrOqlI/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: 535a125d422ad7d0b72708850e8b9cf02b9c3a88f1f3bd585e002514c6fc72d8 tokens: 6090 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/houthis-entered-iran-war.md.summary.md --- Just before the weekend, on a Friday night, we put out a video about how much the Houthis could tip the scales if they decided to enter the Iran war. Apparently someone in Houthi high command was watching, because the very next day the group threw its hat into the ring. And with that, all hell once again broke loose in the Middle East. While it is still early hours in terms of what the Houthis' grand plan is, none of the signs so far are exactly good. The group is almost the perfect complement to the regime in Tehran. Where Iran can close the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis' position in Yemen means they could potentially also shut down Red Sea shipping, a move that would pile even more pressure on the global economy. Beyond the Houthis entering the chat, this weekend brought confirmation that there had been a secret ground component of this war all along: Kurdish fighters, backed by Mossad, with the goal of pushing all the way to Tehran. Suffice it to say, things did not go according to plan. Slightly over a month into the Iran war, the picture is one of widening fronts, a collapsed regime-change gambit, and a fragile diplomatic process that may not be real at all. ## Key Takeaways - The Houthis formally entered the war on Saturday, firing ballistic missiles and then cruise missiles and drones at southern Israel; all were intercepted with no casualties, but the real threat is their potential closure of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. - The Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer chokepoint, has become close to indispensable now that the Strait of Hormuz sits in semi-closure; nearly six million barrels of oil a day transit the corridor, and Goldman Sachs warns prices could blow past the 2008 high of $147.50 a barrel if flows stay depressed. - A secret Mossad plan to use tens of thousands of Iranian Kurdish fighters as a ground force — pushing all the way to Tehran — collapsed after media leaks, withheld assurances, and Turkish pressure, leaving the coalition without a viable regime-change path. - Trump's claimed US-Iran negotiations are disputed by both Iran and a senior House Democrat, while the extended April 6th deadline, 2,500 Marines in theater, and the 82nd Airborne en route signal that military escalation remains very much on the table. - Iran's governance has fractured between President Pezeshkian and the IRGC, Supreme Leader Khamenei has not been seen since the war's opening strikes, and in Lebanon Iran's ambassador is defying an expulsion order backed by Hezbollah and Amal. ## Late to the Party: The Houthis Open a Second Front The Houthis are here. Just last Friday, WarFronts released an episode covering what the group could do if it went all-in on the Iran war, and to severely understate the case, it is not great for the rest of the world. Saturday marked their formal entry. Ballistic missiles aimed at what they described as "sensitive military positions" in southern Israel triggered sirens across Beersheba, followed by a second wave of cruise missiles and drones hours later. All of these were fully intercepted, with no casualties or damage reported on the Israeli side. Sunday, by contrast, was quiet, with no additional launches or claims from Houthi media. That put the all-out war scenario from the earlier episode off to the side, at least for now. The concern that rippled through nearly every capital in the world had almost nothing to do with the missiles themselves and far more to do with the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and what happens to the global oil supply if the Houthis decide to shut it down. ## The Bab al-Mandeb: A Chokepoint Turned Indispensable So far, the Houthis have not moved to close the strait. Dozens of tankers were still transiting the Red Sea daily at the time of recording, early on a Monday. But the Red Sea matters for global trade in the best of times, and with the Strait of Hormuz in a state of semi-closure for weeks, it matters a great deal more. The way Hormuz was shut down is worth understanding, because Iran did not have to physically blockade it or lay a single mine. The threat of launching on tankers, backed by the fact that they did launch on one in the early days of the war, was enough to effectively close the whole thing. Within days, the risk was so high that most ship owners simply stopped sailing. That turned the Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer gap between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, into something close to indispensable. Saudi Arabia has maxed out its East-West Petroline at seven million barrels a day to push crude across the peninsula to Red Sea ports. Egyptian oil is funneling through pipelines to the Mediterranean, and coastal refineries are pumping out hundreds of thousands of barrels of diesel and jet fuel for Europe and North America. Nearly six million barrels a day are now transiting the strait, and that volume was growing. ## The Nuclear Option: What Closing the Strait Would Mean The Houthis know exactly what that corridor is worth, because they have already demonstrated they can bring it to a halt. Their 2023 to 2025 campaign against Red Sea shipping drove major carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, collapsed Suez Canal traffic from 70 ships a day to under 30, and surged insurance premiums twentyfold, all without shutting the strait entirely. Today, roughly 30 tankers near the Saudi port of Yanbu are already within their strike range. Elisabeth Kendall at Cambridge called a simultaneous closure of both chokepoints "a nightmare scenario" that would "disrupt, if not cripple, trade toward Europe." Goldman Sachs has warned that if flows stay depressed for another two months, oil prices could blow past the 2008 all-time high of $147.50 a barrel. That scenario has not materialized yet. The Houthis' deputy information minister, Mohammed Mansour, said on Saturday that the group is "conducting this battle in stages," and that closing the strait is "among our options." It amounts to the geopolitical equivalent of: that is a nice shipping route you have there; be a shame if something happened to it. The Houthis are not guaranteed to use that option. Unlike the attacks of a few years ago, the Red Sea now carries newfound importance not just for the United States and Israel, but for most of the world. Closing it really would be the closest thing to a nuclear option the group has, and once you cross that line, there is no uncrossing it. Analysts at various think tanks agree that while they cannot rule out such a move, Bab al-Mandeb is more valuable as a threat than as a weapon, especially given the years-long back-and-forth the Houthis have had with Saudi Arabia. ## Negotiations That May Not Exist The question of the strait leads to what has allegedly been happening between the White House and Iran. As a quick recap: last Monday, Trump posted on Truth Social claiming "very good and productive conversations" with Iran and announced a pause on strikes against their energy infrastructure until the end of the day on Friday. That deadline has again been extended, now through April 6th, and it remains very much up in the air whether he will make good on it the third time around. There was always something a little off about the negotiations Trump described. For one, they were remarkably well timed, announced right before markets opened with a deadline after markets closed for the weekend. That timing looked all the more suspicious because Iran has steadfastly denied the entire time that any such negotiations took place, across every layer of government, from the more political class like Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to the IRGC itself. A bit more clarity arrived when US Representative Jim Himes, the top-ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, went on CBS's "Face the Nation" and did not mince his words. Speaking about Trump, Himes declared: "Last Sunday, he realized, 'I've got a financial cataclysm in the market,' so he just made that statement up." That claim cannot be independently verified, and there may be more going on behind the scenes than members of the House know. There are indirect channels at the very least; Pakistan has emerged as something of a would-be peacemaker, hosting several regional powers for talks over the weekend. But Himes's quote still stands out. What is left is a diplomatic process real enough to point to, but, as far as anyone can see, nowhere near advanced enough to produce results. The current deadline, April 6th at 8:00 p.m. Eastern, appears to be the next indicator of where things head from here. ## The Best Laid Plans: A Secret Kurdish Ground Force Going into this war, there was considerable debate in analyst circles about whether the coalition could topple the Islamic Republic through an air campaign alone. It was a genuine uncertainty. Analysts skewed slightly toward skepticism, but this was uncharted territory: the country had just carried out a barbaric crackdown on its own people, killing an estimated 36,500 over the span of 48 hours. The United States and Israel together field, quite literally, the most advanced weapon systems on Earth, and were clear they were bringing what they thought would be needed. Had technology, precision strikes, and drone warfare advanced to the point where such a mission could, at least theoretically, succeed? On the other side of the argument, regime change from the air alone is almost unheard of, in no small part because bombing campaigns can only do so much to change the situation on the ground. Trump's thinking largely seemed to be that the previous "forever wars" in the Middle East, which he had himself complained about, needlessly committed boots on the ground, and that he could deliver something more effective. Over the weekend, a fascinating insight emerged into what Washington and Jerusalem had up their sleeves on the ground. Israel's Channel 12 aired a detailed investigative report confirming that Mossad had spent years developing a plan to use Kurdish fighters as the ground force the air campaign could not provide. Tens of thousands of armed fighters from a coalition of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would cross the Iran-Iraq border under massive US and Israeli air cover in the war's opening days, link up with Kurdish networks inside the country, and push deep into Iran to ignite a broader uprising. This was not a provincial plan to set up shop in Kurdish-dominated areas. The plan was to go "all the way to Tehran." ## How the Ground Plan Came Apart Mossad chief David Barnea reportedly briefed Netanyahu directly before the operation kicked off and traveled to Washington to pitch it to Trump's team in January. Netanyahu was an enthusiastic backer; this was the low-footprint regime-change operation he had been dreaming of. According to the report, it was also an influential factor in convincing Trump to greenlight the February 28th strikes. IDF military intelligence was skeptical from the start, giving it slim chances of success, though the report noted that if things did kick off, they were confident "the Kurds would do their part." The CIA went into overdrive as the strikes began. Trump was on the phone with Kurdish leaders, US and Israeli jets were hammering Iranian security forces and Basij sites in the northwest to clear the corridor, and there were reports that some fighters had begun limited cross-border operations. This remains a breaking story that military historians will likely study for years. But from what can be told so far, the full-scale invasion never launched, in no small part because the Kurdish factions wanted assurances that were not coming: a no-fly zone overhead, ground support to ensure their fighters would not become cannon fodder for the IRGC, and political commitments an administration unwilling to promise enough never made. On March 4th, Fox News broke the story that thousands of Iraqi Kurds had launched a ground offensive into Iran. The Kurdish groups were horrified the operation had been made public, and whatever momentum existed collapsed almost immediately. Iran reinforced the northwest border, Erdogan pressured Trump to shut the whole thing down, and the Kurds, who got burned by Trump back in 2019 when he pulled out of Syria and left them without support, would not go an inch further. ## After Plan A: Boots on the Ground? So if Plan A collapsed, what is left? That is the million-dollar question. By all indications, the picture returns to the extended April 6th deadline, as vague as that might be. Unlike past deadlines, though, when this one rolls around there will be significant numbers of US forces in theater. Roughly 2,500 Marines arrived on Friday, the 82nd Airborne are en route, and the Pentagon is reportedly weighing another 10,000 on top of that. For context, that is still a fraction of the 250,000 troops that invaded Iraq, but it is unclear whether that distinction will matter much in public perception. A slight majority of Americans have opposed the war since day one, yet it has not been top-of-mind for many; fewer than 20 percent told CNN they cared "a great deal." After years of military operations, bombing the Middle East is not exactly new. Republicans, for their part, have consistently backed it, with more than 80 percent expressing support. Any form of invasion would be a completely different situation. Trump is the president who ran on "peace through strength" and "no new wars." Pivoting from that to an air campaign against Iran is one thing. Escalating to a full, boots-on-the-ground operation, especially after explicitly guaranteeing it would not involve such a deployment, is something else entirely. With the midterms looming, it would be one enormous gamble to take. ## The Wreckage: Cracks Inside Tehran It is against this backdrop that a tension between President Pezeshkian, remarkably out of the headlines since this war broke out, and the Revolutionary Guards broke into the open this weekend. Opposition outlet Iran International, citing sources inside the regime, reported on Saturday that Pezeshkian has continuously criticized the IRGC's policy of escalating attacks across the region and has demanded that control of the government be returned to the civilian side. Defense Minister General Ahmad Vahidi rejected this outright and turned the blame back on Pezeshkian, accusing his administration of failing to implement structural reforms before the war to ensure stability throughout the country. If the report is to be believed, the Islamic Republic's governance structure has descended into a finger-pointing competition between the civilian and IRGC-linked parts of the government. That is not entirely new; they previously clashed in early March when Pezeshkian apologized to his neighbors for the attacks, which angered the Guards and prompted them to launch even more strikes to send a clear message. Netanyahu, speaking at IDF Northern Command in Safed, framed all of this as vindication that the campaign is working, citing "visible cracks in the terror regime in Tehran." Whether that is intelligence assessment, political messaging, or some combination depends on whom you ask. But the leak is significant because it offers a fresh look at the way Iran is, or is not, being governed. Given widespread uncertainty about the whereabouts and health of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public or on video since reportedly being injured in the war's opening strikes, the question of who actually holds the reins in Tehran remains unclear. Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf has emerged as one potential candidate trying to hold things together, but even he cannot paper over a government where nobody is sure who is in charge. ## Lebanon: A Sovereignty Test in Beirut And yet, for all of that internal chaos, Tehran is still finding the bandwidth to project power abroad. Lebanon's government had set a deadline of March 29th for Iran's ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, to leave the country, declaring him "persona non grata." Sheibani did not just ignore the deadline; he rejected it outright, with staff informing the AFP that he had no plans to leave, in direct defiance of Beirut's orders. This showdown may seem inconsequential given that it concerns one man, but it will determine much of what is to come for Lebanon. Tehran has long viewed Lebanon as being "in their pocket" through the influence Hezbollah and their Shia allies, the Amal party, hold over the country. Even with a literal war raging back home, Tehran is making a stand here, betting that the Lebanese state will not have it in them to unify and expel the ambassador, showing who is really in charge when push comes to shove. They may have a point. Hezbollah's decision to support the ambassador staying may be no surprise, but Amal has backed his continued presence as well, boycotting the cabinet meeting where the expulsion was to be discussed in an attempt to freeze the process entirely. An Iranian diplomatic source told the AFP the ambassador "will not leave Lebanon, in accordance with the wishes of the speaker of parliament Nabih Berri and of Hezbollah." That gap between what the state officially enacts on paper and what it can actually enforce is the story of modern Lebanon in a nutshell, and it is especially unfortunate given the initial progress the state made in early March. The Lebanese state did implement the expulsion legally; Foreign Minister Raggi intentionally went around Berri to avoid Amal's stalling. Under the Vienna Convention, a foreign minister can declare an ambassador persona non grata on his own authority, with no cabinet vote, no parliamentary sign-off, and no input from a Speaker required. And yet the ambassador remains on Lebanese soil. ## The Quiet Escalation in the South While that played out in Beirut, the IDF has been busy pushing deeper into southern Lebanon. Netanyahu ordered the 146th Division to push the "buffer zone" deeper, explicitly closer to the Litani, and actually expanded evacuation zones north of the Litani, which has no historical precedent. This is not a full-scale Israeli invasion just yet, but it is another step in that direction. While much of the world has its eyes busy a few countries to the east, the assault on Lebanon may wind up being one of the most consequential acts of the entire war. Only time will tell how the standoff plays out, but if Lebanon wants to demonstrate that it is a sovereign country, it is clear what has to follow. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### How did the Houthis formally enter the Iran war? On Saturday, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at what they described as "sensitive military positions" in southern Israel, triggering sirens across Beersheba, then followed hours later with a second wave of cruise missiles and drones. All were fully intercepted, with no casualties or damage reported on the Israeli side. Sunday was quiet, with no further launches or claims. ### Why is the Bab al-Mandeb strait so important right now? With the Strait of Hormuz in semi-closure, the Bab al-Mandeb, a 26-kilometer gap between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, has become close to indispensable. Nearly six million barrels of oil a day now transit the strait as Saudi Arabia maxes out its Petroline and Egypt routes crude through pipelines to the Mediterranean. Goldman Sachs has warned that if flows stay depressed for another two months, oil prices could blow past the 2008 all-time high of $147.50 a barrel. ### What was the secret Mossad-Kurdish ground plan and why did it collapse? Israel's Channel 12 reported that Mossad spent years developing a plan to use tens of thousands of Iranian Kurdish opposition fighters as the ground force the air campaign lacked, pushing "all the way to Tehran." The full-scale invasion never launched because the Kurdish factions wanted assurances — a no-fly zone, ground support, and political commitments — that were not forthcoming. Fox News leaking the operation publicly, combined with Turkish pressure on Trump and memories of the 2019 Syria withdrawal, caused the plan to collapse almost immediately. ### Are the US-Iran negotiations real? It is disputed. Trump claimed "very good and productive conversations" and paused strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, with the deadline now extended to April 6th. Iran has denied any negotiations across all layers of government. Representative Jim Himes, the top-ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, alleged on CBS that Trump "made that statement up" to calm markets, though that claim cannot be independently verified. ### What is the standoff over Iran's ambassador in Lebanon? Lebanon declared Iran's ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, persona non grata with a March 29th deadline to leave, but he rejected it outright and remains in the country. Hezbollah and Amal both back his stay, with Amal boycotting the relevant cabinet meeting to freeze the process. 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