---
title: "Nagorno-Karabakh: Can the World Prevent Another Caucasus War?"
description: "If it erupts, it could be the most significant conflict in the South Caucasus since the 1990s. A war that will shatter old power dynamics and permanently alter the ethnic landscape of this starkly beautiful region. For the past year, tensions between neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at boiling point. Following a two-day war in September of 2022, the bitter rivals have remained on the brink of wider conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: a self-governing enclave within Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory. Home to around 120,000 ethnic Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a brutal war in the 1990s. Closer to our time, six weeks of fighting in 2020 killed up to 7,000. In short, it is a place with a deeply troubled history — a history the bloodiest chapter of which may be about to be written. As fall of 2023 gets underway, Nagorno-Karabakh is under a devastating blockade. While recent negotiations may yet bring some relief, they have been accompanied by troop buildups. Buildups that could be a bluff — or could herald the coming of another devastating war.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin Corridor since December 2022 has caused food shortages, medical crises, and miscarriage rates three times above average in Nagorno-Karabakh's population of roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenians.\n- Russia's failure to honor the CSTO collective defense clause after Azerbaijan shelled Armenian territory in September 2022 shattered Moscow's credibility as a security guarantor in the South Caucasus.\n- The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 saw Azerbaijan destroy 60 percent of Armenian air defenses and 40 percent of artillery in the first hour, reversing the outcome of the 1990s conflict.\n- Armenia has pivoted sharply westward in 2023, conducting joint military drills with the US Army, sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and taking steps to join the International Criminal Court.\n- Azerbaijan's proposed Nakhichevan land corridor through Armenia's Syunik province would sever Iran's only land link to Armenia, which a Berlin-based SWP fellow called a potential geopolitical catastrophe for Tehran.\n\n## A Humanitarian Crisis Under Clear Mountain Skies\n\nIn a world roiled by humanitarian crises — from Ukraine, to Yemen, to Haiti — it is perhaps no surprise that one might slip under the radar. But make no mistake. The suffering being experienced by those in Nagorno-Karabakh could rank up there with the populations of many better-known trouble spots. Right now, the 2,700 sq km of territory controlled by the separatist government is suffering crippling shortages. Food has vanished from supermarket shelves. Medicines to treat chronic illnesses have become a mere memory. Fuel stocks have run so low the public transport system has imploded. While those villagers who grow their own crops and have their own wells are able to still eke out an existence, those in the capital Stepanakert are without water and electricity. Unemployment is sky-high. Amid such misery, health problems are taking hold. Deaths among toddlers and the elderly are higher than usual, while miscarriages are three times above their average level. Yet while the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh — known locally as the Republic of Artsakh — may be suffering deprivations similar to those in Haiti or Ukraine, where they differ is the cause. It is not state collapse or a full-blown war causing them such misery. Rather, it is a blockade. A blockade that has sealed off their home as effectively as placing it under a dome. A blockade being enforced by the nation Nagorno-Karabakh is technically a part of: Azerbaijan. The region is a slice of bleakly beautiful mountainous land in the west of Azerbaijan. The first part of its name, Nagorno, means \"mountainous.\" Once home to 120,000 ethnic Armenians, it is today populated by a smaller number who control about 2,700 sq km of its 4,400 sq km area. Around half of them live in the main city of Stepanakert, which they consider the capital of their independent republic. Crucially, though, the international community does not recognize their independence. Even Armenia today accepts Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan's borders. And that is a massive problem. Because the people of Nagorno-Karabakh believe the Azeri government wants to cleanse them from the land — to turn them into refugees and repopulate the region with their own people. It is a narrative the blockade is more than playing into.\n\n## The Lachin Corridor and Azerbaijan's Tightening Grip\n\nGo back in time just one year, and Nagorno-Karabakh was a well-stocked place with regular shops like you might find in any corner of the South Caucasus. Every day, 400 tons of food arrived on trucks from Armenia, shipped along a narrow road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia like an umbilical cord. A road of life known as the Lachin Corridor. Traversing the corridor was always a little nerve-wracking. With the heights around it occupied by Azeri soldiers, it felt like a geopolitical trouble spot. But it was only last December, 2022, that the Azeris came down from the peaks to sever the cord. With the Lachin Corridor blocked, Baku was able to control what went in and out of Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead of food trucks, only Red Cross vehicles were allowed in. Instead of families traveling to Armenia, only pre-approved ambulances could get out. For a while, the blockaded region limped on, surviving on sharply reduced supplies. But then came June 14th. While the wider world was getting ready for a relaxing summer, Azeri and Armenian forces skirmished at the border. In the immediate aftermath, Azerbaijan completely shut the Lachin Corridor. With that, Nagorno-Karabakh's residents were severed from the outside world. Since then, the situation under these clear mountain skies has sharply deteriorated. With starvation on the horizon, some — including a former International Criminal Court prosecutor — have claimed Baku may be conducting genocide. Obviously, that is not how Azerbaijan sees it. When discussing the Lachin Corridor, Azeri officials prefer to point to the illegal arms shipments they say were being sent to the 5,000 Armenian soldiers in Nagorno-Karabakh. Shipments the blockade is meant to disrupt. They also dispute the idea that the region is even under blockade. Since June, Baku has repeatedly offered to ship supplies from the Azeri city of Aghdam. The fact Nagorno-Karabakh's people have refused this — in their eyes — means the Armenians only have themselves to blame. To which one Nagorno-Karabakh official memorably responded on Twitter: \"What would you do if a terrorist blocks your access to a water wellspring in a desert, tortures you for a while, then offers you his urine to drink?\" It is in moments like these that the intractability of the crisis becomes clear — the dueling fears on both sides, with the Azeris worried about arms shipments, while the Armenians fear Azeri aid that, as one interviewee told the Guardian, they believe might be poisoned.\n\n## Soviet Collapse, Ethnic Violence, and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War\n\nThe Caucasus expert and journalist Thomas De Waal memorably wrote that the violence surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh was \"a conflict whose levels of complication go as deep as those of Cyprus, Kashmir, and Jerusalem.\" That was not hyperbole. The roots of hatred in this land are old, twisted, and sunken so deep that following them back to their start point can feel like an impossibility. The ethnic tensions that came spilling over with the collapse of the Soviet Union form the origins of the current crisis. During the glory days of the USSR, leaders were stuck with a conundrum. On the one hand, their Communist utopia was meant to be a society of workers, all united across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. On the other, it turned out that a lot of those ethnicities were pretty big into holding onto their distinctiveness. A fact reflected in the USSR's structure as a collection of 15 separate republics, divided along historic or ethnic lines. In such a vast nation, though, a mere 15 republics was not enough to contain its multitudes of peoples. So each full-level republic might contain any number of smaller second-level republics, known as ASSRs, along with a whole bunch of Autonomous Oblasts. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan contained within its borders both the Nakhichevan ASSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. So long as the USSR was still standing, any differences between their peoples were kept from boiling over. The ASSRs and the Autonomous Oblasts had some slight control over their fates. The trouble came when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, falling apart at the dawn of the 1990s. While everyone seemed to agree the fifteen full republics — places like Ukraine, Estonia, and Kazakhstan — would now be independent countries, no one seemed sure how to treat the smaller, autonomous parts. Some, like the Nakhchivan ASSR, were content to remain part of these newly independent republics. Others felt they had just as much of a right to be fully recognized nations. Most famously, this included Chechnya in Russia. But it also included Nagorno-Karabakh. The violence began to flare as early as 1988, when the oblast demanded it be transferred from Azeri control and instead become part of Socialist Armenia. In Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians attacked their Azeri neighbors. In Azerbaijan, pogroms drove thousands of Armenians from their homes. But it would not be until the Soviet Union had collapsed that things got really bad. Kicking off in 1992, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War saw atrocities, massacres, and ethnic cleansing take place amid this ancient landscape for over two years. Perhaps 30,000 died. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azeris alike were forced to flee their homes. By the time the dust settled in 1994, the land had been stained with blood. Yet for the winning side, all that carnage was almost worth it. The war ended with a decisive Armenian victory. Not only had Yerevan secured Nagorno-Karabakh, it had also taken control of seven ethnically Azeri districts surrounding it — districts that were indisputably part of Azerbaijan.\n\n## The 2020 War, the Collapse of Russian Authority, and the Blockade\n\nFor the Azeris, loss of the war was nothing less than a catastrophe. Over the years, the idea of a \"great return\" took hold — one that imagined an eventual reconquest of lost lands. Although backed by regional power Turkey, Azerbaijan was simply too weak to defeat Armenia, especially after Yerevan joined the CSTO — a Russian-led NATO, where an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. With Moscow providing Yerevan's muscle, there was nothing Baku could do. Not that the Azeris did not try. In 2016, they fought a four-day war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh — a war that killed 200 and saw Baku retake 20 sq km of territory. Even as Yerevan grew to rely more and more on its security treaty with Moscow, Baku was buying TB-2 drones from Turkey, splurging its growing oil wealth on new, advanced military tech that Armenia could not match. Behind the scenes, too, Azerbaijan's strongman president, Ilham Aliyev, was growing personally closer to Vladimir Putin. At the same time, his backer — Turkish autocrat Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — was becoming an ever-more powerful counterweight to Russia. The result: by 2020, the balance of might had tilted far out of Armenia's favor. On September 27, an all-out Azeri attack was launched along the frontlines. According to military analyst Rob Lee, \"Azerbaijan reportedly destroyed 60 percent of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's air defenses and 40 percent of its artillery in the first hour of the war.\" It was the start of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, a war that lasted six weeks and killed up to 7,000 people. By the time it was over, the outcome of the 1990s conflict had been almost totally reversed. In those six weeks, the amount of territory Armenia lost almost made protecting Nagorno-Karabakh untenable. Those seven districts in Azerbaijan that Yerevan had seized all fell to Baku's forces. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, around 1,300 sq km of land were lost. With its buffer zone completely gone, Armenia was reduced to relying on a single road to connect it with Stepanakert. A Moscow-brokered peace deal allowed Azerbaijan to keep its gains but also resulted in 2,000 Russian peacekeepers being deployed to protect the Lachin Corridor. The assumption was that Baku would never dare stand up to Russian troops. The illusion of Russian power evaporated. Putin allowed his army to get so badly mauled in Ukraine that it can no longer effectively carry out peacekeeping missions. A fact that did not go unnoticed by President Ilham Aliyev. The date when Azeri forces launched their next attack — September 12, 2022 — was the culmination of Ukraine's Kharkiv counteroffensive, the moment when Kyiv took back 8,000 sq km of territory in a handful of days and Putin was forced to order a partial mobilization. While the Kremlin was panicking over Ukraine, Baku took another bite out of Nagorno-Karabakh. This time, Azeri forces even shelled villages inside Armenia's internationally recognized borders. Over 300 people were killed. Faced with attacks on Armenian territory proper, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan activated the CSTO's collective defense clause. Instead of coming to protect its ally, Putin just looked away and did nothing. Witnessing Moscow's inability to stand up for its ally was a revelation for Baku. The aura around the Russian peacekeepers crumbled. Just three months later, the blockade of the Lachin Corridor began. The Russian peacekeepers simply stood aside.\n\n## Shifting Alliances: Armenia Turns West as Russian Influence Withers\n\nEven if the blockade has been lifted, few think that will be the end to tensions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Thomas De Waal has written about how President Aliyev thinks he is on a roll — that the balance of power has tilted decisively in Azerbaijan's favor, and the Russian army has shown itself to be a paper bear. Aliyev has been clear about what he expects from the inhabitants of the breakaway region: complete integration into Azeri society. There will be no offers of autonomy. At best, they may be offered special language rights, but even that is uncertain. Aliyev is backed by an Azeri public that feels no sympathy for the inhabitants. Ever since Azerbaijan recaptured the seven Armenian-occupied districts, champions of the Great Return have been publicizing what Armenian rule — according to them — really means: towns in ruins and fields heavily mined. The South Caucasus currently have two identical sets of peace negotiations underway. One is led by the European Union, and another by Russia. Of these, the EU's effort seems the most successful. Over six rounds of talks, Yerevan and Baku have agreed to topics as thorny as mutual recognition and finalizing the border between their nations, and are even discussing a controversial transport link that would cross Armenia's south to connect the main part of Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. On the Armenian side, Prime Minister Pashinyan has hinted he is willing to give up claims on Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for Azerbaijan protecting its residents' rights. The deal is not there yet, but slow progress is being made, and the EU's process is at least keeping diplomacy alive. Moscow's position is that the South Caucasus constitute its backyard, and any EU-brokered peace would be infringing on its turf. Yet this ignores the reality that the Kremlin's influence is withering in the region. Just three short years ago in 2020, Moscow had brokered the peace agreement, put Russian boots on the ground to enforce it, and Vladimir Putin was talking of building a new military base in Armenian-held territory and assuring Armenian refugees they could return under Russian protection. Along with President Erdoğan of Turkey, he had pushed Western powers out of the region. Then came 2022 and the Ukraine war. Open-source analysts Oryx list over 2,300 confirmed tank losses on Moscow's side. A June 2023 statistical analysis by independent Russian outlet Meduza estimated at least 47,000 troop deaths, with tens of thousands more wounded. When Armenia asked the CSTO for help in 2022 and Russia did nothing, it drove Yerevan to take steps that would have once been unthinkable. Armenia is not just one of Russia's allies — it is one of its key allies: the only CSTO state to help Russia in its intervention in Syria, albeit in a non-combat role, and one of just five member states of Putin's cherished Eurasian Economic Union. Since the CSTO's 2022 failure, though, Yerevan has not been so much drifting away as running full pelt for the exit. This year alone, Prime Minister Pashinyan has canceled joint CSTO drills, told reporters \"We are not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine,\" and made steps to join the International Criminal Court — a move that would see Yerevan treaty-bound to arrest Putin if he ever sets foot on Armenian soil. This September, Armenia even sent humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, causing a diplomatic row. From September 11 through the 20th, Armenia is running joint military drills with the US Army — drills designed to get Armenia's military up to NATO standard.\n\n## Iran, Turkey, and the Dangerous Geopolitics of a Third War\n\nFor Pentagon planners hoping to prise Armenia away from Moscow, perhaps the biggest complication is that Russia is not the only geopolitical foe Yerevan is friends with. Armenia also maintains important links with its southern neighbor, Iran. And while it may be an alliance of convenience against Turkey and Azerbaijan, it is also one with deep roots. Speaking to Al-Monitor, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan recently declared: \"The border with Iran is of utmost importance to us. We have two closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, thus Iran and Georgia are our only gates to the outside world.\" Al-Monitor recently did an interesting deep dive into one of Baku's main geopolitical goals: to create a road and rail corridor connecting the Azerbaijani mainland with its exclave of Nakhichevan. The two parts of Azeri territory are separated by Armenia's southernmost point: the province of Syunik. Any land bridge would have to cross here, presumably along the southern border. Unfortunately for Tehran, that border is also the only land link between Iran and Armenia. If Azeri forces control it, then the Islamic Republic loses a vital connection not just to an ally, but to western markets. As a visiting fellow at Berlin-based think tank SWP told Al-Monitor, this \"would be a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran.\" On the flipside, it would be a massive win for Turkey. Ankara's only border with Azerbaijan is at the very northern tip of Nakhichevan. With the land corridor in place, Turkey would be able to export goods through its ally to lucrative Central Asian markets — something it currently has to rely on Iran for. Such a link would not run from or through Nagorno-Karabakh, but it is intimately tied to what happens in the self-governing region. Pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh might be one way to get Armenia to accept its position on the subject. Tehran's interest in the border shows just how dangerous a third Nagorno-Karabakh war could be — how a final Azeri play for victory might drag in not just Baku and Yerevan, but also Turkey and Iran. Already this year, Azeri and Iranian forces have conducted military exercises along one another's borders. President Aliyev has said that \"relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are at the lowest level ever.\" It does not take a genius to see how an Iran that fears a geopolitical catastrophe should Armenia lose another war might be tempted to intervene. Nor is it hard to imagine Turkey responding to that intervention on the side of its ally Azerbaijan. If Iran and Turkey were to get dragged into a South Caucasus conflict, it would make the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War look tame in comparison.\n\n## A Flashpoint the World Cannot Afford to Ignore\n\nThere is nothing inevitable about renewed conflict. It could be that European diplomacy yet bears fruit. It could be that President Aliyev calculates he has gotten as many concessions out of Armenia as currently possible and turns down the pressure. But there are signs that another conflagration could be brewing. Armenia's traditional ally Russia is weakened and distracted. While Yerevan is turning to the US, it is not as though Washington would deploy troops to protect Nagorno-Karabakh. Some analysts therefore think that Aliyev might feel he needs to act now or lose his window of opportunity — that this may be his only chance to complete a clean conquest of the breakaway region and establish a lasting Azeri victory. Already this September, there have been reports of troop buildups along the line of contact — worrying signs that Aliyev might be hoping to finish what his forces started in 2020. Yet even if the final confrontation never comes, this is still a region worth paying attention to. Tiny Nagorno-Karabakh is a place where the fates of regional powers can be determined, where the futures of nations as significant as Russia, Iran, or Turkey may be decided. But it is also something else. A place where tens of thousands of Armenians are suffering, their pain widely ignored by the outside world. A place where acts of cruelty like the blockade are being perpetrated in plain sight, under the clear mountain skies. It may not be as well-known as Ukraine, or Haiti, or Yemen, but Nagorno-Karabakh and her people deserve attention. The least the world can do is acknowledge their suffering — and its significance for the broader international order.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What is the Lachin Corridor and why does its blockade matter so much?\n\nThe Lachin Corridor is the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, carrying 400 tons of food daily before Azerbaijan blocked it in December 2022. When Baku completely sealed the corridor on June 14, 2023, the region's roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenian residents lost almost all outside access, triggering food shortages, the disappearance of medicines for chronic illnesses, collapsed public transport, and miscarriage rates three times above their average level.\n\n### How did the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War shift the balance of power?\n\nThe six-week Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 dramatically reversed the outcome of the 1990s conflict. Azerbaijan reportedly destroyed 60 percent of the region's air defenses and 40 percent of its artillery in the first hour, eventually recapturing the seven ethnically Azeri districts Armenia had held since the 1990s along with roughly 1,300 square kilometers of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. A Moscow-brokered ceasefire placed 2,000 Russian peacekeepers on the Lachin Corridor — peacekeepers who, two years later, simply stood aside as the blockade began.\n\n### Why has Russia lost its influence as a security guarantor in the South Caucasus?\n\nWhen Azerbaijan shelled villages inside Armenia's internationally recognized borders in September 2022, Armenia activated the CSTO collective defense clause — and Russia did nothing. That failure, occurring as Moscow was panicking over Ukraine's Kharkiv counteroffensive, shattered the assumption that Russia would ever act to protect its ally. Meduza estimated at least 47,000 Russian troop deaths in Ukraine by June 2023, and Oryx confirmed over 2,300 confirmed tank losses, leaving Moscow unable to project meaningful military power in the Caucasus.\n\n### What would the proposed Nakhichevan land corridor mean for Iran and Turkey?\n\nAzerbaijan wants a road and rail corridor across Armenia's southernmost Syunik province to link its mainland with its Nakhichevan exclave, but that border strip is also the only land link between Iran and Armenia. If Azerbaijani forces controlled it, Iran would lose a vital connection to western markets — described by a Berlin-based SWP think-tank fellow as \"a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran.\" Conversely, Turkey would gain a direct overland export route through its ally Azerbaijan to lucrative Central Asian markets, currently dependent on Iran.\n\n### How is Armenia responding diplomatically to its weakened security position?\n\nFaced with Russia's failure, Armenia has pivoted sharply westward. Prime Minister Pashinyan canceled joint CSTO military drills, told reporters that Armenia is \"not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine,\" sent humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and took steps to join the International Criminal Court — which would require Yerevan to arrest Putin if he set foot on Armenian soil. In September 2023, Armenia conducted joint military drills with the US Army designed to bring its forces to NATO standards, while the EU's parallel peace negotiations with Baku have made more substantive progress than Russia's own track.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Is a Decades-Long Turkish War Finally Over? Abdullah Öcalan Calls for Peace.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-a-decades-long-turkish-war-finally-over-abdullah-calan-calls-for-peace)\n- [Nagorno-Karabakh's Fall: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Shifting Power Dynamics](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/nagorno-karabakh-fall-impact-armenia-azerbaijan)\n- [After Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia's Uncertain Future](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/after-nagorno-karabakh-armenias-uncertain-future)\n- [War is Coming. Europe isn't Ready.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/war-is-coming-europe-isnt-ready)\n- [South Sudan is on Fire. Here's Why. (And More)](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-is-on-fire-heres-why-and-more)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/armenia-azerbaijan-on-the-brink-again/>\n2. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/inside-nagorno-karabakh-blockade-armenia-azerbaijan>\n3. <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-blockade-humanitarian-situation/32527892.html>\n4. <https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-holds-drills-with-us-troops-amid-rift-with-russia/7262861.html>\n5. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/turkey-rises-russia-fades-iran-and-azerbaijan-clash-over-armenia>\n6. <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-claims-troop-buildup-border/32582534.html>\n7. <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-summons-armenian-ambassador-over-ukraine-aid-pledge/>\n8. <https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717>\n9. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/as-russia-reels-eurasia-roils/>\n\n[1]: https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/armenia-azerbaijan-on-the-brink-again/\n[2]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/inside-nagorno-karabakh-blockade-armenia-azerbaijan\n[3]: https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-blockade-humanitarian-situation/32527892.html\n[4]: https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-holds-drills-with-us-troops-amid-rift-with-russia/7262861.html\n[5]: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/turkey-rises-russia-fades-iran-and-azerbaijan-clash-over-armenia\n[6]: https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-claims-troop-buildup-border/32582534.html\n[7]: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-summons-armenian-ambassador-over-ukraine-aid-pledge/\n[8]: https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717\n[9]: https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/as-russia-reels-eurasia-roils/\n\n<!-- youtube:70WhuoG0XB0 -->"
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If it erupts, it could be the most significant conflict in the South Caucasus since the 1990s. A war that will shatter old power dynamics and permanently alter the ethnic landscape of this starkly beautiful region. For the past year, tensions between neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at boiling point. Following a two-day war in September of 2022, the bitter rivals have remained on the brink of wider conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: a self-governing enclave within Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory. Home to around 120,000 ethnic Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a brutal war in the 1990s. Closer to our time, six weeks of fighting in 2020 killed up to 7,000. In short, it is a place with a deeply troubled history — a history the bloodiest chapter of which may be about to be written. As fall of 2023 gets underway, Nagorno-Karabakh is under a devastating blockade. While recent negotiations may yet bring some relief, they have been accompanied by troop buildups. Buildups that could be a bluff — or could herald the coming of another devastating war.

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## Key Takeaways
- Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin Corridor since December 2022 has caused food shortages, medical crises, and miscarriage rates three times above average in Nagorno-Karabakh's population of roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenians.
- Russia's failure to honor the CSTO collective defense clause after Azerbaijan shelled Armenian territory in September 2022 shattered Moscow's credibility as a security guarantor in the South Caucasus.
- The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 saw Azerbaijan destroy 60 percent of Armenian air defenses and 40 percent of artillery in the first hour, reversing the outcome of the 1990s conflict.
- Armenia has pivoted sharply westward in 2023, conducting joint military drills with the US Army, sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and taking steps to join the International Criminal Court.
- Azerbaijan's proposed Nakhichevan land corridor through Armenia's Syunik province would sever Iran's only land link to Armenia, which a Berlin-based SWP fellow called a potential geopolitical catastrophe for Tehran.

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## A Humanitarian Crisis Under Clear Mountain Skies

In a world roiled by humanitarian crises — from Ukraine, to Yemen, to Haiti — it is perhaps no surprise that one might slip under the radar. But make no mistake. The suffering being experienced by those in Nagorno-Karabakh could rank up there with the populations of many better-known trouble spots. Right now, the 2,700 sq km of territory controlled by the separatist government is suffering crippling shortages. Food has vanished from supermarket shelves. Medicines to treat chronic illnesses have become a mere memory. Fuel stocks have run so low the public transport system has imploded. While those villagers who grow their own crops and have their own wells are able to still eke out an existence, those in the capital Stepanakert are without water and electricity. Unemployment is sky-high. Amid such misery, health problems are taking hold. Deaths among toddlers and the elderly are higher than usual, while miscarriages are three times above their average level. Yet while the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh — known locally as the Republic of Artsakh — may be suffering deprivations similar to those in Haiti or Ukraine, where they differ is the cause. It is not state collapse or a full-blown war causing them such misery. Rather, it is a blockade. A blockade that has sealed off their home as effectively as placing it under a dome. A blockade being enforced by the nation Nagorno-Karabakh is technically a part of: Azerbaijan. The region is a slice of bleakly beautiful mountainous land in the west of Azerbaijan. The first part of its name, Nagorno, means "mountainous." Once home to 120,000 ethnic Armenians, it is today populated by a smaller number who control about 2,700 sq km of its 4,400 sq km area. Around half of them live in the main city of Stepanakert, which they consider the capital of their independent republic. Crucially, though, the international community does not recognize their independence. Even Armenia today accepts Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan's borders. And that is a massive problem. Because the people of Nagorno-Karabakh believe the Azeri government wants to cleanse them from the land — to turn them into refugees and repopulate the region with their own people. It is a narrative the blockade is more than playing into.

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## The Lachin Corridor and Azerbaijan's Tightening Grip

Go back in time just one year, and Nagorno-Karabakh was a well-stocked place with regular shops like you might find in any corner of the South Caucasus. Every day, 400 tons of food arrived on trucks from Armenia, shipped along a narrow road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia like an umbilical cord. A road of life known as the Lachin Corridor. Traversing the corridor was always a little nerve-wracking. With the heights around it occupied by Azeri soldiers, it felt like a geopolitical trouble spot. But it was only last December, 2022, that the Azeris came down from the peaks to sever the cord. With the Lachin Corridor blocked, Baku was able to control what went in and out of Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead of food trucks, only Red Cross vehicles were allowed in. Instead of families traveling to Armenia, only pre-approved ambulances could get out. For a while, the blockaded region limped on, surviving on sharply reduced supplies. But then came June 14th. While the wider world was getting ready for a relaxing summer, Azeri and Armenian forces skirmished at the border. In the immediate aftermath, Azerbaijan completely shut the Lachin Corridor. With that, Nagorno-Karabakh's residents were severed from the outside world. Since then, the situation under these clear mountain skies has sharply deteriorated. With starvation on the horizon, some — including a former International Criminal Court prosecutor — have claimed Baku may be conducting genocide. Obviously, that is not how Azerbaijan sees it. When discussing the Lachin Corridor, Azeri officials prefer to point to the illegal arms shipments they say were being sent to the 5,000 Armenian soldiers in Nagorno-Karabakh. Shipments the blockade is meant to disrupt. They also dispute the idea that the region is even under blockade. Since June, Baku has repeatedly offered to ship supplies from the Azeri city of Aghdam. The fact Nagorno-Karabakh's people have refused this — in their eyes — means the Armenians only have themselves to blame. To which one Nagorno-Karabakh official memorably responded on Twitter: "What would you do if a terrorist blocks your access to a water wellspring in a desert, tortures you for a while, then offers you his urine to drink?" It is in moments like these that the intractability of the crisis becomes clear — the dueling fears on both sides, with the Azeris worried about arms shipments, while the Armenians fear Azeri aid that, as one interviewee told the Guardian, they believe might be poisoned.

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<!-- aeo:section start="soviet-collapse-ethnic-violence-and-the-first-nagorno-karabakh-w" -->
## Soviet Collapse, Ethnic Violence, and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War

The Caucasus expert and journalist Thomas De Waal memorably wrote that the violence surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh was "a conflict whose levels of complication go as deep as those of Cyprus, Kashmir, and Jerusalem." That was not hyperbole. The roots of hatred in this land are old, twisted, and sunken so deep that following them back to their start point can feel like an impossibility. The ethnic tensions that came spilling over with the collapse of the Soviet Union form the origins of the current crisis. During the glory days of the USSR, leaders were stuck with a conundrum. On the one hand, their Communist utopia was meant to be a society of workers, all united across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. On the other, it turned out that a lot of those ethnicities were pretty big into holding onto their distinctiveness. A fact reflected in the USSR's structure as a collection of 15 separate republics, divided along historic or ethnic lines. In such a vast nation, though, a mere 15 republics was not enough to contain its multitudes of peoples. So each full-level republic might contain any number of smaller second-level republics, known as ASSRs, along with a whole bunch of Autonomous Oblasts. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan contained within its borders both the Nakhichevan ASSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. So long as the USSR was still standing, any differences between their peoples were kept from boiling over. The ASSRs and the Autonomous Oblasts had some slight control over their fates. The trouble came when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, falling apart at the dawn of the 1990s. While everyone seemed to agree the fifteen full republics — places like Ukraine, Estonia, and Kazakhstan — would now be independent countries, no one seemed sure how to treat the smaller, autonomous parts. Some, like the Nakhchivan ASSR, were content to remain part of these newly independent republics. Others felt they had just as much of a right to be fully recognized nations. Most famously, this included Chechnya in Russia. But it also included Nagorno-Karabakh. The violence began to flare as early as 1988, when the oblast demanded it be transferred from Azeri control and instead become part of Socialist Armenia. In Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians attacked their Azeri neighbors. In Azerbaijan, pogroms drove thousands of Armenians from their homes. But it would not be until the Soviet Union had collapsed that things got really bad. Kicking off in 1992, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War saw atrocities, massacres, and ethnic cleansing take place amid this ancient landscape for over two years. Perhaps 30,000 died. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azeris alike were forced to flee their homes. By the time the dust settled in 1994, the land had been stained with blood. Yet for the winning side, all that carnage was almost worth it. The war ended with a decisive Armenian victory. Not only had Yerevan secured Nagorno-Karabakh, it had also taken control of seven ethnically Azeri districts surrounding it — districts that were indisputably part of Azerbaijan.

<!-- aeo:section end="soviet-collapse-ethnic-violence-and-the-first-nagorno-karabakh-w" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-2020-war-the-collapse-of-russian-authority-and-the-blockade" -->
## The 2020 War, the Collapse of Russian Authority, and the Blockade

For the Azeris, loss of the war was nothing less than a catastrophe. Over the years, the idea of a "great return" took hold — one that imagined an eventual reconquest of lost lands. Although backed by regional power Turkey, Azerbaijan was simply too weak to defeat Armenia, especially after Yerevan joined the CSTO — a Russian-led NATO, where an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. With Moscow providing Yerevan's muscle, there was nothing Baku could do. Not that the Azeris did not try. In 2016, they fought a four-day war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh — a war that killed 200 and saw Baku retake 20 sq km of territory. Even as Yerevan grew to rely more and more on its security treaty with Moscow, Baku was buying TB-2 drones from Turkey, splurging its growing oil wealth on new, advanced military tech that Armenia could not match. Behind the scenes, too, Azerbaijan's strongman president, Ilham Aliyev, was growing personally closer to Vladimir Putin. At the same time, his backer — Turkish autocrat Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — was becoming an ever-more powerful counterweight to Russia. The result: by 2020, the balance of might had tilted far out of Armenia's favor. On September 27, an all-out Azeri attack was launched along the frontlines. According to military analyst Rob Lee, "Azerbaijan reportedly destroyed 60 percent of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's air defenses and 40 percent of its artillery in the first hour of the war." It was the start of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, a war that lasted six weeks and killed up to 7,000 people. By the time it was over, the outcome of the 1990s conflict had been almost totally reversed. In those six weeks, the amount of territory Armenia lost almost made protecting Nagorno-Karabakh untenable. Those seven districts in Azerbaijan that Yerevan had seized all fell to Baku's forces. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, around 1,300 sq km of land were lost. With its buffer zone completely gone, Armenia was reduced to relying on a single road to connect it with Stepanakert. A Moscow-brokered peace deal allowed Azerbaijan to keep its gains but also resulted in 2,000 Russian peacekeepers being deployed to protect the Lachin Corridor. The assumption was that Baku would never dare stand up to Russian troops. The illusion of Russian power evaporated. Putin allowed his army to get so badly mauled in Ukraine that it can no longer effectively carry out peacekeeping missions. A fact that did not go unnoticed by President Ilham Aliyev. The date when Azeri forces launched their next attack — September 12, 2022 — was the culmination of Ukraine's Kharkiv counteroffensive, the moment when Kyiv took back 8,000 sq km of territory in a handful of days and Putin was forced to order a partial mobilization. While the Kremlin was panicking over Ukraine, Baku took another bite out of Nagorno-Karabakh. This time, Azeri forces even shelled villages inside Armenia's internationally recognized borders. Over 300 people were killed. Faced with attacks on Armenian territory proper, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan activated the CSTO's collective defense clause. Instead of coming to protect its ally, Putin just looked away and did nothing. Witnessing Moscow's inability to stand up for its ally was a revelation for Baku. The aura around the Russian peacekeepers crumbled. Just three months later, the blockade of the Lachin Corridor began. The Russian peacekeepers simply stood aside.

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<!-- aeo:section start="shifting-alliances-armenia-turns-west-as-russian-influence-withe" -->
## Shifting Alliances: Armenia Turns West as Russian Influence Withers

Even if the blockade has been lifted, few think that will be the end to tensions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Thomas De Waal has written about how President Aliyev thinks he is on a roll — that the balance of power has tilted decisively in Azerbaijan's favor, and the Russian army has shown itself to be a paper bear. Aliyev has been clear about what he expects from the inhabitants of the breakaway region: complete integration into Azeri society. There will be no offers of autonomy. At best, they may be offered special language rights, but even that is uncertain. Aliyev is backed by an Azeri public that feels no sympathy for the inhabitants. Ever since Azerbaijan recaptured the seven Armenian-occupied districts, champions of the Great Return have been publicizing what Armenian rule — according to them — really means: towns in ruins and fields heavily mined. The South Caucasus currently have two identical sets of peace negotiations underway. One is led by the European Union, and another by Russia. Of these, the EU's effort seems the most successful. Over six rounds of talks, Yerevan and Baku have agreed to topics as thorny as mutual recognition and finalizing the border between their nations, and are even discussing a controversial transport link that would cross Armenia's south to connect the main part of Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. On the Armenian side, Prime Minister Pashinyan has hinted he is willing to give up claims on Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for Azerbaijan protecting its residents' rights. The deal is not there yet, but slow progress is being made, and the EU's process is at least keeping diplomacy alive. Moscow's position is that the South Caucasus constitute its backyard, and any EU-brokered peace would be infringing on its turf. Yet this ignores the reality that the Kremlin's influence is withering in the region. Just three short years ago in 2020, Moscow had brokered the peace agreement, put Russian boots on the ground to enforce it, and Vladimir Putin was talking of building a new military base in Armenian-held territory and assuring Armenian refugees they could return under Russian protection. Along with President Erdoğan of Turkey, he had pushed Western powers out of the region. Then came 2022 and the Ukraine war. Open-source analysts Oryx list over 2,300 confirmed tank losses on Moscow's side. A June 2023 statistical analysis by independent Russian outlet Meduza estimated at least 47,000 troop deaths, with tens of thousands more wounded. When Armenia asked the CSTO for help in 2022 and Russia did nothing, it drove Yerevan to take steps that would have once been unthinkable. Armenia is not just one of Russia's allies — it is one of its key allies: the only CSTO state to help Russia in its intervention in Syria, albeit in a non-combat role, and one of just five member states of Putin's cherished Eurasian Economic Union. Since the CSTO's 2022 failure, though, Yerevan has not been so much drifting away as running full pelt for the exit. This year alone, Prime Minister Pashinyan has canceled joint CSTO drills, told reporters "We are not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine," and made steps to join the International Criminal Court — a move that would see Yerevan treaty-bound to arrest Putin if he ever sets foot on Armenian soil. This September, Armenia even sent humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, causing a diplomatic row. From September 11 through the 20th, Armenia is running joint military drills with the US Army — drills designed to get Armenia's military up to NATO standard.

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<!-- aeo:section start="iran-turkey-and-the-dangerous-geopolitics-of-a-third-war" -->
## Iran, Turkey, and the Dangerous Geopolitics of a Third War

For Pentagon planners hoping to prise Armenia away from Moscow, perhaps the biggest complication is that Russia is not the only geopolitical foe Yerevan is friends with. Armenia also maintains important links with its southern neighbor, Iran. And while it may be an alliance of convenience against Turkey and Azerbaijan, it is also one with deep roots. Speaking to Al-Monitor, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan recently declared: "The border with Iran is of utmost importance to us. We have two closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, thus Iran and Georgia are our only gates to the outside world." Al-Monitor recently did an interesting deep dive into one of Baku's main geopolitical goals: to create a road and rail corridor connecting the Azerbaijani mainland with its exclave of Nakhichevan. The two parts of Azeri territory are separated by Armenia's southernmost point: the province of Syunik. Any land bridge would have to cross here, presumably along the southern border. Unfortunately for Tehran, that border is also the only land link between Iran and Armenia. If Azeri forces control it, then the Islamic Republic loses a vital connection not just to an ally, but to western markets. As a visiting fellow at Berlin-based think tank SWP told Al-Monitor, this "would be a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran." On the flipside, it would be a massive win for Turkey. Ankara's only border with Azerbaijan is at the very northern tip of Nakhichevan. With the land corridor in place, Turkey would be able to export goods through its ally to lucrative Central Asian markets — something it currently has to rely on Iran for. Such a link would not run from or through Nagorno-Karabakh, but it is intimately tied to what happens in the self-governing region. Pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh might be one way to get Armenia to accept its position on the subject. Tehran's interest in the border shows just how dangerous a third Nagorno-Karabakh war could be — how a final Azeri play for victory might drag in not just Baku and Yerevan, but also Turkey and Iran. Already this year, Azeri and Iranian forces have conducted military exercises along one another's borders. President Aliyev has said that "relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are at the lowest level ever." It does not take a genius to see how an Iran that fears a geopolitical catastrophe should Armenia lose another war might be tempted to intervene. Nor is it hard to imagine Turkey responding to that intervention on the side of its ally Azerbaijan. If Iran and Turkey were to get dragged into a South Caucasus conflict, it would make the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War look tame in comparison.

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<!-- aeo:section start="a-flashpoint-the-world-cannot-afford-to-ignore" -->
## A Flashpoint the World Cannot Afford to Ignore

There is nothing inevitable about renewed conflict. It could be that European diplomacy yet bears fruit. It could be that President Aliyev calculates he has gotten as many concessions out of Armenia as currently possible and turns down the pressure. But there are signs that another conflagration could be brewing. Armenia's traditional ally Russia is weakened and distracted. While Yerevan is turning to the US, it is not as though Washington would deploy troops to protect Nagorno-Karabakh. Some analysts therefore think that Aliyev might feel he needs to act now or lose his window of opportunity — that this may be his only chance to complete a clean conquest of the breakaway region and establish a lasting Azeri victory. Already this September, there have been reports of troop buildups along the line of contact — worrying signs that Aliyev might be hoping to finish what his forces started in 2020. Yet even if the final confrontation never comes, this is still a region worth paying attention to. Tiny Nagorno-Karabakh is a place where the fates of regional powers can be determined, where the futures of nations as significant as Russia, Iran, or Turkey may be decided. But it is also something else. A place where tens of thousands of Armenians are suffering, their pain widely ignored by the outside world. A place where acts of cruelty like the blockade are being perpetrated in plain sight, under the clear mountain skies. It may not be as well-known as Ukraine, or Haiti, or Yemen, but Nagorno-Karabakh and her people deserve attention. The least the world can do is acknowledge their suffering — and its significance for the broader international order.

<!-- aeo:section end="a-flashpoint-the-world-cannot-afford-to-ignore" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Lachin Corridor and why does its blockade matter so much?

The Lachin Corridor is the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, carrying 400 tons of food daily before Azerbaijan blocked it in December 2022. When Baku completely sealed the corridor on June 14, 2023, the region's roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenian residents lost almost all outside access, triggering food shortages, the disappearance of medicines for chronic illnesses, collapsed public transport, and miscarriage rates three times above their average level.

### How did the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War shift the balance of power?

The six-week Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 dramatically reversed the outcome of the 1990s conflict. Azerbaijan reportedly destroyed 60 percent of the region's air defenses and 40 percent of its artillery in the first hour, eventually recapturing the seven ethnically Azeri districts Armenia had held since the 1990s along with roughly 1,300 square kilometers of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. A Moscow-brokered ceasefire placed 2,000 Russian peacekeepers on the Lachin Corridor — peacekeepers who, two years later, simply stood aside as the blockade began.

### Why has Russia lost its influence as a security guarantor in the South Caucasus?

When Azerbaijan shelled villages inside Armenia's internationally recognized borders in September 2022, Armenia activated the CSTO collective defense clause — and Russia did nothing. That failure, occurring as Moscow was panicking over Ukraine's Kharkiv counteroffensive, shattered the assumption that Russia would ever act to protect its ally. Meduza estimated at least 47,000 Russian troop deaths in Ukraine by June 2023, and Oryx confirmed over 2,300 confirmed tank losses, leaving Moscow unable to project meaningful military power in the Caucasus.

### What would the proposed Nakhichevan land corridor mean for Iran and Turkey?

Azerbaijan wants a road and rail corridor across Armenia's southernmost Syunik province to link its mainland with its Nakhichevan exclave, but that border strip is also the only land link between Iran and Armenia. If Azerbaijani forces controlled it, Iran would lose a vital connection to western markets — described by a Berlin-based SWP think-tank fellow as "a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran." Conversely, Turkey would gain a direct overland export route through its ally Azerbaijan to lucrative Central Asian markets, currently dependent on Iran.

### How is Armenia responding diplomatically to its weakened security position?

Faced with Russia's failure, Armenia has pivoted sharply westward. Prime Minister Pashinyan canceled joint CSTO military drills, told reporters that Armenia is "not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine," sent humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and took steps to join the International Criminal Court — which would require Yerevan to arrest Putin if he set foot on Armenian soil. In September 2023, Armenia conducted joint military drills with the US Army designed to bring its forces to NATO standards, while the EU's parallel peace negotiations with Baku have made more substantive progress than Russia's own track.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
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- [Nagorno-Karabakh's Fall: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Shifting Power Dynamics](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/nagorno-karabakh-fall-impact-armenia-azerbaijan)
- [After Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia's Uncertain Future](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/after-nagorno-karabakh-armenias-uncertain-future)
- [War is Coming. Europe isn't Ready.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/war-is-coming-europe-isnt-ready)
- [South Sudan is on Fire. Here's Why. (And More)](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-is-on-fire-heres-why-and-more)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources
1. <https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/armenia-azerbaijan-on-the-brink-again/>
2. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/inside-nagorno-karabakh-blockade-armenia-azerbaijan>
3. <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-blockade-humanitarian-situation/32527892.html>
4. <https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-holds-drills-with-us-troops-amid-rift-with-russia/7262861.html>
5. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/turkey-rises-russia-fades-iran-and-azerbaijan-clash-over-armenia>
6. <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-claims-troop-buildup-border/32582534.html>
7. <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-summons-armenian-ambassador-over-ukraine-aid-pledge/>
8. <https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717>
9. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/as-russia-reels-eurasia-roils/>

[1]: https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/armenia-azerbaijan-on-the-brink-again/
[2]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/inside-nagorno-karabakh-blockade-armenia-azerbaijan
[3]: https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-blockade-humanitarian-situation/32527892.html
[4]: https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-holds-drills-with-us-troops-amid-rift-with-russia/7262861.html
[5]: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/turkey-rises-russia-fades-iran-and-azerbaijan-clash-over-armenia
[6]: https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-claims-troop-buildup-border/32582534.html
[7]: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-summons-armenian-ambassador-over-ukraine-aid-pledge/
[8]: https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-blockade-crisis-choking-of-disputed-region-is-a-consequence-of-war-and-geopolitics-211717
[9]: https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/as-russia-reels-eurasia-roils/

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