---
title: "Russia and China Abandoned Iran: Why the Axis of Upheaval Failed Its Partner"
description: "For years, Western strategists feared the emergence of the so-called Axis of Upheaval—a slowly coalescing bloc of anti-Western, authoritarian regimes comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Spurred on by the war in Ukraine, their alignment seemed to signal a dangerous new force capable of rivaling the American-led order. The worry was always that these component parts would back one another, leveraging their presence across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East to escalate any regional conflict into a global confrontation. But when Israel launched audacious strikes on Iran's nuclear program and leadership on June 13th, followed by direct American bombing of the Islamic Republic, the Axis of Upheaval did absolutely nothing. Despite stern words condemning the attacks, Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang effectively whistled and looked the other way as American and Israeli bombs devastated their close partner, exposing the fundamental weakness of this supposed geopolitical alliance.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- When Israel and the United States attacked Iran in June, Russia, China, and North Korea—despite being part of the so-called Axis of Upheaval—provided no meaningful military support to their partner, exposing the fundamental weakness of anti-Western authoritarian alliances.\n- Russia's failure to support Iran follows a pattern of abandoning allies, including Armenia, Syria's Assad, and Transnistria, largely because Moscow is militarily overstretched by the Ukraine war and prioritizes relationships with Israel and Gulf states over Iran.\n- Iran provided crucial military support to Russia during the Ukraine war, supplying thousands of Shahed drones and artillery ammunition, but Russia refused Iranian requests for advanced weapons like S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighters even after Israel destroyed Iran's air defenses.\n- China maintains a transactional relationship with Iran focused on discounted oil imports, but Beijing has far closer ties to Iran's rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and has no history or interest in foreign military intervention that would risk its broader Middle East interests.\n- The Axis of Upheaval's inaction demonstrates that authoritarian partnerships are purely transactional and lack the institutional frameworks, mutual defense commitments, and demonstrated reliability that characterize American alliance structures.\n\n## The Axis of Upheaval's Moment of Truth\n\nThe concept of the Axis of Upheaval had been a fixture of Western strategic thinking throughout the early 2020s. As China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea drew closer together, analysts warned of a dangerous new bloc that could challenge American hegemony across multiple theaters simultaneously. The war in Ukraine seemed to accelerate this alignment, with Iran providing crucial drone technology to Russia and North Korea eventually sending troops to fight alongside Russian forces.\n\nYet when the regional conflict that strategists had long feared finally materialized—with Israel striking Iran's nuclear facilities and the United States directly bombing the Islamic Republic—the response from Tehran's supposed partners was conspicuously absent. While none of the three capitals had formal mutual defense pacts with Iran, the rhetoric emanating from these countries in preceding months had suggested far deeper bonds. The strategic partnership Russia and Iran signed in January amid much fanfare appeared designed to signal exactly the kind of growing alliance that would involve mutual support in times of crisis.\n\nThe disconnect between rhetoric and action raises fundamental questions about the nature of these authoritarian partnerships. If the Axis of Upheaval cannot or will not defend one of its core members during an unprovoked attack, what does that say about the durability of anti-Western alliances more broadly? The answer, as it turns out, reveals much about the transactional nature of these relationships and the stark contrast with American alliance structures.\n\n## Russia's Pattern of Abandoning Allies\n\nFrom the Iranian perspective, expectations of Russian support seemed reasonable. Since Russian aircraft began bombing Syrian cities in 2015, the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic had worked together to expand their influence, initially focused on keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. But the partnership reached new heights after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow found itself desperately in need of military supplies.\n\nIran proved to be among the first to answer Russia's call for help. Iranian Shahed drones began appearing in Ukraine in summer 2022 and have since become a fixture of the war, causing death and destruction across Ukrainian cities. The technology proved so valuable that Russia began manufacturing the drones domestically, producing 2,700 Shaheds per month. Tehran also provided artillery ammunition and may have sent ballistic missiles, with these supplies arriving at Russia's greatest point of weakness in the war.\n\nWhile Iran received payment for these weapons, the Islamic Republic might reasonably have expected some reciprocal support when it faced its own crisis. As Iran researcher Mahnaz Shirali noted, Russia has never truly helped Iran, while the Islamic Republic has provided Moscow with substantial military assistance. This one-sided dynamic became even clearer in November 2023, when Iran—likely sensing that war with Israel was approaching—requested additional S-400 air-defense systems, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters from Russia.\n\nAccording to Nikita Smagin, an expert on Russia-Iran relations, Iran had been asking Russia for weapons for years, requesting aircraft and air defense systems, but Russia gave practically nothing. This pattern continued even after Israel destroyed Iran's pre-existing air defenses, with Russia either unable or unwilling to replace them in the months that followed. The only jets Moscow supplied were Yak-130 training aircraft, with diplomatic pressure from Gulf states preventing the sale of anything more advanced.\n\n## The Kremlin's Transactional Alliance Strategy\n\nRussia's failure to support Iran fits within a broader pattern of the Kremlin abandoning allies when inconvenient. In 2023, Azerbaijan's forces overran the ethnically-Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers, whom Vladimir Putin had personally promised would guarantee the safety of the Karabakhis. The year before, Azerbaijan shelled across the border into Armenia itself, yet Moscow took no action despite having a mutual defense treaty with Yerevan.\n\nThe Kremlin attempted to spin Armenia's abandonment as punishment for flirting with the West, but Yerevan only began looking to France and America after realizing Russia couldn't or wouldn't defend it. The situation proved even more disappointing for Bashar al-Assad, whom Putin had spent a decade propping up. When a coalition of rebel groups marched on Damascus in late 2024, Putin failed to intervene, resulting in Assad's overthrow.\n\nIn early 2025, the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria experienced similar abandonment when Moscow cut off gas supplies. Effectively a Russian client state since 1992, Transnistria's economy had been sustained by massive flows of free gas, but Gazprom stopped deliveries in January as a means to pressure Moldova. While Moldova suffered an energy shock, Transnistria nearly collapsed, entering a rolling state of emergency.\n\nIran has thus become simply the latest Russian friend to discover the partnership was mostly one-way. The last time Moscow successfully intervened to help an ally appears to have been over three years ago, when the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization helped put down riots in Kazakhstan in early 2022. This date suggests a clear reason for the Kremlin's faltering reach: since becoming bogged down in the Ukrainian quagmire, Russia has lacked the strength to handle other crises. From simultaneously conducting an air war in Syria, a hybrid war in eastern Donbas, and peacekeeping operations in frozen conflicts in the Caucasus during the 2010s—not to mention propping up dictators in places like Belarus—Russia today can sustain only its land war in Ukraine.\n\n## Moscow's Competing Middle East Interests\n\nWhile Russia's overstretched military capabilities provide one explanation for its failure to support Iran, the specifics of Moscow's Middle East relationships reveal additional complications. Perhaps most significant is Russia's relationship with Iran's greatest enemy: Israel. While Moscow and Jerusalem aren't exactly friends, there exists greater cooperation between them than might be expected given Israel's position in the Western camp. Israel hasn't joined sanctions on Russia, hasn't sent Ukraine advanced weapons, and in February joined the United States in voting against a UN resolution condemning Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.\n\nThe reasons for this semi-friendly relationship are complex, but the key point is that Putin remains eager to keep things cordial with the Israelis, with the upsides to a positive relationship with Jerusalem outweighing the downsides of Iran being humiliated. Israel isn't the only Middle Eastern partner Russia wants to preserve. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have both maintained partnerships with Moscow, with the UAE becoming a key destination for Russian oligarchs escaping sanctions. Both countries would be far from impressed if the Kremlin started supplying Tehran with advanced weapons.\n\nThere's also the question of whether the Kremlin even wants Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. Assuming the ceasefire holds, the Iran-Israel War appears to have been limited in scope, with Israel's operations primarily aimed at stopping Iran's nuclear program rather than pursuing regime change. This outcome might suit the Kremlin perfectly, not just because a nuclear-armed Iran would potentially destabilize the entire region, but because Moscow knows it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran.\n\nThis points to a final theory: perhaps Russia has failed to help Iran because having a weaker partner suits Putin's interests. Speaking to the Wall Street Journal, Tino Sanandaji from the Stockholm School of Economics noted that a common complaint in Iran is that China and Russia, rather than being true friends, exploit Iran's isolation to obtain cheap natural resources while selling Iran second-rate military hardware at inflated prices, sometimes never even delivering the promised equipment. Tehran's weakness means it can't be choosy about who it sells weapons and oil to, but also can't do anything when the buyers fail to give much in return.\n\n## China's Superficial Partnership with Tehran\n\nWhile Russia's abandonment of Iran might be explained by military overextension and competing regional interests, China's failure to support Tehran reveals a different dynamic. Iran depends heavily on China, far more so than on Russia, with China serving as Iran's largest trading partner and the largest importer of its oil. Since 2021, China has earmarked the equivalent of nearly half a trillion US dollars to invest in Iran, benefiting from sharply discounted oil and consistent access to energy resources in the event of war with the West.\n\nHowever, China's interests in the Middle East extend far beyond Iran. Beijing maintains far closer relationships with other Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE—nations that have quite negative relationships with Iran. Unlike many of China's other partners, Iran can be belligerent, even demanding that China pay more for oil in 2023 and temporarily stopping the flow of oil when Beijing refused.\n\nDespite China's efforts to become a major exporter of modern military equipment, Chinese weapons have yet to flow into Iran in large quantities. China supported America's first nuclear deal with Iran, the JCPOA, despite helping Iran's rivals in Riyadh develop a civil nuclear program. When it was convenient in 2024 for China to reject Iran's claims in a territorial dispute with the Emirates, Beijing did so unapologetically and with little regard for Iranian backlash.\n\nIn the global press, China talks expansively about what Xi Jinping referred to in 2024 as his desire to \"unswervingly develop friendly cooperation with Iran.\" But examining the details reveals China's relationship with Iran as relatively superficial. Beijing is willing to compromise basically none of its other interests to make life easier for Tehran, and Beijing's leaders are fully aware that Tehran needs them more than they need Tehran.\n\n## Beijing's Cost-Benefit Analysis\n\nWhen Iran and Israel entered direct confrontation, neither of the actions Iran could have taken—rapidly developing a nuclear weapon or shutting down the Strait of Hormuz to restrict oil flow from Gulf states—would have brought any benefit to China. In fact, both scenarios would have posed real risks to China's bottom line. If China had supported Iran in its war effort, it's difficult to identify any real, tangible benefit Beijing could have gained.\n\nIn a hypothetical world where Iran could hand Israel and the United States a major strategic defeat, embarrass their militaries on the world stage, and force them into submission, that might have been a version of the future China would want to usher in. But in reality, the gap in military capabilities between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other was simply too massive for Chinese assistance to overcome.\n\nUnlike Russia, where the Kremlin readily hands out security guarantees even while lacking follow-through, China has never made a habit of providing guarantees to protect its allies. This simply isn't China's modus operandi; it's a nation with no real history of foreign intervention and no desire to participate in somebody else's regional war. When the war between Israel and Iran broke out, it would have been highly uncharacteristic for China to get involved, not least because the faster Iran was defeated, the sooner China could be assured that its regional oil interests were safe from harm.\n\nInstead, China kept its support for Iran strictly rhetorical, tut-tutting and berating the United States from the sidelines while demonstrating zero interest in actually doing anything about the situation. When the US attacked Iran directly, China accused Washington of severe violations of the UN Charter and called on the UN Security Council—where the US has veto power—to intervene. China joined Russia and Pakistan in calling for a ceasefire and condemned Israel's \"violation of Iran's sovereignty.\"\n\nIn a moment when the United States and one of its closest allies could be accused of flagrantly ignoring international norms, it served China's interests to call that out. Beijing could sit on the sidelines condemning warmongering Americans, imploring the rest of the world to follow China's example instead and look to China as the picture of diplomatic restraint or even a natural peacemaker. But China's ability to serve its own domestic interests in this conflict ended there. The most consistent way to understand China's actions is by assuming that China will protect its own interests above all else.\n\n## North Korea's Limited Capacity for Support\n\nThe fourth nation of the Axis of Upheaval, North Korea, might seem best suited to help the theocracy in Tehran in its time of need—rogue state collaboration at its finest. After all, North Korea has proved perfectly willing to help Russia during war, sending over ten thousand troops to accomplish that task. If Iran wants a nuclear weapon so badly, North Korea would seem the perfect candidate to provide one, especially given that Iran and North Korea are already suspected of collaborating on missile designs, underground bunker design, and more.\n\nBut in truth, Iran doesn't want a nuclear weapon, at least not now. Perhaps it truly is Tehran's ambition to have a nuclear arsenal one day, despite their insistence that they only want a civilian nuclear program. But Iran understands just as well as anybody that if it built a nuclear weapon today, it would be attacked by Israel and America with far greater force than it already has been.\n\nNor would North Korean troops be particularly useful. Israel and Iran are fighting an air war, and while North Korea has plenty of bodies and ammunition to spare, it can't rapidly transfer medium-range ballistic missiles across the four thousand miles between Pyongyang and Tehran. Put simply, North Korea and Iran simply aren't equipped for any kind of real military partnership. Their economies are in chronic disrepair, they lack the logistical means to transfer personnel or weapons at large scale, and both have enough problems already before appearing to team up in an alliance that would send the Western world into a very violent panic.\n\n## The Weakness of Anti-Western Alliances\n\nThe relatively straightforward explanations for why the Axis of Upheaval was missing in action during Iran's crisis point to a deeper truth about the contemporary international order. For all the talk about a multipolar world, the fact remains that the only nations capable of challenging America just aren't very good at building durable military alliances. On the economic side, groupings like the European Union or even BRICS could be said to wield might comparable to the United States. But when it comes to hard power—the guns, bombs, and missiles of force projection—there is literally nothing on Earth that can match the network of alliances America has built across the globe.\n\nAt least, for now. The reason Washington remains dominant today isn't just thanks to the US operating the most powerful army in existence. It's because nations around the world can look at the way America stepped into this war to help its ally Israel, then look at the way the Axis of Upheaval ignored its friend Iran, and draw their own conclusions. When it appears that Washington extends that same protection to allies from Poland to South Korea, that makes Team America seem like a pretty good side to be on.\n\nThe contrast between American alliance structures and those of its rivals couldn't be starker. The United States has spent decades building institutional frameworks like NATO, bilateral defense treaties, and security partnerships that create genuine mutual obligations. These alliances involve regular military exercises, integrated command structures, intelligence sharing, and—crucially—a demonstrated willingness to honor commitments even when inconvenient. The Axis of Upheaval, by contrast, consists of transactional relationships where each party pursues its own narrow interests with little regard for partners' needs.\n\n## The Future of American Alliances\n\nHowever, in this era of fraying bonds, it's worth asking how much longer American alliance superiority may remain true. As US commitment to NATO is called into question, as allies in East Asia are hit with tariffs and subjected to defense spending shakedowns, it suddenly seems like the American web of alliances may not be as strong as it once appeared.\n\nThe Axis of Upheaval may have been humiliated by its inability to protect Iran in this war, exposing the fundamental weakness of authoritarian partnerships built on opportunism rather than shared values or genuine mutual defense commitments. But the lesson cuts both ways. If the United States begins to treat its own alliances as transactionally as Russia and China treat theirs—demanding immediate returns on investment, questioning the value of long-standing commitments, and prioritizing short-term economic gains over strategic relationships—then the very advantage that currently distinguishes American power could erode.\n\nThe failure of Russia, China, and North Korea to support Iran demonstrates that authoritarian regimes struggle to build the kind of durable, institutionalized alliances that have been the foundation of American global leadership. These regimes operate on the basis of immediate self-interest, viewing partnerships as tools to be exploited rather than relationships to be nurtured. They lack the ideological cohesion, institutional frameworks, and demonstrated reliability that make allies willing to bear costs on each other's behalf.\n\nYet this advantage is not permanent or guaranteed. It must be continuously earned through demonstrated commitment, even when that commitment is costly or inconvenient. The collective West may look at Iran's abandonment and feel vindicated in its alliance structures. But unless something changes soon, it may be that the collective West is one day left to whistle and look the other way as one of its own members is left out to dry, having squandered the very alliance advantage that once made American leadership so formidable.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)\n- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What is the Axis of Upheaval?\n\nThe Axis of Upheaval refers to a loosely aligned bloc of anti-Western authoritarian regimes comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that grew closer throughout the early 2020s, particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Western strategists feared this alignment could challenge American-led global order across multiple regions simultaneously.\n\n### Why didn't Russia help Iran when Israel and the US attacked?\n\nRussia failed to support Iran for multiple reasons: military overextension from the Ukraine war, desire to maintain positive relationships with Israel and Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, lack of interest in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons that would reduce Russian leverage, and a transactional foreign policy approach that exploits Iran's isolation for cheap resources rather than providing genuine partnership. According to the Wall Street Journal, a common complaint inside Iran is that China and Russia exploit its isolation to obtain cheap natural resources while selling second-rate military hardware at inflated prices.\n\n### What military support did Iran provide to Russia, and what did Russia give in return?\n\nIran supplied Russia with thousands of Shahed drones starting in summer 2022, which became fixtures of the war causing destruction across Ukrainian cities — Russia now manufactures 2,700 Shaheds per month domestically. Iran also provided artillery ammunition and may have sent ballistic missiles. In return, when Iran requested S-400 air defense systems, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Su-35 jet fighters in November 2023, Russia supplied only Yak-130 training aircraft, with diplomatic pressure from Gulf states preventing any more advanced transfers.\n\n### Why didn't China support Iran militarily?\n\nChina has no history of foreign military intervention and operates on a strictly transactional basis. Beijing has far closer relationships with Iran's rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and supporting Iran would have risked China's broader Middle East oil interests with no tangible benefit. The military capability gap between the US-Israel side and Iran was too massive for Chinese assistance to overcome, and in a hypothetical Iranian victory, China still could not have identified any real tangible benefit from having intervened.\n\n### What other allies has Russia abandoned recently, and what does that pattern reveal?\n\nRussia failed to defend Armenia despite a mutual defense treaty when Azerbaijan attacked in 2022-2023, allowed Bashar al-Assad to be overthrown in Syria in late 2024 after a decade of propping him up, and cut off gas supplies to its client state Transnistria in early 2025. The last successful Russian intervention to help an ally was in Kazakhstan in early 2022. This pattern reveals that since becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Russia can sustain only its land war there, leaving every other commitment hollow.\n\n## Sources\n- <https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-putin-israel-iran-trump-4c89855e>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-parliament-approves-strategic-pact-with-russia-2025-05-21/>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hezbollah-houthis-hamas-iraq.html>\n- <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/world/middleeast/iran-russia-relationship-analysis.html>\n- <https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran/article/putins-dilemma-should-he-back-or-ditch-the-iranian-regime-mmpb2sps2>\n- <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/russia-iran-israel-defense/683214/>\n- <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/16/a-strategic-partnership-not-a-military-alliance-russias-role-in-the-israel-iran-conflict-a89452>\n- <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-20/iran-allies-china-russia-axis-of-resistance-quiet-israel-attacks/105435730>\n- <https://kyivindependent.com/transnistria-again-declares-economic-emergency-over-russian-gas-cut/>\n- <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en>\n- <https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/china-iran-relations-rising-axis>\n- <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/03/iran-china-relations-a-strategic-partnership-for-regional-and-global-stability/>\n- <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/25/china-iran-middle-east-conflict/>\n- <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/06/china-iran-ties-rollercoaster-tehran-can-only-grit-its-teeth-hang>\n- <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/19/iran-china-israel-attack-oil-trade-economic-leverage/>\n- <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-24/what-trump-s-israel-iran-ceasefire-means-for-china-s-relationship-with-iran>\n- <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/17/china-iran-israel-conflict-diplomacy-oil-trade-defense-weapons/>\n- <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/24/iran-israel-us-china/>\n- <https://www.newsweek.com/china-issues-warning-over-us-bombing-iran-2089196>\n- <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/23/us-war-israel-tehran-china-beijing-blockade-closure-the-strait-of-hormuz.html>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-us-attack-iran-has-damaged-its-credibility-2025-06-22/>\n- <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/23/iran-china-gulf-states-strait-hormuz/>\n- <https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-stands-to-gain-from-us-strikes-on-iran/a-73020874>\n- <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-19/>\n- <http://nytimes.com/2025/06/20/world/asia/us-iran-israel-china.html>\n- <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250619-outbreak-of-israel-iran-war-leaves-china-s-mideast-diplomacy-at-an-impasse>\n- <https://www.dw.com/en/after-us-bombs-iran-north-korea-watches-closely/a-73022740>\n- <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/north-korea-condemns-us-strike-iran-violation-sovereign-rights-kcna-reports-2025-06-23/>\n- <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trouble-together-how-north-korea-sees-its-growing-interests-iran>\n\n<!-- youtube:lQhZxcXZb14 -->"
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For years, Western strategists feared the emergence of the so-called Axis of Upheaval—a slowly coalescing bloc of anti-Western, authoritarian regimes comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Spurred on by the war in Ukraine, their alignment seemed to signal a dangerous new force capable of rivaling the American-led order. The worry was always that these component parts would back one another, leveraging their presence across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East to escalate any regional conflict into a global confrontation. But when Israel launched audacious strikes on Iran's nuclear program and leadership on June 13th, followed by direct American bombing of the Islamic Republic, the Axis of Upheaval did absolutely nothing. Despite stern words condemning the attacks, Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang effectively whistled and looked the other way as American and Israeli bombs devastated their close partner, exposing the fundamental weakness of this supposed geopolitical alliance.

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## Key Takeaways
- When Israel and the United States attacked Iran in June, Russia, China, and North Korea—despite being part of the so-called Axis of Upheaval—provided no meaningful military support to their partner, exposing the fundamental weakness of anti-Western authoritarian alliances.
- Russia's failure to support Iran follows a pattern of abandoning allies, including Armenia, Syria's Assad, and Transnistria, largely because Moscow is militarily overstretched by the Ukraine war and prioritizes relationships with Israel and Gulf states over Iran.
- Iran provided crucial military support to Russia during the Ukraine war, supplying thousands of Shahed drones and artillery ammunition, but Russia refused Iranian requests for advanced weapons like S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighters even after Israel destroyed Iran's air defenses.
- China maintains a transactional relationship with Iran focused on discounted oil imports, but Beijing has far closer ties to Iran's rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and has no history or interest in foreign military intervention that would risk its broader Middle East interests.
- The Axis of Upheaval's inaction demonstrates that authoritarian partnerships are purely transactional and lack the institutional frameworks, mutual defense commitments, and demonstrated reliability that characterize American alliance structures.

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## The Axis of Upheaval's Moment of Truth

The concept of the Axis of Upheaval had been a fixture of Western strategic thinking throughout the early 2020s. As China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea drew closer together, analysts warned of a dangerous new bloc that could challenge American hegemony across multiple theaters simultaneously. The war in Ukraine seemed to accelerate this alignment, with Iran providing crucial drone technology to Russia and North Korea eventually sending troops to fight alongside Russian forces.

Yet when the regional conflict that strategists had long feared finally materialized—with Israel striking Iran's nuclear facilities and the United States directly bombing the Islamic Republic—the response from Tehran's supposed partners was conspicuously absent. While none of the three capitals had formal mutual defense pacts with Iran, the rhetoric emanating from these countries in preceding months had suggested far deeper bonds. The strategic partnership Russia and Iran signed in January amid much fanfare appeared designed to signal exactly the kind of growing alliance that would involve mutual support in times of crisis.

The disconnect between rhetoric and action raises fundamental questions about the nature of these authoritarian partnerships. If the Axis of Upheaval cannot or will not defend one of its core members during an unprovoked attack, what does that say about the durability of anti-Western alliances more broadly? The answer, as it turns out, reveals much about the transactional nature of these relationships and the stark contrast with American alliance structures.

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## Russia's Pattern of Abandoning Allies

From the Iranian perspective, expectations of Russian support seemed reasonable. Since Russian aircraft began bombing Syrian cities in 2015, the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic had worked together to expand their influence, initially focused on keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. But the partnership reached new heights after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow found itself desperately in need of military supplies.

Iran proved to be among the first to answer Russia's call for help. Iranian Shahed drones began appearing in Ukraine in summer 2022 and have since become a fixture of the war, causing death and destruction across Ukrainian cities. The technology proved so valuable that Russia began manufacturing the drones domestically, producing 2,700 Shaheds per month. Tehran also provided artillery ammunition and may have sent ballistic missiles, with these supplies arriving at Russia's greatest point of weakness in the war.

While Iran received payment for these weapons, the Islamic Republic might reasonably have expected some reciprocal support when it faced its own crisis. As Iran researcher Mahnaz Shirali noted, Russia has never truly helped Iran, while the Islamic Republic has provided Moscow with substantial military assistance. This one-sided dynamic became even clearer in November 2023, when Iran—likely sensing that war with Israel was approaching—requested additional S-400 air-defense systems, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters from Russia.

According to Nikita Smagin, an expert on Russia-Iran relations, Iran had been asking Russia for weapons for years, requesting aircraft and air defense systems, but Russia gave practically nothing. This pattern continued even after Israel destroyed Iran's pre-existing air defenses, with Russia either unable or unwilling to replace them in the months that followed. The only jets Moscow supplied were Yak-130 training aircraft, with diplomatic pressure from Gulf states preventing the sale of anything more advanced.

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## The Kremlin's Transactional Alliance Strategy

Russia's failure to support Iran fits within a broader pattern of the Kremlin abandoning allies when inconvenient. In 2023, Azerbaijan's forces overran the ethnically-Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers, whom Vladimir Putin had personally promised would guarantee the safety of the Karabakhis. The year before, Azerbaijan shelled across the border into Armenia itself, yet Moscow took no action despite having a mutual defense treaty with Yerevan.

The Kremlin attempted to spin Armenia's abandonment as punishment for flirting with the West, but Yerevan only began looking to France and America after realizing Russia couldn't or wouldn't defend it. The situation proved even more disappointing for Bashar al-Assad, whom Putin had spent a decade propping up. When a coalition of rebel groups marched on Damascus in late 2024, Putin failed to intervene, resulting in Assad's overthrow.

In early 2025, the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria experienced similar abandonment when Moscow cut off gas supplies. Effectively a Russian client state since 1992, Transnistria's economy had been sustained by massive flows of free gas, but Gazprom stopped deliveries in January as a means to pressure Moldova. While Moldova suffered an energy shock, Transnistria nearly collapsed, entering a rolling state of emergency.

Iran has thus become simply the latest Russian friend to discover the partnership was mostly one-way. The last time Moscow successfully intervened to help an ally appears to have been over three years ago, when the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization helped put down riots in Kazakhstan in early 2022. This date suggests a clear reason for the Kremlin's faltering reach: since becoming bogged down in the Ukrainian quagmire, Russia has lacked the strength to handle other crises. From simultaneously conducting an air war in Syria, a hybrid war in eastern Donbas, and peacekeeping operations in frozen conflicts in the Caucasus during the 2010s—not to mention propping up dictators in places like Belarus—Russia today can sustain only its land war in Ukraine.

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<!-- aeo:section start="moscow-s-competing-middle-east-interests" -->
## Moscow's Competing Middle East Interests

While Russia's overstretched military capabilities provide one explanation for its failure to support Iran, the specifics of Moscow's Middle East relationships reveal additional complications. Perhaps most significant is Russia's relationship with Iran's greatest enemy: Israel. While Moscow and Jerusalem aren't exactly friends, there exists greater cooperation between them than might be expected given Israel's position in the Western camp. Israel hasn't joined sanctions on Russia, hasn't sent Ukraine advanced weapons, and in February joined the United States in voting against a UN resolution condemning Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

The reasons for this semi-friendly relationship are complex, but the key point is that Putin remains eager to keep things cordial with the Israelis, with the upsides to a positive relationship with Jerusalem outweighing the downsides of Iran being humiliated. Israel isn't the only Middle Eastern partner Russia wants to preserve. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have both maintained partnerships with Moscow, with the UAE becoming a key destination for Russian oligarchs escaping sanctions. Both countries would be far from impressed if the Kremlin started supplying Tehran with advanced weapons.

There's also the question of whether the Kremlin even wants Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. Assuming the ceasefire holds, the Iran-Israel War appears to have been limited in scope, with Israel's operations primarily aimed at stopping Iran's nuclear program rather than pursuing regime change. This outcome might suit the Kremlin perfectly, not just because a nuclear-armed Iran would potentially destabilize the entire region, but because Moscow knows it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran.

This points to a final theory: perhaps Russia has failed to help Iran because having a weaker partner suits Putin's interests. Speaking to the Wall Street Journal, Tino Sanandaji from the Stockholm School of Economics noted that a common complaint in Iran is that China and Russia, rather than being true friends, exploit Iran's isolation to obtain cheap natural resources while selling Iran second-rate military hardware at inflated prices, sometimes never even delivering the promised equipment. Tehran's weakness means it can't be choosy about who it sells weapons and oil to, but also can't do anything when the buyers fail to give much in return.

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<!-- aeo:section start="china-s-superficial-partnership-with-tehran" -->
## China's Superficial Partnership with Tehran

While Russia's abandonment of Iran might be explained by military overextension and competing regional interests, China's failure to support Tehran reveals a different dynamic. Iran depends heavily on China, far more so than on Russia, with China serving as Iran's largest trading partner and the largest importer of its oil. Since 2021, China has earmarked the equivalent of nearly half a trillion US dollars to invest in Iran, benefiting from sharply discounted oil and consistent access to energy resources in the event of war with the West.

However, China's interests in the Middle East extend far beyond Iran. Beijing maintains far closer relationships with other Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE—nations that have quite negative relationships with Iran. Unlike many of China's other partners, Iran can be belligerent, even demanding that China pay more for oil in 2023 and temporarily stopping the flow of oil when Beijing refused.

Despite China's efforts to become a major exporter of modern military equipment, Chinese weapons have yet to flow into Iran in large quantities. China supported America's first nuclear deal with Iran, the JCPOA, despite helping Iran's rivals in Riyadh develop a civil nuclear program. When it was convenient in 2024 for China to reject Iran's claims in a territorial dispute with the Emirates, Beijing did so unapologetically and with little regard for Iranian backlash.

In the global press, China talks expansively about what Xi Jinping referred to in 2024 as his desire to "unswervingly develop friendly cooperation with Iran." But examining the details reveals China's relationship with Iran as relatively superficial. Beijing is willing to compromise basically none of its other interests to make life easier for Tehran, and Beijing's leaders are fully aware that Tehran needs them more than they need Tehran.

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<!-- aeo:section start="beijing-s-cost-benefit-analysis" -->
## Beijing's Cost-Benefit Analysis

When Iran and Israel entered direct confrontation, neither of the actions Iran could have taken—rapidly developing a nuclear weapon or shutting down the Strait of Hormuz to restrict oil flow from Gulf states—would have brought any benefit to China. In fact, both scenarios would have posed real risks to China's bottom line. If China had supported Iran in its war effort, it's difficult to identify any real, tangible benefit Beijing could have gained.

In a hypothetical world where Iran could hand Israel and the United States a major strategic defeat, embarrass their militaries on the world stage, and force them into submission, that might have been a version of the future China would want to usher in. But in reality, the gap in military capabilities between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other was simply too massive for Chinese assistance to overcome.

Unlike Russia, where the Kremlin readily hands out security guarantees even while lacking follow-through, China has never made a habit of providing guarantees to protect its allies. This simply isn't China's modus operandi; it's a nation with no real history of foreign intervention and no desire to participate in somebody else's regional war. When the war between Israel and Iran broke out, it would have been highly uncharacteristic for China to get involved, not least because the faster Iran was defeated, the sooner China could be assured that its regional oil interests were safe from harm.

Instead, China kept its support for Iran strictly rhetorical, tut-tutting and berating the United States from the sidelines while demonstrating zero interest in actually doing anything about the situation. When the US attacked Iran directly, China accused Washington of severe violations of the UN Charter and called on the UN Security Council—where the US has veto power—to intervene. China joined Russia and Pakistan in calling for a ceasefire and condemned Israel's "violation of Iran's sovereignty."

In a moment when the United States and one of its closest allies could be accused of flagrantly ignoring international norms, it served China's interests to call that out. Beijing could sit on the sidelines condemning warmongering Americans, imploring the rest of the world to follow China's example instead and look to China as the picture of diplomatic restraint or even a natural peacemaker. But China's ability to serve its own domestic interests in this conflict ended there. The most consistent way to understand China's actions is by assuming that China will protect its own interests above all else.

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<!-- aeo:section start="north-korea-s-limited-capacity-for-support" -->
## North Korea's Limited Capacity for Support

The fourth nation of the Axis of Upheaval, North Korea, might seem best suited to help the theocracy in Tehran in its time of need—rogue state collaboration at its finest. After all, North Korea has proved perfectly willing to help Russia during war, sending over ten thousand troops to accomplish that task. If Iran wants a nuclear weapon so badly, North Korea would seem the perfect candidate to provide one, especially given that Iran and North Korea are already suspected of collaborating on missile designs, underground bunker design, and more.

But in truth, Iran doesn't want a nuclear weapon, at least not now. Perhaps it truly is Tehran's ambition to have a nuclear arsenal one day, despite their insistence that they only want a civilian nuclear program. But Iran understands just as well as anybody that if it built a nuclear weapon today, it would be attacked by Israel and America with far greater force than it already has been.

Nor would North Korean troops be particularly useful. Israel and Iran are fighting an air war, and while North Korea has plenty of bodies and ammunition to spare, it can't rapidly transfer medium-range ballistic missiles across the four thousand miles between Pyongyang and Tehran. Put simply, North Korea and Iran simply aren't equipped for any kind of real military partnership. Their economies are in chronic disrepair, they lack the logistical means to transfer personnel or weapons at large scale, and both have enough problems already before appearing to team up in an alliance that would send the Western world into a very violent panic.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-weakness-of-anti-western-alliances" -->
## The Weakness of Anti-Western Alliances

The relatively straightforward explanations for why the Axis of Upheaval was missing in action during Iran's crisis point to a deeper truth about the contemporary international order. For all the talk about a multipolar world, the fact remains that the only nations capable of challenging America just aren't very good at building durable military alliances. On the economic side, groupings like the European Union or even BRICS could be said to wield might comparable to the United States. But when it comes to hard power—the guns, bombs, and missiles of force projection—there is literally nothing on Earth that can match the network of alliances America has built across the globe.

At least, for now. The reason Washington remains dominant today isn't just thanks to the US operating the most powerful army in existence. It's because nations around the world can look at the way America stepped into this war to help its ally Israel, then look at the way the Axis of Upheaval ignored its friend Iran, and draw their own conclusions. When it appears that Washington extends that same protection to allies from Poland to South Korea, that makes Team America seem like a pretty good side to be on.

The contrast between American alliance structures and those of its rivals couldn't be starker. The United States has spent decades building institutional frameworks like NATO, bilateral defense treaties, and security partnerships that create genuine mutual obligations. These alliances involve regular military exercises, integrated command structures, intelligence sharing, and—crucially—a demonstrated willingness to honor commitments even when inconvenient. The Axis of Upheaval, by contrast, consists of transactional relationships where each party pursues its own narrow interests with little regard for partners' needs.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-future-of-american-alliances" -->
## The Future of American Alliances

However, in this era of fraying bonds, it's worth asking how much longer American alliance superiority may remain true. As US commitment to NATO is called into question, as allies in East Asia are hit with tariffs and subjected to defense spending shakedowns, it suddenly seems like the American web of alliances may not be as strong as it once appeared.

The Axis of Upheaval may have been humiliated by its inability to protect Iran in this war, exposing the fundamental weakness of authoritarian partnerships built on opportunism rather than shared values or genuine mutual defense commitments. But the lesson cuts both ways. If the United States begins to treat its own alliances as transactionally as Russia and China treat theirs—demanding immediate returns on investment, questioning the value of long-standing commitments, and prioritizing short-term economic gains over strategic relationships—then the very advantage that currently distinguishes American power could erode.

The failure of Russia, China, and North Korea to support Iran demonstrates that authoritarian regimes struggle to build the kind of durable, institutionalized alliances that have been the foundation of American global leadership. These regimes operate on the basis of immediate self-interest, viewing partnerships as tools to be exploited rather than relationships to be nurtured. They lack the ideological cohesion, institutional frameworks, and demonstrated reliability that make allies willing to bear costs on each other's behalf.

Yet this advantage is not permanent or guaranteed. It must be continuously earned through demonstrated commitment, even when that commitment is costly or inconvenient. The collective West may look at Iran's abandonment and feel vindicated in its alliance structures. But unless something changes soon, it may be that the collective West is one day left to whistle and look the other way as one of its own members is left out to dry, having squandered the very alliance advantage that once made American leadership so formidable.

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<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)
- [How the UAE's Regional Meddling Triggered a Historic Realignment Across the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-destabilizing-middle-east-regional-realignment-2026)
- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the Axis of Upheaval?

The Axis of Upheaval refers to a loosely aligned bloc of anti-Western authoritarian regimes comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that grew closer throughout the early 2020s, particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Western strategists feared this alignment could challenge American-led global order across multiple regions simultaneously.

### Why didn't Russia help Iran when Israel and the US attacked?

Russia failed to support Iran for multiple reasons: military overextension from the Ukraine war, desire to maintain positive relationships with Israel and Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, lack of interest in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons that would reduce Russian leverage, and a transactional foreign policy approach that exploits Iran's isolation for cheap resources rather than providing genuine partnership. According to the Wall Street Journal, a common complaint inside Iran is that China and Russia exploit its isolation to obtain cheap natural resources while selling second-rate military hardware at inflated prices.

### What military support did Iran provide to Russia, and what did Russia give in return?

Iran supplied Russia with thousands of Shahed drones starting in summer 2022, which became fixtures of the war causing destruction across Ukrainian cities — Russia now manufactures 2,700 Shaheds per month domestically. Iran also provided artillery ammunition and may have sent ballistic missiles. In return, when Iran requested S-400 air defense systems, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Su-35 jet fighters in November 2023, Russia supplied only Yak-130 training aircraft, with diplomatic pressure from Gulf states preventing any more advanced transfers.

### Why didn't China support Iran militarily?

China has no history of foreign military intervention and operates on a strictly transactional basis. Beijing has far closer relationships with Iran's rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and supporting Iran would have risked China's broader Middle East oil interests with no tangible benefit. The military capability gap between the US-Israel side and Iran was too massive for Chinese assistance to overcome, and in a hypothetical Iranian victory, China still could not have identified any real tangible benefit from having intervened.

### What other allies has Russia abandoned recently, and what does that pattern reveal?

Russia failed to defend Armenia despite a mutual defense treaty when Azerbaijan attacked in 2022-2023, allowed Bashar al-Assad to be overthrown in Syria in late 2024 after a decade of propping him up, and cut off gas supplies to its client state Transnistria in early 2025. The last successful Russian intervention to help an ally was in Kazakhstan in early 2022. This pattern reveals that since becoming bogged down in Ukraine, Russia can sustain only its land war there, leaving every other commitment hollow.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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<!-- aeo:section end="sources" -->