--- title: "Who Russia Invades Next: The Case Against Armenia and Georgia" description: "Vladimir Putin is getting desperate, and it is precisely when Putin is desperate that he is at his most dangerous. Russian high command is burning through its options to change the status quo in Ukraine, and nothing seems to be working. The Iran war was supposed to be a perfect opportunity to sell oil, but Russia's ports in the Black Sea, and even the Baltic, have been blown up. The Victory Day parade was supposed to inspire a fresh wave of devotion to the Fatherland; instead Putin's parade went ahead only after Ukraine issued him a permit, and Ukraine bombed Moscow a few days later, to show that they had merely been being polite. When Russia deployed its fearsome, nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile last weekend, the response from Ukraine and the West basically amounted to a sarcastic \"scary.\" Ukrainian forces are at zero risk of collapse.\n\nA growing list of insider reports leaking out of the Kremlin and the Russian military makes one thing clear: Putin is searching for a way to turn the tables. Depending on their school of thought, outside experts have suggested he might start destroying symbolic targets across Kyiv, try to pull Belarus into the conflict, or, as Ukrainian strategic advisor Illya Sekirin told WarFronts in a recent interview, even attempt to fracture the NATO alliance with an attack on Latvia.\n\nBut there is one more possibility, however insane it sounds, that has to be taken seriously: that Putin could seize another state on Russia's doorstep and make an example of it. He would not target a large, populous, or powerful country like NATO's Finland or Central Asia's Kazakhstan. He would go after one of the little guys, a state that could hypothetically be invaded in a few days, or even a few hours. Conquest, vassal statehood, and annexation would all be an afterthought. The real message would be that Russia is still a major military power that deserves respect, so Ukraine had better hand over the Donbas, swear off NATO, and kiss Putin's ring before he stops playing nice.\n\n**This is the WarFronts assessment of where that logic points: toward the tiny Caucasus nations of Georgia and Armenia, and the very different ways an invasion of each might unfold.**\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- Insider reporting suggests Putin remains convinced Russia can seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk by autumn, a belief contradicted by battlefield reality, and that conviction is driving a search for a way to \"turn the tables\" outside Ukraine.\n- A lateral expansion of the war is one of the most discussed Kremlin options: using forces too small to matter on the Ukrainian front for a quick smash-and-grab against a vulnerable third country.\n- Armenia and Georgia share the traits that make them attractive targets: small size, regional proximity, weak militaries, and deep internal divides where pro-Russian elements already wield real power.\n- Putin's feelings about the two states differ sharply. Russia \"practically owns\" Georgia through the ruling Georgian Dream party, while Armenia has spent years angering Moscow by pivoting toward Europe.\n- An invasion of Armenia is militarily tempting but logistically tricky: the country is landlocked, shares no border with Russia, and neighbors unlikely to wave Russian troops through.\n- Georgia is the easier target by far, with a pro-Russian government that could invite Russian forces in, brand resisters as coup plotters, and provide multiple invasion routes, including a separatist capital less than a two-hour drive from Tbilisi.\n- Armenia's parliamentary elections fall on June 7, 2026. If Russia's alleged influence campaign fails, that defeat could hand Putin the pretext for more direct action.\n\n## The Desperation Driving the Search\n\nThe strategic picture for Russia is one of stagnation dressed up as progress. Western intelligence estimates and independent conflict trackers suggest Russia is losing soldiers faster than it can recruit them, and whatever spare capacity it retains is not enough to produce change anywhere along the front. Russian forward progress, in many cases, consists of the lies that front-line commanders feed the Kremlin as they try to cover up their inability to produce results.\n\nThe Institute for the Study of War, one of the most diligent conflict trackers in the field, recently announced it would no longer project an estimate for when Russia could conquer the rest of Donetsk Oblast, because it is no longer clear Russia can capture Donetsk at all. As the ISW put it, \"Russia's exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality.\"\n\nYet according to insider sources, Putin remains convinced Russia can seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk by this autumn, based on assurances from top advisors who appear to completely control the flow of information he receives. The soldiers cannot make it happen. But for Putin's advisors to admit defeat, or worse, to acknowledge the scale of their deception against their own leader, would be an exceptionally bad idea. That gap, between what Putin believes and what is true, is the engine of the danger.\n\n## The Myth of Russian Restraint\n\nIt is genuinely ridiculous to claim that Russia is holding back in Ukraine. This is a conflict where Russia has repeatedly tried to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership, where Russian soldiers routinely carry out extrajudicial executions and torture of Ukrainian POWs and civilians, and where, in its attempt to assimilate Ukraine to Russian culture, Moscow has abducted and forcibly transferred nearly twenty thousand Ukrainian children to be adopted into Russian families against their will.\n\nBut the idea of restraint is a common theme for Russian citizens at home and for media consumers who prefer their Kremlin propaganda straight from the faucet. That is no accident. It is the product of a coordinated Kremlin campaign running along several lines at once: that this is still a \"special military operation\" rather than a full-scale war, meaning Russia retains untapped power; that Russia avoids civilians and infrastructure because it fights more benevolently than the US or NATO ever would, despite consistently striking verified civilian targets; and that Russia is deliberately holding back to avoid pulling larger powers into the war.\n\nThese ideas are so pervasive that even Russia's own supporters, when they criticize the war effort, often fall back on the claim that Russia is ineffective because it is holding back too much.\n\n## What the Hardliners Want\n\nThe milblogger reaction to last weekend's Oreshnik strike captures the mood inside the pro-war camp. The Oreshnik was meant to gin up hardliner support and stoke nuclear fears; instead it drew open contempt. The milblogger \"Thirteenth\" asked, \"What's the point of firing a blank slug without a warhead and calling it 'Oreshnik'? Did it kill anyone there? Why hasn't any of Ukraine's leadership been killed? Why is Zelenskyy still alive?\"\n\n\"Shadow of Rus\" added, \"'Oreshnik' is supposed to work as a news hook: to frighten, to convince, to pressure. But it doesn't work.\" And \"Larkin\" was harshest of all: \"Oreshnik is like Novichok, no one has ever died from it. This time, it doesn't even explode; it's just a fireworks show for the Ukrainians. A humiliating circus, a clown dance on the bones of Russians.\"\n\nAs Russian setbacks and Ukrainian long-range attacks both grow more common, and public opinion begins to shift, hardliners are clearly expressing what they want: a show of force big enough, bold enough, and destructive enough to prove Russia is still as powerful as it claims. The trouble is that Russia cannot provide one right now. The best it can do is bombard Ukrainian cities every few days and score hits on symbolic targets. That mismatch, between the demand for a dramatic show of strength and the inability to deliver it inside Ukraine, is what pushes the Kremlin to look elsewhere.\n\n## The Case for Armenia\n\nArmenia and Georgia are especially juicy targets because of the problems they share: small geographical size, regional proximity, underpowered militaries, and internal social divides where strong pro-Russian elements already wield substantial power. Where they differ most is in how Putin probably feels about each. In 2026, Georgia is a country Russia practically owns. Armenia is a nation that has been very successful at angering Putin.\n\nThe story traces back to 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and then watched it go sideways. At the time, Armenia was still locked in a frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over the exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries claimed the region, but most of it was governed by ethnic Armenians who formed a local majority. After a six-week war over the territory in 2020, Armenia received assurances from Russia that its control of Nagorno-Karabakh would be preserved with the help of Russian peacekeepers.\n\nBut in September 2023, once it was clear how deep Russia's problems in Ukraine had become, Azerbaijan's leader Ilham Aliyev attacked Nagorno-Karabakh anyway, betting that Russia would not dare intervene. He was right. Nagorno-Karabakh was overrun, its Armenian population expelled, its government dissolved, and its territory incorporated into Azerbaijan.\n\n## Armenia Turns West\n\nThat moment was a brutal wake-up call for Armenia, a former Soviet Socialist Republic that had long thought of itself as part of Russia's regional orbit. Russia's security guarantees turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on, and Armenia has not stuck around waiting for Russia to come to its senses. Instead, the country is pursuing deeper ties with the West, and especially Europe.\n\nIn 2025, Armenia passed a law mandating the national government to pursue European integration, including eventual EU membership. It has gone to great lengths to engage with European trade networks and energy infrastructure. In early May 2026, European leaders traveled to Yerevan for the first-ever EU-Armenia summit, alongside a parallel summit signaling the EU's willingness to work with partners outside Europe, specifically Canada. But the signal of Armenia's shifting loyalties became undeniable thanks to one name on the guest list: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Armenia has also chosen to work with American brokers to establish a more permanent peace with Azerbaijan, accepting a peace plan with very few concessions to Armenia, seemingly because America is at least willing to pay a bit of attention.\n\nNaturally, Moscow has not been thrilled, and it has not hesitated to voice its displeasure. The relationship had been deteriorating since before Nagorno-Karabakh fell, and it really began curdling in 2018, when Armenia's current leader, Nikol Pashinyan, came to power amid the anti-corruption protests of the Velvet Revolution. Since then, Pashinyan has been trashing Moscow and Moscow has been trashing Pashinyan.\n\n## Russia's Grip on Armenia\n\nThe relationship remains complicated. Armenia still hosts Russian military bases, remains part of Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization, and participates in the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian corporate interests are powerful there, and Russia wields immense social influence through the Armenian Apostolic Church.\n\nArmenian and international experts have been sounding the alarm that Russia is working to control, or even destabilize, Armenia outright. In 2025, an Armenian-Russian billionaire and two apostolic archbishops were arrested in a very high-profile scandal over allegations that they had plotted a coup against Pashinyan. In January of this year, prominent Russian television propagandist Vladimir Solovyov called for direct military action against Yerevan, suggesting Armenia could be targeted in a special military operation similar to the one directed at Ukraine.\n\nThis June, Armenia holds critical parliamentary elections, where Russia already faces allegations of interference through the church, disinformation operations, and influence campaigns. A recent trove of leaked documents suggested that a prominent Kremlin official, Sergei Kiriyenko, is supporting efforts to influence the vote, following his work on similar operations in Georgia and occupied Ukraine.\n\nFor anyone wanting more proof of the danger, Putin himself offered it just a few weeks ago, as of the time of writing: \"We all see what's happening with Ukraine now. But where did it all start? With Ukraine's attempt to join the EU.\" He suggested Armenia should hold a referendum on EU membership. But the upcoming parliamentary vote introduces an even sharper pressure point. If Russia's alleged influence campaign fails, that may give Putin the pretext he needs for more direct action. Those elections take place in less than two weeks, on Sunday, June 7.\n\n## Why Armenia Is Harder Than It Looks\n\nOn paper, an attack on Armenia would not be especially difficult, even for Russia's overstretched military. The country's armed forces consist of just forty-five thousand people in total, equipped with a small number of functioning main battle tanks, mostly outdated ex-Soviet artillery, and fewer than twenty combat aircraft. Air defenses are limited and largely of Soviet origin, and the country's troops simply are not prepared to fight a drone-integrated war of the kind Russia has been waging in Ukraine. Russia already stations some four to five thousand troops on Armenian territory, equipped with substantial firepower.\n\nBut there is reason to believe an Armenian invasion could be tougher than it sounds. Armenia shares no land border with Russia, and it is landlocked, meaning Russian troops would have to be flown in or roll through another country. Georgia's leadership would most likely open its airspace to Russia, and Azerbaijan might consider it, given that Armenia could be permanently defeated, but both are tricky propositions, especially since Russia's ability to drop paratrooper units is quite limited right now.\n\nIt is not likely that Georgia would allow Russian troop convoys to roll through, and Azerbaijan and Turkey certainly would not. That does not mean Russia cannot attack Armenia. But unless it attacked Georgia first, its alternative would be a combination of long-range drone and missile bombardment plus smaller ground attacks, which is not impossible but tricky, in a way Russia may not be willing to risk.\n\n## The Case for Georgia\n\nAs difficult as an Armenian invasion might be, the same cannot be said for Georgia, a country that has already suffered a full-scale Russian invasion within the last twenty years. That was the five-day Russo-Georgian War of 2008, when, after escalation between Georgia, Russia, and Georgia's two breakaway regions, Russia attacked its southern neighbor in battles that left around sixty-five Russians, 180 Georgians, and roughly sixty separatists dead, along with hundreds of civilians in Georgia and the separatist territories. That conflict ended in a negotiated settlement very much to Georgia's disadvantage.\n\nThe bigger problem for Georgia today is democratic backsliding under a political party called Georgian Dream. Founded by a Georgian oligarch who made his fortune in Russia, Georgian Dream took control of the country the same year it was founded. It has gained power slowly but surely, and after years of quietly pulling Georgia away from the West, the country's leadership refused to join sanctions against Russia at the start of the full-scale Ukraine invasion.\n\nFrom there, Georgian Dream began repressing media and civil society more openly, culminating in a definitive victory in a 2024 parliamentary election. That election drew intense condemnation across the world, with Georgian Dream accused of widespread fraud, but it has not mattered.\n\n## Georgia as an Open Door\n\nSince that election, Georgian Dream has used its judiciary as a weapon against the opposition, forced dissidents into exile abroad, and laid the groundwork to convert Georgia's once-promising democracy into an authoritarian government. All the while it has grown closer to Russia, deepening economic dependence and modeling Russian legislation meant to suppress and control the media. Just this week, Georgia created a so-called \"Russophobia Monitoring Council,\" a body that will hunt down what it calls anti-Russian discrimination and hate speech, in a country where pro-European protesters still demonstrate in the capital every single night.\n\nGiven how close Georgian Dream already is to Russia, suggesting a Ukraine-style invasion might seem strange. But if it happened, Russia would not be trying to push Georgian Dream out of power. Georgia presents a unique opportunity: a place where Russian troops could enter in response to some real or contrived provocation, while working with a ruling government that could be trusted to portray Russian soldiers as heroes.\n\nLike Armenia, Georgia's military is weak: about thirty-seven thousand active-duty troops, fewer than a dozen combat aircraft, and a force that has not attempted serious combat since well before the global shift to drone warfare. But Georgia's pro-Russian leaders can order those troops to stand down and let the Russians in to address, say, a protest movement Georgian Dream brands an internal security threat. And if proud anti-Russian elements within the Georgian military do fight back, they can be defeated in isolated or localized clashes, then condemned by Georgian Dream as the very coup plotters and renegades Russia needed to stop.\n\n## The Roads Into Georgia, and Beyond\n\nMaking matters even easier, there are many ways to go about military action in Georgia. If Georgian Dream is worried about being seen as complicit, a column of Russian troops could launch a surprise offensive from the oblast of North Ossetia, less than a five-hour car ride from Tbilisi. Or, if that is too far or there is a risk of Georgian troops actually fighting back, Georgian Dream could conveniently ignore a Russian buildup in the separatist region of South Ossetia, whose regional capital is less than a two-hour drive from Tbilisi.\n\nRussian troops could cross the border, launch a massive wave of missiles and drones, or conduct bomber flyovers, all to create enough of a threat that Georgia's pro-Russian leadership can justify rolling over: \"Oh, yeah, looks like you've got us outmatched, come fetch the keys to the kingdom.\" If Russia does not want the headaches of annexation, it can \"stabilize\" Georgia for a while before withdrawing, perhaps annexing the two breakaway regions in the process. Those steps would not quite mirror Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine, but they would certainly rhyme.\n\nAnd if Russia established conditions in Georgia that gave its troop columns freedom of movement in the future, then Armenia would be in even deeper trouble. As an ordinary civilian, you could drive from Tbilisi to Yerevan in about five hours. Securing Georgia would, in effect, unlock the road to Armenia.\n\n## A Desperate Bluff\n\nIn its moment of desperation, as it looks to reverse the stagnation and embarrassment of its operations in Ukraine, Moscow is hunting for a way to reassert power. In Ukraine, in Georgia, in Europe, or anywhere else, Russia's conduct under Putin is consistent: it presents its adversaries with a show of force and dares them to call the bluff. More often than not, those adversaries back down and hand Russia major concessions on a silver platter.\n\nAfter more than four years watching Russia's conduct in Ukraine, WarFronts would hope the rest of the world would recognize an unprovoked attack on Armenia, or a farcical dog-and-pony show in Georgia, for what it would be: a desperate attempt to project power by a desperate leader who has allowed his own ambition to back him into a corner. An action like this, targeting Armenia or Georgia under current circumstances, would be a very stupid decision that ends in failure. The problem is that this is Vladimir Putin, operating on Putin's logic, using Putin's tactics, on the basis of the completely non-credible information he is fed. We are confident it would fail. We are not confident he will not try anyway.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why is Putin considering an invasion of a third country at all?\n\nRussia's effort in Ukraine has stagnated. Insider reports suggest Putin is searching for a way to \"turn the tables,\" and a lateral expansion using forces too small to matter on the Ukrainian front, deployed in a quick smash-and-grab against a vulnerable neighbor, is one of the most discussed options. The aim would be less conquest than a message: that Russia is still a major military power that deserves respect, so Ukraine had better hand over the Donbas and swear off NATO.\n\n### What happened to Nagorno-Karabakh, and why does it matter for understanding the Armenia threat?\n\nAfter a 2020 war, Armenia received Russian assurances that its control of Nagorno-Karabakh would be preserved by Russian peacekeepers. But in September 2023, Azerbaijan's leader Ilham Aliyev attacked anyway, betting Russia would not intervene because of its problems in Ukraine. He was right — the enclave was overrun, its Armenian population expelled, and its territory absorbed into Azerbaijan. The episode proved Russia's security guarantees were worthless and triggered Armenia's pivot toward Europe and the EU.\n\n### Why would invading Armenia be harder than it looks on paper?\n\nOn paper Armenia looks vulnerable — just 45,000 troops, outdated Soviet-era equipment, and limited air defenses. But Armenia shares no land border with Russia and is landlocked, so troops would have to be flown in or pass through another country. Georgia might open its airspace and Azerbaijan might consider it, but neither convoy route through a third country is reliable, and Azerbaijan and Turkey would not permit troop columns. Russia's paratrooper capacity is also limited, leaving a combination of long-range bombardment and small ground attacks as the difficult alternative.\n\n### Why is Georgia considered the easier target?\n\nThe ruling Georgian Dream party is already deeply aligned with Russia, meaning Russian troops could enter in response to a real or contrived provocation while a friendly government portrays them as heroes. Georgian Dream could order its own military to stand down, and brand any soldiers who resist as coup plotters. Multiple invasion routes exist — from North Ossetia under five hours from Tbilisi, or from the separatist South Ossetia under two hours — making Georgia far more accessible than Armenia.\n\n### Could a Russian move into Georgia threaten Armenia too?\n\nYes. If Russia secured Georgia and gained freedom of movement for its troop columns, Armenia would be in far deeper trouble. A civilian can drive from Tbilisi to Yerevan in about five hours, so control of Georgia would effectively unlock the overland route into Armenia — meaning a Georgian operation could be both a prize in itself and a stepping stone to the more difficult Armenian target.\n\n## Sources\n\n1. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7g5xnvl2eo\n2. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-commission-concludes-deportation-and-forcible-transfer-ukrainian-children\n3. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/12/11/russias-systematic-torture-of-ukrainian-pows\n4. https://www.amnesty.org/en/projects/russias-aggression-in-ukraine/\n5. https://www.cfr.org/articles/can-russia-be-held-accountable-war-crimes-ukraine\n6. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-strange-fear-of-russia/\n7. https://nps.edu/web/ecco/w/perspectives-on-ukraine-and-the-russian-invasion\n8. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2025.2467057\n9. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/09/my-country-right-or-wrong-russian-public-opinion-on-ukraine\n10. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-russians-are-souring-on-putins-war/\n11. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/\n12. https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/2058527373314740308\n13. https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/2058534327596519490\n14. https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2054894416356147431\n15. https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer\n16. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/listen-to-what-vladimir-putin-is-saying-about-armenia\n17. https://x.com/Mikiashvili_M/status/2058844113970057380\n18. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/?utm_source=x&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=ukrainestrikecampaign\n19. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/05/25/kyiv-attacks-the-complex-logistics-network-behind-russia-s-war-machine_6753798_4.html\n20. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-use-local-and-external-tools\n21. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/01/armenia-russia-drifting-apart\n22. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/25/armenia-election-crossroads-between-east-west\n23. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/20/russia-wants-armenia-back-in-the-fold-it-may-be-too-late-a92801\n24. https://www.euractiv.com/news/putin-says-armenia-eu-membership-referendum-would-be-logical/\n25. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-may-21/\n26. https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/05/25/from-georgia-to-armenia-russias-use-of-economic-warfare-to-preserve-regional-influence/\n27. https://www.dw.com/en/armenia-balances-on-the-tightrope-between-russia-and-the-eu/a-77055231\n28. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5841162-armenia-west-strategic-shift/\n29. https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/standard-event/armenias-pivotal-election-what-stake-0\n30. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-adopts-law-launch-european-union-accession-process/\n31. https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/08/russia-increasing-military-presence-in-armenia-ukraines-military-intelligence-claims\n32. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/magazine/georgia-russia-autocracy-dictatorship.html\n33. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/12/georgia-repressions-consequences\n34. https://www.gmfus.org/news/georgian-dream-digging-its-own-grave\n35. https://www.reuters.com/world/five-minutes-autocracy-how-georgia-u-turned-its-western-path-2025-11-18/\n36. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/georgian-dream-now-nothing-nightmare\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/russia-armenia-georgia-next-invasion.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/russia-armenia-georgia-next-invasion datePublished: 2026-06-02 dateModified: 2026-06-02 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/A3jmsJKWAiY/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: 26fb59c0969be5669b659aaf935f30159a994860135648419d74132249426f2c tokens: 6625 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/russia-armenia-georgia-next-invasion.md.summary.md --- Vladimir Putin is getting desperate, and it is precisely when Putin is desperate that he is at his most dangerous. Russian high command is burning through its options to change the status quo in Ukraine, and nothing seems to be working. The Iran war was supposed to be a perfect opportunity to sell oil, but Russia's ports in the Black Sea, and even the Baltic, have been blown up. The Victory Day parade was supposed to inspire a fresh wave of devotion to the Fatherland; instead Putin's parade went ahead only after Ukraine issued him a permit, and Ukraine bombed Moscow a few days later, to show that they had merely been being polite. When Russia deployed its fearsome, nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile last weekend, the response from Ukraine and the West basically amounted to a sarcastic "scary." Ukrainian forces are at zero risk of collapse. A growing list of insider reports leaking out of the Kremlin and the Russian military makes one thing clear: Putin is searching for a way to turn the tables. Depending on their school of thought, outside experts have suggested he might start destroying symbolic targets across Kyiv, try to pull Belarus into the conflict, or, as Ukrainian strategic advisor Illya Sekirin told WarFronts in a recent interview, even attempt to fracture the NATO alliance with an attack on Latvia. But there is one more possibility, however insane it sounds, that has to be taken seriously: that Putin could seize another state on Russia's doorstep and make an example of it. He would not target a large, populous, or powerful country like NATO's Finland or Central Asia's Kazakhstan. He would go after one of the little guys, a state that could hypothetically be invaded in a few days, or even a few hours. Conquest, vassal statehood, and annexation would all be an afterthought. The real message would be that Russia is still a major military power that deserves respect, so Ukraine had better hand over the Donbas, swear off NATO, and kiss Putin's ring before he stops playing nice. **This is the WarFronts assessment of where that logic points: toward the tiny Caucasus nations of Georgia and Armenia, and the very different ways an invasion of each might unfold.** ## Key Takeaways - Insider reporting suggests Putin remains convinced Russia can seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk by autumn, a belief contradicted by battlefield reality, and that conviction is driving a search for a way to "turn the tables" outside Ukraine. - A lateral expansion of the war is one of the most discussed Kremlin options: using forces too small to matter on the Ukrainian front for a quick smash-and-grab against a vulnerable third country. - Armenia and Georgia share the traits that make them attractive targets: small size, regional proximity, weak militaries, and deep internal divides where pro-Russian elements already wield real power. - Putin's feelings about the two states differ sharply. Russia "practically owns" Georgia through the ruling Georgian Dream party, while Armenia has spent years angering Moscow by pivoting toward Europe. - An invasion of Armenia is militarily tempting but logistically tricky: the country is landlocked, shares no border with Russia, and neighbors unlikely to wave Russian troops through. - Georgia is the easier target by far, with a pro-Russian government that could invite Russian forces in, brand resisters as coup plotters, and provide multiple invasion routes, including a separatist capital less than a two-hour drive from Tbilisi. - Armenia's parliamentary elections fall on June 7, 2026. If Russia's alleged influence campaign fails, that defeat could hand Putin the pretext for more direct action. ## The Desperation Driving the Search The strategic picture for Russia is one of stagnation dressed up as progress. Western intelligence estimates and independent conflict trackers suggest Russia is losing soldiers faster than it can recruit them, and whatever spare capacity it retains is not enough to produce change anywhere along the front. Russian forward progress, in many cases, consists of the lies that front-line commanders feed the Kremlin as they try to cover up their inability to produce results. The Institute for the Study of War, one of the most diligent conflict trackers in the field, recently announced it would no longer project an estimate for when Russia could conquer the rest of Donetsk Oblast, because it is no longer clear Russia can capture Donetsk at all. As the ISW put it, "Russia's exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality." Yet according to insider sources, Putin remains convinced Russia can seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk by this autumn, based on assurances from top advisors who appear to completely control the flow of information he receives. The soldiers cannot make it happen. But for Putin's advisors to admit defeat, or worse, to acknowledge the scale of their deception against their own leader, would be an exceptionally bad idea. That gap, between what Putin believes and what is true, is the engine of the danger. ## The Myth of Russian Restraint It is genuinely ridiculous to claim that Russia is holding back in Ukraine. This is a conflict where Russia has repeatedly tried to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership, where Russian soldiers routinely carry out extrajudicial executions and torture of Ukrainian POWs and civilians, and where, in its attempt to assimilate Ukraine to Russian culture, Moscow has abducted and forcibly transferred nearly twenty thousand Ukrainian children to be adopted into Russian families against their will. But the idea of restraint is a common theme for Russian citizens at home and for media consumers who prefer their Kremlin propaganda straight from the faucet. That is no accident. It is the product of a coordinated Kremlin campaign running along several lines at once: that this is still a "special military operation" rather than a full-scale war, meaning Russia retains untapped power; that Russia avoids civilians and infrastructure because it fights more benevolently than the US or NATO ever would, despite consistently striking verified civilian targets; and that Russia is deliberately holding back to avoid pulling larger powers into the war. These ideas are so pervasive that even Russia's own supporters, when they criticize the war effort, often fall back on the claim that Russia is ineffective because it is holding back too much. ## What the Hardliners Want The milblogger reaction to last weekend's Oreshnik strike captures the mood inside the pro-war camp. The Oreshnik was meant to gin up hardliner support and stoke nuclear fears; instead it drew open contempt. The milblogger "Thirteenth" asked, "What's the point of firing a blank slug without a warhead and calling it 'Oreshnik'? Did it kill anyone there? Why hasn't any of Ukraine's leadership been killed? Why is Zelenskyy still alive?" "Shadow of Rus" added, "'Oreshnik' is supposed to work as a news hook: to frighten, to convince, to pressure. But it doesn't work." And "Larkin" was harshest of all: "Oreshnik is like Novichok, no one has ever died from it. This time, it doesn't even explode; it's just a fireworks show for the Ukrainians. A humiliating circus, a clown dance on the bones of Russians." As Russian setbacks and Ukrainian long-range attacks both grow more common, and public opinion begins to shift, hardliners are clearly expressing what they want: a show of force big enough, bold enough, and destructive enough to prove Russia is still as powerful as it claims. The trouble is that Russia cannot provide one right now. The best it can do is bombard Ukrainian cities every few days and score hits on symbolic targets. That mismatch, between the demand for a dramatic show of strength and the inability to deliver it inside Ukraine, is what pushes the Kremlin to look elsewhere. ## The Case for Armenia Armenia and Georgia are especially juicy targets because of the problems they share: small geographical size, regional proximity, underpowered militaries, and internal social divides where strong pro-Russian elements already wield substantial power. Where they differ most is in how Putin probably feels about each. In 2026, Georgia is a country Russia practically owns. Armenia is a nation that has been very successful at angering Putin. The story traces back to 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and then watched it go sideways. At the time, Armenia was still locked in a frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over the exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries claimed the region, but most of it was governed by ethnic Armenians who formed a local majority. After a six-week war over the territory in 2020, Armenia received assurances from Russia that its control of Nagorno-Karabakh would be preserved with the help of Russian peacekeepers. But in September 2023, once it was clear how deep Russia's problems in Ukraine had become, Azerbaijan's leader Ilham Aliyev attacked Nagorno-Karabakh anyway, betting that Russia would not dare intervene. He was right. Nagorno-Karabakh was overrun, its Armenian population expelled, its government dissolved, and its territory incorporated into Azerbaijan. ## Armenia Turns West That moment was a brutal wake-up call for Armenia, a former Soviet Socialist Republic that had long thought of itself as part of Russia's regional orbit. Russia's security guarantees turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on, and Armenia has not stuck around waiting for Russia to come to its senses. Instead, the country is pursuing deeper ties with the West, and especially Europe. In 2025, Armenia passed a law mandating the national government to pursue European integration, including eventual EU membership. It has gone to great lengths to engage with European trade networks and energy infrastructure. In early May 2026, European leaders traveled to Yerevan for the first-ever EU-Armenia summit, alongside a parallel summit signaling the EU's willingness to work with partners outside Europe, specifically Canada. But the signal of Armenia's shifting loyalties became undeniable thanks to one name on the guest list: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Armenia has also chosen to work with American brokers to establish a more permanent peace with Azerbaijan, accepting a peace plan with very few concessions to Armenia, seemingly because America is at least willing to pay a bit of attention. Naturally, Moscow has not been thrilled, and it has not hesitated to voice its displeasure. The relationship had been deteriorating since before Nagorno-Karabakh fell, and it really began curdling in 2018, when Armenia's current leader, Nikol Pashinyan, came to power amid the anti-corruption protests of the Velvet Revolution. Since then, Pashinyan has been trashing Moscow and Moscow has been trashing Pashinyan. ## Russia's Grip on Armenia The relationship remains complicated. Armenia still hosts Russian military bases, remains part of Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization, and participates in the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian corporate interests are powerful there, and Russia wields immense social influence through the Armenian Apostolic Church. Armenian and international experts have been sounding the alarm that Russia is working to control, or even destabilize, Armenia outright. In 2025, an Armenian-Russian billionaire and two apostolic archbishops were arrested in a very high-profile scandal over allegations that they had plotted a coup against Pashinyan. In January of this year, prominent Russian television propagandist Vladimir Solovyov called for direct military action against Yerevan, suggesting Armenia could be targeted in a special military operation similar to the one directed at Ukraine. This June, Armenia holds critical parliamentary elections, where Russia already faces allegations of interference through the church, disinformation operations, and influence campaigns. A recent trove of leaked documents suggested that a prominent Kremlin official, Sergei Kiriyenko, is supporting efforts to influence the vote, following his work on similar operations in Georgia and occupied Ukraine. For anyone wanting more proof of the danger, Putin himself offered it just a few weeks ago, as of the time of writing: "We all see what's happening with Ukraine now. But where did it all start? With Ukraine's attempt to join the EU." He suggested Armenia should hold a referendum on EU membership. But the upcoming parliamentary vote introduces an even sharper pressure point. If Russia's alleged influence campaign fails, that may give Putin the pretext he needs for more direct action. Those elections take place in less than two weeks, on Sunday, June 7. ## Why Armenia Is Harder Than It Looks On paper, an attack on Armenia would not be especially difficult, even for Russia's overstretched military. The country's armed forces consist of just forty-five thousand people in total, equipped with a small number of functioning main battle tanks, mostly outdated ex-Soviet artillery, and fewer than twenty combat aircraft. Air defenses are limited and largely of Soviet origin, and the country's troops simply are not prepared to fight a drone-integrated war of the kind Russia has been waging in Ukraine. Russia already stations some four to five thousand troops on Armenian territory, equipped with substantial firepower. But there is reason to believe an Armenian invasion could be tougher than it sounds. Armenia shares no land border with Russia, and it is landlocked, meaning Russian troops would have to be flown in or roll through another country. Georgia's leadership would most likely open its airspace to Russia, and Azerbaijan might consider it, given that Armenia could be permanently defeated, but both are tricky propositions, especially since Russia's ability to drop paratrooper units is quite limited right now. It is not likely that Georgia would allow Russian troop convoys to roll through, and Azerbaijan and Turkey certainly would not. That does not mean Russia cannot attack Armenia. But unless it attacked Georgia first, its alternative would be a combination of long-range drone and missile bombardment plus smaller ground attacks, which is not impossible but tricky, in a way Russia may not be willing to risk. ## The Case for Georgia As difficult as an Armenian invasion might be, the same cannot be said for Georgia, a country that has already suffered a full-scale Russian invasion within the last twenty years. That was the five-day Russo-Georgian War of 2008, when, after escalation between Georgia, Russia, and Georgia's two breakaway regions, Russia attacked its southern neighbor in battles that left around sixty-five Russians, 180 Georgians, and roughly sixty separatists dead, along with hundreds of civilians in Georgia and the separatist territories. That conflict ended in a negotiated settlement very much to Georgia's disadvantage. The bigger problem for Georgia today is democratic backsliding under a political party called Georgian Dream. Founded by a Georgian oligarch who made his fortune in Russia, Georgian Dream took control of the country the same year it was founded. It has gained power slowly but surely, and after years of quietly pulling Georgia away from the West, the country's leadership refused to join sanctions against Russia at the start of the full-scale Ukraine invasion. From there, Georgian Dream began repressing media and civil society more openly, culminating in a definitive victory in a 2024 parliamentary election. That election drew intense condemnation across the world, with Georgian Dream accused of widespread fraud, but it has not mattered. ## Georgia as an Open Door Since that election, Georgian Dream has used its judiciary as a weapon against the opposition, forced dissidents into exile abroad, and laid the groundwork to convert Georgia's once-promising democracy into an authoritarian government. All the while it has grown closer to Russia, deepening economic dependence and modeling Russian legislation meant to suppress and control the media. Just this week, Georgia created a so-called "Russophobia Monitoring Council," a body that will hunt down what it calls anti-Russian discrimination and hate speech, in a country where pro-European protesters still demonstrate in the capital every single night. Given how close Georgian Dream already is to Russia, suggesting a Ukraine-style invasion might seem strange. But if it happened, Russia would not be trying to push Georgian Dream out of power. Georgia presents a unique opportunity: a place where Russian troops could enter in response to some real or contrived provocation, while working with a ruling government that could be trusted to portray Russian soldiers as heroes. Like Armenia, Georgia's military is weak: about thirty-seven thousand active-duty troops, fewer than a dozen combat aircraft, and a force that has not attempted serious combat since well before the global shift to drone warfare. But Georgia's pro-Russian leaders can order those troops to stand down and let the Russians in to address, say, a protest movement Georgian Dream brands an internal security threat. And if proud anti-Russian elements within the Georgian military do fight back, they can be defeated in isolated or localized clashes, then condemned by Georgian Dream as the very coup plotters and renegades Russia needed to stop. ## The Roads Into Georgia, and Beyond Making matters even easier, there are many ways to go about military action in Georgia. If Georgian Dream is worried about being seen as complicit, a column of Russian troops could launch a surprise offensive from the oblast of North Ossetia, less than a five-hour car ride from Tbilisi. Or, if that is too far or there is a risk of Georgian troops actually fighting back, Georgian Dream could conveniently ignore a Russian buildup in the separatist region of South Ossetia, whose regional capital is less than a two-hour drive from Tbilisi. Russian troops could cross the border, launch a massive wave of missiles and drones, or conduct bomber flyovers, all to create enough of a threat that Georgia's pro-Russian leadership can justify rolling over: "Oh, yeah, looks like you've got us outmatched, come fetch the keys to the kingdom." If Russia does not want the headaches of annexation, it can "stabilize" Georgia for a while before withdrawing, perhaps annexing the two breakaway regions in the process. Those steps would not quite mirror Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine, but they would certainly rhyme. And if Russia established conditions in Georgia that gave its troop columns freedom of movement in the future, then Armenia would be in even deeper trouble. As an ordinary civilian, you could drive from Tbilisi to Yerevan in about five hours. Securing Georgia would, in effect, unlock the road to Armenia. ## A Desperate Bluff In its moment of desperation, as it looks to reverse the stagnation and embarrassment of its operations in Ukraine, Moscow is hunting for a way to reassert power. In Ukraine, in Georgia, in Europe, or anywhere else, Russia's conduct under Putin is consistent: it presents its adversaries with a show of force and dares them to call the bluff. More often than not, those adversaries back down and hand Russia major concessions on a silver platter. After more than four years watching Russia's conduct in Ukraine, WarFronts would hope the rest of the world would recognize an unprovoked attack on Armenia, or a farcical dog-and-pony show in Georgia, for what it would be: a desperate attempt to project power by a desperate leader who has allowed his own ambition to back him into a corner. An action like this, targeting Armenia or Georgia under current circumstances, would be a very stupid decision that ends in failure. The problem is that this is Vladimir Putin, operating on Putin's logic, using Putin's tactics, on the basis of the completely non-credible information he is fed. We are confident it would fail. We are not confident he will not try anyway. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### Why is Putin considering an invasion of a third country at all? Russia's effort in Ukraine has stagnated. Insider reports suggest Putin is searching for a way to "turn the tables," and a lateral expansion using forces too small to matter on the Ukrainian front, deployed in a quick smash-and-grab against a vulnerable neighbor, is one of the most discussed options. The aim would be less conquest than a message: that Russia is still a major military power that deserves respect, so Ukraine had better hand over the Donbas and swear off NATO. ### What happened to Nagorno-Karabakh, and why does it matter for understanding the Armenia threat? After a 2020 war, Armenia received Russian assurances that its control of Nagorno-Karabakh would be preserved by Russian peacekeepers. But in September 2023, Azerbaijan's leader Ilham Aliyev attacked anyway, betting Russia would not intervene because of its problems in Ukraine. He was right — the enclave was overrun, its Armenian population expelled, and its territory absorbed into Azerbaijan. The episode proved Russia's security guarantees were worthless and triggered Armenia's pivot toward Europe and the EU. ### Why would invading Armenia be harder than it looks on paper? On paper Armenia looks vulnerable — just 45,000 troops, outdated Soviet-era equipment, and limited air defenses. But Armenia shares no land border with Russia and is landlocked, so troops would have to be flown in or pass through another country. Georgia might open its airspace and Azerbaijan might consider it, but neither convoy route through a third country is reliable, and Azerbaijan and Turkey would not permit troop columns. Russia's paratrooper capacity is also limited, leaving a combination of long-range bombardment and small ground attacks as the difficult alternative. ### Why is Georgia considered the easier target? The ruling Georgian Dream party is already deeply aligned with Russia, meaning Russian troops could enter in response to a real or contrived provocation while a friendly government portrays them as heroes. Georgian Dream could order its own military to stand down, and brand any soldiers who resist as coup plotters. Multiple invasion routes exist — from North Ossetia under five hours from Tbilisi, or from the separatist South Ossetia under two hours — making Georgia far more accessible than Armenia. ### Could a Russian move into Georgia threaten Armenia too? Yes. If Russia secured Georgia and gained freedom of movement for its troop columns, Armenia would be in far deeper trouble. 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