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title: "Iran and Israel Could Return to War Soon: Why the Twelve-Day War May Only Be the Beginning"
description: "The Twelve-Day War of 2025 between Iran and Israel was a moment of extraordinary global danger — dozens of Israeli civilians killed, hundreds of Iranian civilians dead, tens of thousands displaced, and Iran's nuclear program set back by years. Yet as devastating as that conflict was, both sides deliberately limited their engagement, choosing restraint over total war. Four months later, the leadership in both Jerusalem and Tehran appears to agree on one unsettling conclusion: the war isn't over. Both nations are re-arming, both face mounting domestic and international pressures, and a growing chorus of global experts warns that a return to direct military confrontation is becoming more likely — with no guarantee that the next round will end as quickly, or as mercifully, as the last one did.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- The Twelve-Day War of 2025 was deliberately limited by all parties — Iran, Israel, and the United States — with both sides avoiding their most devastating capabilities in order to preserve an off-ramp for de-escalation.\n- Four months after the ceasefire, both Iran and Israel are actively re-arming and preparing for the possibility of renewed conflict, rather than pursuing comprehensive peace.\n- Israel depleted significant air defense interceptors during the war, and the United States is estimated to have used a full one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors in just twelve days.\n- Iran's enriched uranium stockpile — roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — was not conclusively destroyed, and Iran retains centrifuges and equipment to continue enrichment.\n- Iran is pursuing major arms deals, including 48 Russian Su-35 fighter jets with deliveries potentially starting in 2026, Chinese J-10 fighters, and possibly Russian MiG-29s.\n- Renewed UN 'snapback' sanctions are expected to hit Iran hard, accelerating economic decline and regime instability — potentially pressuring Tehran to act before its position deteriorates further.\n\n## The Twelve-Day War Was a Limited Engagement — By Design\n\nTo understand why a return to war is increasingly plausible, it is essential to grasp a core reality about the 2025 conflict: as ruinous as it was, the Twelve-Day War was still a very limited engagement compared to what both sides were capable of unleashing. During the fighting, Iran, Israel, and the United States all fought to inflict damage and achieve core objectives, but each party deliberately chose to limit its involvement in a successful attempt to ensure the conflict could be drawn down and resolved relatively quickly.\n\nOn Israel's side, the nation avoided killing Iran's Supreme Leader and other high-ranking clerics. It chose to cripple a single element of Iran's missile production chain rather than continuing strikes until Iran's missile capabilities were fully destroyed. And, critically, Israel refrained from drawing on its nuclear arsenal. Iran, for its part, avoided launching the scale of drone swarms that could have fully overwhelmed Israeli air defenses. It avoided forcing the hand of proxy allies like Hezbollah, even involuntarily, and it avoided any action to close the Strait of Hormuz — a move that would have held hostage a large share of the world's oil supply. Both sides avoided targeting vulnerable civilian populations located far from military assets, and neither gave any indication of involving ground forces.\n\nThe United States kept its involvement carefully limited as well, avoiding pressure on its European or Middle Eastern allies to play a significant role and engaging in only a fraction of the offensive strikes it was capable of. All sides entered the conflict hoping they could leave themselves a suitable off-ramp to draw down hostilities. After twelve days of intense bloodletting, that is precisely what happened. The outcome could have been far worse.\n\n## The Missed Opportunity for Peace\n\nThe aftermath of the Twelve-Day War presented the international community with a clear choice. It could have stepped in and placed meaningful incentives on both Iran and Israel to draw them into a more comprehensive peace accord — giving both Tehran and Jerusalem real, tangible reasons to keep the peace and avoid even the chance of further conflict. That is not what happened. Instead, the world witnessed the alternative: both Israel and Iran retreated to their respective corners, took time to assess their losses, and then got back to business, operating on the premise that the adversary they had only just fought would probably go to war with them again in the future. This failure to capitalize on the post-war moment has set the stage for the dangerous dynamics now unfolding across the region.\n\n## Israel's Post-War Challenges and Incentives\n\nIsrael emerged from the Twelve-Day War with a far stronger claim to victory, but it has still had to contend with very important challenges in the aftermath. For one, Israel appears to have been only partially successful in accomplishing its wartime objectives. Despite the bombardment of key Iranian nuclear sites, neither Israel, the United States, nor the International Atomic Energy Agency has been able to conclusively determine the fate of Iran's roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Iran is believed to still possess the requisite centrifuges and other equipment to continue enriching uranium. And while Iran sustained significant disruption to its ability to launch missiles and drones, it still retains some infrastructure to do so.\n\nJust as critically, Israel and its main ally, the United States, depleted many of their air defense interceptors over the course of the twelve-day conflict. The United States is estimated to have depleted a full one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors during just those twelve days alone, and US officials indicate that despite Israel's denials, Jerusalem may be facing a similar problem.\n\nBeyond the military balance sheet, a range of international circumstances incentivize Israel to consider a return to war while disincentivizing trust in the prospect of peace. Israel's recent decision to conduct airstrikes against Hamas in the nation of Qatar has set the wider Middle East on a knife's edge. The rich and powerful leaders of the Arab world are no longer willing to treat Israel with the relative openness they have shown over the last decade. Israel's attempts to normalize relations with the Arab world are in jeopardy, and the Arab League recently joined forces with a number of European nations that recognized Palestinian statehood for the first time — a move that Israeli leaders have broadly interpreted as a sign of growing hostility.\n\nIsrael is growing more isolated in its war effort in Gaza and has even faced limited pressure from the United States. At the same time, negotiations with Hamas are ongoing but risk falling apart for several reasons, and the US has indicated to Israel that if Hamas refuses a deal, Israel may be empowered to take greater unilateral action in Gaza. Taken together, these international factors create a situation where Israel feels isolated, forced to fend for itself, and less trustful of the international community's willingness to help resolve disputes in Israel's favor.\n\nA growing chorus of global experts and observers also agree that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival has been tied to the war in Gaza for some time — and that Netanyahu is incentivized to continue the war in Gaza, or even expand conflict to other sectors, as a way to remain in power.\n\n## Iran's Vulnerability and Rearmament Drive\n\nNetanyahu is far from the only leader in this discussion who may see war as the best way to retain power. In Iran, the nation's clerical leaders are more vulnerable than they have ever been, caught between a crumbling economy, an enduring popular opposition movement, and a crisis of faith among regime loyalists who now doubt the stories of military might that Tehran has been selling for decades.\n\nIran's military leaders have been made paranoid by a wave of Israeli assassinations and are known to be working out contingency plans and orders of succession in case the current wave of leaders is wiped out in a renewed conflict. The regime is working to hunt down and arrest anybody who might even be suspected of being an Israeli asset. Iran has executed more people in 2025 than in any year since the 1979 revolution, including a man named Bahman Choobiasl, who was hanged in late September and described as \"one of the most important spies for Israel in Iran.\"\n\nAt the same time, Iran is reportedly working to reconsolidate and rebuild its air defenses as quickly as possible, prioritizing short-range drone interceptors that would have been helpful against many of the drone attacks Israeli assets are suspected of having launched in asymmetric operations on Iranian soil. According to leaked Russian documents exposed by a Ukrainian hacking group, Iran has inked a deal for 48 copies of Russia's Su-35 fighter jet, including early deliveries as soon as 2026 if Russia can keep to the intended schedule. Iran is also looking to acquire Chinese J-10 fighter jets and may already have purchased MiG-29s from Russia — all in an attempt to address Israel's ability to gain air superiority so quickly during the last war. Meanwhile, Iran continues to test ballistic missiles, demonstrating that it has at least some launch capability remaining, and it is thought to still be able to produce long-range, low-cost kamikaze drones.\n\nWhile those factors alone might suggest Iran would take time to lock down regime stability and spend a few years gathering and rebuilding weapons systems, Iran's international situation is creating pressure for Tehran to push up its timeline. In mid-October, Iran was hit by so-called \"snapback\" sanctions from the United Nations, which had been suspended as part of the global attempt to get Iran to peacefully call off its nuclear weapons program. Those renewed sanctions are expected to hit Iran very hard. Although Iran's subversive financial arrangements with nations like Russia and China can blunt the pain somewhat, the results will still make public fury toward the regime even more intense. Iran's ability to finance rearmament will start to decline, the unity of its ruling elites will begin to fray, and regime collapse becomes far more likely. Add to that the reports that Iranian officials believe Israel is planning a new round of strikes — seemingly confirmed by recent statements by Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists that Israel knows where Iran's remaining nuclear stockpiles are being held.\n\n## A Destabilizing Regional Landscape\n\nAcross the Middle East, growing destabilization and disunity make for an environment that practically fosters a future war. Syria is on the brink of a return to violence, most recently due to a standoff between Damascus and the autonomous Kurdish region of Rojava, while the Islamic State continues to reconstitute itself in the border zones between Syria and Iraq. Iraq itself is increasingly unstable, and Gulf states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are now on guard against the prospect of strikes from all directions — even from Israel.\n\nHardliners within Iran's long-time proxy ally, Hezbollah, are trying to resist a push for disarmament. Although they no longer have the ability to directly threaten Israel in the way they could have done before 2024, they can certainly destabilize Lebanon and threaten Israeli forces still stationed on Lebanese territory. An ongoing pattern of arms interceptions shows that Iran is still working to arm Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthi rebels, and proxy militias in Iraq and Syria.\n\nAll the while, the United States appears to be working to draw down its involvement in the Middle East, creating the first hints of a diplomatic and security vacuum that all sorts of bad actors could exploit. This combination of regional fragility, proxy rearmament, and diminishing American engagement creates a volatile backdrop against which any renewed Iran-Israel confrontation would play out.\n\n## Why Both Sides May See Advantage in Striking First\n\nThe specific fault lines that incentivize each side to consider a return to fighting — and specifically a quick return to violence rather than a years-long buildup — are deeply concerning. Israel has taken a hit to its air defenses, and Iran appears intent on rebuilding its long-range strike capability. If Israel waits, Iran might learn the lessons of its past engagement, rebuilding its arsenal and rethinking its tactics so that Israel is forced to burn interceptors faster and become more vulnerable. Both Israel and Iran seem to agree that Iran's enriched uranium was not destroyed, incentivizing Israel to try to target it while reliable intelligence is still coming in, and incentivizing Iran to consider forcefully deterring Israel from making another attempt.\n\nIran is facing greater regime instability than ever, but that problem is going to get worse as the months and years go on, not better. Even though it is far from an ideal time for Iran to strike Israel, it might be now or never. Similarly, Israel's leaders are feeling their isolation on the global stage and may fear a collapse of their government if they cannot use the threat of an external enemy to justify their continued hold on power.\n\nThe international fault lines compound the danger. The wider Middle East is getting more fractious, the Arab world's perceptions of Israel are dropping quickly, Israel's non-US allies are frustrated with Jerusalem's conduct, and Iran's proxies abroad are still armed and dangerous but getting desperate — all contributing to the idea within the Iranian regime that now is as good an opportunity as they are going to get. But that same combination of factors makes Israel more likely to engage, both because Jerusalem may see changing international perceptions as a sign of darker days ahead, and because Jerusalem may reason that if Europe, the Arab world, and other international forces have already been alienated, then Israel has nothing left to lose by taking the sorts of actions it has previously avoided.\n\nPerhaps most dangerous of all is the possibility that both Israel and Iran may independently conclude that they would have the advantage in acting quickly. From Israel's perspective, the Iranian regime is on the brink of collapse and could be toppled with one big, final push. If Israel indeed knows where Iran's nuclear materials are being stored, it could destroy that equipment before Iran has the chance to hide it or split it up. Israel knows that Iran will try to procure combat jets, rebuild its air defenses, and reconstitute its long-range missile and drone threat — but all of that has not happened yet, and if Israel strikes first and strikes hard, perhaps it never will.\n\nFrom Iran's perspective, the same situation can lead to the same conclusion. Israel is more isolated than ever, and Iran might believe it stands a better chance of using war with Israel — or the threat of war — to gain more favorable treatment than it could otherwise get. Iran knows that Israel is low on air defenses right now, but that if Israel is given time, that problem will be addressed. Iran knows that even though it is not in a good position to strike right now, it is in a better position than it will be once international sanctions really start to bite. And it knows that the same is true for its proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria: in a couple of years, they could be disarmed, devastated by one-on-one wars with Israel, or lose an appetite for conflict — but right now, they can be drawn into a war on Iran's side.\n\n## The Escalation Ladder: When Neither Side Backs Down\n\nIn a situation where both sides believe they have something to gain from instigating a violent exchange, and where they also believe their adversary has a lot to lose, both nations have ample incentives to ratchet up tensions. They have incentives to issue clear threats of violent escalation, then to engage in military provocations, and then — when shown what is supposed to be a deterrent — they have an incentive to escalate again, because they believe they are willing to go farther than their adversary.\n\nBut when both sides feel that way, the situation is at its most dangerous. When both sides are climbing an escalation ladder and waiting for their enemy to back down, there is a real possibility that both sides might keep on climbing — before realizing, a little too late, that their enemy was more willing to engage in a conflict than they had initially realized. This dynamic of mutual miscalculation, where each side overestimates its own resolve relative to the other's, is one of the most well-documented pathways to unintended large-scale war in the history of international conflict.\n\n## Specific Triggers That Could Spark Renewed Conflict\n\nWhile a new round of escalation between Iran and Israel does not need to happen — and there are still plenty of opportunities for diplomacy and level-headedness to prevail — it is worth identifying the specific conditions that could lead either side to pull the trigger in the coming months.\n\nFor Israel, the most likely prompt would be clear evidence that Iran has either restarted full-scale nuclear enrichment efforts or has begun enriching its existing stockpiles to a level closer to weapons-grade. There is also the possibility that the Netanyahu government could turn its attention toward Iran and begin laying the groundwork for future conflict in the event that it strikes a ceasefire or even a true peace deal with Hamas. If, as suspected, the Netanyahu government feels it needs a war or national security crisis to ensure it remains in power, then the end of a war against Hamas would create a vacuum that a war with Iran could easily fill.\n\nFor Iran, one trigger could be an escalation of Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip, in the event that a peace accord fails to materialize and Israel doubles down on its current efforts. Or, if the notoriously paranoid regime were to uncover large-scale infiltration by Israel's Mossad, or identify some real or perceived plot against it, Iran could choose to react violently.\n\nMost troubling of all, however, is the possibility that either side could choose to return to conflict because of a combination of building stressors rather than any acute threat. The advantage of an acute threat — to the extent that anything is advantageous about this situation — is that a return to fighting would probably be preceded by global news reports, diplomatic rhetoric, military posturing, and other clear indicators that something is about to happen. But if either Israel or Iran believes that as a result of its overall situation, it is in its interest to launch an attack, then a surprise assault becomes much more likely. Surprise attacks make all sides more uncertain, especially the nation on the receiving end, and raise the odds that the targeted nation might opt for a disproportionate response — setting the stage for more escalation, and even more after that.\n\n## What a Renewed Conflict Could Look Like\n\nIf Israel and Iran do return to conflict in the coming months, the fighting should not be expected to look the same as the Twelve-Day War. Instead, both nations will have learned the lessons of that prior exchange and will be more ready to avoid their adversary's strengths and zero in on their weaknesses.\n\nIn the case of an Israeli attack, Iran's air defenses are still very far from being rebuilt, and Israel would almost certainly take full advantage of that vulnerability. With no meaningful air-defense capability and no combat-ready aircraft to battle Israeli warplanes in the sky, Iran would be at Israel's mercy against a coordinated, all-out air attack. This time around, Israel may lean more heavily on its non-stealthy F-15s and F-16s, carrying heavier payloads into Iranian skies — especially through the F-15 — and delivering as much ordnance as possible, as quickly as possible.\n\nIn that scenario, Israel would likely prioritize two types of Iranian targets. First, Israel would work to eliminate Iran's remaining ballistic missiles, especially its launch installations and mobile launch platforms, while wiping out as many of Iran's long-range drones as possible. The goal would be to neuter Iran's ability to strike back, potentially even pre-empting an immediate counterattack if Israel's intelligence is good enough and its aircraft can hit their targets accurately enough. The second group of targets would be economic: oil fields and refineries, natural gas infrastructure, drone and missile production factories, seaports, airports, and large manufacturing centers. Such an approach would aim not just to degrade Iran's military capability but to cripple the economic foundations that sustain the regime and fund its rearmament efforts.\n\nIt bears repeating one final time: a renewed conflict is far from guaranteed. There are still many ways to avoid a return to fighting, and hopefully Iran, Israel, and the international community will be able to ensure that it does not happen. But the risk is significantly greater than most global headlines would suggest, and the window for diplomacy — while still open — may not remain so indefinitely.\n\n## Israel's Strategic Calculus: Regime Change Over Nuclear Targeting\n\nWhile Israel's desire to eliminate Iran's remaining nuclear materials is well established, a renewed Israeli offensive would not necessarily place those materials at the top of its target list. Instead, Israel's strategic calculus may prioritize a more devastating combination: preventing Iran from launching a meaningful counterattack while simultaneously crippling what remains of its economy. If Israel can accomplish both objectives in rapid succession, the threat of regime change in Tehran transforms from a distant possibility into a truly acute one.\n\nThis two-pronged approach — neutralizing Iran's retaliatory capability and devastating its economic infrastructure — could be enough to force Iran to the negotiating table on terms overwhelmingly favorable to Israel. Even more consequentially from Jerusalem's perspective, such a campaign could trigger a full collapse of the Ayatollah's regime. And there are no guarantees that the Supreme Leader himself would survive to witness such a collapse, given Israel's demonstrated willingness and capability to target senior Iranian leadership.\n\nIn the event that Iran refused to capitulate despite the initial onslaught, Israeli warplanes maintaining air superiority and intelligence operatives already embedded on the ground would have ample time to hunt down Iran's nuclear materials at a more deliberate pace. As Israel continued to degrade drone and missile stores throughout the campaign, it would simultaneously maintain the early advantage that prevents its shortage of interceptors from becoming an acute vulnerability. In Israel's ideal scenario, the United States would play a far more active role than it did during the Twelve-Day War, deploying its fighter aircraft and strategic bombers and using its heaviest bunker-busting munitions to destroy deeply buried targets that Israel's own arsenal cannot reach.\n\n## An Iranian First Strike: Drones, Missiles, and the Lessons of Ukraine\n\nThe opposite scenario — in which Iran is the aggressor and Israel is forced onto the defensive — presents a very different but equally dangerous set of dynamics. In that situation, Iran would need to extract maximum value from the ballistic missiles it still possesses, and would likely attempt an initial attack modeled on tactics that Russia has refined during its war in Ukraine: launching a massive wave of incoming drones designed to soak up Israeli air defense interceptors, then timing the launch of more dangerous ballistic missiles to punch through the resulting gap in coverage.\n\nThis is precisely the approach Iran employed during one of its 2024 exchanges with Israel, when its initial salvo stressed the limits of Israel's multi-layered air defense network. But in a renewed conflict, Iran could easily launch far more kamikaze drones than it committed during that 2024 assault, having had months to rebuild production capacity and stockpile airframes. This time, Iran would also likely employ cluster munitions — missiles loaded with small bomblets that can still rain down and cause significant damage even if the missile carrying them is successfully intercepted by systems like Iron Dome or Arrow. The use of cluster munitions would represent a meaningful escalation in Iran's approach, designed to ensure that even a partially successful Israeli intercept still results in casualties and destruction on the ground.\n\nAt the same time, Iran would almost certainly attempt to divide Israel's attention across multiple fronts simultaneously. Tehran could leverage its proxy forces to open several theaters at once: a Hezbollah ground assault against Israeli military emplacements still stationed on Lebanese territory, a coordinated rocket and drone attack from militia positions in Syria and Iraq, and a long-range strike leveraging drones and cruise missiles from Yemen's Houthi rebels. Even if Iran's proxies refused to fully engage — a real possibility given the degraded state of some of these groups — Iran could still achieve the effect of dividing Israel's defensive posture by throwing those proxies under the bus, creating the perception that attacks from multiple directions are imminent and thus forcing Israel to split off some of its precious defensive assets to cover each potential threat axis.\n\n## Exploiting Arab Estrangement and the Strait of Hormuz\n\nIn a scenario where Iran initiates hostilities, Tehran may be able to exploit the growing strain between Israel and the Arab world to its advantage. Arab nations that previously cooperated — however quietly — with Israel's defense during the 2024 exchanges would be far less likely to intervene on Israel's behalf given the diplomatic fallout from Israeli airstrikes in Qatar and the broader deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations. This means that Iran's drones and missiles would face fewer obstacles on their way to Israeli airspace, and Israel would bear a greater share of the defensive burden alone.\n\nIf Iran can soak up Israeli interceptors fast enough through its combined drone-and-missile saturation strategy, there would be at least a window — however brief — during which Iranian projectiles have a meaningful chance of scoring hits against Israeli targets. And although Iran stands quite literally zero chance of defeating Israel in an extended air war, Tehran would likely have a very different series of objectives in mind than outright military victory.\n\nIt would not take long at all for Iran to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, through which a massive share of the world's oil supply transits daily. Iran could then use that blockade as a bargaining chip to extract favorable concessions from the international community: long-term sanctions relief, some form of compromise around its nuclear program, or any other arrangement that could help the Iranian regime survive and recover lost ground. Make no mistake — this would be a desperate play by a ruling regime in a desperate situation. But if Iran were willing to make that gamble, the regime would give itself significantly more leverage by first demonstrating that it could inflict real damage on Israel. This could include more targeted attacks against economic infrastructure, political centers, religious sites, or even deliberate strikes against civilian populations — a horrifying escalation that would nonetheless serve Tehran's goal of proving it can impose unacceptable costs.\n\n## The Race to the Bottom: Why a Renewed War Would Be Far Worse\n\nWhether it is Israel or Iran that ultimately decides, in this dark hypothetical, that the time has come to pull the trigger, the result would undeniably bring pain and tragedy to the people of both nations on a scale that could dwarf the Twelve-Day War. The limited, carefully calibrated nature of the 2025 conflict — where both sides deliberately preserved off-ramps and avoided their most devastating options — would be far less likely to characterize a second round. Both nations have now studied each other's capabilities, identified vulnerabilities, and developed strategies specifically designed to exploit the weaknesses revealed during the first engagement.\n\nMiscalculations would only compound the suffering. One side or the other will inevitably overestimate its own capabilities, fail to perform as expected in the fog of war, and find itself drawn deeper into what would quickly become a prolonged conflict rather than a brief, decisive exchange. Right now, both Israel and Iran might be open to the idea of a return to fighting, each believing it can achieve a quick, favorable outcome. But that conflict would soon devolve into a race to the bottom — a war of attrition that only one side can survive, and that neither will endure without immense pain.\n\nThe Twelve-Day War ended because all parties chose restraint. A second war would begin with both sides having already exhausted much of their willingness to hold back, having already seen what restraint cost them in terms of unfinished objectives and unresolved threats. The escalation dynamics described throughout this analysis — where both sides climb the ladder expecting the other to back down first — become exponentially more dangerous when neither side believes it can afford to show weakness again.\n\nIf the Middle East gets lucky, none of this will come to pass. Diplomacy, economic incentives, international pressure, or simple exhaustion could still prevent a return to open conflict. But waiting for a day when luck favors the Middle East has historically been a losing proposition — and the stakes this time are higher than they have been in decades.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)\n- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why was the Twelve-Day War considered a 'limited' conflict?\n\nDespite its devastation, the Twelve-Day War was limited because both Iran and Israel deliberately avoided using their most destructive capabilities. Israel refrained from targeting Iran's Supreme Leader, avoided using nuclear weapons, and limited strikes on missile production. Iran avoided overwhelming Israeli air defenses with massive drone swarms, didn't close the Strait of Hormuz, and didn't fully engage proxy forces like Hezbollah. Both sides preserved diplomatic off-ramps for de-escalation.\n\n### What happened to Iran's nuclear materials during the Twelve-Day War?\n\nDespite Israeli bombardment of key Iranian nuclear sites, neither Israel, the United States, nor the International Atomic Energy Agency has been able to conclusively determine the fate of Iran's roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Iran is believed to still possess the requisite centrifuges and other equipment to continue enriching uranium, making this a major unresolved concern and a potential trigger for renewed conflict.\n\n### How did the war affect Israel's air defense capabilities, and why does it matter?\n\nIsrael significantly depleted its air defense interceptors during the Twelve-Day War. The United States used an estimated one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors in just twelve days, and US officials indicate that despite Israel's denials, Jerusalem may be facing a similar shortage. This vulnerability creates pressure on Israel to act before Iran can rebuild its offensive capabilities and exploit the gap.\n\n### Why might both sides believe they have an advantage in striking first?\n\nIsrael believes the Iranian regime is on the brink of collapse and could be toppled with one final push, especially before Iran rebuilds its air defenses and missile capabilities. Iran sees Israel as more isolated than ever and currently low on interceptors — a vulnerability that will be addressed if Israel is given time. Both sides perceive a closing window: Israel fears Iran will disperse its nuclear materials, while Iran fears that snapback sanctions will soon make action impossible.\n\n### What role does domestic politics play in the likelihood of renewed conflict?\n\nPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival has been tied to ongoing conflict, incentivizing him to continue or expand military operations to remain in power. In Iran, clerical leaders face unprecedented vulnerability due to a crumbling economy, popular opposition, and loss of faith among regime loyalists. Both leaderships may see war as essential to their political survival, creating dangerous incentives for escalation on both sides.\n\n## Sources\n- <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-6-2025-68e462d516605>\n- <https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-twelve-days-shook-region-inside-iran-israel-war>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/06/world/middleeast/thrust-into-the-line-of-fire-iranians-worry-about-what-comes-next.html#:~:text=Thrust%20Into%20the%20Line%20of,Next%20%2D%20The%20New%20York%20Times&text=Over%2012%20days%20of%20war,fear%20it%20will%20not%20last>\n- <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/10/iran-us-israel-sanctions-response/684471/>\n- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/iran-hangs-one-of-the-most-important-spies-for-israel-in-latest-execution>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/irans-clerical-leaders-face-existential-crisis-amid-nuclear-deadlock-2025-09-28/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/angry-afraid-iranians-brace-more-israeli-attacks-2025-06-13/>\n- <https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/israel-and-iran-brink-preventing-next-war>\n- <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-preserve-rising-lions-achievements-israel-must-support-an-iran-nuclear-deal/>\n- <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/iran-starts-rebuilding-missile-sites-hit-by-israel-but-experts-say-a-key-component-is-missing/>\n- <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509202533>\n- <https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-land-defense/land-defense-2024/iran-inroduces-zoubin-air-defense-missile-system-with-360-interception-similar-to-israels-iron-dome>\n- <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran>\n- <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-israel-and-iran-had-decided-avoid-long-war>\n- <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-israels-strike-on-doha-is-forcing-a-gulf-security-reckoning/#:~:text=Israel's%20September%209%20military%20strike,reached%20new%20heights%20this%20month>\n- <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israels-attack-on-qatar-and-the-end-of-diplomacy/#:~:text=Despite%20repeated%20Israeli%20attacks%2C%20Hamas,mediator%20after%20the%20Israeli%20attack>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/03/us/politics/trump-israel-qatar-gaza.html>\n- <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/from-doha-to-riyadh-how-israels-strike-sparked-the-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact/>\n- <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/09/israels-attack-qatar-shows-why-its-time-gulf-defence-union>\n- <https://www.newsweek.com/us-missile-defenses-heavily-depleted-shielding-israel-report-2091465>\n- <https://www.timesofisrael.com/denying-reports-idf-indicates-that-its-not-running-low-on-missile-interceptors/>\n- <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-is-running-low-on-defensive-interceptors-official-says-fd64163d?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhKL9Vbt73T3gNMQefeOqVI0ZbPTrzjtOZYwROLspx9eHQuv65xeXrU3B1-tUQ%3D&gaa_ts=68e539c7&gaa_sig=fnTab48CMbMvDZq2P7DWXigD0SdIqdyCaCW1BhP6gQM8gwxzPCOIAKy5wmPrSzMrauSAZz_zYtRaXdfZkmk34A%3D%3D>\n- <https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-06-18/iran-finds-cracks-in-israels-missile-defense-system.html>\n- <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-2-2025/>\n- <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-1-2025/>\n- <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-30-2025/>\n- <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-29-2025/>\n- <https://www.timesofisrael.com/its-missile-stock-is-depleted-but-irans-arsenal-may-still-be-a-threat/>\n- <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/europes-takeaway-from-the-israel-iran-war-offense-is-still-the-best-defense/>\n- <https://time.com/7316478/iran-israel-war-nuclear-program-us/>\n- <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/wargaming-the-middle-east-how-iran-might-reshape-its-hezbollah-proxy-playbook/>\n- <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-militia-allies-houthis-hezbollah-a36d7de7?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAg69HepL9N6fBMd0kfvGlzwlqscBJ2e5UAYAWhjez8vUXzmy4jmqvFZKwms2_o%3D&gaa_ts=68e54467&gaa_sig=k6CYhPy77dJV9flWtPPgkZRTX4bNsOTiN8eqmF5wbXNL_J19kOuDGn5Irm2MPUmmfWRPvspWUUNZQHDjsogM_w%3D%3D>\n\n<!-- youtube:unAXwGdgkeQ -->"
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---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
The Twelve-Day War of 2025 between Iran and Israel was a moment of extraordinary global danger — dozens of Israeli civilians killed, hundreds of Iranian civilians dead, tens of thousands displaced, and Iran's nuclear program set back by years. Yet as devastating as that conflict was, both sides deliberately limited their engagement, choosing restraint over total war. Four months later, the leadership in both Jerusalem and Tehran appears to agree on one unsettling conclusion: the war isn't over. Both nations are re-arming, both face mounting domestic and international pressures, and a growing chorus of global experts warns that a return to direct military confrontation is becoming more likely — with no guarantee that the next round will end as quickly, or as mercifully, as the last one did.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways

- The Twelve-Day War of 2025 was deliberately limited by all parties — Iran, Israel, and the United States — with both sides avoiding their most devastating capabilities in order to preserve an off-ramp for de-escalation.
- Four months after the ceasefire, both Iran and Israel are actively re-arming and preparing for the possibility of renewed conflict, rather than pursuing comprehensive peace.
- Israel depleted significant air defense interceptors during the war, and the United States is estimated to have used a full one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors in just twelve days.
- Iran's enriched uranium stockpile — roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — was not conclusively destroyed, and Iran retains centrifuges and equipment to continue enrichment.
- Iran is pursuing major arms deals, including 48 Russian Su-35 fighter jets with deliveries potentially starting in 2026, Chinese J-10 fighters, and possibly Russian MiG-29s.
- Renewed UN 'snapback' sanctions are expected to hit Iran hard, accelerating economic decline and regime instability — potentially pressuring Tehran to act before its position deteriorates further.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-twelve-day-war-was-a-limited-engagement-by-design" -->
## The Twelve-Day War Was a Limited Engagement — By Design

To understand why a return to war is increasingly plausible, it is essential to grasp a core reality about the 2025 conflict: as ruinous as it was, the Twelve-Day War was still a very limited engagement compared to what both sides were capable of unleashing. During the fighting, Iran, Israel, and the United States all fought to inflict damage and achieve core objectives, but each party deliberately chose to limit its involvement in a successful attempt to ensure the conflict could be drawn down and resolved relatively quickly.

On Israel's side, the nation avoided killing Iran's Supreme Leader and other high-ranking clerics. It chose to cripple a single element of Iran's missile production chain rather than continuing strikes until Iran's missile capabilities were fully destroyed. And, critically, Israel refrained from drawing on its nuclear arsenal. Iran, for its part, avoided launching the scale of drone swarms that could have fully overwhelmed Israeli air defenses. It avoided forcing the hand of proxy allies like Hezbollah, even involuntarily, and it avoided any action to close the Strait of Hormuz — a move that would have held hostage a large share of the world's oil supply. Both sides avoided targeting vulnerable civilian populations located far from military assets, and neither gave any indication of involving ground forces.

The United States kept its involvement carefully limited as well, avoiding pressure on its European or Middle Eastern allies to play a significant role and engaging in only a fraction of the offensive strikes it was capable of. All sides entered the conflict hoping they could leave themselves a suitable off-ramp to draw down hostilities. After twelve days of intense bloodletting, that is precisely what happened. The outcome could have been far worse.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-twelve-day-war-was-a-limited-engagement-by-design" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-missed-opportunity-for-peace" -->
## The Missed Opportunity for Peace

The aftermath of the Twelve-Day War presented the international community with a clear choice. It could have stepped in and placed meaningful incentives on both Iran and Israel to draw them into a more comprehensive peace accord — giving both Tehran and Jerusalem real, tangible reasons to keep the peace and avoid even the chance of further conflict. That is not what happened. Instead, the world witnessed the alternative: both Israel and Iran retreated to their respective corners, took time to assess their losses, and then got back to business, operating on the premise that the adversary they had only just fought would probably go to war with them again in the future. This failure to capitalize on the post-war moment has set the stage for the dangerous dynamics now unfolding across the region.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-missed-opportunity-for-peace" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="israel-s-post-war-challenges-and-incentives" -->
## Israel's Post-War Challenges and Incentives

Israel emerged from the Twelve-Day War with a far stronger claim to victory, but it has still had to contend with very important challenges in the aftermath. For one, Israel appears to have been only partially successful in accomplishing its wartime objectives. Despite the bombardment of key Iranian nuclear sites, neither Israel, the United States, nor the International Atomic Energy Agency has been able to conclusively determine the fate of Iran's roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Iran is believed to still possess the requisite centrifuges and other equipment to continue enriching uranium. And while Iran sustained significant disruption to its ability to launch missiles and drones, it still retains some infrastructure to do so.

Just as critically, Israel and its main ally, the United States, depleted many of their air defense interceptors over the course of the twelve-day conflict. The United States is estimated to have depleted a full one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors during just those twelve days alone, and US officials indicate that despite Israel's denials, Jerusalem may be facing a similar problem.

Beyond the military balance sheet, a range of international circumstances incentivize Israel to consider a return to war while disincentivizing trust in the prospect of peace. Israel's recent decision to conduct airstrikes against Hamas in the nation of Qatar has set the wider Middle East on a knife's edge. The rich and powerful leaders of the Arab world are no longer willing to treat Israel with the relative openness they have shown over the last decade. Israel's attempts to normalize relations with the Arab world are in jeopardy, and the Arab League recently joined forces with a number of European nations that recognized Palestinian statehood for the first time — a move that Israeli leaders have broadly interpreted as a sign of growing hostility.

Israel is growing more isolated in its war effort in Gaza and has even faced limited pressure from the United States. At the same time, negotiations with Hamas are ongoing but risk falling apart for several reasons, and the US has indicated to Israel that if Hamas refuses a deal, Israel may be empowered to take greater unilateral action in Gaza. Taken together, these international factors create a situation where Israel feels isolated, forced to fend for itself, and less trustful of the international community's willingness to help resolve disputes in Israel's favor.

A growing chorus of global experts and observers also agree that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival has been tied to the war in Gaza for some time — and that Netanyahu is incentivized to continue the war in Gaza, or even expand conflict to other sectors, as a way to remain in power.

<!-- aeo:section end="israel-s-post-war-challenges-and-incentives" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="iran-s-vulnerability-and-rearmament-drive" -->
## Iran's Vulnerability and Rearmament Drive

Netanyahu is far from the only leader in this discussion who may see war as the best way to retain power. In Iran, the nation's clerical leaders are more vulnerable than they have ever been, caught between a crumbling economy, an enduring popular opposition movement, and a crisis of faith among regime loyalists who now doubt the stories of military might that Tehran has been selling for decades.

Iran's military leaders have been made paranoid by a wave of Israeli assassinations and are known to be working out contingency plans and orders of succession in case the current wave of leaders is wiped out in a renewed conflict. The regime is working to hunt down and arrest anybody who might even be suspected of being an Israeli asset. Iran has executed more people in 2025 than in any year since the 1979 revolution, including a man named Bahman Choobiasl, who was hanged in late September and described as "one of the most important spies for Israel in Iran."

At the same time, Iran is reportedly working to reconsolidate and rebuild its air defenses as quickly as possible, prioritizing short-range drone interceptors that would have been helpful against many of the drone attacks Israeli assets are suspected of having launched in asymmetric operations on Iranian soil. According to leaked Russian documents exposed by a Ukrainian hacking group, Iran has inked a deal for 48 copies of Russia's Su-35 fighter jet, including early deliveries as soon as 2026 if Russia can keep to the intended schedule. Iran is also looking to acquire Chinese J-10 fighter jets and may already have purchased MiG-29s from Russia — all in an attempt to address Israel's ability to gain air superiority so quickly during the last war. Meanwhile, Iran continues to test ballistic missiles, demonstrating that it has at least some launch capability remaining, and it is thought to still be able to produce long-range, low-cost kamikaze drones.

While those factors alone might suggest Iran would take time to lock down regime stability and spend a few years gathering and rebuilding weapons systems, Iran's international situation is creating pressure for Tehran to push up its timeline. In mid-October, Iran was hit by so-called "snapback" sanctions from the United Nations, which had been suspended as part of the global attempt to get Iran to peacefully call off its nuclear weapons program. Those renewed sanctions are expected to hit Iran very hard. Although Iran's subversive financial arrangements with nations like Russia and China can blunt the pain somewhat, the results will still make public fury toward the regime even more intense. Iran's ability to finance rearmament will start to decline, the unity of its ruling elites will begin to fray, and regime collapse becomes far more likely. Add to that the reports that Iranian officials believe Israel is planning a new round of strikes — seemingly confirmed by recent statements by Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists that Israel knows where Iran's remaining nuclear stockpiles are being held.

<!-- aeo:section end="iran-s-vulnerability-and-rearmament-drive" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="a-destabilizing-regional-landscape" -->
## A Destabilizing Regional Landscape

Across the Middle East, growing destabilization and disunity make for an environment that practically fosters a future war. Syria is on the brink of a return to violence, most recently due to a standoff between Damascus and the autonomous Kurdish region of Rojava, while the Islamic State continues to reconstitute itself in the border zones between Syria and Iraq. Iraq itself is increasingly unstable, and Gulf states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are now on guard against the prospect of strikes from all directions — even from Israel.

Hardliners within Iran's long-time proxy ally, Hezbollah, are trying to resist a push for disarmament. Although they no longer have the ability to directly threaten Israel in the way they could have done before 2024, they can certainly destabilize Lebanon and threaten Israeli forces still stationed on Lebanese territory. An ongoing pattern of arms interceptions shows that Iran is still working to arm Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthi rebels, and proxy militias in Iraq and Syria.

All the while, the United States appears to be working to draw down its involvement in the Middle East, creating the first hints of a diplomatic and security vacuum that all sorts of bad actors could exploit. This combination of regional fragility, proxy rearmament, and diminishing American engagement creates a volatile backdrop against which any renewed Iran-Israel confrontation would play out.

<!-- aeo:section end="a-destabilizing-regional-landscape" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="why-both-sides-may-see-advantage-in-striking-first" -->
## Why Both Sides May See Advantage in Striking First

The specific fault lines that incentivize each side to consider a return to fighting — and specifically a quick return to violence rather than a years-long buildup — are deeply concerning. Israel has taken a hit to its air defenses, and Iran appears intent on rebuilding its long-range strike capability. If Israel waits, Iran might learn the lessons of its past engagement, rebuilding its arsenal and rethinking its tactics so that Israel is forced to burn interceptors faster and become more vulnerable. Both Israel and Iran seem to agree that Iran's enriched uranium was not destroyed, incentivizing Israel to try to target it while reliable intelligence is still coming in, and incentivizing Iran to consider forcefully deterring Israel from making another attempt.

Iran is facing greater regime instability than ever, but that problem is going to get worse as the months and years go on, not better. Even though it is far from an ideal time for Iran to strike Israel, it might be now or never. Similarly, Israel's leaders are feeling their isolation on the global stage and may fear a collapse of their government if they cannot use the threat of an external enemy to justify their continued hold on power.

The international fault lines compound the danger. The wider Middle East is getting more fractious, the Arab world's perceptions of Israel are dropping quickly, Israel's non-US allies are frustrated with Jerusalem's conduct, and Iran's proxies abroad are still armed and dangerous but getting desperate — all contributing to the idea within the Iranian regime that now is as good an opportunity as they are going to get. But that same combination of factors makes Israel more likely to engage, both because Jerusalem may see changing international perceptions as a sign of darker days ahead, and because Jerusalem may reason that if Europe, the Arab world, and other international forces have already been alienated, then Israel has nothing left to lose by taking the sorts of actions it has previously avoided.

Perhaps most dangerous of all is the possibility that both Israel and Iran may independently conclude that they would have the advantage in acting quickly. From Israel's perspective, the Iranian regime is on the brink of collapse and could be toppled with one big, final push. If Israel indeed knows where Iran's nuclear materials are being stored, it could destroy that equipment before Iran has the chance to hide it or split it up. Israel knows that Iran will try to procure combat jets, rebuild its air defenses, and reconstitute its long-range missile and drone threat — but all of that has not happened yet, and if Israel strikes first and strikes hard, perhaps it never will.

From Iran's perspective, the same situation can lead to the same conclusion. Israel is more isolated than ever, and Iran might believe it stands a better chance of using war with Israel — or the threat of war — to gain more favorable treatment than it could otherwise get. Iran knows that Israel is low on air defenses right now, but that if Israel is given time, that problem will be addressed. Iran knows that even though it is not in a good position to strike right now, it is in a better position than it will be once international sanctions really start to bite. And it knows that the same is true for its proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria: in a couple of years, they could be disarmed, devastated by one-on-one wars with Israel, or lose an appetite for conflict — but right now, they can be drawn into a war on Iran's side.

<!-- aeo:section end="why-both-sides-may-see-advantage-in-striking-first" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-escalation-ladder-when-neither-side-backs-down" -->
## The Escalation Ladder: When Neither Side Backs Down

In a situation where both sides believe they have something to gain from instigating a violent exchange, and where they also believe their adversary has a lot to lose, both nations have ample incentives to ratchet up tensions. They have incentives to issue clear threats of violent escalation, then to engage in military provocations, and then — when shown what is supposed to be a deterrent — they have an incentive to escalate again, because they believe they are willing to go farther than their adversary.

But when both sides feel that way, the situation is at its most dangerous. When both sides are climbing an escalation ladder and waiting for their enemy to back down, there is a real possibility that both sides might keep on climbing — before realizing, a little too late, that their enemy was more willing to engage in a conflict than they had initially realized. This dynamic of mutual miscalculation, where each side overestimates its own resolve relative to the other's, is one of the most well-documented pathways to unintended large-scale war in the history of international conflict.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-escalation-ladder-when-neither-side-backs-down" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="specific-triggers-that-could-spark-renewed-conflict" -->
## Specific Triggers That Could Spark Renewed Conflict

While a new round of escalation between Iran and Israel does not need to happen — and there are still plenty of opportunities for diplomacy and level-headedness to prevail — it is worth identifying the specific conditions that could lead either side to pull the trigger in the coming months.

For Israel, the most likely prompt would be clear evidence that Iran has either restarted full-scale nuclear enrichment efforts or has begun enriching its existing stockpiles to a level closer to weapons-grade. There is also the possibility that the Netanyahu government could turn its attention toward Iran and begin laying the groundwork for future conflict in the event that it strikes a ceasefire or even a true peace deal with Hamas. If, as suspected, the Netanyahu government feels it needs a war or national security crisis to ensure it remains in power, then the end of a war against Hamas would create a vacuum that a war with Iran could easily fill.

For Iran, one trigger could be an escalation of Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip, in the event that a peace accord fails to materialize and Israel doubles down on its current efforts. Or, if the notoriously paranoid regime were to uncover large-scale infiltration by Israel's Mossad, or identify some real or perceived plot against it, Iran could choose to react violently.

Most troubling of all, however, is the possibility that either side could choose to return to conflict because of a combination of building stressors rather than any acute threat. The advantage of an acute threat — to the extent that anything is advantageous about this situation — is that a return to fighting would probably be preceded by global news reports, diplomatic rhetoric, military posturing, and other clear indicators that something is about to happen. But if either Israel or Iran believes that as a result of its overall situation, it is in its interest to launch an attack, then a surprise assault becomes much more likely. Surprise attacks make all sides more uncertain, especially the nation on the receiving end, and raise the odds that the targeted nation might opt for a disproportionate response — setting the stage for more escalation, and even more after that.

<!-- aeo:section end="specific-triggers-that-could-spark-renewed-conflict" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="what-a-renewed-conflict-could-look-like" -->
## What a Renewed Conflict Could Look Like

If Israel and Iran do return to conflict in the coming months, the fighting should not be expected to look the same as the Twelve-Day War. Instead, both nations will have learned the lessons of that prior exchange and will be more ready to avoid their adversary's strengths and zero in on their weaknesses.

In the case of an Israeli attack, Iran's air defenses are still very far from being rebuilt, and Israel would almost certainly take full advantage of that vulnerability. With no meaningful air-defense capability and no combat-ready aircraft to battle Israeli warplanes in the sky, Iran would be at Israel's mercy against a coordinated, all-out air attack. This time around, Israel may lean more heavily on its non-stealthy F-15s and F-16s, carrying heavier payloads into Iranian skies — especially through the F-15 — and delivering as much ordnance as possible, as quickly as possible.

In that scenario, Israel would likely prioritize two types of Iranian targets. First, Israel would work to eliminate Iran's remaining ballistic missiles, especially its launch installations and mobile launch platforms, while wiping out as many of Iran's long-range drones as possible. The goal would be to neuter Iran's ability to strike back, potentially even pre-empting an immediate counterattack if Israel's intelligence is good enough and its aircraft can hit their targets accurately enough. The second group of targets would be economic: oil fields and refineries, natural gas infrastructure, drone and missile production factories, seaports, airports, and large manufacturing centers. Such an approach would aim not just to degrade Iran's military capability but to cripple the economic foundations that sustain the regime and fund its rearmament efforts.

It bears repeating one final time: a renewed conflict is far from guaranteed. There are still many ways to avoid a return to fighting, and hopefully Iran, Israel, and the international community will be able to ensure that it does not happen. But the risk is significantly greater than most global headlines would suggest, and the window for diplomacy — while still open — may not remain so indefinitely.

<!-- aeo:section end="what-a-renewed-conflict-could-look-like" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="israel-s-strategic-calculus-regime-change-over-nuclear-targeting" -->
## Israel's Strategic Calculus: Regime Change Over Nuclear Targeting

While Israel's desire to eliminate Iran's remaining nuclear materials is well established, a renewed Israeli offensive would not necessarily place those materials at the top of its target list. Instead, Israel's strategic calculus may prioritize a more devastating combination: preventing Iran from launching a meaningful counterattack while simultaneously crippling what remains of its economy. If Israel can accomplish both objectives in rapid succession, the threat of regime change in Tehran transforms from a distant possibility into a truly acute one.

This two-pronged approach — neutralizing Iran's retaliatory capability and devastating its economic infrastructure — could be enough to force Iran to the negotiating table on terms overwhelmingly favorable to Israel. Even more consequentially from Jerusalem's perspective, such a campaign could trigger a full collapse of the Ayatollah's regime. And there are no guarantees that the Supreme Leader himself would survive to witness such a collapse, given Israel's demonstrated willingness and capability to target senior Iranian leadership.

In the event that Iran refused to capitulate despite the initial onslaught, Israeli warplanes maintaining air superiority and intelligence operatives already embedded on the ground would have ample time to hunt down Iran's nuclear materials at a more deliberate pace. As Israel continued to degrade drone and missile stores throughout the campaign, it would simultaneously maintain the early advantage that prevents its shortage of interceptors from becoming an acute vulnerability. In Israel's ideal scenario, the United States would play a far more active role than it did during the Twelve-Day War, deploying its fighter aircraft and strategic bombers and using its heaviest bunker-busting munitions to destroy deeply buried targets that Israel's own arsenal cannot reach.

<!-- aeo:section end="israel-s-strategic-calculus-regime-change-over-nuclear-targeting" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="an-iranian-first-strike-drones-missiles-and-the-lessons-of-ukrai" -->
## An Iranian First Strike: Drones, Missiles, and the Lessons of Ukraine

The opposite scenario — in which Iran is the aggressor and Israel is forced onto the defensive — presents a very different but equally dangerous set of dynamics. In that situation, Iran would need to extract maximum value from the ballistic missiles it still possesses, and would likely attempt an initial attack modeled on tactics that Russia has refined during its war in Ukraine: launching a massive wave of incoming drones designed to soak up Israeli air defense interceptors, then timing the launch of more dangerous ballistic missiles to punch through the resulting gap in coverage.

This is precisely the approach Iran employed during one of its 2024 exchanges with Israel, when its initial salvo stressed the limits of Israel's multi-layered air defense network. But in a renewed conflict, Iran could easily launch far more kamikaze drones than it committed during that 2024 assault, having had months to rebuild production capacity and stockpile airframes. This time, Iran would also likely employ cluster munitions — missiles loaded with small bomblets that can still rain down and cause significant damage even if the missile carrying them is successfully intercepted by systems like Iron Dome or Arrow. The use of cluster munitions would represent a meaningful escalation in Iran's approach, designed to ensure that even a partially successful Israeli intercept still results in casualties and destruction on the ground.

At the same time, Iran would almost certainly attempt to divide Israel's attention across multiple fronts simultaneously. Tehran could leverage its proxy forces to open several theaters at once: a Hezbollah ground assault against Israeli military emplacements still stationed on Lebanese territory, a coordinated rocket and drone attack from militia positions in Syria and Iraq, and a long-range strike leveraging drones and cruise missiles from Yemen's Houthi rebels. Even if Iran's proxies refused to fully engage — a real possibility given the degraded state of some of these groups — Iran could still achieve the effect of dividing Israel's defensive posture by throwing those proxies under the bus, creating the perception that attacks from multiple directions are imminent and thus forcing Israel to split off some of its precious defensive assets to cover each potential threat axis.

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<!-- aeo:section start="exploiting-arab-estrangement-and-the-strait-of-hormuz" -->
## Exploiting Arab Estrangement and the Strait of Hormuz

In a scenario where Iran initiates hostilities, Tehran may be able to exploit the growing strain between Israel and the Arab world to its advantage. Arab nations that previously cooperated — however quietly — with Israel's defense during the 2024 exchanges would be far less likely to intervene on Israel's behalf given the diplomatic fallout from Israeli airstrikes in Qatar and the broader deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations. This means that Iran's drones and missiles would face fewer obstacles on their way to Israeli airspace, and Israel would bear a greater share of the defensive burden alone.

If Iran can soak up Israeli interceptors fast enough through its combined drone-and-missile saturation strategy, there would be at least a window — however brief — during which Iranian projectiles have a meaningful chance of scoring hits against Israeli targets. And although Iran stands quite literally zero chance of defeating Israel in an extended air war, Tehran would likely have a very different series of objectives in mind than outright military victory.

It would not take long at all for Iran to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, through which a massive share of the world's oil supply transits daily. Iran could then use that blockade as a bargaining chip to extract favorable concessions from the international community: long-term sanctions relief, some form of compromise around its nuclear program, or any other arrangement that could help the Iranian regime survive and recover lost ground. Make no mistake — this would be a desperate play by a ruling regime in a desperate situation. But if Iran were willing to make that gamble, the regime would give itself significantly more leverage by first demonstrating that it could inflict real damage on Israel. This could include more targeted attacks against economic infrastructure, political centers, religious sites, or even deliberate strikes against civilian populations — a horrifying escalation that would nonetheless serve Tehran's goal of proving it can impose unacceptable costs.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-race-to-the-bottom-why-a-renewed-war-would-be-far-worse" -->
## The Race to the Bottom: Why a Renewed War Would Be Far Worse

Whether it is Israel or Iran that ultimately decides, in this dark hypothetical, that the time has come to pull the trigger, the result would undeniably bring pain and tragedy to the people of both nations on a scale that could dwarf the Twelve-Day War. The limited, carefully calibrated nature of the 2025 conflict — where both sides deliberately preserved off-ramps and avoided their most devastating options — would be far less likely to characterize a second round. Both nations have now studied each other's capabilities, identified vulnerabilities, and developed strategies specifically designed to exploit the weaknesses revealed during the first engagement.

Miscalculations would only compound the suffering. One side or the other will inevitably overestimate its own capabilities, fail to perform as expected in the fog of war, and find itself drawn deeper into what would quickly become a prolonged conflict rather than a brief, decisive exchange. Right now, both Israel and Iran might be open to the idea of a return to fighting, each believing it can achieve a quick, favorable outcome. But that conflict would soon devolve into a race to the bottom — a war of attrition that only one side can survive, and that neither will endure without immense pain.

The Twelve-Day War ended because all parties chose restraint. A second war would begin with both sides having already exhausted much of their willingness to hold back, having already seen what restraint cost them in terms of unfinished objectives and unresolved threats. The escalation dynamics described throughout this analysis — where both sides climb the ladder expecting the other to back down first — become exponentially more dangerous when neither side believes it can afford to show weakness again.

If the Middle East gets lucky, none of this will come to pass. Diplomacy, economic incentives, international pressure, or simple exhaustion could still prevent a return to open conflict. But waiting for a day when luck favors the Middle East has historically been a losing proposition — and the stakes this time are higher than they have been in decades.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-race-to-the-bottom-why-a-renewed-war-would-be-far-worse" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)
- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)
- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why was the Twelve-Day War considered a 'limited' conflict?

Despite its devastation, the Twelve-Day War was limited because both Iran and Israel deliberately avoided using their most destructive capabilities. Israel refrained from targeting Iran's Supreme Leader, avoided using nuclear weapons, and limited strikes on missile production. Iran avoided overwhelming Israeli air defenses with massive drone swarms, didn't close the Strait of Hormuz, and didn't fully engage proxy forces like Hezbollah. Both sides preserved diplomatic off-ramps for de-escalation.

### What happened to Iran's nuclear materials during the Twelve-Day War?

Despite Israeli bombardment of key Iranian nuclear sites, neither Israel, the United States, nor the International Atomic Energy Agency has been able to conclusively determine the fate of Iran's roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Iran is believed to still possess the requisite centrifuges and other equipment to continue enriching uranium, making this a major unresolved concern and a potential trigger for renewed conflict.

### How did the war affect Israel's air defense capabilities, and why does it matter?

Israel significantly depleted its air defense interceptors during the Twelve-Day War. The United States used an estimated one-quarter of its high-quality missile interceptors in just twelve days, and US officials indicate that despite Israel's denials, Jerusalem may be facing a similar shortage. This vulnerability creates pressure on Israel to act before Iran can rebuild its offensive capabilities and exploit the gap.

### Why might both sides believe they have an advantage in striking first?

Israel believes the Iranian regime is on the brink of collapse and could be toppled with one final push, especially before Iran rebuilds its air defenses and missile capabilities. Iran sees Israel as more isolated than ever and currently low on interceptors — a vulnerability that will be addressed if Israel is given time. Both sides perceive a closing window: Israel fears Iran will disperse its nuclear materials, while Iran fears that snapback sanctions will soon make action impossible.

### What role does domestic politics play in the likelihood of renewed conflict?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival has been tied to ongoing conflict, incentivizing him to continue or expand military operations to remain in power. In Iran, clerical leaders face unprecedented vulnerability due to a crumbling economy, popular opposition, and loss of faith among regime loyalists. Both leaderships may see war as essential to their political survival, creating dangerous incentives for escalation on both sides.

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<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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<!-- aeo:section end="sources" -->