--- title: "Somaliland: Future Strategic Partner, or Future Pariah State?" description: "In the Horn of Africa, there are few things more abundant than war. From civil war and piracy in Somalia, to ethnic cleansing in the Tigray region, to aggressive posturing by Ethiopia, the region sits on the precipice at any given moment. It is a place where the UN goes to embarrass itself, where ceasefires and peace accords go to be broken, and where dreams of stability and economic prosperity go to die. But in all this chaos, there is one geopolitical oddity that stands alone: Somaliland. Situated in the northwest of what is, at least nominally, the nation of Somalia, Somaliland is a globally unrecognized but functionally sovereign state. It has a democratically elected government, it is the largest unrecognized nation in the world, and it has a fair bit of geopolitical potential. In an area where violence and volatility are all too common, Somaliland is practically an oasis of stability, and it is not unthinkable that in exchange for recognition on the global stage, it could be built into a stabilizing force for the whole region. But at the same time, reports of massacres from inside Somaliland have led to fears that this de facto state could get very dark, very quickly. Somaliland is a stateless nation on the precipice. The question is what Somaliland could be — and what Somaliland might become, if it is swept up into the same carnage that has defined the entire region.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- Somaliland is the world's largest unrecognized nation with 5.7 million people, 177,000 square kilometers, and a GDP of just $2.5 billion, yet maintains a functioning multiparty democracy.\n- The Isaaq clan genocide orchestrated by Somalia's ruling junta may have killed as many as 200,000 civilians, fueling Somaliland's drive for independence after the regime collapsed in 1991.\n- UN arms embargoes on Somalia apply to Somaliland by default, barring it from acquiring weapons, receiving World Bank or IMF loans, or accessing formal humanitarian aid channels.\n- Somaliland's coastline along the Bab al-Mandeb strait — through which nearly one-third of global shipping passes — makes it prime strategic real estate for foreign military basing; Taiwan recognized Somaliland in 2020 and the UAE already operates from the port of Berbera.\n- The 2023 Las Anod conflict saw Somaliland bombard civilian areas, displace hundreds of thousands, and ultimately lose control of disputed territories to Puntland forces — raising doubts about the territory's democratic trajectory.\n\n## The Horn of Africa: A Region Defined by Instability\n\nLook up \"unstable\" in the dictionary, and you are likely to find a picture of the African Horn. Situated on the African continent's furthest eastern reaches, it is a region marked by frequent civil and international wars, drawn-out local conflicts, famines, droughts, and natural disasters. The nation of Somalia has been at war with itself since the 1990s. Eritrea and Ethiopia are lifelong frenemies, whilst both waging a brutal war against resistance fighters and civilians in the local Tigray region. The nation of Djibouti has made itself a military melting pot, hosting bases for the US, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia, and several other nations. Immediately to the west, neighboring Sudan is tearing itself to pieces. Across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Yemen's ongoing civil war and famines have led to the deaths of close to half a million people and displacement of millions more. In the southwest, Rwanda and Uganda wage a proxy war against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whilst barely tolerating each other. Kenya, the only reasonably stable country in the region, looks to be on the edge of going to war with the gangs of Haiti, halfway around the world. In a place like this, any geopolitical entity — recognized or otherwise — that can keep its peace despite the violence around it, is going to be rather unique, and Somaliland is exactly that.\n\n## From British Protectorate to Breakaway State: Somaliland's Historical Path\n\nWith a population of about 5.7 million people, a land area of some 177,000 square kilometers or 68,000 square miles, and a total GDP of just $2.5 billion, Somaliland is not much to look at, and although it has enough coastline and enough of an agriculture industry to at least keep its people mostly fed, it is decades off from gaining economic strength, even in the best-case scenario. But it also has one key attribute that sets it apart from its neighbors — specifically, that it is not Somalia, at least not in any functional sense. Somaliland has been distinct from the rest of territorial Somalia since the colonial period, where Somaliland existed as a British protectorate — with some exceptions — through 1960, whereas the rest of Somalia had been under Italian rule. It was granted independence in that same year, but it was expected to merge with neighboring Somalia into the Somali Republic, which it did just a few days later. But even from these early days, Somaliland had very little will to be part of Somalia; many northerners in modern Somaliland boycotted a referendum on their new constitution in 1961, and those that did vote largely voted against it. A politician from Somaliland spent two years as Prime Minister in the late 1960s, but was forced out when Somalia was taken over in a military coup, which held power for 22 years. During that time, Somaliland waged a war of independence, one that saw over a hundred thousand people killed and half a million displaced within the territory. That included a genocide against the Isaaq clan of Somaliland, orchestrated by the ruling junta in Somalia, which some sources report may have killed as many as 200,000 civilians. But despite the intense and unyielding pain of genocide, the resistance in Somaliland was able to outlast Somalia's ruling regime, and when the regime collapsed in early 1991, Somaliland was left to pick up the pieces alone. Refugees and internally displaced people were able to return home, neighborhoods and businesses were slowly rebuilt, and the area's many militias were disbanded or unified into the new Somaliland National Armed Forces. Despite brief outbursts of violence in 1992, Somaliland was able to coalesce itself under an elected civilian government, and chose its first elected president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, in 2003. By then, Somaliland had also ratified its constitution in what is widely considered a free and fair vote, which saw over 97% of the population vote in favor of the constitution with a turnout of very nearly 100% of eligible voters. In the intervening years, Somaliland has been able to defend its borders and stay aloof from the violence ravaging much of southern Somalia. It has been consistently disinterested in participating in reunification talks with the rest of Somalia, understandably so, and maintains its claim to independence, although it is not recognized by any UN member state. It was, however, recognized by Taiwan in 2020, with Taipei having spread its influence across the area ever since.\n\n## Stability Amid Poverty: Somaliland's Paradox\n\nSomaliland is a multiparty democracy, and despite its weak economy, very low GDP per capita, and grim situation for the average citizen, it has stayed almost completely away from the armed conflicts that have defined the surrounding region. It relies on a steady stream of payments sent from Somalilanders working in other countries, it lives almost entirely without foreign aid, and it holds its tribes and ethnic factions together largely through participation in the military, which, despite its limited resources, is generally able to keep coastal waters safe from piracy and illegal fishing. Overall, the situation for Somalilanders is very bad, regardless of whether the breakaway territory is uncommonly stable in its region. Illiteracy in Somaliland is as high as 70% in some areas, unemployment is through the roof, education access is limited, most people live in poverty, and luxuries like water, reliable sanitation, and electricity are all but nonexistent for large sections of the population. It may be safe and stable, especially in the capital city of Hargeisa, yet it is geopolitically isolated on a level rarely seen around the world. But unlike other nations and communities in the African Horn, the plight of the average Somalilander seems, at the very least, not to be getting worse — and it is in the prospect of making Somaliland better that its value to other nations will start to become clear.\n\n## The Strategic Case for Recognizing Somaliland\n\nIf a couple of decently powerful nations were about to go to war, and each of them got to pick someone on the global stage who was going to have their back, it would be extremely unlikely that either of them would choose Somaliland. After all, this little pocket of not-quite-Somalia is not exactly a military powerhouse. It lacks an air force, it has a grand total of twelve artillery pieces, and on the high seas, it sails a total of one Coast Guard ship and seven armed speedboats. But with 45 T-54 and T-55 tanks to its name, and an overall strength of up to 100,000 combined active and reserve personnel, it is more than a match for better-equipped but vastly outmanned Somalia. It is capable of defending its borders, it can eliminate threats to its own internal security, and it has the political will to resist offensive military action from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and other neighbors, to the extent that their military resources would allow them to do so. But therein lies the issue with Somaliland's national defense — the fact that Somaliland is barred from acquiring armaments from anywhere in the world. Technically speaking, it is Somalia that the UN prohibits from procuring weapons, and according to the UN, Somaliland is part of Somalia, thus falling under that same designation. So long as that is the case, Somaliland cannot add to its arsenal and cannot acquire any more advanced weaponry. This is an issue that goes far beyond the Somaliland armed forces. Because it is not a recognized nation, it cannot receive loans from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund; it is unable to formally request help from many providers of humanitarian aid, and it is subject to all the same trade embargoes that the rest of Somalia deals with. The Somaliland passport is not recognized in most global nations, the Somaliland shilling generally cannot be exchanged outside of Somaliland itself, and private donors who may want to give money have few mechanisms to verify that aid sent to Somaliland directly will be used for the benefit of the people rather than siphoned off. All those barriers can go away in the blink of an eye if one key change happens: international recognition. If the nations of the world were to recognize Somaliland's independence tomorrow, then immediately, the new nation would be able to welcome a tidal wave of humanitarian assistance; it would be able to work with international banks to start triaging its own finances; and it would be able to acquire military equipment that could deter any hungry expansionist states in the region.\n\n## Maritime Chokepoints, Military Bases, and Oil: What Somaliland Offers the World\n\nPerhaps the most obvious strategic value lies in Somaliland's position alongside the Gulf of Aden, right next to a sea lane called the Bab al-Mandeb. This is an incredibly well-traveled shipping route, with nearly one-third of the globe's shipping traffic moving through that area each year, and while the area is a lot more free from pirates and other offshore threats than it used to be, Somaliland is still located on prime real estate when it comes to control of the Gulf. The opposite shore belongs to Yemen, a highly unstable nation still rocked by civil war, meaning that if a nation wants to assert its influence across that critical maritime region, then Somaliland is the place to base operations. Somaliland also has potential to be swept up in a much larger ongoing trend: the expansion of foreign influence in the African Horn more broadly, by way of infrastructural and security investment. Neighboring Djibouti hosts military bases for no fewer than eight nations, some of which have less than friendly relationships at present. For those nations, the prospect of shifting operations to Somaliland would offer a valuable opportunity to build up a military presence and have a far easier time establishing close ties with the local government, as opposed to the highly competitive political atmosphere in Djibouti. Somaliland has offered the United States military use of a seaport and airport as recently as 2022, and the United Arab Emirates already run operations out of the port of Berbera. There is also a major opportunity in courting other potential visitors who have been denied access to the exclusive club next door. Both India and Russia have attempted to get in on Djibouti's military paradise, but Russia's aspirations have been largely blocked in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, while India has instead built on the remote Agalega Islands, some three thousand kilometers away. Either nation could take the politically risky but militarily rewarding step of recognizing Somaliland and proceeding with a partnership from there. Somaliland also has potential inroads with the United States and the European Union, owing to Taiwan's 2020 decision to open diplomatic ties with Somaliland directly, while China, rapidly expanding its influence across Africa, could make Somaliland a client state while simultaneously booting Taiwan from the premises. On the topic of sea access, Somaliland may have an increasingly promising potential partner in neighboring Ethiopia, which has spent months expressing its desire for access to a seaport. Ethiopia is landlocked by Eritrea and Djibouti to the north, and Somalia to the east, raising fears that the country might be considering the use of military force to establish a presence on the seaside. But Somaliland enjoys relations with Ethiopia that, while not incredible, are at least not overtly hostile, and while Somaliland might have some stipulations for Ethiopia to build a port — specifically, for Ethiopian officials to refer publicly to the independent nation of Somaliland — that is almost certainly an easier cost for Ethiopia to pay than provoking a full-scale war. Then there is the question of oil, which was confirmed to exist in Somaliland within the last year. The territory's lack of international recognition means that investments in getting to that oil have been slow to arrive, but at the same time, Somaliland's very limited economic resources mean that it will be very difficult to build the infrastructure to access that oil on their own. Any country willing to go out on a limb and work with Somaliland as an independent nation could very well be stumbling onto serious oil reserves and positioning themselves to benefit greatly by drilling for it.\n\n## Why the World Has Not Recognized Somaliland\n\nWhether it is the global West, or Russia, or China, or India, or somebody else who chooses to partner with Somaliland, that initiative would probably be fairly cheap — at least in comparison to what wealthy countries are likely to experience with other developing nations. Somaliland is very poor, and if the budding nation is willing to take the money it makes from a partnership and use that money to benefit its people, then it can do a lot of good work with a seemingly small amount of capital. Add to that the potential for Somaliland to give up some of its expected revenues in exchange for recognition of its independence, and Somaliland's potential foreign backers could enjoy cheaper land-leasing for military bases, a greater share of oil profits, and less restrictive regulations than what they would find elsewhere. Such a situation could very easily become exploitative against the government and people of Somaliland, but even still, it is impossible to overstate just how massive a deal like this would be in Somaliland's broader efforts to change its fortunes. With all these potential upsides to recognizing Somaliland's independence, one key question emerges: if Somaliland could be so helpful, then why has no one recognized it? Around the world, much of the answer comes from deference to the African Union, which the UN, the United States, and other global entities have tried to elevate as a reliable decision-maker in African matters. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the African Union has resisted recognizing Somaliland largely because of the implications that would have across other parts of Africa. Western Sahara in territorially disputed Morocco, Biafra in territorial Nigeria, Ambazonia in Cameroon, Brazzaville in the Congo, Mombasa in Kenya, and a whole range of other breakaway regions would immediately have a claim to legitimacy if Somaliland got its independence — something that only South Sudan and Eritrea have earned since the African Union formed some sixty years ago. The fact that Eritrea has since become an incredibly repressive authoritarian state, while South Sudan has teetered on the edge of failure for its entire existence, only serves to remind the African Union and the neighboring Arab League just how dangerous an independent Somaliland might become — regardless of the situation in the real Somaliland. Those concerns, in the eyes of the world, are worth the price of allowing Somaliland to languish, even as its potential as a force for stability is wasted as the clock runs out.\n\n## The Puntland Conflict and Signs of Democratic Backsliding\n\nThere is also a much darker side to the situation in Somaliland, one that suggests this struggling, embryonic nation might go the way of the rest of the countries in the African Horn unless something changes soon. The problems are twofold: hostilities with a fellow unrecognized neighbor, and the potential for Somaliland's fragile democracy to begin coming apart at the seams. First, there is the matter of Puntland. One of Somalia's remaining member provinces, Puntland is in reality a semi-autonomous region that can do as it pleases on its own territory — the very tip of the African Horn. Puntland and Somaliland both lay claim to several disputed stretches of territory: the provinces of Sool and Sanaag, and the small Buuhoodle district of a province called Togdheer. Skirmishes between the two are not new; in 2007, they fought over the city of Las Anod in a battle that left some ten to twenty people dead by official counts, and in 2016, a skirmish saw Somaliland hold a prominent Puntland legislator hostage. But tensions have been consistently high since 2018, when the Battle of Tukaraq left up to 300 people dead and nearly 3,000 families displaced. That battle was a victory for Somaliland, but it laid the groundwork for what happened in 2023: a series of clashes in and around Las Anod that continued for over nine months. The violence began after years of civil unrest and political assassinations in Las Anod, which had been under Somaliland's control since 2007. Early in 2023, after initial skirmishes caused Somaliland troops to withdraw from the area, Somaliland retaliated with bombardments of civilian areas, causing clan leaders in Las Anod to accuse the Somaliland government of genocide. Offensive actions by Somaliland continued in the following months, indiscriminately firing rockets, bombing public buildings and hospitals, and killing or injuring hundreds of people, although the Somaliland government has consistently presented a differing version of events and claimed that it has been fighting clan and Islamist militias. The situation escalated further in August of 2023, when Puntland forces defeated a pair of well-fortified strongholds that belonged to Somaliland, and since that time, Somaliland has lost control over the regions it disputed with Puntland. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced since the start of the fighting, and the incident has prompted rare international attention toward the region, with several major world powers declaring that the conflict called into question their continued engagement with Somaliland. The other emerging set of issues has to do with democratic backsliding and increasingly foreboding signs that political and civil rights in Somaliland are coming under attack. In 2023, Somaliland was awarded a score of 44 out of 100 by Freedom House, rating it Partly Free, but that score featured a five-point erosion from its score in 2022. The report notes myriad issues, both in terms of political rights and civil liberties, largely brought on by the Somaliland government's recent tendency to delay elections, extend the mandate of elected officials, and violently repress political dissidents and protesters. Powerful clans have increasingly extended their own dominance over local political systems, while protections against corruption and nepotism are starkly limited. Journalists have come under increasing harassment and experienced physical assault, and press behaviors are tightly regulated and punished within the legal system. Citizens have begun to be arrested for controversial posts on social media and have been met with live ammunition from security forces while trying to protest. Domestic violence and female genital mutilation are common and serious problems, but both have been largely ignored by Somaliland's leaders.\n\n## Reckoning with Somaliland: A Closing Window of Opportunity\n\nIronically, some of the recent turn toward violence has come out of more than just a desire for authoritarianism or a desire to assert authority in territories disputed with Puntland. Instead, many political officials and even ordinary Somalilanders have expressed a growing frustration with Somaliland's fruitless attempts to present itself as a nonthreatening potential ally to world nations. In the territory, many people are embittered against Somaliland's tendency to be peaceful, simply because this means that Somaliland is also very quiet, very unobtrusive, and in general the least of anyone's concerns in the African Horn. A lack of wars and a lack of ongoing genocides has translated to a relative lack of interest in changing the status quo there. That is not to say that Somaliland's current uptick in violence is happening as a cry for help, but at the same time, it is a sobering reminder of Somaliland's situation. When examining the grand scope of Somaliland's history, it has become increasingly clear that the territory is coming to a turning point. Although it has managed to survive for decades as a reasonably peaceful, reasonably free holdout in a volatile region, Somaliland's recent years have seen the country increasingly struggle to hold itself together in its current form, while having a harder and harder time turning away from authoritarianism. It is not for any lack of solutions; the international community has a relief valve well within reach, either by recognizing Somaliland's independence claims and doing business with it as a nation, or by working to change the status quo inside Somalia and supply aid more directly to those in Somaliland who need it. No matter which nation comes forward and provides that support, no matter their intentions or political ideology, it is impossible to ignore the fact that a relatively small amount of money, directed toward ordinary Somalilanders, can make an outsize difference in rescuing people from poverty and the brink of famine. The potentially stabilizing influence of foreign partners could be game-changing for Somaliland's fledgling democracy. And if the price Somaliland's ruling elites must pay for recognition and economic stability is to take steps against corruption, toward openness, and in preservation of their own clans and their shared territory, that price is probably worth paying. There is, absolutely, potential for such a process to exploit Somaliland rather than developing it, or for Somaliland's elites to get richer as everyone else gets poorer. But it does not have to be that way, and after so many failed geopolitical experiments on the African continent, there are no excuses for Somaliland's potential foreign partners not to learn from their mistakes and get one right. Somaliland's most famous celebrity, Edna Adan, told a reporter from The Guardian in 2018, \"For 25 years I've been waiting for the world to see how stable, peaceful and governable we are.\" Adan should know better than most; she worked as Somalia's Foreign Minister from 2003 to 2006, working as a midwife and running a maternity hospital simultaneously during her entire tenure. And while Somaliland's last few years are filled with bad omens, filled with signs that things will get worse there if they proceed on their current path, the points Edna Adan makes about her fledgling nation are still true. There are plenty of good reasons, both humanitarian and selfish, for powerful global nations to support Somaliland's cause, but the window is closing.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why has no UN member state recognized Somaliland's independence?\n\nThe African Union has resisted recognizing Somaliland largely because doing so would give legitimacy to a long list of other breakaway regions across Africa — from Western Sahara to Biafra to Ambazonia — and the UN, US, and other global bodies have deferred to the AU on African territorial matters. The AU's own track record with the only two post-colonial African state splits, Eritrea and South Sudan, has reinforced skepticism about encouraging further secession.\n\n### What strategic value does Somaliland offer to foreign powers?\n\nSomaliland sits alongside the Gulf of Aden next to the Bab al-Mandeb, one of the world's most critical shipping lanes, through which nearly one-third of global shipping passes annually. Its position makes it prime real estate for military basing, particularly as an alternative to overcrowded Djibouti. The UAE already runs operations from the port of Berbera, the United States was offered use of a seaport and airport in 2022, and confirmed oil reserves add further economic incentive for potential partners.\n\n### What happened in the Las Anod conflict of 2023 and what did it reveal about Somaliland?\n\nA series of clashes erupted in and around Las Anod in early 2023 after years of civil unrest and political assassinations in the city. Somaliland retaliated with bombardments of civilian areas, indiscriminately firing rockets and bombing public buildings and hospitals, prompting clan leaders to accuse the Somaliland government of genocide. By August 2023, Puntland forces defeated Somaliland's strongholds in the region, and Somaliland ultimately lost control of the disputed territories — raising serious concerns among world powers about the territory's stability.\n\n### Why does Somaliland's lack of recognition create such severe practical problems?\n\nBecause the UN treats Somaliland as part of Somalia, it falls under the UN arms embargo on Somalia, barring it from acquiring weapons or adding to its arsenal. The same unrecognized status prevents Somaliland from receiving World Bank or IMF loans, formally requesting humanitarian aid, using its currency internationally, or having its passports accepted in most countries — all barriers that could disappear with a single act of international recognition.\n\n### What warning signs of democratic backsliding has Somaliland shown in recent years?\n\nFreedom House gave Somaliland a score of 44 out of 100 in 2023, rating it Partly Free, with a five-point erosion from 2022. The report cited the government's tendency to delay elections, extend officials' mandates, and violently repress dissidents and protesters. Powerful clans have increasingly dominated local politics, journalists face harassment and physical assault, and citizens have been arrested for social media posts and met with live ammunition during protests.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Ethiopia and Eritrea Are Preparing for War: Tigray Faces Another Catastrophic Conflict](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ethiopia-eritrea-preparing-for-war-tigray-conflict)\n- [Is Ethiopia At War Again? The Escalating Fano Insurgency in Amhara Region](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-ethiopia-at-war-again-fano-insurgency-amhara)\n- [Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-kenyas-haiti-intervention-in-danger-of-falling-apart)\n- [South Sudan Is Sliding into War: How the World's Youngest Nation Faces Collapse in 2025](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-sliding-into-war-2025-civil-war-crisis)\n- [Sudan's Partition: Ethnic Cleansing and the Push for a Divided State](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/sudan-partition-ethnic-cleansing-darfur-crisis)\n\n## Sources\n1. \n2. \n3. \n4. \n5. \n6. \n7. \n8. \n9. \n10. \n11. \n12. \n13. \n14. \n15. \n16. \n17. \n18. \n19. \n20. \n21. \n22. \n\n[1]: https://www.cfr.org/report/climate-change-and-regional-instability-horn-africa\n[2]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/02/ethiopian-civil-war-parties-agree-truce-to-end-hostilities\n[3]: https://politicstoday.org/djibouti-surrounded-by-military-bases-of-china-us-france-uk-germany-others/\n[4]: https://somalilandsun.com/somaliland-after-two-decades-the-armed-forces-come-to-age/\n[5]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/6/shared-status-fuels-closer-taiwan-and-somaliland-partnership\n[6]: https://web.archive.org/web/20130120162017/http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1299/Somalilands_Military_is_a_Shadow_of_the_Past_\n[7]: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1042401\n[8]: https://cja.org/where-we-work/somalia/related-resources/background-on-somaliland/\n[9]: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state\n[10]: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/agalega-glimpse-india-s-remote-island-military-base\n[11]: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somaliland-combats-al-shabaab/\n[12]: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/20/when-is-a-nation-not-a-nation-somalilands-dream-of-independence\n[13]: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa\n[14]: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2023/jan/opinion-somalilands-oil-find-could-reset-regional-balance-heres-how\n[15]: https://www.voanews.com/a/somaliland-withdraws-troops-from-disputed-town-to-halt-violence/6907540.html\n[16]: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/5/10/conflict-in-disputed-las-anod-dims-somalilands-diplomatic-dreams\n[17]: https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/inside-the-newest-conflict-in-somalias-long-civil-war/\n[18]: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/23/healthcare-reaches-new-lows-in-somaliland-as-conflict-hits-new-highs\n[19]: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/03/07/somaliland__key_to_winning_americas_longest_war_114238.html\n[20]: https://web.archive.org/web/20210908130425/https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1150581/download\n[21]: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/29/new-world-bank-gdp-and-poverty-estimates-for-somaliland\n[22]: https://freedomhouse.org/country/somaliland/freedom-world/2023\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/somaliland-future-strategic-partner-or-pariah-state.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/somaliland-future-strategic-partner-or-pariah-state datePublished: 2026-03-04 dateModified: 2026-03-04 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/ovsKV1aLJSU/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: 7495222bda16acf1d653a31767e3a2d5ecc3b46c7eea558ef6597a42f7ee669a tokens: 8323 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/somaliland-future-strategic-partner-or-pariah-state.md.summary.md --- In the Horn of Africa, there are few things more abundant than war. From civil war and piracy in Somalia, to ethnic cleansing in the Tigray region, to aggressive posturing by Ethiopia, the region sits on the precipice at any given moment. It is a place where the UN goes to embarrass itself, where ceasefires and peace accords go to be broken, and where dreams of stability and economic prosperity go to die. But in all this chaos, there is one geopolitical oddity that stands alone: Somaliland. Situated in the northwest of what is, at least nominally, the nation of Somalia, Somaliland is a globally unrecognized but functionally sovereign state. It has a democratically elected government, it is the largest unrecognized nation in the world, and it has a fair bit of geopolitical potential. In an area where violence and volatility are all too common, Somaliland is practically an oasis of stability, and it is not unthinkable that in exchange for recognition on the global stage, it could be built into a stabilizing force for the whole region. But at the same time, reports of massacres from inside Somaliland have led to fears that this de facto state could get very dark, very quickly. Somaliland is a stateless nation on the precipice. The question is what Somaliland could be — and what Somaliland might become, if it is swept up into the same carnage that has defined the entire region. ## Key Takeaways - Somaliland is the world's largest unrecognized nation with 5.7 million people, 177,000 square kilometers, and a GDP of just $2.5 billion, yet maintains a functioning multiparty democracy. - The Isaaq clan genocide orchestrated by Somalia's ruling junta may have killed as many as 200,000 civilians, fueling Somaliland's drive for independence after the regime collapsed in 1991. - UN arms embargoes on Somalia apply to Somaliland by default, barring it from acquiring weapons, receiving World Bank or IMF loans, or accessing formal humanitarian aid channels. - Somaliland's coastline along the Bab al-Mandeb strait — through which nearly one-third of global shipping passes — makes it prime strategic real estate for foreign military basing; Taiwan recognized Somaliland in 2020 and the UAE already operates from the port of Berbera. - The 2023 Las Anod conflict saw Somaliland bombard civilian areas, displace hundreds of thousands, and ultimately lose control of disputed territories to Puntland forces — raising doubts about the territory's democratic trajectory. ## The Horn of Africa: A Region Defined by Instability Look up "unstable" in the dictionary, and you are likely to find a picture of the African Horn. Situated on the African continent's furthest eastern reaches, it is a region marked by frequent civil and international wars, drawn-out local conflicts, famines, droughts, and natural disasters. The nation of Somalia has been at war with itself since the 1990s. Eritrea and Ethiopia are lifelong frenemies, whilst both waging a brutal war against resistance fighters and civilians in the local Tigray region. The nation of Djibouti has made itself a military melting pot, hosting bases for the US, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia, and several other nations. Immediately to the west, neighboring Sudan is tearing itself to pieces. Across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Yemen's ongoing civil war and famines have led to the deaths of close to half a million people and displacement of millions more. In the southwest, Rwanda and Uganda wage a proxy war against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whilst barely tolerating each other. Kenya, the only reasonably stable country in the region, looks to be on the edge of going to war with the gangs of Haiti, halfway around the world. In a place like this, any geopolitical entity — recognized or otherwise — that can keep its peace despite the violence around it, is going to be rather unique, and Somaliland is exactly that. ## From British Protectorate to Breakaway State: Somaliland's Historical Path With a population of about 5.7 million people, a land area of some 177,000 square kilometers or 68,000 square miles, and a total GDP of just $2.5 billion, Somaliland is not much to look at, and although it has enough coastline and enough of an agriculture industry to at least keep its people mostly fed, it is decades off from gaining economic strength, even in the best-case scenario. But it also has one key attribute that sets it apart from its neighbors — specifically, that it is not Somalia, at least not in any functional sense. Somaliland has been distinct from the rest of territorial Somalia since the colonial period, where Somaliland existed as a British protectorate — with some exceptions — through 1960, whereas the rest of Somalia had been under Italian rule. It was granted independence in that same year, but it was expected to merge with neighboring Somalia into the Somali Republic, which it did just a few days later. But even from these early days, Somaliland had very little will to be part of Somalia; many northerners in modern Somaliland boycotted a referendum on their new constitution in 1961, and those that did vote largely voted against it. A politician from Somaliland spent two years as Prime Minister in the late 1960s, but was forced out when Somalia was taken over in a military coup, which held power for 22 years. During that time, Somaliland waged a war of independence, one that saw over a hundred thousand people killed and half a million displaced within the territory. That included a genocide against the Isaaq clan of Somaliland, orchestrated by the ruling junta in Somalia, which some sources report may have killed as many as 200,000 civilians. But despite the intense and unyielding pain of genocide, the resistance in Somaliland was able to outlast Somalia's ruling regime, and when the regime collapsed in early 1991, Somaliland was left to pick up the pieces alone. Refugees and internally displaced people were able to return home, neighborhoods and businesses were slowly rebuilt, and the area's many militias were disbanded or unified into the new Somaliland National Armed Forces. Despite brief outbursts of violence in 1992, Somaliland was able to coalesce itself under an elected civilian government, and chose its first elected president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, in 2003. By then, Somaliland had also ratified its constitution in what is widely considered a free and fair vote, which saw over 97% of the population vote in favor of the constitution with a turnout of very nearly 100% of eligible voters. In the intervening years, Somaliland has been able to defend its borders and stay aloof from the violence ravaging much of southern Somalia. It has been consistently disinterested in participating in reunification talks with the rest of Somalia, understandably so, and maintains its claim to independence, although it is not recognized by any UN member state. It was, however, recognized by Taiwan in 2020, with Taipei having spread its influence across the area ever since. ## Stability Amid Poverty: Somaliland's Paradox Somaliland is a multiparty democracy, and despite its weak economy, very low GDP per capita, and grim situation for the average citizen, it has stayed almost completely away from the armed conflicts that have defined the surrounding region. It relies on a steady stream of payments sent from Somalilanders working in other countries, it lives almost entirely without foreign aid, and it holds its tribes and ethnic factions together largely through participation in the military, which, despite its limited resources, is generally able to keep coastal waters safe from piracy and illegal fishing. Overall, the situation for Somalilanders is very bad, regardless of whether the breakaway territory is uncommonly stable in its region. Illiteracy in Somaliland is as high as 70% in some areas, unemployment is through the roof, education access is limited, most people live in poverty, and luxuries like water, reliable sanitation, and electricity are all but nonexistent for large sections of the population. It may be safe and stable, especially in the capital city of Hargeisa, yet it is geopolitically isolated on a level rarely seen around the world. But unlike other nations and communities in the African Horn, the plight of the average Somalilander seems, at the very least, not to be getting worse — and it is in the prospect of making Somaliland better that its value to other nations will start to become clear. ## The Strategic Case for Recognizing Somaliland If a couple of decently powerful nations were about to go to war, and each of them got to pick someone on the global stage who was going to have their back, it would be extremely unlikely that either of them would choose Somaliland. After all, this little pocket of not-quite-Somalia is not exactly a military powerhouse. It lacks an air force, it has a grand total of twelve artillery pieces, and on the high seas, it sails a total of one Coast Guard ship and seven armed speedboats. But with 45 T-54 and T-55 tanks to its name, and an overall strength of up to 100,000 combined active and reserve personnel, it is more than a match for better-equipped but vastly outmanned Somalia. It is capable of defending its borders, it can eliminate threats to its own internal security, and it has the political will to resist offensive military action from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and other neighbors, to the extent that their military resources would allow them to do so. But therein lies the issue with Somaliland's national defense — the fact that Somaliland is barred from acquiring armaments from anywhere in the world. Technically speaking, it is Somalia that the UN prohibits from procuring weapons, and according to the UN, Somaliland is part of Somalia, thus falling under that same designation. So long as that is the case, Somaliland cannot add to its arsenal and cannot acquire any more advanced weaponry. This is an issue that goes far beyond the Somaliland armed forces. Because it is not a recognized nation, it cannot receive loans from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund; it is unable to formally request help from many providers of humanitarian aid, and it is subject to all the same trade embargoes that the rest of Somalia deals with. The Somaliland passport is not recognized in most global nations, the Somaliland shilling generally cannot be exchanged outside of Somaliland itself, and private donors who may want to give money have few mechanisms to verify that aid sent to Somaliland directly will be used for the benefit of the people rather than siphoned off. All those barriers can go away in the blink of an eye if one key change happens: international recognition. If the nations of the world were to recognize Somaliland's independence tomorrow, then immediately, the new nation would be able to welcome a tidal wave of humanitarian assistance; it would be able to work with international banks to start triaging its own finances; and it would be able to acquire military equipment that could deter any hungry expansionist states in the region. ## Maritime Chokepoints, Military Bases, and Oil: What Somaliland Offers the World Perhaps the most obvious strategic value lies in Somaliland's position alongside the Gulf of Aden, right next to a sea lane called the Bab al-Mandeb. This is an incredibly well-traveled shipping route, with nearly one-third of the globe's shipping traffic moving through that area each year, and while the area is a lot more free from pirates and other offshore threats than it used to be, Somaliland is still located on prime real estate when it comes to control of the Gulf. The opposite shore belongs to Yemen, a highly unstable nation still rocked by civil war, meaning that if a nation wants to assert its influence across that critical maritime region, then Somaliland is the place to base operations. Somaliland also has potential to be swept up in a much larger ongoing trend: the expansion of foreign influence in the African Horn more broadly, by way of infrastructural and security investment. Neighboring Djibouti hosts military bases for no fewer than eight nations, some of which have less than friendly relationships at present. For those nations, the prospect of shifting operations to Somaliland would offer a valuable opportunity to build up a military presence and have a far easier time establishing close ties with the local government, as opposed to the highly competitive political atmosphere in Djibouti. Somaliland has offered the United States military use of a seaport and airport as recently as 2022, and the United Arab Emirates already run operations out of the port of Berbera. There is also a major opportunity in courting other potential visitors who have been denied access to the exclusive club next door. Both India and Russia have attempted to get in on Djibouti's military paradise, but Russia's aspirations have been largely blocked in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, while India has instead built on the remote Agalega Islands, some three thousand kilometers away. Either nation could take the politically risky but militarily rewarding step of recognizing Somaliland and proceeding with a partnership from there. Somaliland also has potential inroads with the United States and the European Union, owing to Taiwan's 2020 decision to open diplomatic ties with Somaliland directly, while China, rapidly expanding its influence across Africa, could make Somaliland a client state while simultaneously booting Taiwan from the premises. On the topic of sea access, Somaliland may have an increasingly promising potential partner in neighboring Ethiopia, which has spent months expressing its desire for access to a seaport. Ethiopia is landlocked by Eritrea and Djibouti to the north, and Somalia to the east, raising fears that the country might be considering the use of military force to establish a presence on the seaside. But Somaliland enjoys relations with Ethiopia that, while not incredible, are at least not overtly hostile, and while Somaliland might have some stipulations for Ethiopia to build a port — specifically, for Ethiopian officials to refer publicly to the independent nation of Somaliland — that is almost certainly an easier cost for Ethiopia to pay than provoking a full-scale war. Then there is the question of oil, which was confirmed to exist in Somaliland within the last year. The territory's lack of international recognition means that investments in getting to that oil have been slow to arrive, but at the same time, Somaliland's very limited economic resources mean that it will be very difficult to build the infrastructure to access that oil on their own. Any country willing to go out on a limb and work with Somaliland as an independent nation could very well be stumbling onto serious oil reserves and positioning themselves to benefit greatly by drilling for it. ## Why the World Has Not Recognized Somaliland Whether it is the global West, or Russia, or China, or India, or somebody else who chooses to partner with Somaliland, that initiative would probably be fairly cheap — at least in comparison to what wealthy countries are likely to experience with other developing nations. Somaliland is very poor, and if the budding nation is willing to take the money it makes from a partnership and use that money to benefit its people, then it can do a lot of good work with a seemingly small amount of capital. Add to that the potential for Somaliland to give up some of its expected revenues in exchange for recognition of its independence, and Somaliland's potential foreign backers could enjoy cheaper land-leasing for military bases, a greater share of oil profits, and less restrictive regulations than what they would find elsewhere. Such a situation could very easily become exploitative against the government and people of Somaliland, but even still, it is impossible to overstate just how massive a deal like this would be in Somaliland's broader efforts to change its fortunes. With all these potential upsides to recognizing Somaliland's independence, one key question emerges: if Somaliland could be so helpful, then why has no one recognized it? Around the world, much of the answer comes from deference to the African Union, which the UN, the United States, and other global entities have tried to elevate as a reliable decision-maker in African matters. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the African Union has resisted recognizing Somaliland largely because of the implications that would have across other parts of Africa. Western Sahara in territorially disputed Morocco, Biafra in territorial Nigeria, Ambazonia in Cameroon, Brazzaville in the Congo, Mombasa in Kenya, and a whole range of other breakaway regions would immediately have a claim to legitimacy if Somaliland got its independence — something that only South Sudan and Eritrea have earned since the African Union formed some sixty years ago. The fact that Eritrea has since become an incredibly repressive authoritarian state, while South Sudan has teetered on the edge of failure for its entire existence, only serves to remind the African Union and the neighboring Arab League just how dangerous an independent Somaliland might become — regardless of the situation in the real Somaliland. Those concerns, in the eyes of the world, are worth the price of allowing Somaliland to languish, even as its potential as a force for stability is wasted as the clock runs out. ## The Puntland Conflict and Signs of Democratic Backsliding There is also a much darker side to the situation in Somaliland, one that suggests this struggling, embryonic nation might go the way of the rest of the countries in the African Horn unless something changes soon. The problems are twofold: hostilities with a fellow unrecognized neighbor, and the potential for Somaliland's fragile democracy to begin coming apart at the seams. First, there is the matter of Puntland. One of Somalia's remaining member provinces, Puntland is in reality a semi-autonomous region that can do as it pleases on its own territory — the very tip of the African Horn. Puntland and Somaliland both lay claim to several disputed stretches of territory: the provinces of Sool and Sanaag, and the small Buuhoodle district of a province called Togdheer. Skirmishes between the two are not new; in 2007, they fought over the city of Las Anod in a battle that left some ten to twenty people dead by official counts, and in 2016, a skirmish saw Somaliland hold a prominent Puntland legislator hostage. But tensions have been consistently high since 2018, when the Battle of Tukaraq left up to 300 people dead and nearly 3,000 families displaced. That battle was a victory for Somaliland, but it laid the groundwork for what happened in 2023: a series of clashes in and around Las Anod that continued for over nine months. The violence began after years of civil unrest and political assassinations in Las Anod, which had been under Somaliland's control since 2007. Early in 2023, after initial skirmishes caused Somaliland troops to withdraw from the area, Somaliland retaliated with bombardments of civilian areas, causing clan leaders in Las Anod to accuse the Somaliland government of genocide. Offensive actions by Somaliland continued in the following months, indiscriminately firing rockets, bombing public buildings and hospitals, and killing or injuring hundreds of people, although the Somaliland government has consistently presented a differing version of events and claimed that it has been fighting clan and Islamist militias. The situation escalated further in August of 2023, when Puntland forces defeated a pair of well-fortified strongholds that belonged to Somaliland, and since that time, Somaliland has lost control over the regions it disputed with Puntland. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced since the start of the fighting, and the incident has prompted rare international attention toward the region, with several major world powers declaring that the conflict called into question their continued engagement with Somaliland. The other emerging set of issues has to do with democratic backsliding and increasingly foreboding signs that political and civil rights in Somaliland are coming under attack. In 2023, Somaliland was awarded a score of 44 out of 100 by Freedom House, rating it Partly Free, but that score featured a five-point erosion from its score in 2022. The report notes myriad issues, both in terms of political rights and civil liberties, largely brought on by the Somaliland government's recent tendency to delay elections, extend the mandate of elected officials, and violently repress political dissidents and protesters. Powerful clans have increasingly extended their own dominance over local political systems, while protections against corruption and nepotism are starkly limited. Journalists have come under increasing harassment and experienced physical assault, and press behaviors are tightly regulated and punished within the legal system. Citizens have begun to be arrested for controversial posts on social media and have been met with live ammunition from security forces while trying to protest. Domestic violence and female genital mutilation are common and serious problems, but both have been largely ignored by Somaliland's leaders. ## Reckoning with Somaliland: A Closing Window of Opportunity Ironically, some of the recent turn toward violence has come out of more than just a desire for authoritarianism or a desire to assert authority in territories disputed with Puntland. Instead, many political officials and even ordinary Somalilanders have expressed a growing frustration with Somaliland's fruitless attempts to present itself as a nonthreatening potential ally to world nations. In the territory, many people are embittered against Somaliland's tendency to be peaceful, simply because this means that Somaliland is also very quiet, very unobtrusive, and in general the least of anyone's concerns in the African Horn. A lack of wars and a lack of ongoing genocides has translated to a relative lack of interest in changing the status quo there. That is not to say that Somaliland's current uptick in violence is happening as a cry for help, but at the same time, it is a sobering reminder of Somaliland's situation. When examining the grand scope of Somaliland's history, it has become increasingly clear that the territory is coming to a turning point. Although it has managed to survive for decades as a reasonably peaceful, reasonably free holdout in a volatile region, Somaliland's recent years have seen the country increasingly struggle to hold itself together in its current form, while having a harder and harder time turning away from authoritarianism. It is not for any lack of solutions; the international community has a relief valve well within reach, either by recognizing Somaliland's independence claims and doing business with it as a nation, or by working to change the status quo inside Somalia and supply aid more directly to those in Somaliland who need it. No matter which nation comes forward and provides that support, no matter their intentions or political ideology, it is impossible to ignore the fact that a relatively small amount of money, directed toward ordinary Somalilanders, can make an outsize difference in rescuing people from poverty and the brink of famine. The potentially stabilizing influence of foreign partners could be game-changing for Somaliland's fledgling democracy. And if the price Somaliland's ruling elites must pay for recognition and economic stability is to take steps against corruption, toward openness, and in preservation of their own clans and their shared territory, that price is probably worth paying. There is, absolutely, potential for such a process to exploit Somaliland rather than developing it, or for Somaliland's elites to get richer as everyone else gets poorer. But it does not have to be that way, and after so many failed geopolitical experiments on the African continent, there are no excuses for Somaliland's potential foreign partners not to learn from their mistakes and get one right. Somaliland's most famous celebrity, Edna Adan, told a reporter from The Guardian in 2018, "For 25 years I've been waiting for the world to see how stable, peaceful and governable we are." Adan should know better than most; she worked as Somalia's Foreign Minister from 2003 to 2006, working as a midwife and running a maternity hospital simultaneously during her entire tenure. And while Somaliland's last few years are filled with bad omens, filled with signs that things will get worse there if they proceed on their current path, the points Edna Adan makes about her fledgling nation are still true. There are plenty of good reasons, both humanitarian and selfish, for powerful global nations to support Somaliland's cause, but the window is closing. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### Why has no UN member state recognized Somaliland's independence? The African Union has resisted recognizing Somaliland largely because doing so would give legitimacy to a long list of other breakaway regions across Africa — from Western Sahara to Biafra to Ambazonia — and the UN, US, and other global bodies have deferred to the AU on African territorial matters. The AU's own track record with the only two post-colonial African state splits, Eritrea and South Sudan, has reinforced skepticism about encouraging further secession. ### What strategic value does Somaliland offer to foreign powers? Somaliland sits alongside the Gulf of Aden next to the Bab al-Mandeb, one of the world's most critical shipping lanes, through which nearly one-third of global shipping passes annually. Its position makes it prime real estate for military basing, particularly as an alternative to overcrowded Djibouti. The UAE already runs operations from the port of Berbera, the United States was offered use of a seaport and airport in 2022, and confirmed oil reserves add further economic incentive for potential partners. ### What happened in the Las Anod conflict of 2023 and what did it reveal about Somaliland? A series of clashes erupted in and around Las Anod in early 2023 after years of civil unrest and political assassinations in the city. Somaliland retaliated with bombardments of civilian areas, indiscriminately firing rockets and bombing public buildings and hospitals, prompting clan leaders to accuse the Somaliland government of genocide. By August 2023, Puntland forces defeated Somaliland's strongholds in the region, and Somaliland ultimately lost control of the disputed territories — raising serious concerns among world powers about the territory's stability. ### Why does Somaliland's lack of recognition create such severe practical problems? Because the UN treats Somaliland as part of Somalia, it falls under the UN arms embargo on Somalia, barring it from acquiring weapons or adding to its arsenal. The same unrecognized status prevents Somaliland from receiving World Bank or IMF loans, formally requesting humanitarian aid, using its currency internationally, or having its passports accepted in most countries — all barriers that could disappear with a single act of international recognition. ### What warning signs of democratic backsliding has Somaliland shown in recent years? Freedom House gave Somaliland a score of 44 out of 100 in 2023, rating it Partly Free, with a five-point erosion from 2022. The report cited the government's tendency to delay elections, extend officials' mandates, and violently repress dissidents and protesters. Powerful clans have increasingly dominated local politics, journalists face harassment and physical assault, and citizens have been arrested for social media posts and met with live ammunition during protests. ## Related Coverage - [Ethiopia and Eritrea Are Preparing for War: Tigray Faces Another Catastrophic Conflict](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ethiopia-eritrea-preparing-for-war-tigray-conflict) - [Is Ethiopia At War Again? The Escalating Fano Insurgency in Amhara Region](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-ethiopia-at-war-again-fano-insurgency-amhara) - [Is Kenya's Haiti Intervention in Danger of Falling Apart?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-kenyas-haiti-intervention-in-danger-of-falling-apart) - [South Sudan Is Sliding into War: How the World's Youngest Nation Faces Collapse in 2025](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-sliding-into-war-2025-civil-war-crisis) - [Sudan's Partition: Ethnic Cleansing and the Push for a Divided State](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/sudan-partition-ethnic-cleansing-darfur-crisis) ## Sources 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 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