---
title: "North Korean Troops Are Failing in Kursk, But That May Not Matter to Kim Jong-Un"
description: "On January 9, 2025, Ukrainian forces captured a battered Russian Army soldier in Kursk Oblast. His military ID identified him as a nineteen-year-old native of Tuva, a Siberian republic near Mongolia. But the ID was fake—the soldier couldn't speak Russian, a language standard for ethnic Tuvans or anyone who'd spent months in the Russian military. He was North Korean, part of a detachment of DPRK soldiers supporting Russia's faltering attempt to counter Ukraine's incursion into Russian territory. This capture, aided by South Korean intelligence, revealed the extent of North Korean involvement in a conflict that has drawn one of the world's most isolated nations into direct combat for the first time in over seventy years.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- Ukraine captured a North Korean soldier disguised as a Russian Tuvan in Kursk Oblast on January 9, 2025, revealing North Korea's direct combat involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict for the first time in over 70 years.\n- Between 10,000–12,000 North Korean troops, primarily from the elite 11th Army Corps (Storm Corps), were deployed to Kursk starting in October 2024 following a July 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea.\n- North Korean forces have suffered significant casualties, with estimates ranging from 1,200 (US) to 4,000 (Ukraine) killed or wounded by mid-January 2025, though performance assessments are mixed.\n- The deployment represents a strategic win for Kim Jong-Un regardless of battlefield outcomes: he gains a mutual defense pact with Russia, combat experience for his troops, real-world weapons testing, and reduces the burden of feeding an oversized military in a famine-stricken nation.\n- North Korean soldiers have been instructed to commit suicide rather than be captured, reflecting extreme ideological indoctrination about the shame of capture.\n\n## The Current Situation in Kursk\n\nUkraine currently occupies around 800 square kilometres of Russian territory in the Kursk region, predominantly in the border district of Sudzha. Ukrainian forces launched their surprise offensive across the frontier in August 2024, marking the first assault directly on Russian soil since World War II. The initial attack quickly overwhelmed Russian defences, with Ukrainian forces capturing as much as 1,400 square kilometres of territory.\n\nRussia mounted a counter-offensive and managed to reclaim approximately half the ground lost, but not before suffering severe casualties and being forced to evacuate some 150,000 people from the affected region. Despite these efforts, Russia has been unsuccessful in completely repelling the Ukrainian ground assault from its territory, at significant cost to both its military capabilities and Putin's image.\n\nAs the Russian counter-offensive advanced, Ukraine unleashed a new offensive in January 2025, focused on dealing a follow-up blow to the Kursk defenders. However, on this occasion, Ukrainian forces would encounter not only the Russian army but a new player in the conflict entirely: North Korean troops fighting on European soil.\n\n## The Russia-North Korea Alliance: How We Got Here\n\nBetween the first and second Ukrainian offensives in Kursk, a detachment of between ten and twelve thousand North Korean soldiers were sent to support Russia. The first reports of their involvement emerged in October 2024, when a South Korean spy agency announced the deployment of around 1,500 Korean People's Army troops to Russia.\n\nThe deployment of North Korean forces is a direct byproduct of the exceptionally close ties between Moscow and Pyongyang. Russia is one of only twenty-two countries with a diplomatic mission in North Korea and one of only two countries—alongside China—with flights to the secretive state. The countries are physically connected by the Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge, and Vladimir Putin is one of very few world leaders to have made a state visit to the DPRK, something he has done on two occasions.\n\nAmidst this close relationship, Russia and North Korea have signed several military treaties over the years. These include an agreement on arms cooperation in 2001, another on limited security cooperation in 2015, and ultimately a mutual defence pact in July 2024. This latest pact would prove instrumental in facilitating the deployment of North Korean troops to Russian soil.\n\nNorth Korea has played more than a passive role in the War in Ukraine. The DPRK became only the third entity to recognise the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in 2022, after Russia and Syria—collectively the only three countries to do so. By autumn of that year, North Korean shells were arriving in Russia to shore up depleted Russian munitions, and KPA ballistic missiles were identified on the battlefield not long after.\n\nAccording to NK News, North Korean military personnel probably first deployed to Russia in 2023. Already by that time, Pyongyang had been providing hardware support in the form of 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 240mm multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). As such, the first North Korean boots on the ground were technical advisors and hardware maintenance staff, not combat troops.\n\nThis changed dramatically with the arrival of combat troops in late 2024, in the wake of the mutual defence pact signed that summer. Most of the North Korean detachment—some seven to nine thousand men—are ground forces, according to Ukrainian and South Korean sources. This includes light infantry, special operations units, guard units, and construction personnel. In addition, it is believed that a full artillery brigade of around 1,500 men are part of the North Korean force. NK News estimated that up to six KPA generals have been sent to Russia as well, although this figure has not been corroborated.\n\n## The Storm Corps: North Korea's Elite Forces\n\nMuch of the ground force deployed to Kursk is believed to belong to the 11th Army Corps, one of Pyongyang's most elite formations, also referred to as the Storm Corps. The 11th Corps are said to be able to withstand a high degree of physical pain and torture, as noted by Michael Madden, an expert from the Stimson Centre in Washington. According to Madden: \"What they lack in combat they make up for with what they can tolerate physically and mentally.\"\n\nDespite their elite status, many of the North Korean light infantry quickly wound up straight on the frontline with only a week of training in Russia before deployment, according to the Ukrainian SBU intelligence service. This minimal preparation period would prove to be a significant handicap when facing battle-hardened Ukrainian forces with years of combat experience.\n\n## Performance Analysis: Mixed Results on the Battlefield\n\nReports on North Korean military performance in Kursk present a contradictory picture. In spite of their supposed prowess, some accounts indicate the North Koreans are not as effective in countering the Ukrainians as their reputation would suggest.\n\nThe Storm Corps may be drilled in physical pain and torture containment, but they lack the battlefield experience that would allow them to match the abilities of battle-hardened Ukrainian forces. According to South Korean assessments, the troops suffer from an acute lack of understanding of contemporary warfare, something likely exacerbated by their lack of preparation as well as outdated military tactics. Reports indicate they may have fallen victim to the meat grinder tactics employed by Russian forces.\n\nCasualty figures for North Korean forces remain varied and difficult to verify. Russia has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of North Korean troops and has consistently released little information on its army casualty count in Kursk and the wider war. North Korea, for its part, has never released much of anything related to its military affairs. However, Ukraine has described the KPA soldiers as having suffered woeful losses.\n\nBy the end of December 2024—roughly two months after deployment—President Zelenskyy announced that the detachment had suffered as many as 3,000 killed or wounded in Kursk. By January 2025, Ukrainian sources had raised the figure further to 4,000. US estimates were lower but nonetheless significant: 1,200 casualties by mid-January. South Korea simultaneously offered its own body count, describing the DPRK losses as 300 killed and 2,700 wounded, for a collective casualty count of 3,000—more closely resembling the Ukrainian estimate than the American.\n\nHowever, not all assessments have been negative. Military analysts such as John Helin have stated that the recovery of territory by Russia has proceeded more effectively since the appearance of the North Korean troops. Helin argued that the North Koreans have proved disciplined in combat and are in large part responsible for the 30% territorial loss suffered by Ukraine since October 2024.\n\nSuch sentiments have been echoed by units of the Ukrainian field staff, reporting that—far from being mere cannon fodder—North Korean soldiers have proved fit, motivated, and adept with small arms. According to Ukrainian serviceman Yuriy Bondar, the soldiers have proved themselves able to shoot down drones using small arms fire and have developed innovative tactics to counter UAVs. One reported tactic involves one soldier breaking cover to attract drone attention, allowing others to target the drone with fire. This same tactic, however, has been dismissed by some analysts as lunacy.\n\n## Suicide Soldiers: The Kamikaze Doctrine\n\nThe North Korean soldiers have also been imbued with kamikaze-style tactics, reportedly blowing themselves up in the face of Ukrainian troop encroachment. This was confirmed by some North Korean defectors, who stated that to be captured by the enemy would be considered shameful, and DPRK soldiers have been instructed to take their own lives in such circumstances. The practice has since gained notoriety, with Reuters labelling the detachment 'suicide soldiers.'\n\nThis extreme doctrine reflects the ideological indoctrination of North Korean military personnel, who are taught that capture represents not only personal shame but dishonor to their families and the state. The willingness to self-detonate rather than surrender presents unique challenges for Ukrainian forces attempting to take prisoners for intelligence purposes.\n\n## Why Kim Jong-Un May Not Be Bothered by Losses\n\nEven if reports that the North Korean involvement has yielded nothing other than miserable failure prove accurate, it is possible that this will represent barely a hindrance for the DPRK leader. In a perverse way, the decision to send his troops to Kursk for Kim Jong-Un is really a win-win scenario.\n\nOn one hand, the July 2024 mutual defence pact with Russia could be seen as a huge strategic asset. Aside from currying favour with Putin, the pact secures—in theory—Russian military support for Pyongyang in the event of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. As pointed out by Mongolian security analyst Zorigt Dashdorj, North Korea's support of Russia may not be critically significant for Moscow, but the reverse could be decisive for North Korea in regards to its own security and defence.\n\nAlthough Russia has abandoned erstwhile allies in the past—such as Armenia—it may see itself bound to North Korea, given the latter's provision of soldiers and hardware, and given the relatively few uncontestable allies Moscow has been left with following Bashar Al Assad's demise and the pro-Western ambitions of most of its eastern neighbours. Pyongyang will have secured itself formidable support without even significant cost to the relationship with its other strategic partner, China, which reaffirmed its friendly ties with North Korea in October 2024.\n\nOn the other hand, by sending soldiers to Ukraine, there is a chance that what Kim might get in return is fighting men with actual war experience and the chance to stress-test his forces' and munitions' prowess in real-life combat.\n\n## The Combat Experience Deficit\n\nKim's hallowed army is highly short on war experience. Since the end of large-scale hostilities with South Korea in 1953, they've largely wallowed in endless training, obsessively preparing for a new war which hasn't yet happened. For obvious reasons, North Korea is not part of any international peace-keeping operations and hasn't openly engaged in any active warfare until Kursk. For the better part of a century, their combat experience has been limited to the occasional skirmish along the border with the South.\n\nIn the meantime, North Korean military technology has languished, by now superseded by the advanced hardware of South Korea. Although Pyongyang is believed to have sent Russia as many as 5 million shells since September 2023—including Hwasong short-range ballistic missiles—Carnegie has reported that the failure rate of these missiles in Ukraine has been notably high.\n\nThe DPRK is heavily restricted by its military budget which—while somewhere between 20 and 30% of its entire GDP—is thought to be less than a quarter of South Korea's budget of some 48 billion dollars. The tentative availability of Russian military equipment—not least its 5,000+ nuclear warheads—could be a deterrent that could shore up the DPRK's security extensively.\n\nIn short, the benefit to Kim Jong-Un includes both military assurances from Putin against the South and the opportunity to gain combat experience and to test the mettle of his troops. And if his men get butchered? Well, to put it starkly: fewer mouths to feed.\n\n## The Burden of a Massive Military in a Starving Nation\n\nNorth Korea has one of the world's largest militaries, with 1.28 million active soldiers. But it is also in an almost-perpetual state of famine, both due to the ineffective agricultural practices of the state and because of crippling international sanctions. Around 5% of the entire population is in the military, where conscription lasts no less than ten years for males. This is aside from the roughly 600,000 who are believed to serve as reserve soldiers. For any static army, that would constitute an astronomical drain on resources—resources that the DPRK simply does not have.\n\nIn an interview with the BBC, a North Korean defector named Haneul revealed that far from being combat-ready warriors in peak condition, the soldiers of the Korean People's Army are severely malnourished. This includes those in the storied Storm Corps, in which Haneul had served. He revealed that rather than being a crack battalion of super-soldiers, the Storm Corps are equally as combat-inexperienced as the rest of the army and equally as malnourished. He claimed to have lost 10 kilogrammes during his first month of service due to piecemeal rations.\n\nThis revelation casts the deployment to Kursk in a different light. The soldiers being sent to Russia may represent not just military assets but economic liabilities that the regime can afford to lose.\n\n## The Kursk Meat Grinder: A Pattern of Expendable Forces\n\nIn the event that the North Koreans are indeed being obliterated in Kursk, this will come as little worry to Putin, as well as to his partner in Pyongyang. While accurate insights as to the number of losses in Kursk are difficult to ascertain, it has generally been accepted that the war has come at a heavy cost to Russia in terms of human capital.\n\nThe BBC reported that Moscow has recently been recruiting at least 20,000 new soldiers a month to support its war effort, citing NATO estimates that more than 1,000 Russian soldiers are killed or wounded on average daily. So in the event that DPRK soldiers are being used as cannon fodder by Russia, this will come as little other than respite to the beleaguered Russian forces, having incurred such heavy losses of their own in the preceding period.\n\nIt would not be the first time that effective mercenaries have been lost to Moscow's meat grinder tactics in the conflict. Since the earliest stages of the war, it was alleged that the local militias of Luhansk and Donetsk suffered a similar fate, being subject to a casualty count of up to fifty percent in the Donbass theatre.\n\nThe same is true of minority detachments in the Russian army proper, including the ethnic Tuvans and Buryats, who were reported to have suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine. These two groups represent the single highest republics of the Russian Federation by number of natives lost to the fighting. Many will also recall that wanton and unnecessary losses were reported by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, who declared that his Wagner troops were forced to carry out the dirty work of the Russian army and suffer terrible casualties in the process for minimal gain.\n\n## Expendable Youth: The Profile of North Korean Troops in Kursk\n\nThe same outlook is likely true of North Korea. Given its massive personnel reserves, Kim Jong-Un is likely to be unconcerned by the floundering of his men in Kursk. Reuters reported that some 1.4 million North Koreans applied to join the military in the autumn of 2024, amid rising tensions with the South. So if the deployed DPRK soldiers do not return, that means fewer mouths to feed with the meagre military rations back home, by an army staff that has probably already regenerated itself.\n\nIt is also highly likely that the soldiers—members of the elite 11th Corps notwithstanding—are junior officers: low on military experience and largely dispensable. This would seem to be corroborated by the two captive Koreans detained by Ukraine, found to be roughly 25 and 19 years old respectively, as well as online videos reportedly of the troops in Russia, which show younger, \"frailer\" soldiers than the standard class, according to defector Haneul.\n\nIn short, even if the entire force would be wiped out, it is likely that Kim Jong-Un would hardly bat an eye—other than perhaps jotting down a few notes on training and tactics for future reference. The deployment represents a calculated gamble where the potential strategic gains far outweigh the human costs, at least from the perspective of the North Korean leadership. Whether the troops succeed or fail on the battlefield, Kim has already secured what matters most: a strengthened alliance with Russia, combat data for his military, and a reduction in the burden of feeding an oversized army in a nation perpetually on the brink of famine.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)\n- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### How many North Korean troops are deployed in Kursk, and who are they?\n\nBetween 10,000 and 12,000 North Korean soldiers were deployed to support Russia in Kursk. The force includes approximately 7,000–9,000 ground troops—light infantry, special operations units, guard units, and construction personnel—plus around 1,500 artillery brigade members. Most belong to the elite 11th Army Corps, also known as the Storm Corps, which is trained to endure extreme physical hardship.\n\n### Why did North Korea send troops to fight in Ukraine?\n\nThe deployment flows directly from a July 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea. For Kim Jong-Un the arrangement is a strategic win regardless of battlefield outcomes: it secures potential Russian military support against South Korea, provides combat experience for an army that has not fought a major war since 1953, allows real-world testing of North Korean weapons and tactics, and reduces the burden of feeding soldiers in a famine-stricken nation.\n\n### How have North Korean troops performed in Kursk?\n\nAssessments are contradictory. Some reports describe the troops suffering heavy losses because of their lack of modern warfare understanding, only one week of pre-deployment training in Russia, and outdated tactics. Other analysts note they have proved disciplined, motivated, and adept with small arms, and credit them with helping Russia reclaim roughly 30% of territory lost to Ukraine since October 2024. Ukrainian soldiers report the North Koreans can shoot down drones and have developed innovative counter-UAV tactics.\n\n### Why are North Korean soldiers called 'suicide soldiers'?\n\nNorth Korean troops have been instructed to take their own lives rather than be captured, as surrender is considered shameful to themselves, their families, and the state. Reports confirmed by defectors indicate soldiers blow themselves up when facing Ukrainian encroachment. This kamikaze doctrine led Reuters to label the detachment \"suicide soldiers\" and presents unique challenges for Ukrainian forces seeking prisoners for intelligence.\n\n### Why might Kim Jong-Un be unconcerned by heavy casualties?\n\nNorth Korea has one of the world's largest militaries—1.28 million active soldiers—in a country that is almost perpetually famine-stricken. Around 1.4 million North Koreans reportedly applied to join the military in autumn 2024. With such vast personnel reserves, Kim can absorb losses while the army replenishes itself, and fewer surviving soldiers means fewer mouths to feed on meagre military rations at home.\n\n## Sources\n- <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn57z316y02o>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-claims-14-million-young-people-joined-army-this-week-2024-10-15/>\n- <https://www.euronews.com/2024/10/17/north-korean-troops-in-ukraine-how-powerful-is-pyongyangs-military>\n- <https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2025/01/10/guesstimating-nk-troop-presence-in-eastern-europe/>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-military-is-one-worlds-largest-how-powerful-is-it-2024-10-25/>\n- <https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2025/01/113_390219.html>\n- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_presidential_trips_made_by_Vladimir_Putin>\n- <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en>\n- <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-north-korea-treaty/>\n- <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/11/kursk-region-governor-says-over-150k-civilians-evacuated-from-border-areas-a86333>\n- <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/24/2-years-into-ukraine-war-russias-ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-killed-in-battle-a84170>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/north-koreas-suicide-soldiers-pose-new-challenge-ukraine-war-with-russia-2025-01-14/>\n- <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/25/yevgeny-prigozhin-head-of-the-wagner-group-reveals-horrendous-russian-losses-in-ukraine_6017263_4.html>\n- <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/27/ukraine-says-north-korean-troops-suffering-heavy-losses-in-kursk-region-fighting>\n- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/13/seoul-says-300-north-korean-soldiers-killed-2700-wounded-fighting-ukraine>\n- <https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korean-troops-in-ukraine-gain-battlefield-experience-cementing-alliance-with-russia/7933800.html>\n- <https://x.com/J_JHelin/status/1878618247333126521>\n- <https://www.politico.eu/article/north-koreans-skilled-fighters-rather-kill-themselves-then-get-captured-ukrainian-soldiers-say/>\n- <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/11/18/the-donetsk-separatist-army-went-to-war-in-ukraine-with-20000-men-statistically-almost-every-single-one-was-killed-or-wounded/>\n- <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6238exzjpxo>\n- <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/11/europe/zelensky-north-korean-soldiers-korea-intl/index.html>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-north-korea-mark-75th-anniversary-ties-with-vows-cooperation-2024-10-05/>\n\n<!-- youtube:Y-A_3WsXwzc -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/north-korean-troops-failing-kursk-russia-ukraine.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/north-korean-troops-failing-kursk-russia-ukraine
datePublished: 2026-02-17
dateModified: 2026-02-17
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  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
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---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
On January 9, 2025, Ukrainian forces captured a battered Russian Army soldier in Kursk Oblast. His military ID identified him as a nineteen-year-old native of Tuva, a Siberian republic near Mongolia. But the ID was fake—the soldier couldn't speak Russian, a language standard for ethnic Tuvans or anyone who'd spent months in the Russian military. He was North Korean, part of a detachment of DPRK soldiers supporting Russia's faltering attempt to counter Ukraine's incursion into Russian territory. This capture, aided by South Korean intelligence, revealed the extent of North Korean involvement in a conflict that has drawn one of the world's most isolated nations into direct combat for the first time in over seventy years.

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<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- Ukraine captured a North Korean soldier disguised as a Russian Tuvan in Kursk Oblast on January 9, 2025, revealing North Korea's direct combat involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict for the first time in over 70 years.
- Between 10,000–12,000 North Korean troops, primarily from the elite 11th Army Corps (Storm Corps), were deployed to Kursk starting in October 2024 following a July 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea.
- North Korean forces have suffered significant casualties, with estimates ranging from 1,200 (US) to 4,000 (Ukraine) killed or wounded by mid-January 2025, though performance assessments are mixed.
- The deployment represents a strategic win for Kim Jong-Un regardless of battlefield outcomes: he gains a mutual defense pact with Russia, combat experience for his troops, real-world weapons testing, and reduces the burden of feeding an oversized military in a famine-stricken nation.
- North Korean soldiers have been instructed to commit suicide rather than be captured, reflecting extreme ideological indoctrination about the shame of capture.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-current-situation-in-kursk" -->
## The Current Situation in Kursk

Ukraine currently occupies around 800 square kilometres of Russian territory in the Kursk region, predominantly in the border district of Sudzha. Ukrainian forces launched their surprise offensive across the frontier in August 2024, marking the first assault directly on Russian soil since World War II. The initial attack quickly overwhelmed Russian defences, with Ukrainian forces capturing as much as 1,400 square kilometres of territory.

Russia mounted a counter-offensive and managed to reclaim approximately half the ground lost, but not before suffering severe casualties and being forced to evacuate some 150,000 people from the affected region. Despite these efforts, Russia has been unsuccessful in completely repelling the Ukrainian ground assault from its territory, at significant cost to both its military capabilities and Putin's image.

As the Russian counter-offensive advanced, Ukraine unleashed a new offensive in January 2025, focused on dealing a follow-up blow to the Kursk defenders. However, on this occasion, Ukrainian forces would encounter not only the Russian army but a new player in the conflict entirely: North Korean troops fighting on European soil.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-current-situation-in-kursk" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-russia-north-korea-alliance-how-we-got-here" -->
## The Russia-North Korea Alliance: How We Got Here

Between the first and second Ukrainian offensives in Kursk, a detachment of between ten and twelve thousand North Korean soldiers were sent to support Russia. The first reports of their involvement emerged in October 2024, when a South Korean spy agency announced the deployment of around 1,500 Korean People's Army troops to Russia.

The deployment of North Korean forces is a direct byproduct of the exceptionally close ties between Moscow and Pyongyang. Russia is one of only twenty-two countries with a diplomatic mission in North Korea and one of only two countries—alongside China—with flights to the secretive state. The countries are physically connected by the Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge, and Vladimir Putin is one of very few world leaders to have made a state visit to the DPRK, something he has done on two occasions.

Amidst this close relationship, Russia and North Korea have signed several military treaties over the years. These include an agreement on arms cooperation in 2001, another on limited security cooperation in 2015, and ultimately a mutual defence pact in July 2024. This latest pact would prove instrumental in facilitating the deployment of North Korean troops to Russian soil.

North Korea has played more than a passive role in the War in Ukraine. The DPRK became only the third entity to recognise the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in 2022, after Russia and Syria—collectively the only three countries to do so. By autumn of that year, North Korean shells were arriving in Russia to shore up depleted Russian munitions, and KPA ballistic missiles were identified on the battlefield not long after.

According to NK News, North Korean military personnel probably first deployed to Russia in 2023. Already by that time, Pyongyang had been providing hardware support in the form of 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 240mm multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). As such, the first North Korean boots on the ground were technical advisors and hardware maintenance staff, not combat troops.

This changed dramatically with the arrival of combat troops in late 2024, in the wake of the mutual defence pact signed that summer. Most of the North Korean detachment—some seven to nine thousand men—are ground forces, according to Ukrainian and South Korean sources. This includes light infantry, special operations units, guard units, and construction personnel. In addition, it is believed that a full artillery brigade of around 1,500 men are part of the North Korean force. NK News estimated that up to six KPA generals have been sent to Russia as well, although this figure has not been corroborated.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-russia-north-korea-alliance-how-we-got-here" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-storm-corps-north-korea-s-elite-forces" -->
## The Storm Corps: North Korea's Elite Forces

Much of the ground force deployed to Kursk is believed to belong to the 11th Army Corps, one of Pyongyang's most elite formations, also referred to as the Storm Corps. The 11th Corps are said to be able to withstand a high degree of physical pain and torture, as noted by Michael Madden, an expert from the Stimson Centre in Washington. According to Madden: "What they lack in combat they make up for with what they can tolerate physically and mentally."

Despite their elite status, many of the North Korean light infantry quickly wound up straight on the frontline with only a week of training in Russia before deployment, according to the Ukrainian SBU intelligence service. This minimal preparation period would prove to be a significant handicap when facing battle-hardened Ukrainian forces with years of combat experience.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-storm-corps-north-korea-s-elite-forces" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="performance-analysis-mixed-results-on-the-battlefield" -->
## Performance Analysis: Mixed Results on the Battlefield

Reports on North Korean military performance in Kursk present a contradictory picture. In spite of their supposed prowess, some accounts indicate the North Koreans are not as effective in countering the Ukrainians as their reputation would suggest.

The Storm Corps may be drilled in physical pain and torture containment, but they lack the battlefield experience that would allow them to match the abilities of battle-hardened Ukrainian forces. According to South Korean assessments, the troops suffer from an acute lack of understanding of contemporary warfare, something likely exacerbated by their lack of preparation as well as outdated military tactics. Reports indicate they may have fallen victim to the meat grinder tactics employed by Russian forces.

Casualty figures for North Korean forces remain varied and difficult to verify. Russia has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of North Korean troops and has consistently released little information on its army casualty count in Kursk and the wider war. North Korea, for its part, has never released much of anything related to its military affairs. However, Ukraine has described the KPA soldiers as having suffered woeful losses.

By the end of December 2024—roughly two months after deployment—President Zelenskyy announced that the detachment had suffered as many as 3,000 killed or wounded in Kursk. By January 2025, Ukrainian sources had raised the figure further to 4,000. US estimates were lower but nonetheless significant: 1,200 casualties by mid-January. South Korea simultaneously offered its own body count, describing the DPRK losses as 300 killed and 2,700 wounded, for a collective casualty count of 3,000—more closely resembling the Ukrainian estimate than the American.

However, not all assessments have been negative. Military analysts such as John Helin have stated that the recovery of territory by Russia has proceeded more effectively since the appearance of the North Korean troops. Helin argued that the North Koreans have proved disciplined in combat and are in large part responsible for the 30% territorial loss suffered by Ukraine since October 2024.

Such sentiments have been echoed by units of the Ukrainian field staff, reporting that—far from being mere cannon fodder—North Korean soldiers have proved fit, motivated, and adept with small arms. According to Ukrainian serviceman Yuriy Bondar, the soldiers have proved themselves able to shoot down drones using small arms fire and have developed innovative tactics to counter UAVs. One reported tactic involves one soldier breaking cover to attract drone attention, allowing others to target the drone with fire. This same tactic, however, has been dismissed by some analysts as lunacy.

<!-- aeo:section end="performance-analysis-mixed-results-on-the-battlefield" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="suicide-soldiers-the-kamikaze-doctrine" -->
## Suicide Soldiers: The Kamikaze Doctrine

The North Korean soldiers have also been imbued with kamikaze-style tactics, reportedly blowing themselves up in the face of Ukrainian troop encroachment. This was confirmed by some North Korean defectors, who stated that to be captured by the enemy would be considered shameful, and DPRK soldiers have been instructed to take their own lives in such circumstances. The practice has since gained notoriety, with Reuters labelling the detachment 'suicide soldiers.'

This extreme doctrine reflects the ideological indoctrination of North Korean military personnel, who are taught that capture represents not only personal shame but dishonor to their families and the state. The willingness to self-detonate rather than surrender presents unique challenges for Ukrainian forces attempting to take prisoners for intelligence purposes.

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<!-- aeo:section start="why-kim-jong-un-may-not-be-bothered-by-losses" -->
## Why Kim Jong-Un May Not Be Bothered by Losses

Even if reports that the North Korean involvement has yielded nothing other than miserable failure prove accurate, it is possible that this will represent barely a hindrance for the DPRK leader. In a perverse way, the decision to send his troops to Kursk for Kim Jong-Un is really a win-win scenario.

On one hand, the July 2024 mutual defence pact with Russia could be seen as a huge strategic asset. Aside from currying favour with Putin, the pact secures—in theory—Russian military support for Pyongyang in the event of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. As pointed out by Mongolian security analyst Zorigt Dashdorj, North Korea's support of Russia may not be critically significant for Moscow, but the reverse could be decisive for North Korea in regards to its own security and defence.

Although Russia has abandoned erstwhile allies in the past—such as Armenia—it may see itself bound to North Korea, given the latter's provision of soldiers and hardware, and given the relatively few uncontestable allies Moscow has been left with following Bashar Al Assad's demise and the pro-Western ambitions of most of its eastern neighbours. Pyongyang will have secured itself formidable support without even significant cost to the relationship with its other strategic partner, China, which reaffirmed its friendly ties with North Korea in October 2024.

On the other hand, by sending soldiers to Ukraine, there is a chance that what Kim might get in return is fighting men with actual war experience and the chance to stress-test his forces' and munitions' prowess in real-life combat.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-combat-experience-deficit" -->
## The Combat Experience Deficit

Kim's hallowed army is highly short on war experience. Since the end of large-scale hostilities with South Korea in 1953, they've largely wallowed in endless training, obsessively preparing for a new war which hasn't yet happened. For obvious reasons, North Korea is not part of any international peace-keeping operations and hasn't openly engaged in any active warfare until Kursk. For the better part of a century, their combat experience has been limited to the occasional skirmish along the border with the South.

In the meantime, North Korean military technology has languished, by now superseded by the advanced hardware of South Korea. Although Pyongyang is believed to have sent Russia as many as 5 million shells since September 2023—including Hwasong short-range ballistic missiles—Carnegie has reported that the failure rate of these missiles in Ukraine has been notably high.

The DPRK is heavily restricted by its military budget which—while somewhere between 20 and 30% of its entire GDP—is thought to be less than a quarter of South Korea's budget of some 48 billion dollars. The tentative availability of Russian military equipment—not least its 5,000+ nuclear warheads—could be a deterrent that could shore up the DPRK's security extensively.

In short, the benefit to Kim Jong-Un includes both military assurances from Putin against the South and the opportunity to gain combat experience and to test the mettle of his troops. And if his men get butchered? Well, to put it starkly: fewer mouths to feed.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-combat-experience-deficit" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-burden-of-a-massive-military-in-a-starving-nation" -->
## The Burden of a Massive Military in a Starving Nation

North Korea has one of the world's largest militaries, with 1.28 million active soldiers. But it is also in an almost-perpetual state of famine, both due to the ineffective agricultural practices of the state and because of crippling international sanctions. Around 5% of the entire population is in the military, where conscription lasts no less than ten years for males. This is aside from the roughly 600,000 who are believed to serve as reserve soldiers. For any static army, that would constitute an astronomical drain on resources—resources that the DPRK simply does not have.

In an interview with the BBC, a North Korean defector named Haneul revealed that far from being combat-ready warriors in peak condition, the soldiers of the Korean People's Army are severely malnourished. This includes those in the storied Storm Corps, in which Haneul had served. He revealed that rather than being a crack battalion of super-soldiers, the Storm Corps are equally as combat-inexperienced as the rest of the army and equally as malnourished. He claimed to have lost 10 kilogrammes during his first month of service due to piecemeal rations.

This revelation casts the deployment to Kursk in a different light. The soldiers being sent to Russia may represent not just military assets but economic liabilities that the regime can afford to lose.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-kursk-meat-grinder-a-pattern-of-expendable-forces" -->
## The Kursk Meat Grinder: A Pattern of Expendable Forces

In the event that the North Koreans are indeed being obliterated in Kursk, this will come as little worry to Putin, as well as to his partner in Pyongyang. While accurate insights as to the number of losses in Kursk are difficult to ascertain, it has generally been accepted that the war has come at a heavy cost to Russia in terms of human capital.

The BBC reported that Moscow has recently been recruiting at least 20,000 new soldiers a month to support its war effort, citing NATO estimates that more than 1,000 Russian soldiers are killed or wounded on average daily. So in the event that DPRK soldiers are being used as cannon fodder by Russia, this will come as little other than respite to the beleaguered Russian forces, having incurred such heavy losses of their own in the preceding period.

It would not be the first time that effective mercenaries have been lost to Moscow's meat grinder tactics in the conflict. Since the earliest stages of the war, it was alleged that the local militias of Luhansk and Donetsk suffered a similar fate, being subject to a casualty count of up to fifty percent in the Donbass theatre.

The same is true of minority detachments in the Russian army proper, including the ethnic Tuvans and Buryats, who were reported to have suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine. These two groups represent the single highest republics of the Russian Federation by number of natives lost to the fighting. Many will also recall that wanton and unnecessary losses were reported by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, who declared that his Wagner troops were forced to carry out the dirty work of the Russian army and suffer terrible casualties in the process for minimal gain.

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<!-- aeo:section start="expendable-youth-the-profile-of-north-korean-troops-in-kursk" -->
## Expendable Youth: The Profile of North Korean Troops in Kursk

The same outlook is likely true of North Korea. Given its massive personnel reserves, Kim Jong-Un is likely to be unconcerned by the floundering of his men in Kursk. Reuters reported that some 1.4 million North Koreans applied to join the military in the autumn of 2024, amid rising tensions with the South. So if the deployed DPRK soldiers do not return, that means fewer mouths to feed with the meagre military rations back home, by an army staff that has probably already regenerated itself.

It is also highly likely that the soldiers—members of the elite 11th Corps notwithstanding—are junior officers: low on military experience and largely dispensable. This would seem to be corroborated by the two captive Koreans detained by Ukraine, found to be roughly 25 and 19 years old respectively, as well as online videos reportedly of the troops in Russia, which show younger, "frailer" soldiers than the standard class, according to defector Haneul.

In short, even if the entire force would be wiped out, it is likely that Kim Jong-Un would hardly bat an eye—other than perhaps jotting down a few notes on training and tactics for future reference. The deployment represents a calculated gamble where the potential strategic gains far outweigh the human costs, at least from the perspective of the North Korean leadership. Whether the troops succeed or fail on the battlefield, Kim has already secured what matters most: a strengthened alliance with Russia, combat data for his military, and a reduction in the burden of feeding an oversized army in a nation perpetually on the brink of famine.

<!-- aeo:section end="expendable-youth-the-profile-of-north-korean-troops-in-kursk" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)
- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)
- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### How many North Korean troops are deployed in Kursk, and who are they?

Between 10,000 and 12,000 North Korean soldiers were deployed to support Russia in Kursk. The force includes approximately 7,000–9,000 ground troops—light infantry, special operations units, guard units, and construction personnel—plus around 1,500 artillery brigade members. Most belong to the elite 11th Army Corps, also known as the Storm Corps, which is trained to endure extreme physical hardship.

### Why did North Korea send troops to fight in Ukraine?

The deployment flows directly from a July 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea. For Kim Jong-Un the arrangement is a strategic win regardless of battlefield outcomes: it secures potential Russian military support against South Korea, provides combat experience for an army that has not fought a major war since 1953, allows real-world testing of North Korean weapons and tactics, and reduces the burden of feeding soldiers in a famine-stricken nation.

### How have North Korean troops performed in Kursk?

Assessments are contradictory. Some reports describe the troops suffering heavy losses because of their lack of modern warfare understanding, only one week of pre-deployment training in Russia, and outdated tactics. Other analysts note they have proved disciplined, motivated, and adept with small arms, and credit them with helping Russia reclaim roughly 30% of territory lost to Ukraine since October 2024. Ukrainian soldiers report the North Koreans can shoot down drones and have developed innovative counter-UAV tactics.

### Why are North Korean soldiers called 'suicide soldiers'?

North Korean troops have been instructed to take their own lives rather than be captured, as surrender is considered shameful to themselves, their families, and the state. Reports confirmed by defectors indicate soldiers blow themselves up when facing Ukrainian encroachment. This kamikaze doctrine led Reuters to label the detachment "suicide soldiers" and presents unique challenges for Ukrainian forces seeking prisoners for intelligence.

### Why might Kim Jong-Un be unconcerned by heavy casualties?

North Korea has one of the world's largest militaries—1.28 million active soldiers—in a country that is almost perpetually famine-stricken. Around 1.4 million North Koreans reportedly applied to join the military in autumn 2024. With such vast personnel reserves, Kim can absorb losses while the army replenishes itself, and fewer surviving soldiers means fewer mouths to feed on meagre military rations at home.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources
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