---
title: "Life After Assad: Syria's Uncertain Path to Reconstruction and Peace"
description: "After half a century of dictatorship, the Assad regime of Syria has finally collapsed. It took nearly fourteen years of war, incredible casualties, millions of people displaced, and unspeakable human tragedy, but the father-son dynasty that dominated Syria for so long has been condemned to history. While the fall of the Assad regime represents a great victory for the nation of Syria, the question of what happens next looms large. The nation remains divided between powerful armed factions, its people must find a way for rebels and regime collaborators to live peacefully together, and its place on the world stage will need to be thoroughly recalibrated or even reimagined from the ground up. With any luck, the battles in Syria might finally be over, but the process of peace has only just begun, and if history around the world is any indication, Syria's most difficult moments may still lie ahead.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- HTS controls four of Syria's five most populous cities (Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus) and has established a transitional government with an 18-month timeline, including plans for a new constitution after six months.\n- The transitional government under HTS has issued broad amnesties to former regime officials and emphasized protection of minorities, though concerns remain about limited outreach to other factions like Kurdish Rojava and the Turkish-backed SNA.\n- Syria's reconstruction costs are estimated at $250 billion (2021 figures), with additional complications from economic collapse, tens of billions in debt to Iran, and international sanctions against HTS as a designated terror organization.\n- Kurdish-controlled Rojava faces existential threats from Turkish-backed forces and Turkey itself, with ongoing violence in Manbij and Deir ez-Zor signaling potential for larger conflict despite Kurdish control of major oil fields.\n- Israel has conducted over 480 airstrikes destroying approximately 80% of Syria's military capabilities and established a buffer zone extending potentially 25 kilometers from Damascus, while threatening retaliation if Iran re-establishes presence.\n\n## The Current State of Affairs in Post-Assad Syria\n\nThe situation in Syria remains highly fluid as of December 11, 2024, with territorial control, leadership identities, and the extent of foreign involvement all liable to change. The immediate aftermath of the rebel takeover of Damascus has generated a wide range of maps depicting who controls what, though many prove unreliable. Using the Institute for the Study of War's \"Reported Control of Terrain in Syria\" as a primary reference point, along with additional context, a complex picture emerges of the forces currently holding land across the country.\n\nThe most prominent force is Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, better known as HTS. This organization most directly brought about the fall of Damascus through a cascading offensive that started at the fringes of Idlib governate, where HTS had been at its strongest. From there, HTS crashed eastward to Aleppo, then south to Hama, then to the key city of Homs, and finally to the capital, Damascus. HTS now holds direct control over all five of these cities, and according to pre-war census figures, this grants HTS control over four of the five most populous cities in all of Syria. The only other city within the top five is Latakia, Syria's premier port city. While HTS doesn't hold direct control of Latakia at present, both it and its southerly neighbor Tartus are cut off from the rest of Syria by a continuous line of HTS territory. Although HTS fighters and civil administrators haven't yet established themselves in many of Syria's outlying towns, they hold functional control over much of west-central Syria, including a range of oil and gas fields to the southeast of Homs.\n\nOwing to their direct hold on Damascus, HTS and their civilian leadership wing, the Syrian Salvation Government, have laid the groundwork for a transitional administration. The transitional government received a major gift just hours after the Assad regime fell, when the final Prime Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, agreed to lead in a caretaker capacity. Rather than being merely a naked power play, the offer had the potential to be very important in the early days of reconciliation, when former Syrian Army soldiers, regime officials, intelligence officers, civil administrators, and more would have to live alongside the very same rebels who overthrew them. Not only that, but they would have to live amongst newly liberated ordinary Syrians who had lived under their yoke for many years, learned their faces, names, and habits, and would no doubt seek retribution. HTS and its leaders issued a broad amnesty to regime officials and soldiers, and on both sides, there has been a strong focus on avoiding retributive action. Nonetheless, former Prime Minister al-Jalali lasted only one day in his caretaker role before transferring power to the Prime Minister of HTS' Syrian Salvation Government, a man named Mohammed al-Bashir.\n\n## Understanding HTS: A Complex Organization with a Complicated Past\n\nHTS and its corresponding civilian administration represent an interesting and complex force in modern Syria. In the United States, Russia, the European Union, and elsewhere, they are designated as a terror organization, and they were, at one time, an al-Qaeda affiliate with strong links to the Islamic State. They have also been accused of widespread repression in the province of Idlib over the last half-decade, including the mass imprisonment of critics and dissidents against their rule.\n\nAt the same time, HTS has taken pains to distance itself from its jihadist past and portray itself as a moderate, trustworthy force. Since taking Damascus, their leadership has called for the protection of all minorities in Syria, explicitly including non-Muslims, and has gone out of its way to make statements discouraging retribution against state officials. Their Syrian Salvation Government has worked hard to clean up unexploded ordnance, restore basic services, and set up local administration in areas they have taken over, especially Aleppo. In the past, they have been responsive to public outcry, even releasing hundreds of imprisoned dissidents in response to a protest movement earlier in 2024.\n\nHTS is a very complex organization with a very complex history, and it will be their actions, not their rhetoric, that will show their true colors in time. But as for what those true colors will eventually prove to be, observers will simply have to watch and find out.\n\n## The Kurdish Question and Rojava's Precarious Position\n\nAcross the country, the other most powerful force in Syria is the Kurdish-led autonomous state of Rojava, backed up by its fighting wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces or SDF. Kurdish Rojava has long held territory north and east of the Euphrates River, in areas where the Kurds have historically exerted informal control within Syria, and where Rojava held a mostly quiet front-line with the Syrian regime until a few days ago. During the chaos of the rebel offensive in December, Rojava and the SDF claimed chunks of territory on what was formerly the regime side of the Euphrates, as well as a large patch of land in the north-central portion of the country. Broadly, though, the Kurds declined to take the opportunity to attack targets that were within their reach, in favor of consolidating their positions, keeping their hold over critical territory, and watching to see what came next.\n\nThe reason for their hesitation is the next faction to discuss: the so-called Syrian Interim Government, shortened to SNA. The SNA is backed directly by Syria's northern neighbor, the more powerful and more wealthy nation of Turkey, and they hold territory in Syria's northwest corner. They fought alongside HTS during the latter group's attack on Aleppo and captured territory of their own, although they largely stayed clear of the fighting once it progressed southward. In addition to the SNA, Turkey holds a large stretch of territory itself along the northern border between its own land and Syria. That territory cuts into Kurdish Rojava, where it is surrounded to the east, south, and west by Kurdish forces. Turkey has a very long, very bloody relationship with the Middle East's Kurdish population, and while it mostly concerns itself with Kurds on its own territory, it has launched large-scale airstrikes on Rojava as recently as the autumn of 2024.\n\n## Other Factions and Foreign Powers in Syria\n\nBeyond the three major factions, a handful of other landholding groups must be considered before moving into discussions of peace and reconstruction. In the south, autonomous and loosely collaborative rebel factions hold most territory in the provinces of Dara'a and Suwayda, although they lack the sort of broad, overarching state infrastructure that HTS has in the Syrian Salvation Government or that the Kurds have in Rojava. To the southeast, US-backed Syrian fighters hold a large patch of mostly empty desert and surged northward to capture the central city of Palmyra.\n\nIn addition to Turkey, three other key nations hold at least some territory in Syria. Russia holds multiple air and naval bases that it still occupies at the time of writing, while about 900 US troops maintain a deconfliction zone in the southeast, and Israel has surged troops into a buffer zone northeast of the disputed Golan Heights after the Assad regime's collapse. Finally, the Islamic State holds scattered small villages and hamlets across the open desert and is active in large portions of the Syrian countryside, amidst what regional experts have warned is a years-long reconsolidation of their forces.\n\nEach of these factions has been laid out not just to belabor the point that Syria is currently a very complicated place, but because every single one of these organizations will have to be taken into account in the effort to establish a lasting peace. Each of them is well-armed, most are empowered directly or indirectly by at least one major foreign backer, and many of them have a long and difficult history with each other, in a situation where achieving true peace is a lot easier said than done.\n\n## The Transitional Government's Plans and Early Challenges\n\nThe effort to establish a path forward is still in its early stages, when interesting ideas are abundant and detailed, actionable plans are still scarce. But the early signs coming out of Damascus are, at least, not outwardly concerning. Although HTS installed its own Prime Minister at the head of the new transitional government, the organization continues to work with the ex-Prime Minister of the Assad regime and other key officials to establish a peaceful transfer of power.\n\nHTS' leader, widely referred to as Abu Mohammed al-Julani but now going by his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has emphasized that a return to violent conflict doesn't appear to be in the cards. In an interview with Sky News, he stated: \"People are exhausted from war. So the country isn't ready for another one and it's not going to get into another one.\" Al-Sharaa has emphasized the removal of Iran-backed militias from Syria, completing a de-Iranization of a nation that was, until recently, Tehran's closest sovereign ally in all of the Middle East.\n\nHis transitional government has already announced plans for economic reforms, with the intent of shifting away from the Assad regime's policy of state-controlled economics and toward a free-market system that would see Syria reintegrate with the global economy. Ongoing meetings between the new PM and members of the former Assad government are meant to \"restart the institutions to be able to serve our people in Syria\" and to \"facilitate all the necessary works for the next two months until we have a constitutional system to be able to serve the Syrian people.\" According to the transition government, the total transition period in Syria is now expected to last about eighteen months in total, with hopes of drafting a new constitution at the end of an initial six-month period of stabilization.\n\nHowever, concern has already cropped up across Syria and the international community around HTS' apparently limited overtures toward either Kurdish Rojava, the Turkish-backed SNA, or any other rebel group or organization. For all its talk of an inclusive process, HTS has thus far worked to implement unilateral control over the transition. It hasn't looped in Rojava, the SNA, the alternative National Coalition government currently headquartered in Turkey, or others. It is still early in the process, and international arbiters who might more easily network with different sides of Syria's conflict have yet to arrive. But it will take more than just HTS to form a real, stable government across all of Syria, and the group has yet to take steps to engage with a wide coalition of interests in the country.\n\nIn the meantime, stability across most of the nation is holding for now, including in areas that HTS controls directly. Public accounts from Damascus, Aleppo, and elsewhere within Syria broadly express a feeling of safety, security, and hesitant acceptance of HTS, as life goes back to normal. One particularly common sentiment is that although things might get bad under HTS, it is difficult to envision a way that they would get worse than what Syria has experienced recently. If an ISIS caliphate scores ten-of-ten on a scale of Bad Outcomes, and the Assad regime scores a nine, then HTS scoring an eight or lower would constitute improvement. Hopefully, of course, Syria's next leaders will do a good bit better than that.\n\n## The Daunting Economics of Reconstruction\n\nThe reconstruction process itself presents challenges where, although a full and detailed nationwide assessment has yet to be completed, the early figures are daunting. Back in 2021, the cost of reconstruction was thought to be at about 250 billion US dollars, and that figure will likely have gone up with the events of late 2024. The country's economic collapse will have to be factored in, as will Syria's debts to Iran, currently estimated in the tens of billions of dollars.\n\nThe future of international sanctions against Syria remains to be seen, especially in the event that HTS, a designated terror organization across much of the world, does take unilateral control. Not only that, but with the US skeptical, Iran and Russia scorned, China looking to keep a low profile, and Turkey and Israel jockeying for geopolitical influence, the question of who might foot the bill on reconstruction has yet to be answered.\n\n## International Responses and Diplomatic Engagement\n\nInternationally, there are some bright spots and a few early indicators that global forces may try to engage with the process of rebuilding Syria. The United States, for example, has emphasized that its Foreign Terrorist Organization designation against HTS won't bar it from starting a dialogue, and that the nation's current, outgoing administration would consider revoking that status if HTS can meet certain conditions. The UK and the EU tend to follow the US' example on such things, and the UN has indicated that it may consider removing HTS' terror classification as well. UN officials have expressed broad optimism thus far over how the transition has gone, although that optimism is, understandably, very cautious.\n\nMeanwhile, Iran has opened its own direct communications with HTS and has advocated a nationwide conference of Syria's various opposed parties. Iranian officials, speaking to Western press, have expressed that Iran's focus is to keep Syria as firmly under Iran's umbrella as possible. One official stated: \"The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit. That is a scenario Iran is keen to avoid.\"\n\nAs for Russia, Vladimir Putin claims not to have met with Bashar al-Assad, who he is hosting in Moscow, and purportedly doesn't plan to meet with him anytime soon. Russia's engagement with HTS has consisted of a series of terse exchanges around the fate of Russia's military bases and personnel in the country, although those talks appear to have resolved in Russia's favor, at least for now. Despite pullbacks from many of Russia's smaller outposts, the nation has showed no signs of withdrawal from its major naval base at Tartus or its major airbase in Latakia.\n\nFor Russia, maintaining access to those bases is very important. A Russian state TV presenter explaining the situation on Telegram stated: \"Obviously if we lose the bases in Syria we lose Africa. It'll be almost impossible to fly cargo to the CAR or Mali…well, we'll develop Siberia instead.\" While HTS leaders have guaranteed the safety of Russia's bases for now, Russian milbloggers indicate that the situation remains tense and that those guarantees may not last long.\n\n## The Return of Syrian Refugees\n\nThere is a somewhat happier issue to consider: the mass return of millions of refugees who have been living outside Syria, some of them for upward of the last decade. HTS has issued an open invitation to all Syrians living abroad to finally return home, and some of them may be able to do so quickly. About three million Syrians live in Turkey, and the nation had announced plans to resettle those Syrians back in their home nation before Damascus had even fallen, back when the HTS shock offensive had only captured Aleppo.\n\nForeign leaders have echoed those calls, including the leaders of Denmark and Austria on Tuesday the tenth, both seeking to alleviate the pressure of a long-running Syrian refugee presence in their countries. Other leaders around the world, including some in the Syrian diaspora, have emphasized patience in order to see how the situation shakes out. The diaspora community, however, has been the subject of broad press attention around the globe, and for the most part, Syrian refugees have made clear their desire to return home.\n\n## Ongoing Violence and the Kurdish-Turkish Flashpoint\n\nAs the dust settles over Damascus, the world has quickly woken up to the reality that elsewhere across Syria, there is a real risk of continued violence at scale. One such flashpoint comes in and around the city of Manbij in the north, where Kurdish forces had been in control until December the eighth, just hours after the Assad regime crumbled. There, even as most of Syria was celebrating victory, the Turkish-backed SNA were taking advantage of the confusion to attack the Kurds in that area. Despite fierce resistance, the SNA was able to take over most of the region in hours. The fighting reportedly left hundreds dead and ended with a deal between the US and Turkey so that the US-backed Kurds could withdraw without further bloodshed.\n\nThis retreat followed earlier Kurdish withdrawals from areas where Turkish-backed forces were advancing and led Kurdish fighters to leave behind enclaves of their own people in and around Aleppo. In the days since, Turkish aircraft have carried out their own strikes on Kurdish positions, and HTS military leaders have claimed that they have pushed Kurdish forces entirely out of the eastern city of Deir ez-Zor. They reportedly encountered only minimal resistance in doing so.\n\nThe mere fact that violence would still be ongoing in Syria after the fall of Assad is trouble enough, but in this case, it speaks to the particular problems faced by the Kurds in this new order. Turkey has long vilified the Kurdish population of both its own nation and Syria, especially autonomous Rojava. The fact that Syria has now been taken over by HTS, whose relations with Turkey are quite cordial in practice, and that HTS was supported by the same Turkish-backed rebels who have since pushed the Kurds out of Manbij, is widely recognized as a bad sign for Kurdish forces and their people.\n\n## The Range of Outcomes for Kurdish Rojava\n\nIn a vacuum, the fall of the Assad regime could be an opportunity for the Kurds. They, a major landholding power within the country, could have a chance to become active participants in a new Syrian state, carving out special provisions or retaining autonomy on the lands they control. Perhaps they could even realize the long-held ambition of all of Kurdistan: sovereignty, negotiated as part of a peace agreement that subdivides lands where the very concept of \"Syria\" may no longer reflect the reality on the ground.\n\nInstead, the opposite appears to be what's coming. A difficult outcome, but certainly one of the less ruinous options, would be for Rojava to be pushed back to territory within the bounds of the Euphrates and forced to accept and resettle displaced Kurds who had been forced from their homes elsewhere. An outcome that could be a few ticks worse is that Turkish-backed rebels and HTS turn their military attention northward, opening a battlefront against a new enemy while writing the Kurds out of any settlements coming from Damascus.\n\nWorst of all is the possibility that Turkey, confronting only a very weak government in Damascus, might take its chance and launch a large-scale offensive against Rojava directly—with potentially catastrophic effect. To be clear, there are less bad alternatives that could be framed as a win for Turkey—accepting Kurdish statehood in Rojava, for example, and then forcibly relocating all of Turkey's own Kurds there as well. It is not an easy or a kind solution, but certainly easier than all-out war. For now, everything from stalemate to war appears to be on the table.\n\n## The Oil Question: Energy Resources as a Source of Division\n\nDeeply interlinked with the question of territorial control is the question of oil. Syria doesn't produce much in the way of oil compared to most nations that drill for the stuff, mostly due to a crush of international sanctions. But Syria itself does depend on what oil it can harvest, and right now, the Kurdish-led SDF control many of Syria's biggest oil fields—backed up by the United States. That oil, as well as natural gas, is likely to be a major source of future division inside Syria, and it's a problem that can quickly go international, with Shell and TotalEnergies each maintaining a broad presence in Syria.\n\nThe role of the United States in backing up Kurdish oil holdings is sure to become a problem for everybody from Turkey, to Iran, to Russia, and more. The Russian military also controls oil fields within Syria, and so long as that's the case, two of the world's most important, and most starkly opposed nations will be financially entwined with the outcome of Syria's transition process. This energy dimension adds yet another layer of complexity to an already fraught situation, where control over natural resources could determine not just economic viability but also the balance of power between competing factions and their international backers.\n\n## The Alawite Community: Early Signs of Reconciliation\n\nThen, there are the Alawites, members of the same religious sect as Bashar al-Assad, his father Hafez, and many of the leaders within his government. Here, the early signs are positive; rather than face widespread retributive attacks, as many Alawites had feared, they've been treated with a far more open mind by HTS and its allies. In Bashar al-Assad's majority-Alawite hometown, local elders pledged their support to HTS, a move that many other Alawite communities have since copied.\n\nUnfortunately, both sides know all too well that such a façade would be easy enough to maintain for a few days, if it was, indeed, disingenuous. But at least for now, HTS does appear to be genuine in its overtures to the community. That's a direct rebuttal to the party line the Assad regime fed the Alawites for decades, promising that if Assad ever fell, the minority community would be massacred. It's also a way to leave an open door for former regime officials to come into the fold, trusting that between assurances to their Alawite community and broader commitments to amnesty, they may not have anything to fear.\n\nWhile HTS has been clear that they \"will not hesitate to hold accountable the criminals, murderers, security and army officers involved in torturing the Syrian people,\" the signals they've sent the Alawite community and other ex-regime personnel seem to have reassured people that they'll just be going after high-ranking or particularly monstrous individuals. This approach, if maintained, could prove crucial to preventing the kind of sectarian violence that has plagued other post-conflict transitions in the region.\n\n## The Islamic State Threat: A Growing Danger in the Power Vacuum\n\nA harder problem to deal with is the Islamic State—whose fighters still run free across Syria's open wastes, and are getting stronger by the day. Since the fall of the Assad regime, US warplanes have carried out airstrikes against Islamic State targets, but the limited actions by the US, and the Syrian commandoes and SDF forces they partner with, aren't nearly enough to get the job done by themselves.\n\nThe Islamic State loves a power vacuum, and it's got a massive one to exploit across Syria, especially in the empty heartlands where no group can really assert control. Their goals now appear less focused on territorial consolidation than they used to be, but even still, such massive swathes of land offer the potential for widespread asymmetric attacks, the planting of roadside bombs, the gathering and training of larger bands of fighters, and the takeover of small towns and villages that could supply a power base.\n\nEven worse, any large-scale moves against the Kurds could end up swelling the ranks of the Islamic State. Thousands of Islamic State fighters are currently held in Kurdish prisons, but the Kurds have made no secret of the fact that if they're forced to choose between defending their people and protecting the prisons, they'll choose their own people. Vacate the prisons, and mass jailbreaks could very quickly follow, refilling the ranks of an organization that's smarter and more cunning than it was even at the height of its power. This scenario represents one of the most dangerous potential outcomes of the current instability, with implications that would extend far beyond Syria's borders.\n\n## Israel's Military Intervention and Buffer Zone Strategy\n\nAnd speaking of problems that are hard to solve, we turn to Israel. In the hours following the overthrow of Assad, IDF troops surged into Syria, past the disputed territory of the Golan Heights, in order to carve out a buffer zone between themselves and Syria's armed factions. In the initial push, Israel took over a chunk of territory several kilometers deep, including Mount Hermon, a strategically vital point of high ground that offers a vantage point over much of the border zone. There, they can maintain a presence just forty kilometers away from Damascus, although new reports suggest that the IDF has pushed even further, potentially as close as 25 kilometers from Damascus. The IDF denies those claims. In the area it's taken over, Israel explains its moves as an attempt to create a \"sterile defensive zone.\" Defense Minister Israel Katz described it as a demilitarized zone.\n\nMeanwhile, Jerusalem has attempted to place heavy rhetorical pressure on the new leaders in Damascus, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu threatening retribution if Iran is allowed to re-establish its presence there. Quoting Netanyahu: \"If this regime allows Iran to re-establish itself in Syria, or permits the transfer of Iranian weapons or any other weapons to Hezbollah, or if it attacks us—we will respond forcefully, and we will exact a heavy price.\"\n\n## Israel's Massive Airstrike Campaign Against Syrian Military Assets\n\nAttacking from the sky, Israel claims to have hit Syria with upward of 480 airstrikes within just a 48-hour stretch since the fall of the Assad regime. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, claim to have \"struck most of the strategic weapons stockpiles in Syria, preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorist elements.\" Among the hardware that Israel claims to have destroyed are anti-air batteries, warplanes and combat helicopters, about fifteen naval vessels, and factories and infrastructure for weapons production, collectively constituting eighty percent of the Syrian Army's military capabilities prior to the fall of Assad.\n\nIsrael is also believed to have struck a range of sites tied to the Assad government's long-running chemical weapons program. This massive degradation of Syria's military infrastructure represents a significant shift in the regional balance of power, effectively ensuring that whatever government emerges in Damascus will be militarily weak for years to come. While Israel frames these strikes as preventive measures to keep advanced weapons out of the hands of hostile actors, they also serve to cement Israeli military superiority in the region and limit Syria's ability to project power or defend itself against future interventions.\n\n## Humanitarian Challenges and the Aid Delivery Dilemma\n\nFinally, there's the question of humanitarian work, in an environment where most of the groups that aid organizations could liaise with are designated by somebody or another as a terrorist organization. For their part, HTS has reportedly done a good job opening up bread lines, redistributing fuel and water, and supplying other basic needs in areas they control. But those initiatives can only last so long, on limited resources, and they'll take away from the civil manpower needed to stabilize and push for a peace in the area.\n\nNow that the fighting has ended, it'll be vital to surge international aid to much of the country, where food, fuel, and medicine shortages are expected to be widespread. For their part, HTS has recognized the ways in which their terrorist designation could stand in the way of the proper delivery of aid, and the group has committed to running captured territory through third-party administrations and an overarching transitional government that can do business much easier. With luck, that decision will coincide with foreign governments lifting restrictions on the flow of aid into Syria, in a potential jumpstart to the reconstruction effort.\n\nThe humanitarian situation remains precarious, with millions of Syrians in need of immediate assistance after years of conflict and economic collapse. The ability of international organizations to operate effectively in Syria will depend heavily on the willingness of Western governments to create carve-outs in their sanctions regimes and terrorist designations, allowing aid to flow without legal complications for the organizations delivering it.\n\n## Conclusion: A Fragile Moment with Catastrophic Stakes\n\nThis is an extremely fragile moment for Syria, and for every person, organization, and nation with a stake in Syria's future. Very little about these coming months will be easy, but failure to reach a lasting peace, at this juncture, can and will have catastrophic consequences. The challenges are numerous and interconnected: territorial disputes between armed factions, the threat of renewed Islamic State activity, Turkish pressure on Kurdish populations, Israeli military intervention, the question of oil and natural resource control, the integration of minority communities like the Alawites, the massive economic costs of reconstruction, and the complex web of international interests that all have a say in Syria's future.\n\nEach of these issues could, on its own, derail the peace process. Together, they represent a daunting array of obstacles that will require careful diplomacy, genuine compromise, and sustained international engagement to overcome. The early signs from HTS and the transitional government offer some reason for cautious optimism, but words and initial gestures will need to be backed up by consistent action over months and years. As Syria's future evolves, the world will be watching closely, holding out hope that this utterly shattered nation may finally start to heal.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)\n- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Who controls Syria after Assad's fall?\n\nHTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) controls west-central Syria including Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and effectively Latakia and Tartus. Kurdish-led Rojava and the SDF control territory north and east of the Euphrates River. The Turkish-backed SNA holds Syria's northwest corner. Southern rebel factions control Dara'a and Suwayda provinces. The US, Russia, Turkey, and Israel maintain military presences, while the Islamic State holds scattered villages across the desert.\n\n### What is HTS and what is their background?\n\nHTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) is designated as a terror organization by the US, Russia, and EU. They were formerly an al-Qaeda affiliate with links to the Islamic State and have been accused of repression in Idlib province. However, they have worked to distance themselves from their jihadist past, calling for protection of minorities including non-Muslims, releasing imprisoned dissidents in response to protests, and establishing the Syrian Salvation Government to provide civil administration and basic services.\n\n### What is the timeline for Syria's political transition?\n\nThe transitional government expects an 18-month total transition period. The first six months will focus on stabilization, after which they hope to draft a new constitution. The first two months are dedicated to restarting institutions and facilitating necessary governmental functions. HTS installed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister after former Assad PM Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali served only one day in a caretaker role.\n\n### How much will Syria's reconstruction cost, and who will pay for it?\n\nAs of 2021, reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $250 billion, a figure likely higher after late 2024 events. Additional factors include Syria's economic collapse and tens of billions of dollars in debt to Iran. The question of who will fund reconstruction remains unanswered, with the US skeptical, Iran and Russia scorned, China keeping a low profile, and Turkey and Israel focused on geopolitical influence rather than reconstruction funding.\n\n### What threats do the Kurds face in post-Assad Syria?\n\nKurdish Rojava faces multiple threats: Turkish-backed SNA forces have already pushed them out of Manbij with hundreds dead, and Turkey has conducted airstrikes on Kurdish positions. HTS has reportedly pushed Kurdish forces out of Deir ez-Zor. Worst-case scenarios include Turkey launching a large-scale offensive against Rojava directly, or Kurds being completely excluded from peace settlements despite controlling significant territory and oil fields. The Kurds also hold thousands of ISIS prisoners they may not be able to guard if forced into a larger conflict.\n\n## Sources\n- <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SyriaCoTDecember9%2C2024.png>\n- <https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir>\n- <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q0w1g8zqvo>\n- <https://abcnews.go.com/International/who-are-syrian-rebels-hts/story?id=116571007>\n- <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/dec/09/will-emergence-of-hts-in-syria-raise-level-of-global-terrorism-threats>\n- <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/10/un-may-remove-syrian-rebel-group-hts-from-terror-list-if-conditions-met>\n- <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241205-hts-rebel-group-sweeping-syria-tries-to-shed-its-jihadist-image>\n- <https://apnews.com/article/syria-bashar-assad-war-1468a97ff95bb782f5933856d99c9a8d>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iron-fisted-assad-under-threat-syrian-rebels-draw-closer-2024-12-07/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-bases-syria-threatened-by-insurgent-advance-say-moscows-war-bloggers-2024-12-07/>\n- <https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/economic-consequences-of-rebuilding-syria>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-direct-contact-with-groups-within-syrias-new-leadership-says-iranian-2024-12-09/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-rebels-work-form-government-restore-order-after-assad-ouster-2024-12-10/>\n- <https://www.ft.com/content/1922d0e6-5b63-4507-8a2b-e4fbac68f767>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-syrias-assad-has-left-country-given-orders-peaceful-power-handover-2024-12-08/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rebels-capture-aleppo-stirs-syrian-homecoming-hopes-turkey-2024-12-05/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-rebels-enter-northern-city-manbij-turkish-source-says-2024-12-08/>\n- <https://www.barrons.com/news/218-killed-in-syria-in-fighting-between-pro-turk-and-kurdish-forces-war-monitor-e66dc2cf>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rebels-take-north-syria-town-us-backed-group-turkish-source-says-2024-12-09/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blinken-lays-out-us-hopes-syrias-political-transition-2024-12-10/>\n- <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/10/syrian-rebels-name-new-pm-as-outside-powers-move-to-shore-up-interests>\n- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/10/after-taking-damascus-syria-opposition-begins-government>\n- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/12/10/live-israel-bombards-syria-as-opposition-seeks-to-form-new-government>\n- <https://freedomhouse.org/article/syria-transition-and-future-governance-must-center-freedom-and-justice>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mohamed-al-bashir-appointed-caretaker-syrian-pm-transitional-government-until-2024-12-10/>\n- <https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/12/whats-next-for-syria-the-region-and-the-world/>\n- <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd75e8gdy9jo>\n- <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-next-assad-hts/>\n- <https://apnews.com/article/syria-future-assad-government-islamist-rebels-secular-6e55f1e1e019d4f51756605d3f931b55>\n- <https://www.newsweek.com/syria-map-middle-east-1997870>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-rebels-celebrate-captured-homs-set-sights-damascus-2024-12-07/>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/08/world/syria-war-damascus>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/07/world/middleeast/syria-opposition-forces-domination.html>\n- <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ex7ek9pyeo>\n- <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241205-kurds-dream-of-self-rule-under-threat-as-turkish-backed-forces-sweep-across-syria>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-has-fall-assad-impacted-syrias-energy-sector-2024-12-09/>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/09/world/syria-assad-rebels#oil-prices-syria>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/assads-alawite-hometown-syria-rebels-win-statement-support-2024-12-09/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/assad-loyalists-shaken-by-his-fall-some-relieved-by-lack-violence-2024-12-08/>\n- <https://www.newsweek.com/isis-takes-advantage-rebel-gains-syria-1997025>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-incursion-into-syria-reaches-25-km-southwest-damascus-security-sources-2024-12-10/>\n- <https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-airstrike-assad-war-b90edb8dbe8268dacf90e59ca601e2e3>\n- <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-strikes-advances-syria-buffer-zone-assad-overthrow-rebels-rcna183565>\n- <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-blueprint-for-bringing-about-a-new-syria/>\n\n<!-- youtube:r9Smjbugd18 -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/life-after-assad-syria-uncertain-path-reconstruction-peace.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/life-after-assad-syria-uncertain-path-reconstruction-peace
datePublished: 2026-02-17
dateModified: 2026-02-17
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
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summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/life-after-assad-syria-uncertain-path-reconstruction-peace.md.summary.md
---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
After half a century of dictatorship, the Assad regime of Syria has finally collapsed. It took nearly fourteen years of war, incredible casualties, millions of people displaced, and unspeakable human tragedy, but the father-son dynasty that dominated Syria for so long has been condemned to history. While the fall of the Assad regime represents a great victory for the nation of Syria, the question of what happens next looms large. The nation remains divided between powerful armed factions, its people must find a way for rebels and regime collaborators to live peacefully together, and its place on the world stage will need to be thoroughly recalibrated or even reimagined from the ground up. With any luck, the battles in Syria might finally be over, but the process of peace has only just begun, and if history around the world is any indication, Syria's most difficult moments may still lie ahead.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- HTS controls four of Syria's five most populous cities (Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus) and has established a transitional government with an 18-month timeline, including plans for a new constitution after six months.
- The transitional government under HTS has issued broad amnesties to former regime officials and emphasized protection of minorities, though concerns remain about limited outreach to other factions like Kurdish Rojava and the Turkish-backed SNA.
- Syria's reconstruction costs are estimated at $250 billion (2021 figures), with additional complications from economic collapse, tens of billions in debt to Iran, and international sanctions against HTS as a designated terror organization.
- Kurdish-controlled Rojava faces existential threats from Turkish-backed forces and Turkey itself, with ongoing violence in Manbij and Deir ez-Zor signaling potential for larger conflict despite Kurdish control of major oil fields.
- Israel has conducted over 480 airstrikes destroying approximately 80% of Syria's military capabilities and established a buffer zone extending potentially 25 kilometers from Damascus, while threatening retaliation if Iran re-establishes presence.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-current-state-of-affairs-in-post-assad-syria" -->
## The Current State of Affairs in Post-Assad Syria

The situation in Syria remains highly fluid as of December 11, 2024, with territorial control, leadership identities, and the extent of foreign involvement all liable to change. The immediate aftermath of the rebel takeover of Damascus has generated a wide range of maps depicting who controls what, though many prove unreliable. Using the Institute for the Study of War's "Reported Control of Terrain in Syria" as a primary reference point, along with additional context, a complex picture emerges of the forces currently holding land across the country.

The most prominent force is Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, better known as HTS. This organization most directly brought about the fall of Damascus through a cascading offensive that started at the fringes of Idlib governate, where HTS had been at its strongest. From there, HTS crashed eastward to Aleppo, then south to Hama, then to the key city of Homs, and finally to the capital, Damascus. HTS now holds direct control over all five of these cities, and according to pre-war census figures, this grants HTS control over four of the five most populous cities in all of Syria. The only other city within the top five is Latakia, Syria's premier port city. While HTS doesn't hold direct control of Latakia at present, both it and its southerly neighbor Tartus are cut off from the rest of Syria by a continuous line of HTS territory. Although HTS fighters and civil administrators haven't yet established themselves in many of Syria's outlying towns, they hold functional control over much of west-central Syria, including a range of oil and gas fields to the southeast of Homs.

Owing to their direct hold on Damascus, HTS and their civilian leadership wing, the Syrian Salvation Government, have laid the groundwork for a transitional administration. The transitional government received a major gift just hours after the Assad regime fell, when the final Prime Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, agreed to lead in a caretaker capacity. Rather than being merely a naked power play, the offer had the potential to be very important in the early days of reconciliation, when former Syrian Army soldiers, regime officials, intelligence officers, civil administrators, and more would have to live alongside the very same rebels who overthrew them. Not only that, but they would have to live amongst newly liberated ordinary Syrians who had lived under their yoke for many years, learned their faces, names, and habits, and would no doubt seek retribution. HTS and its leaders issued a broad amnesty to regime officials and soldiers, and on both sides, there has been a strong focus on avoiding retributive action. Nonetheless, former Prime Minister al-Jalali lasted only one day in his caretaker role before transferring power to the Prime Minister of HTS' Syrian Salvation Government, a man named Mohammed al-Bashir.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-current-state-of-affairs-in-post-assad-syria" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="understanding-hts-a-complex-organization-with-a-complicated-past" -->
## Understanding HTS: A Complex Organization with a Complicated Past

HTS and its corresponding civilian administration represent an interesting and complex force in modern Syria. In the United States, Russia, the European Union, and elsewhere, they are designated as a terror organization, and they were, at one time, an al-Qaeda affiliate with strong links to the Islamic State. They have also been accused of widespread repression in the province of Idlib over the last half-decade, including the mass imprisonment of critics and dissidents against their rule.

At the same time, HTS has taken pains to distance itself from its jihadist past and portray itself as a moderate, trustworthy force. Since taking Damascus, their leadership has called for the protection of all minorities in Syria, explicitly including non-Muslims, and has gone out of its way to make statements discouraging retribution against state officials. Their Syrian Salvation Government has worked hard to clean up unexploded ordnance, restore basic services, and set up local administration in areas they have taken over, especially Aleppo. In the past, they have been responsive to public outcry, even releasing hundreds of imprisoned dissidents in response to a protest movement earlier in 2024.

HTS is a very complex organization with a very complex history, and it will be their actions, not their rhetoric, that will show their true colors in time. But as for what those true colors will eventually prove to be, observers will simply have to watch and find out.

<!-- aeo:section end="understanding-hts-a-complex-organization-with-a-complicated-past" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-kurdish-question-and-rojava-s-precarious-position" -->
## The Kurdish Question and Rojava's Precarious Position

Across the country, the other most powerful force in Syria is the Kurdish-led autonomous state of Rojava, backed up by its fighting wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces or SDF. Kurdish Rojava has long held territory north and east of the Euphrates River, in areas where the Kurds have historically exerted informal control within Syria, and where Rojava held a mostly quiet front-line with the Syrian regime until a few days ago. During the chaos of the rebel offensive in December, Rojava and the SDF claimed chunks of territory on what was formerly the regime side of the Euphrates, as well as a large patch of land in the north-central portion of the country. Broadly, though, the Kurds declined to take the opportunity to attack targets that were within their reach, in favor of consolidating their positions, keeping their hold over critical territory, and watching to see what came next.

The reason for their hesitation is the next faction to discuss: the so-called Syrian Interim Government, shortened to SNA. The SNA is backed directly by Syria's northern neighbor, the more powerful and more wealthy nation of Turkey, and they hold territory in Syria's northwest corner. They fought alongside HTS during the latter group's attack on Aleppo and captured territory of their own, although they largely stayed clear of the fighting once it progressed southward. In addition to the SNA, Turkey holds a large stretch of territory itself along the northern border between its own land and Syria. That territory cuts into Kurdish Rojava, where it is surrounded to the east, south, and west by Kurdish forces. Turkey has a very long, very bloody relationship with the Middle East's Kurdish population, and while it mostly concerns itself with Kurds on its own territory, it has launched large-scale airstrikes on Rojava as recently as the autumn of 2024.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-kurdish-question-and-rojava-s-precarious-position" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="other-factions-and-foreign-powers-in-syria" -->
## Other Factions and Foreign Powers in Syria

Beyond the three major factions, a handful of other landholding groups must be considered before moving into discussions of peace and reconstruction. In the south, autonomous and loosely collaborative rebel factions hold most territory in the provinces of Dara'a and Suwayda, although they lack the sort of broad, overarching state infrastructure that HTS has in the Syrian Salvation Government or that the Kurds have in Rojava. To the southeast, US-backed Syrian fighters hold a large patch of mostly empty desert and surged northward to capture the central city of Palmyra.

In addition to Turkey, three other key nations hold at least some territory in Syria. Russia holds multiple air and naval bases that it still occupies at the time of writing, while about 900 US troops maintain a deconfliction zone in the southeast, and Israel has surged troops into a buffer zone northeast of the disputed Golan Heights after the Assad regime's collapse. Finally, the Islamic State holds scattered small villages and hamlets across the open desert and is active in large portions of the Syrian countryside, amidst what regional experts have warned is a years-long reconsolidation of their forces.

Each of these factions has been laid out not just to belabor the point that Syria is currently a very complicated place, but because every single one of these organizations will have to be taken into account in the effort to establish a lasting peace. Each of them is well-armed, most are empowered directly or indirectly by at least one major foreign backer, and many of them have a long and difficult history with each other, in a situation where achieving true peace is a lot easier said than done.

<!-- aeo:section end="other-factions-and-foreign-powers-in-syria" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-transitional-government-s-plans-and-early-challenges" -->
## The Transitional Government's Plans and Early Challenges

The effort to establish a path forward is still in its early stages, when interesting ideas are abundant and detailed, actionable plans are still scarce. But the early signs coming out of Damascus are, at least, not outwardly concerning. Although HTS installed its own Prime Minister at the head of the new transitional government, the organization continues to work with the ex-Prime Minister of the Assad regime and other key officials to establish a peaceful transfer of power.

HTS' leader, widely referred to as Abu Mohammed al-Julani but now going by his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has emphasized that a return to violent conflict doesn't appear to be in the cards. In an interview with Sky News, he stated: "People are exhausted from war. So the country isn't ready for another one and it's not going to get into another one." Al-Sharaa has emphasized the removal of Iran-backed militias from Syria, completing a de-Iranization of a nation that was, until recently, Tehran's closest sovereign ally in all of the Middle East.

His transitional government has already announced plans for economic reforms, with the intent of shifting away from the Assad regime's policy of state-controlled economics and toward a free-market system that would see Syria reintegrate with the global economy. Ongoing meetings between the new PM and members of the former Assad government are meant to "restart the institutions to be able to serve our people in Syria" and to "facilitate all the necessary works for the next two months until we have a constitutional system to be able to serve the Syrian people." According to the transition government, the total transition period in Syria is now expected to last about eighteen months in total, with hopes of drafting a new constitution at the end of an initial six-month period of stabilization.

However, concern has already cropped up across Syria and the international community around HTS' apparently limited overtures toward either Kurdish Rojava, the Turkish-backed SNA, or any other rebel group or organization. For all its talk of an inclusive process, HTS has thus far worked to implement unilateral control over the transition. It hasn't looped in Rojava, the SNA, the alternative National Coalition government currently headquartered in Turkey, or others. It is still early in the process, and international arbiters who might more easily network with different sides of Syria's conflict have yet to arrive. But it will take more than just HTS to form a real, stable government across all of Syria, and the group has yet to take steps to engage with a wide coalition of interests in the country.

In the meantime, stability across most of the nation is holding for now, including in areas that HTS controls directly. Public accounts from Damascus, Aleppo, and elsewhere within Syria broadly express a feeling of safety, security, and hesitant acceptance of HTS, as life goes back to normal. One particularly common sentiment is that although things might get bad under HTS, it is difficult to envision a way that they would get worse than what Syria has experienced recently. If an ISIS caliphate scores ten-of-ten on a scale of Bad Outcomes, and the Assad regime scores a nine, then HTS scoring an eight or lower would constitute improvement. Hopefully, of course, Syria's next leaders will do a good bit better than that.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-transitional-government-s-plans-and-early-challenges" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-daunting-economics-of-reconstruction" -->
## The Daunting Economics of Reconstruction

The reconstruction process itself presents challenges where, although a full and detailed nationwide assessment has yet to be completed, the early figures are daunting. Back in 2021, the cost of reconstruction was thought to be at about 250 billion US dollars, and that figure will likely have gone up with the events of late 2024. The country's economic collapse will have to be factored in, as will Syria's debts to Iran, currently estimated in the tens of billions of dollars.

The future of international sanctions against Syria remains to be seen, especially in the event that HTS, a designated terror organization across much of the world, does take unilateral control. Not only that, but with the US skeptical, Iran and Russia scorned, China looking to keep a low profile, and Turkey and Israel jockeying for geopolitical influence, the question of who might foot the bill on reconstruction has yet to be answered.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-daunting-economics-of-reconstruction" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="international-responses-and-diplomatic-engagement" -->
## International Responses and Diplomatic Engagement

Internationally, there are some bright spots and a few early indicators that global forces may try to engage with the process of rebuilding Syria. The United States, for example, has emphasized that its Foreign Terrorist Organization designation against HTS won't bar it from starting a dialogue, and that the nation's current, outgoing administration would consider revoking that status if HTS can meet certain conditions. The UK and the EU tend to follow the US' example on such things, and the UN has indicated that it may consider removing HTS' terror classification as well. UN officials have expressed broad optimism thus far over how the transition has gone, although that optimism is, understandably, very cautious.

Meanwhile, Iran has opened its own direct communications with HTS and has advocated a nationwide conference of Syria's various opposed parties. Iranian officials, speaking to Western press, have expressed that Iran's focus is to keep Syria as firmly under Iran's umbrella as possible. One official stated: "The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit. That is a scenario Iran is keen to avoid."

As for Russia, Vladimir Putin claims not to have met with Bashar al-Assad, who he is hosting in Moscow, and purportedly doesn't plan to meet with him anytime soon. Russia's engagement with HTS has consisted of a series of terse exchanges around the fate of Russia's military bases and personnel in the country, although those talks appear to have resolved in Russia's favor, at least for now. Despite pullbacks from many of Russia's smaller outposts, the nation has showed no signs of withdrawal from its major naval base at Tartus or its major airbase in Latakia.

For Russia, maintaining access to those bases is very important. A Russian state TV presenter explaining the situation on Telegram stated: "Obviously if we lose the bases in Syria we lose Africa. It'll be almost impossible to fly cargo to the CAR or Mali…well, we'll develop Siberia instead." While HTS leaders have guaranteed the safety of Russia's bases for now, Russian milbloggers indicate that the situation remains tense and that those guarantees may not last long.

<!-- aeo:section end="international-responses-and-diplomatic-engagement" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-return-of-syrian-refugees" -->
## The Return of Syrian Refugees

There is a somewhat happier issue to consider: the mass return of millions of refugees who have been living outside Syria, some of them for upward of the last decade. HTS has issued an open invitation to all Syrians living abroad to finally return home, and some of them may be able to do so quickly. About three million Syrians live in Turkey, and the nation had announced plans to resettle those Syrians back in their home nation before Damascus had even fallen, back when the HTS shock offensive had only captured Aleppo.

Foreign leaders have echoed those calls, including the leaders of Denmark and Austria on Tuesday the tenth, both seeking to alleviate the pressure of a long-running Syrian refugee presence in their countries. Other leaders around the world, including some in the Syrian diaspora, have emphasized patience in order to see how the situation shakes out. The diaspora community, however, has been the subject of broad press attention around the globe, and for the most part, Syrian refugees have made clear their desire to return home.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-return-of-syrian-refugees" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="ongoing-violence-and-the-kurdish-turkish-flashpoint" -->
## Ongoing Violence and the Kurdish-Turkish Flashpoint

As the dust settles over Damascus, the world has quickly woken up to the reality that elsewhere across Syria, there is a real risk of continued violence at scale. One such flashpoint comes in and around the city of Manbij in the north, where Kurdish forces had been in control until December the eighth, just hours after the Assad regime crumbled. There, even as most of Syria was celebrating victory, the Turkish-backed SNA were taking advantage of the confusion to attack the Kurds in that area. Despite fierce resistance, the SNA was able to take over most of the region in hours. The fighting reportedly left hundreds dead and ended with a deal between the US and Turkey so that the US-backed Kurds could withdraw without further bloodshed.

This retreat followed earlier Kurdish withdrawals from areas where Turkish-backed forces were advancing and led Kurdish fighters to leave behind enclaves of their own people in and around Aleppo. In the days since, Turkish aircraft have carried out their own strikes on Kurdish positions, and HTS military leaders have claimed that they have pushed Kurdish forces entirely out of the eastern city of Deir ez-Zor. They reportedly encountered only minimal resistance in doing so.

The mere fact that violence would still be ongoing in Syria after the fall of Assad is trouble enough, but in this case, it speaks to the particular problems faced by the Kurds in this new order. Turkey has long vilified the Kurdish population of both its own nation and Syria, especially autonomous Rojava. The fact that Syria has now been taken over by HTS, whose relations with Turkey are quite cordial in practice, and that HTS was supported by the same Turkish-backed rebels who have since pushed the Kurds out of Manbij, is widely recognized as a bad sign for Kurdish forces and their people.

<!-- aeo:section end="ongoing-violence-and-the-kurdish-turkish-flashpoint" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-range-of-outcomes-for-kurdish-rojava" -->
## The Range of Outcomes for Kurdish Rojava

In a vacuum, the fall of the Assad regime could be an opportunity for the Kurds. They, a major landholding power within the country, could have a chance to become active participants in a new Syrian state, carving out special provisions or retaining autonomy on the lands they control. Perhaps they could even realize the long-held ambition of all of Kurdistan: sovereignty, negotiated as part of a peace agreement that subdivides lands where the very concept of "Syria" may no longer reflect the reality on the ground.

Instead, the opposite appears to be what's coming. A difficult outcome, but certainly one of the less ruinous options, would be for Rojava to be pushed back to territory within the bounds of the Euphrates and forced to accept and resettle displaced Kurds who had been forced from their homes elsewhere. An outcome that could be a few ticks worse is that Turkish-backed rebels and HTS turn their military attention northward, opening a battlefront against a new enemy while writing the Kurds out of any settlements coming from Damascus.

Worst of all is the possibility that Turkey, confronting only a very weak government in Damascus, might take its chance and launch a large-scale offensive against Rojava directly—with potentially catastrophic effect. To be clear, there are less bad alternatives that could be framed as a win for Turkey—accepting Kurdish statehood in Rojava, for example, and then forcibly relocating all of Turkey's own Kurds there as well. It is not an easy or a kind solution, but certainly easier than all-out war. For now, everything from stalemate to war appears to be on the table.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-range-of-outcomes-for-kurdish-rojava" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-oil-question-energy-resources-as-a-source-of-division" -->
## The Oil Question: Energy Resources as a Source of Division

Deeply interlinked with the question of territorial control is the question of oil. Syria doesn't produce much in the way of oil compared to most nations that drill for the stuff, mostly due to a crush of international sanctions. But Syria itself does depend on what oil it can harvest, and right now, the Kurdish-led SDF control many of Syria's biggest oil fields—backed up by the United States. That oil, as well as natural gas, is likely to be a major source of future division inside Syria, and it's a problem that can quickly go international, with Shell and TotalEnergies each maintaining a broad presence in Syria.

The role of the United States in backing up Kurdish oil holdings is sure to become a problem for everybody from Turkey, to Iran, to Russia, and more. The Russian military also controls oil fields within Syria, and so long as that's the case, two of the world's most important, and most starkly opposed nations will be financially entwined with the outcome of Syria's transition process. This energy dimension adds yet another layer of complexity to an already fraught situation, where control over natural resources could determine not just economic viability but also the balance of power between competing factions and their international backers.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-oil-question-energy-resources-as-a-source-of-division" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-alawite-community-early-signs-of-reconciliation" -->
## The Alawite Community: Early Signs of Reconciliation

Then, there are the Alawites, members of the same religious sect as Bashar al-Assad, his father Hafez, and many of the leaders within his government. Here, the early signs are positive; rather than face widespread retributive attacks, as many Alawites had feared, they've been treated with a far more open mind by HTS and its allies. In Bashar al-Assad's majority-Alawite hometown, local elders pledged their support to HTS, a move that many other Alawite communities have since copied.

Unfortunately, both sides know all too well that such a façade would be easy enough to maintain for a few days, if it was, indeed, disingenuous. But at least for now, HTS does appear to be genuine in its overtures to the community. That's a direct rebuttal to the party line the Assad regime fed the Alawites for decades, promising that if Assad ever fell, the minority community would be massacred. It's also a way to leave an open door for former regime officials to come into the fold, trusting that between assurances to their Alawite community and broader commitments to amnesty, they may not have anything to fear.

While HTS has been clear that they "will not hesitate to hold accountable the criminals, murderers, security and army officers involved in torturing the Syrian people," the signals they've sent the Alawite community and other ex-regime personnel seem to have reassured people that they'll just be going after high-ranking or particularly monstrous individuals. This approach, if maintained, could prove crucial to preventing the kind of sectarian violence that has plagued other post-conflict transitions in the region.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-islamic-state-threat-a-growing-danger-in-the-power-vacuum" -->
## The Islamic State Threat: A Growing Danger in the Power Vacuum

A harder problem to deal with is the Islamic State—whose fighters still run free across Syria's open wastes, and are getting stronger by the day. Since the fall of the Assad regime, US warplanes have carried out airstrikes against Islamic State targets, but the limited actions by the US, and the Syrian commandoes and SDF forces they partner with, aren't nearly enough to get the job done by themselves.

The Islamic State loves a power vacuum, and it's got a massive one to exploit across Syria, especially in the empty heartlands where no group can really assert control. Their goals now appear less focused on territorial consolidation than they used to be, but even still, such massive swathes of land offer the potential for widespread asymmetric attacks, the planting of roadside bombs, the gathering and training of larger bands of fighters, and the takeover of small towns and villages that could supply a power base.

Even worse, any large-scale moves against the Kurds could end up swelling the ranks of the Islamic State. Thousands of Islamic State fighters are currently held in Kurdish prisons, but the Kurds have made no secret of the fact that if they're forced to choose between defending their people and protecting the prisons, they'll choose their own people. Vacate the prisons, and mass jailbreaks could very quickly follow, refilling the ranks of an organization that's smarter and more cunning than it was even at the height of its power. This scenario represents one of the most dangerous potential outcomes of the current instability, with implications that would extend far beyond Syria's borders.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-islamic-state-threat-a-growing-danger-in-the-power-vacuum" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="israel-s-military-intervention-and-buffer-zone-strategy" -->
## Israel's Military Intervention and Buffer Zone Strategy

And speaking of problems that are hard to solve, we turn to Israel. In the hours following the overthrow of Assad, IDF troops surged into Syria, past the disputed territory of the Golan Heights, in order to carve out a buffer zone between themselves and Syria's armed factions. In the initial push, Israel took over a chunk of territory several kilometers deep, including Mount Hermon, a strategically vital point of high ground that offers a vantage point over much of the border zone. There, they can maintain a presence just forty kilometers away from Damascus, although new reports suggest that the IDF has pushed even further, potentially as close as 25 kilometers from Damascus. The IDF denies those claims. In the area it's taken over, Israel explains its moves as an attempt to create a "sterile defensive zone." Defense Minister Israel Katz described it as a demilitarized zone.

Meanwhile, Jerusalem has attempted to place heavy rhetorical pressure on the new leaders in Damascus, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu threatening retribution if Iran is allowed to re-establish its presence there. Quoting Netanyahu: "If this regime allows Iran to re-establish itself in Syria, or permits the transfer of Iranian weapons or any other weapons to Hezbollah, or if it attacks us—we will respond forcefully, and we will exact a heavy price."

<!-- aeo:section end="israel-s-military-intervention-and-buffer-zone-strategy" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="israel-s-massive-airstrike-campaign-against-syrian-military-asse" -->
## Israel's Massive Airstrike Campaign Against Syrian Military Assets

Attacking from the sky, Israel claims to have hit Syria with upward of 480 airstrikes within just a 48-hour stretch since the fall of the Assad regime. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, claim to have "struck most of the strategic weapons stockpiles in Syria, preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorist elements." Among the hardware that Israel claims to have destroyed are anti-air batteries, warplanes and combat helicopters, about fifteen naval vessels, and factories and infrastructure for weapons production, collectively constituting eighty percent of the Syrian Army's military capabilities prior to the fall of Assad.

Israel is also believed to have struck a range of sites tied to the Assad government's long-running chemical weapons program. This massive degradation of Syria's military infrastructure represents a significant shift in the regional balance of power, effectively ensuring that whatever government emerges in Damascus will be militarily weak for years to come. While Israel frames these strikes as preventive measures to keep advanced weapons out of the hands of hostile actors, they also serve to cement Israeli military superiority in the region and limit Syria's ability to project power or defend itself against future interventions.

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<!-- aeo:section start="humanitarian-challenges-and-the-aid-delivery-dilemma" -->
## Humanitarian Challenges and the Aid Delivery Dilemma

Finally, there's the question of humanitarian work, in an environment where most of the groups that aid organizations could liaise with are designated by somebody or another as a terrorist organization. For their part, HTS has reportedly done a good job opening up bread lines, redistributing fuel and water, and supplying other basic needs in areas they control. But those initiatives can only last so long, on limited resources, and they'll take away from the civil manpower needed to stabilize and push for a peace in the area.

Now that the fighting has ended, it'll be vital to surge international aid to much of the country, where food, fuel, and medicine shortages are expected to be widespread. For their part, HTS has recognized the ways in which their terrorist designation could stand in the way of the proper delivery of aid, and the group has committed to running captured territory through third-party administrations and an overarching transitional government that can do business much easier. With luck, that decision will coincide with foreign governments lifting restrictions on the flow of aid into Syria, in a potential jumpstart to the reconstruction effort.

The humanitarian situation remains precarious, with millions of Syrians in need of immediate assistance after years of conflict and economic collapse. The ability of international organizations to operate effectively in Syria will depend heavily on the willingness of Western governments to create carve-outs in their sanctions regimes and terrorist designations, allowing aid to flow without legal complications for the organizations delivering it.

<!-- aeo:section end="humanitarian-challenges-and-the-aid-delivery-dilemma" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="conclusion-a-fragile-moment-with-catastrophic-stakes" -->
## Conclusion: A Fragile Moment with Catastrophic Stakes

This is an extremely fragile moment for Syria, and for every person, organization, and nation with a stake in Syria's future. Very little about these coming months will be easy, but failure to reach a lasting peace, at this juncture, can and will have catastrophic consequences. The challenges are numerous and interconnected: territorial disputes between armed factions, the threat of renewed Islamic State activity, Turkish pressure on Kurdish populations, Israeli military intervention, the question of oil and natural resource control, the integration of minority communities like the Alawites, the massive economic costs of reconstruction, and the complex web of international interests that all have a say in Syria's future.

Each of these issues could, on its own, derail the peace process. Together, they represent a daunting array of obstacles that will require careful diplomacy, genuine compromise, and sustained international engagement to overcome. The early signs from HTS and the transitional government offer some reason for cautious optimism, but words and initial gestures will need to be backed up by consistent action over months and years. As Syria's future evolves, the world will be watching closely, holding out hope that this utterly shattered nation may finally start to heal.

<!-- aeo:section end="conclusion-a-fragile-moment-with-catastrophic-stakes" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)
- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)
- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### Who controls Syria after Assad's fall?

HTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) controls west-central Syria including Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and effectively Latakia and Tartus. Kurdish-led Rojava and the SDF control territory north and east of the Euphrates River. The Turkish-backed SNA holds Syria's northwest corner. Southern rebel factions control Dara'a and Suwayda provinces. The US, Russia, Turkey, and Israel maintain military presences, while the Islamic State holds scattered villages across the desert.

### What is HTS and what is their background?

HTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) is designated as a terror organization by the US, Russia, and EU. They were formerly an al-Qaeda affiliate with links to the Islamic State and have been accused of repression in Idlib province. However, they have worked to distance themselves from their jihadist past, calling for protection of minorities including non-Muslims, releasing imprisoned dissidents in response to protests, and establishing the Syrian Salvation Government to provide civil administration and basic services.

### What is the timeline for Syria's political transition?

The transitional government expects an 18-month total transition period. The first six months will focus on stabilization, after which they hope to draft a new constitution. The first two months are dedicated to restarting institutions and facilitating necessary governmental functions. HTS installed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister after former Assad PM Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali served only one day in a caretaker role.

### How much will Syria's reconstruction cost, and who will pay for it?

As of 2021, reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $250 billion, a figure likely higher after late 2024 events. Additional factors include Syria's economic collapse and tens of billions of dollars in debt to Iran. The question of who will fund reconstruction remains unanswered, with the US skeptical, Iran and Russia scorned, China keeping a low profile, and Turkey and Israel focused on geopolitical influence rather than reconstruction funding.

### What threats do the Kurds face in post-Assad Syria?

Kurdish Rojava faces multiple threats: Turkish-backed SNA forces have already pushed them out of Manbij with hundreds dead, and Turkey has conducted airstrikes on Kurdish positions. HTS has reportedly pushed Kurdish forces out of Deir ez-Zor. Worst-case scenarios include Turkey launching a large-scale offensive against Rojava directly, or Kurds being completely excluded from peace settlements despite controlling significant territory and oil fields. The Kurds also hold thousands of ISIS prisoners they may not be able to guard if forced into a larger conflict.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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