---
title: "To Save the Soviets: Russia's Last Communist Coup Attempt"
description: "The Soviet Union was one of the defining institutions of the 20th century. From the overthrow of the Tsar in 1917, to the Second World War, to the Cold War, Space Race, and long, slow decline, the overarching story of the 1900s is, in many ways, the Soviet Union's story. Their presence on the world stage forced innovation, militarization, and social polarization, while their impact on the many Soviet peoples was largely one of punishing, brutal, perpetual socioeconomic winter. If there's anything the long arc of humanity has taught us, it's that all empires will someday fall. For the Soviets, that day came in 1991, as the individual nations of the Eastern Bloc went their separate ways and modern-day Russia assumed the bulk of the Soviet legacy. But after nearly a century of global war and domestic infighting, some within the Soviet Union had no intention of seeing Lenin's grand experiment go down without a fight. Over the course of three days in August 1991, a group of the highest-ranking Soviet officials and the KGB staged a last-ditch coup attempt to remove the Soviet Union's last head of state, Mikhail Gorbachev, or otherwise force him to restore order. It was a desperate move, one fraught with political drama and intrigue, which stood little chance of success. When the conspirators went down, the whole of the Soviet Union went down with them.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov began planning resistance to Gorbachev's reforms as early as December 11, 1990, recruiting senior officials including Prime Minister Pavlov and Defense Minister Yazov.\n- The Gang of Eight confronted Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha on August 18, 1991, at 4:50 PM, demanding he sign a state of emergency declaration, but Gorbachev refused and called them traitors.\n- Boris Yeltsin coordinated an effective counter-coup from the Russian parliament building, leveraging his popular mandate to rally citizens and military defectors against the Gang of Eight.\n- Soviet soldiers overwhelmingly refused to fire on civilians in Moscow, and high-ranking military officers defected to Yeltsin's side, fatally undermining the conspirators' position.\n- Yeltsin used the crisis to transfer control of Russia's economy and security forces to himself, effectively reducing Gorbachev to a figurehead before the coup even fully collapsed.\n- Interior Minister Boris Pugo killed himself and his wife on August 22; the remaining seven conspirators were charged with treason but granted amnesty by the Russian Duma on February 23, 1994.\n\n## The Soviet Death Spiral: Chernobyl, Glasnost, and Revolution Across the Eastern Bloc\n\nThe story begins in the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union's death spiral began. Even before the 1980s, the Soviets had been in decline, worn down by failing economic policies and the demands of proxy war with the West. But after a revolving door of prime ministers and similarly discordant domestic policies to start the 80s off, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 spiraled the situation from bad to worse. By this time, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Union's last President, was already in power as the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and was responsible for the introduction of two major policy shifts: Glasnost, or openness, and perestroika, or restructuring. Taken together, these two policies were Gorbachev's best attempt to reform the Soviet Union before it was too late. But Glasnost and perestroika did come too late, and in the end, they were too little. Nationalist parties had swelled in the Baltics, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere by 1988, just as Gorbachev was elected President, and in 1989, revolution swept across the Eastern Bloc. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany all overthrew their ruling elites, Georgia broke out into riots, Lithuania declared its independence, and the Berlin Wall fell. Even the combination of a much-needed withdrawal from the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, plus reforms to allow the introduction of a private sector of the economy, weren't enough to stem the tide, and by 1990, the Union was struggling to hold together amidst widespread revolt and declarations of independence. Food was scarce, medicine was hard to come by, and intense state repression made the problem that much worse.\n\n## The Roots of Conspiracy: How the KGB and Soviet Hardliners Plotted Against Gorbachev\n\nThis sea change was a populist one, and one that very clearly stemmed from the introduction of principles of free speech, the first signs of an open market, and pent-up frustration with the status quo. This was not a debate about communism versus capitalism, but with openness and restructuring came a quick awareness of just how much the Soviet peoples had been missing, and that awareness cast their economic, social, and individual pain into sharp relief. Party control of the Union was beginning to slip away, and while Gorbachev understood that this might be an eventuality, many within the Communist Party's upper levels of government were not willing to let go without a fight. It was from this urge to regain control that the coup plot was born. The conspiracy to save the Soviet Union started the same place most matters of high geopolitical intrigue did in the Eastern Bloc: the KGB. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB chief, was a hardliner within the government and staunchly opposed any talk of reform. He was one of many high-ranking Soviets who believed that his government's domination of Eastern Europe was not only their responsibility, but a natural order of things, one which the more progressive Gorbachev was a fool to throw away. As early as December 11, 1990, Kryuchkov and his KGB subordinates were considering measures to resist, if Gorbachev were to declare a state of emergency amidst the chaos. Kryuchkov brought in Valentin Pavlov, who filled the newly created post of Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. A compromise candidate, Pavlov was deeply opposed to the idea of decentralizing power between the many Soviet republics, and he was well-aware of the many crises he felt Gorbachev's policies would only exacerbate. Another conspirator, Dmitry Yazov, was the Soviet Union's Defense Minister at this time, and was the last Marshal of the Soviet Union. He had played a large part in the Black January massacres in Baku, Azerbaijan, which had killed well over a hundred people.\n\n## The Gang of Eight: Profiles of the Soviet Union's Would-Be Saviors\n\nThe Soviet Interior Minister, Boris Pugo, had significant ties to the KGB, and had worked his way up in the Party for decades. Oleg Baklanov, the Defense Council Deputy Chairman, was a leading member of the Soviet Union's military-industrial infrastructure. Valentin Varennikov, a general and the Deputy Defense Minister, was a die-hard advocate for Josef Stalin's legacy who had overseen the Chernobyl cleanup and the Afghanistan withdrawal. Vasily Starodubtsev, Chairman of the Soviet Peasants Union, considered glasnost and perestroika a \"terrible experiment\", and ostensibly considered himself a savior figure for much of the Soviet population. Aleksandr Tizyakov, leader of the Soviet Industrial Consortium, oversaw much of the Soviets' infrastructure across numerous sectors. The two heaviest hitters among the conspirators were Gennady Yanayev, the Soviet Vice President and Gorbachev's ostensible right-hand man, and Anatoly Lukyanov, the Supreme Soviet Chairman. Yanayev hadn't expected to be Vice President, which was a newly created post, and he was largely brought into the fold during the conspiracy's final days. Described as having been \"drunk when the coup started and drunk when it ended\", Yanayev's inherent political power as Gorbachev's clearest successor was a massive benefit to the coup. Chairman Lukyanov, by contrast, had kept a long relationship with Gorbachev since their days as university students. He had initially played a role in instituting Gorbachev's changes, and only appeared to sour on his friend as the situation in Eastern Europe really began to deteriorate. Nonetheless, he would join in on the attempted coup. These men formed the Gang of Eight, and with the help of the KGB and a scattering of other co-conspirators, they believed they comprised the Soviet Union's best hope at survival. The pressure was on from all directions: several members of the Gang of Eight had had their influence curtailed as part of Gorbachev's reforms, and the rising violence and secessionism across Soviet holdings created a dangerous ticking clock. Success would mean that Soviet rule at least had a chance to cling on, and failure was not an option.\n\n## August 18–19: The Coup Begins at Gorbachev's Crimean Dacha\n\nOn Sunday, August 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev was taking a much-needed break from Moscow, at his vacation home, or dacha, in Crimea. At 4:50 PM, the dacha was approached by five men: Gorbachev's chief of staff, a high-ranking party secretary, a KGB general overseeing security, and two among the Gang of Eight, Deputy Chairman Baklanov and General Varennikov. Gorbachev immediately knew something was up, and he attempted to phone for assistance, but the lines were already dead. When Gorbachev allowed his five guests in, they informed him that they were representing the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, the quasi-official name the coup conspirators had chosen for their group. Their demands were simple. Gorbachev would sign a document declaring a state of emergency across the USSR, thus assuming the emergency powers that came with it. He would then transfer authority to his vice president, who, again, was among the co-conspirators. But rather than accept their demands, Gorbachev stood firm, taking some of them by surprise. They were traitors, said Gorbachev, and their attempts at blackmail would not work. Several of the conspirators were taken aback by the strength of Gorbachev's refusal, and the level of outrage he showed for the whole affair. This speaks to the level of conviction and passion on all sides, and the genuine care that each side seemed to believe they were showing to the grand Soviet experiment. Gorbachev was unmoved, and the conspirators' demands went unmet. So, Plan A failed. Plan B, however, had no such issues, and Gorbachev and his family were placed under house arrest under the watch of General Igor Maltsev, who commanded the Soviet Union's Air Defense system. Later testimony by both Gorbachev and his wife stated that they had believed they would be executed, but they were not harmed in Maltsev's custody. Gorbachev smuggled word out to his loyalists in Moscow that he was okay, and individual members of Gorbachev's bodyguard were able to get him a receiver that allowed him to keep up to date with what was going on in the capital. After a long night of preparations, Soviet state news began the day of August 19 with a televised broadcast of the Swan Lake ballet, followed by reporting that Gorbachev had fallen ill. The official line was that Gorbachev would not be able to execute his duties as President, and as such Vice President Yanayev would assume his authority. Yanayev would establish an Emergency Committee, one with eight positions in total—and that was the same Gang of Eight who had concocted the coup in the first place. Their first acts were to ban strikes and demonstrations, censor the press, and inform the Soviet peoples of their claims of \"mortal danger\" that threatened their Union.\n\n## The People of Moscow Rise: Popular Resistance and Yeltsin's Counter-Coup\n\nOn the next day, August 20, most news organizations were banned and a majority of the USSR's ministers expressed their support of the coup. Tanks appeared all across Moscow, and the conspirators readied to put the finishing touches on their takeover. But then came the moment that the coup's momentum ended, and its collapse began, in a way that the co-conspirators perhaps should have seen coming. The people of Moscow did not take kindly to this show of power on their doorstep, and soldiers across the city were confronted by citizens expressing not just their apprehensions about the state of emergency, but their direct, personal opposition to it. A large part of Gorbachev's reforms included an emphasis on the fundamental rights of ordinary people, to speak about their wishes for autonomy and representative rule. And as much as the coup plotters apparently disagreed with this premise, it's no surprise that the everyday people of Moscow—and indeed, people across the Soviet Union—cared about having their voices heard. The Eastern Bloc was already in crisis, with severe shortages that threatened people's ability to meet their basic daily needs. Martial law by hardline traditionalists wasn't about to help. Soviet citizens began to congregate around Moscow's centers of power, and dug in for what would be a substantial, and maybe even forceful opposition. Right at this moment, as the Gang of Eight were scrambling to complete their takeover, a second and diametrically opposed group emerged to seize their opportunity within the chaos. Led by Boris Yeltsin, future President of Russia and current President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, this group coordinated resistance to the Gang of Eight almost immediately. On August 19, Yeltsin made his presence known at the Russian parliament building, calling for the release of Gorbachev and calling out the Gang of Eight's coup for what it was. Yeltsin, unlike the Gang of Eight, had been elected by popular vote, and it took little time for the people to come to his side. All across the Soviet Union, protests erupted against the coup, and the Gang of Eight responded by broadening military intervention in the streets. However, it was clear that the conspirators hadn't been prepared for this level of meaningful opposition, and they were slow to take the most drastic and repressive measures which might have consolidated their rule. In the streets, Yeltsin demanded \"a return to normal constitutional development\", and the people listened. Rallies and protests intensified, and more and more people marched on parliament in Moscow. The area was barricaded by parked buses and trucks, and by the bodies of everyday Russians who felt Yeltsin should be protected. The Soviet state news agency amplified Yeltsin's urgings to the general public, an extremely unusual move, and Yeltsin received support from Kazakh and Ukrainian leaders.\n\n## Collapse of the Coup: Military Defections and the Gang of Eight's Surrender\n\nEven the military, which ostensibly had every reason to support the aims of the coup plotters, were divided in opinion. High-ranking military officers began to defect from the Gang of Eight to Yeltsin's side, taking with them the soldiers under their command. And everyday soldiers, Russian citizens themselves, overwhelmingly refused to fire on Russian civilians in Moscow. By August 21, it became crystal-clear that the people of the Soviet Union had repelled the Gang of Eight. The coup had failed. By August 21, Yeltsin had completed his own bloodless takeover in Moscow. He had used the chaos to his own advantage, and transferred power over the Russian economy and its security forces—previously overseen by Gorbachev—to himself, and the office of the Russian President. To say that his legal ground for doing so was shaky would be akin to saying that the ocean might be a little bit wet, but constitutional or not, it worked. This action had the effect of reducing Gorbachev to little more than a figurehead, now without control of the defense and economic powerhouse of the Soviet Union. The coup plotters attempted to save the situation at a press conference, but even here, it was clear that they already knew they would fail. Acting President Gennady Yanayev's hands were visibly trembling at the conference, and public opinion seized on his weak appearance, questioning his sobriety and further diminishing the Gang of Eight as a simple paper tiger. State news, cutting back and forth between this imagery and footage of Yeltsin calling for resistance while standing atop a tank, certainly didn't help the coup plotters save face. The Gang of Eight packed up by August 21 and returned to Gorbachev's dacha, where he was still being held, in an attempt to negotiate an end to the crisis. Gorbachev refused outright to meet with them. The Gang of Eight were arrested, except for Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo, who shot and killed himself and his wife on August 22. There are continued questions as to whether Pugo might have been murdered, but there is currently no clear evidence to indicate that his death was anything other than suicide.\n\n## The End of an Empire: Dissolution, Amnesty, and the Legacy of August 1991\n\nGorbachev returned to Moscow, though his powers had been gutted, and he understood that the Soviet Union had effectively already ended. In the coming months, Gorbachev took essentially the last major action he could, and dissolved the Communist Party. He handed the powers of sovereign autonomy over to Yeltsin and all the other heads of former Eastern Bloc nations, and granted independence to their states in turn. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus gathered in Minsk to declare the Soviet Union dissolute, establishing in its place a loose confederation between most of the formerly Soviet states. It was an abrupt, and relatively bloodless end to a major power that dominated the 20th century. The seven who survived the coup's immediate aftermath would be tried for their actions. Although they would be held on charges of treason, on February 23, 1994, all seven and their affiliates were granted amnesty by the Russian Duma. They would then go on to fill various roles in post-communist Russia, in both the public and private sectors, and one, former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, even became Vice President at an American software firm. Former Defense Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Baklanov was the last surviving member of the Gang of Eight; he died in Russia on July 28, 2021. The Soviet Union ended with a whimper, not a bang, and in many ways, the Gang of Eight are the reason why. Their attempt to seize power was overwhelmingly resisted by the people of Moscow and other major cities across the Soviet Union, and while there may have been many citizens across the Eastern Bloc who did agree with the coup's aims, the Gang of Eight made no attempts to solicit their support. Instead, the coup plotters made their very best attempt to wrestle the Soviet Union back under totalitarian control, and leverage what remained of its military-intelligence apparatus for their own gain. Not only did the military decline to show the support the Gang of Eight expected, but through their own sloppy, poorly-conceived attempts to assume power, they created the conditions that ultimately led to the Union's complete dissolution. In hindsight, it's not unreasonable to suppose that the Gang of Eight's actions galvanized each of the Soviet republics to action, and forced them to figure out where their loyalties lay. The coup captured the focus of hardline loyalists, but the aftermath of the affair committed party and state officials to the concept that it was time for the Union to be dissolved. Rather than a process of armed revolution and state-by-state wars of independence, as many had feared for decades, the Soviet Union instead fell peacefully into history. It was far from the intent of the coup plotters, and in fact this outcome constituted the exact version of events that they'd desperately sought to avoid. But it was the actions of the Gang of Eight that directly ensured the end of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the establishment of the world order that persists to this day.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why did the Gang of Eight decide to stage the coup in August 1991?\n\nKGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had been considering measures to resist Gorbachev's reforms since at least December 11, 1990. By August 1991 the pressure was acute: several gang members had had their own influence curtailed by Gorbachev's decentralization policies, violence and secessionism were spreading across Soviet holdings, and Gorbachev was about to sign a new union treaty that would have transferred significant power to the republics. The conspirators saw it as their last opportunity to halt what they viewed as the Soviet Union's disintegration before it became irreversible.\n\n### What happened when the conspirators confronted Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha?\n\nOn August 18, 1991, at 4:50 PM, five men arrived at Gorbachev's vacation home — including Gang of Eight members Deputy Chairman Baklanov and General Varennikov. Gorbachev immediately tried to call for help but found all communication lines already dead. When the visitors demanded he sign a state of emergency declaration and transfer authority to Vice President Yanayev, Gorbachev refused, called them traitors, and expressed outrage at the whole affair. His refusal surprised several of the conspirators. Gorbachev and his family were subsequently placed under house arrest and later testified that they had expected to be executed.\n\n### How did Boris Yeltsin use the coup attempt to his own advantage?\n\nYeltsin, as the popularly elected President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, went to the Russian parliament building on August 19 and publicly called for Gorbachev's release, framing the coup for what it was. The Soviet state news agency amplified his call — an extremely unusual move. As the coup collapsed by August 21, Yeltsin transferred control of Russia's economy and security forces from Gorbachev to himself and the office of the Russian President. This effectively reduced Gorbachev to a figurehead and positioned Yeltsin as the dominant political figure before the Soviet Union was even formally dissolved.\n\n### Why did Soviet soldiers refuse to support the coup?\n\nSoviet soldiers — Russian citizens themselves — overwhelmingly declined to fire on civilians in Moscow despite orders from the coup's leadership. High-ranking military officers also began defecting from the Gang of Eight to Yeltsin's side, taking their troops with them. Gorbachev's reforms had cultivated a sense among ordinary people that their voices mattered, and the soldiers reflected that broader public sentiment. The coup plotters had apparently not anticipated this level of opposition and were slow to take the most drastic repressive measures that might have consolidated their rule.\n\n### What happened to the members of the Gang of Eight after the coup collapsed?\n\nInterior Minister Boris Pugo shot and killed himself and his wife on August 22 — though questions about whether he was murdered have never been definitively resolved. The remaining seven were arrested and charged with treason. On February 23, 1994, all seven and their affiliates were granted amnesty by the Russian Duma. Several went on to fill roles in post-communist Russia's public and private sectors; former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov even became Vice President at an American software firm. The last surviving member, former Defense Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Baklanov, died in Russia on July 28, 2021.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Bolivia Just Survived a Really Weird Coup. Here’s What Happened.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/bolivia-just-survived-a-really-weird-coup-heres-what-happened)\n- [Special Operators: The KGB, Soviet Union](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/special-operators-the-kgb-soviet-union)\n- [Alexander Dugin: A 21st-Century Rasputin?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/alexander-dugin-a-21st-century-rasputin)\n- [Ukraine's Counteroffensive Has Failed...](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/ukraines-counteroffensive-has-failed)\n- [How Russia Gaslights the World: Putin's Decades-Long Campaign of Denial and Disinformation](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/how-russia-gaslights-the-world-putin-denial-disinformation)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17858981>\n2. <https://www.rferl.org/a/what-happened-to-the-august-1991-coup-plotters/27933729.html>\n3. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/1991-Soviet-coup-attempt>\n4. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/cold-war-history/valentin-pavlov>\n5. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/11/russia-afghanistan>\n6. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/26/gennady-yanayev-obituary-communist-gorbachev>\n7. <https://apnews.com/article/041446081e384177a58df3bd52d90b92>\n8. <https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union>\n9. <https://www.cer.eu/insights/moscow-coups-1991-who-won-and-why-does-it-still-matter>\n10. <https://apnews.com/article/europe-aaf01f87bfed95e5bfcf23bdb0350085>\n11. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviet-hard-liners-launch-coup-against-gorbachev>\n12. <https://apnews.com/article/europe-fca50dc443b66b53a67fc8043b9c2d2a>\n13. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/20/communist-hardliners-stage-coup-against-gorbachev-russia-1991>\n14. <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/19/1029437787/in-1991-soviet-citizens-saw-swans-on-the-tv-and-knew-it-meant-turmoil>\n15. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union>\n16. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Boris-Yeltsin>\n17. <https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/5/1/94/12588/The-August-1991-Coup-and-Its-Impact-on-Soviet>\n\n[1]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17858981\n[2]: https://www.rferl.org/a/what-happened-to-the-august-1991-coup-plotters/27933729.html\n[3]: https://www.britannica.com/topic/1991-Soviet-coup-attempt\n[4]: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/cold-war-history/valentin-pavlov\n[5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/11/russia-afghanistan\n[6]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/26/gennady-yanayev-obituary-communist-gorbachev\n[7]: https://apnews.com/article/041446081e384177a58df3bd52d90b92\n[8]: https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union\n[9]: https://www.cer.eu/insights/moscow-coups-1991-who-won-and-why-does-it-still-matter\n[10]: https://apnews.com/article/europe-aaf01f87bfed95e5bfcf23bdb0350085\n[11]: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviet-hard-liners-launch-coup-against-gorbachev\n[12]: https://apnews.com/article/europe-fca50dc443b66b53a67fc8043b9c2d2a\n[13]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/20/communist-hardliners-stage-coup-against-gorbachev-russia-1991\n[14]: https://www.npr.org/2021/08/19/1029437787/in-1991-soviet-citizens-saw-swans-on-the-tv-and-knew-it-meant-turmoil\n[15]: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union\n[16]: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Boris-Yeltsin\n[17]: https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/5/1/94/12588/The-August-1991-Coup-and-Its-Impact-on-Soviet\n\n<!-- youtube:Q9D8Gi6XRAY -->"
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The Soviet Union was one of the defining institutions of the 20th century. From the overthrow of the Tsar in 1917, to the Second World War, to the Cold War, Space Race, and long, slow decline, the overarching story of the 1900s is, in many ways, the Soviet Union's story. Their presence on the world stage forced innovation, militarization, and social polarization, while their impact on the many Soviet peoples was largely one of punishing, brutal, perpetual socioeconomic winter. If there's anything the long arc of humanity has taught us, it's that all empires will someday fall. For the Soviets, that day came in 1991, as the individual nations of the Eastern Bloc went their separate ways and modern-day Russia assumed the bulk of the Soviet legacy. But after nearly a century of global war and domestic infighting, some within the Soviet Union had no intention of seeing Lenin's grand experiment go down without a fight. Over the course of three days in August 1991, a group of the highest-ranking Soviet officials and the KGB staged a last-ditch coup attempt to remove the Soviet Union's last head of state, Mikhail Gorbachev, or otherwise force him to restore order. It was a desperate move, one fraught with political drama and intrigue, which stood little chance of success. When the conspirators went down, the whole of the Soviet Union went down with them.

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<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov began planning resistance to Gorbachev's reforms as early as December 11, 1990, recruiting senior officials including Prime Minister Pavlov and Defense Minister Yazov.
- The Gang of Eight confronted Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha on August 18, 1991, at 4:50 PM, demanding he sign a state of emergency declaration, but Gorbachev refused and called them traitors.
- Boris Yeltsin coordinated an effective counter-coup from the Russian parliament building, leveraging his popular mandate to rally citizens and military defectors against the Gang of Eight.
- Soviet soldiers overwhelmingly refused to fire on civilians in Moscow, and high-ranking military officers defected to Yeltsin's side, fatally undermining the conspirators' position.
- Yeltsin used the crisis to transfer control of Russia's economy and security forces to himself, effectively reducing Gorbachev to a figurehead before the coup even fully collapsed.
- Interior Minister Boris Pugo killed himself and his wife on August 22; the remaining seven conspirators were charged with treason but granted amnesty by the Russian Duma on February 23, 1994.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-soviet-death-spiral-chernobyl-glasnost-and-revolution-across" -->
## The Soviet Death Spiral: Chernobyl, Glasnost, and Revolution Across the Eastern Bloc

The story begins in the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union's death spiral began. Even before the 1980s, the Soviets had been in decline, worn down by failing economic policies and the demands of proxy war with the West. But after a revolving door of prime ministers and similarly discordant domestic policies to start the 80s off, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 spiraled the situation from bad to worse. By this time, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Union's last President, was already in power as the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and was responsible for the introduction of two major policy shifts: Glasnost, or openness, and perestroika, or restructuring. Taken together, these two policies were Gorbachev's best attempt to reform the Soviet Union before it was too late. But Glasnost and perestroika did come too late, and in the end, they were too little. Nationalist parties had swelled in the Baltics, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere by 1988, just as Gorbachev was elected President, and in 1989, revolution swept across the Eastern Bloc. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany all overthrew their ruling elites, Georgia broke out into riots, Lithuania declared its independence, and the Berlin Wall fell. Even the combination of a much-needed withdrawal from the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, plus reforms to allow the introduction of a private sector of the economy, weren't enough to stem the tide, and by 1990, the Union was struggling to hold together amidst widespread revolt and declarations of independence. Food was scarce, medicine was hard to come by, and intense state repression made the problem that much worse.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-roots-of-conspiracy-how-the-kgb-and-soviet-hardliners-plotte" -->
## The Roots of Conspiracy: How the KGB and Soviet Hardliners Plotted Against Gorbachev

This sea change was a populist one, and one that very clearly stemmed from the introduction of principles of free speech, the first signs of an open market, and pent-up frustration with the status quo. This was not a debate about communism versus capitalism, but with openness and restructuring came a quick awareness of just how much the Soviet peoples had been missing, and that awareness cast their economic, social, and individual pain into sharp relief. Party control of the Union was beginning to slip away, and while Gorbachev understood that this might be an eventuality, many within the Communist Party's upper levels of government were not willing to let go without a fight. It was from this urge to regain control that the coup plot was born. The conspiracy to save the Soviet Union started the same place most matters of high geopolitical intrigue did in the Eastern Bloc: the KGB. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB chief, was a hardliner within the government and staunchly opposed any talk of reform. He was one of many high-ranking Soviets who believed that his government's domination of Eastern Europe was not only their responsibility, but a natural order of things, one which the more progressive Gorbachev was a fool to throw away. As early as December 11, 1990, Kryuchkov and his KGB subordinates were considering measures to resist, if Gorbachev were to declare a state of emergency amidst the chaos. Kryuchkov brought in Valentin Pavlov, who filled the newly created post of Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. A compromise candidate, Pavlov was deeply opposed to the idea of decentralizing power between the many Soviet republics, and he was well-aware of the many crises he felt Gorbachev's policies would only exacerbate. Another conspirator, Dmitry Yazov, was the Soviet Union's Defense Minister at this time, and was the last Marshal of the Soviet Union. He had played a large part in the Black January massacres in Baku, Azerbaijan, which had killed well over a hundred people.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-gang-of-eight-profiles-of-the-soviet-union-s-would-be-savior" -->
## The Gang of Eight: Profiles of the Soviet Union's Would-Be Saviors

The Soviet Interior Minister, Boris Pugo, had significant ties to the KGB, and had worked his way up in the Party for decades. Oleg Baklanov, the Defense Council Deputy Chairman, was a leading member of the Soviet Union's military-industrial infrastructure. Valentin Varennikov, a general and the Deputy Defense Minister, was a die-hard advocate for Josef Stalin's legacy who had overseen the Chernobyl cleanup and the Afghanistan withdrawal. Vasily Starodubtsev, Chairman of the Soviet Peasants Union, considered glasnost and perestroika a "terrible experiment", and ostensibly considered himself a savior figure for much of the Soviet population. Aleksandr Tizyakov, leader of the Soviet Industrial Consortium, oversaw much of the Soviets' infrastructure across numerous sectors. The two heaviest hitters among the conspirators were Gennady Yanayev, the Soviet Vice President and Gorbachev's ostensible right-hand man, and Anatoly Lukyanov, the Supreme Soviet Chairman. Yanayev hadn't expected to be Vice President, which was a newly created post, and he was largely brought into the fold during the conspiracy's final days. Described as having been "drunk when the coup started and drunk when it ended", Yanayev's inherent political power as Gorbachev's clearest successor was a massive benefit to the coup. Chairman Lukyanov, by contrast, had kept a long relationship with Gorbachev since their days as university students. He had initially played a role in instituting Gorbachev's changes, and only appeared to sour on his friend as the situation in Eastern Europe really began to deteriorate. Nonetheless, he would join in on the attempted coup. These men formed the Gang of Eight, and with the help of the KGB and a scattering of other co-conspirators, they believed they comprised the Soviet Union's best hope at survival. The pressure was on from all directions: several members of the Gang of Eight had had their influence curtailed as part of Gorbachev's reforms, and the rising violence and secessionism across Soviet holdings created a dangerous ticking clock. Success would mean that Soviet rule at least had a chance to cling on, and failure was not an option.

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<!-- aeo:section start="august-18-19-the-coup-begins-at-gorbachev-s-crimean-dacha" -->
## August 18–19: The Coup Begins at Gorbachev's Crimean Dacha

On Sunday, August 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev was taking a much-needed break from Moscow, at his vacation home, or dacha, in Crimea. At 4:50 PM, the dacha was approached by five men: Gorbachev's chief of staff, a high-ranking party secretary, a KGB general overseeing security, and two among the Gang of Eight, Deputy Chairman Baklanov and General Varennikov. Gorbachev immediately knew something was up, and he attempted to phone for assistance, but the lines were already dead. When Gorbachev allowed his five guests in, they informed him that they were representing the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, the quasi-official name the coup conspirators had chosen for their group. Their demands were simple. Gorbachev would sign a document declaring a state of emergency across the USSR, thus assuming the emergency powers that came with it. He would then transfer authority to his vice president, who, again, was among the co-conspirators. But rather than accept their demands, Gorbachev stood firm, taking some of them by surprise. They were traitors, said Gorbachev, and their attempts at blackmail would not work. Several of the conspirators were taken aback by the strength of Gorbachev's refusal, and the level of outrage he showed for the whole affair. This speaks to the level of conviction and passion on all sides, and the genuine care that each side seemed to believe they were showing to the grand Soviet experiment. Gorbachev was unmoved, and the conspirators' demands went unmet. So, Plan A failed. Plan B, however, had no such issues, and Gorbachev and his family were placed under house arrest under the watch of General Igor Maltsev, who commanded the Soviet Union's Air Defense system. Later testimony by both Gorbachev and his wife stated that they had believed they would be executed, but they were not harmed in Maltsev's custody. Gorbachev smuggled word out to his loyalists in Moscow that he was okay, and individual members of Gorbachev's bodyguard were able to get him a receiver that allowed him to keep up to date with what was going on in the capital. After a long night of preparations, Soviet state news began the day of August 19 with a televised broadcast of the Swan Lake ballet, followed by reporting that Gorbachev had fallen ill. The official line was that Gorbachev would not be able to execute his duties as President, and as such Vice President Yanayev would assume his authority. Yanayev would establish an Emergency Committee, one with eight positions in total—and that was the same Gang of Eight who had concocted the coup in the first place. Their first acts were to ban strikes and demonstrations, censor the press, and inform the Soviet peoples of their claims of "mortal danger" that threatened their Union.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-people-of-moscow-rise-popular-resistance-and-yeltsin-s-count" -->
## The People of Moscow Rise: Popular Resistance and Yeltsin's Counter-Coup

On the next day, August 20, most news organizations were banned and a majority of the USSR's ministers expressed their support of the coup. Tanks appeared all across Moscow, and the conspirators readied to put the finishing touches on their takeover. But then came the moment that the coup's momentum ended, and its collapse began, in a way that the co-conspirators perhaps should have seen coming. The people of Moscow did not take kindly to this show of power on their doorstep, and soldiers across the city were confronted by citizens expressing not just their apprehensions about the state of emergency, but their direct, personal opposition to it. A large part of Gorbachev's reforms included an emphasis on the fundamental rights of ordinary people, to speak about their wishes for autonomy and representative rule. And as much as the coup plotters apparently disagreed with this premise, it's no surprise that the everyday people of Moscow—and indeed, people across the Soviet Union—cared about having their voices heard. The Eastern Bloc was already in crisis, with severe shortages that threatened people's ability to meet their basic daily needs. Martial law by hardline traditionalists wasn't about to help. Soviet citizens began to congregate around Moscow's centers of power, and dug in for what would be a substantial, and maybe even forceful opposition. Right at this moment, as the Gang of Eight were scrambling to complete their takeover, a second and diametrically opposed group emerged to seize their opportunity within the chaos. Led by Boris Yeltsin, future President of Russia and current President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, this group coordinated resistance to the Gang of Eight almost immediately. On August 19, Yeltsin made his presence known at the Russian parliament building, calling for the release of Gorbachev and calling out the Gang of Eight's coup for what it was. Yeltsin, unlike the Gang of Eight, had been elected by popular vote, and it took little time for the people to come to his side. All across the Soviet Union, protests erupted against the coup, and the Gang of Eight responded by broadening military intervention in the streets. However, it was clear that the conspirators hadn't been prepared for this level of meaningful opposition, and they were slow to take the most drastic and repressive measures which might have consolidated their rule. In the streets, Yeltsin demanded "a return to normal constitutional development", and the people listened. Rallies and protests intensified, and more and more people marched on parliament in Moscow. The area was barricaded by parked buses and trucks, and by the bodies of everyday Russians who felt Yeltsin should be protected. The Soviet state news agency amplified Yeltsin's urgings to the general public, an extremely unusual move, and Yeltsin received support from Kazakh and Ukrainian leaders.

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<!-- aeo:section start="collapse-of-the-coup-military-defections-and-the-gang-of-eight-s" -->
## Collapse of the Coup: Military Defections and the Gang of Eight's Surrender

Even the military, which ostensibly had every reason to support the aims of the coup plotters, were divided in opinion. High-ranking military officers began to defect from the Gang of Eight to Yeltsin's side, taking with them the soldiers under their command. And everyday soldiers, Russian citizens themselves, overwhelmingly refused to fire on Russian civilians in Moscow. By August 21, it became crystal-clear that the people of the Soviet Union had repelled the Gang of Eight. The coup had failed. By August 21, Yeltsin had completed his own bloodless takeover in Moscow. He had used the chaos to his own advantage, and transferred power over the Russian economy and its security forces—previously overseen by Gorbachev—to himself, and the office of the Russian President. To say that his legal ground for doing so was shaky would be akin to saying that the ocean might be a little bit wet, but constitutional or not, it worked. This action had the effect of reducing Gorbachev to little more than a figurehead, now without control of the defense and economic powerhouse of the Soviet Union. The coup plotters attempted to save the situation at a press conference, but even here, it was clear that they already knew they would fail. Acting President Gennady Yanayev's hands were visibly trembling at the conference, and public opinion seized on his weak appearance, questioning his sobriety and further diminishing the Gang of Eight as a simple paper tiger. State news, cutting back and forth between this imagery and footage of Yeltsin calling for resistance while standing atop a tank, certainly didn't help the coup plotters save face. The Gang of Eight packed up by August 21 and returned to Gorbachev's dacha, where he was still being held, in an attempt to negotiate an end to the crisis. Gorbachev refused outright to meet with them. The Gang of Eight were arrested, except for Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo, who shot and killed himself and his wife on August 22. There are continued questions as to whether Pugo might have been murdered, but there is currently no clear evidence to indicate that his death was anything other than suicide.

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<!-- aeo:section start="the-end-of-an-empire-dissolution-amnesty-and-the-legacy-of-augus" -->
## The End of an Empire: Dissolution, Amnesty, and the Legacy of August 1991

Gorbachev returned to Moscow, though his powers had been gutted, and he understood that the Soviet Union had effectively already ended. In the coming months, Gorbachev took essentially the last major action he could, and dissolved the Communist Party. He handed the powers of sovereign autonomy over to Yeltsin and all the other heads of former Eastern Bloc nations, and granted independence to their states in turn. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus gathered in Minsk to declare the Soviet Union dissolute, establishing in its place a loose confederation between most of the formerly Soviet states. It was an abrupt, and relatively bloodless end to a major power that dominated the 20th century. The seven who survived the coup's immediate aftermath would be tried for their actions. Although they would be held on charges of treason, on February 23, 1994, all seven and their affiliates were granted amnesty by the Russian Duma. They would then go on to fill various roles in post-communist Russia, in both the public and private sectors, and one, former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, even became Vice President at an American software firm. Former Defense Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Baklanov was the last surviving member of the Gang of Eight; he died in Russia on July 28, 2021. The Soviet Union ended with a whimper, not a bang, and in many ways, the Gang of Eight are the reason why. Their attempt to seize power was overwhelmingly resisted by the people of Moscow and other major cities across the Soviet Union, and while there may have been many citizens across the Eastern Bloc who did agree with the coup's aims, the Gang of Eight made no attempts to solicit their support. Instead, the coup plotters made their very best attempt to wrestle the Soviet Union back under totalitarian control, and leverage what remained of its military-intelligence apparatus for their own gain. Not only did the military decline to show the support the Gang of Eight expected, but through their own sloppy, poorly-conceived attempts to assume power, they created the conditions that ultimately led to the Union's complete dissolution. In hindsight, it's not unreasonable to suppose that the Gang of Eight's actions galvanized each of the Soviet republics to action, and forced them to figure out where their loyalties lay. The coup captured the focus of hardline loyalists, but the aftermath of the affair committed party and state officials to the concept that it was time for the Union to be dissolved. Rather than a process of armed revolution and state-by-state wars of independence, as many had feared for decades, the Soviet Union instead fell peacefully into history. It was far from the intent of the coup plotters, and in fact this outcome constituted the exact version of events that they'd desperately sought to avoid. But it was the actions of the Gang of Eight that directly ensured the end of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the establishment of the world order that persists to this day.

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<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why did the Gang of Eight decide to stage the coup in August 1991?

KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had been considering measures to resist Gorbachev's reforms since at least December 11, 1990. By August 1991 the pressure was acute: several gang members had had their own influence curtailed by Gorbachev's decentralization policies, violence and secessionism were spreading across Soviet holdings, and Gorbachev was about to sign a new union treaty that would have transferred significant power to the republics. The conspirators saw it as their last opportunity to halt what they viewed as the Soviet Union's disintegration before it became irreversible.

### What happened when the conspirators confronted Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha?

On August 18, 1991, at 4:50 PM, five men arrived at Gorbachev's vacation home — including Gang of Eight members Deputy Chairman Baklanov and General Varennikov. Gorbachev immediately tried to call for help but found all communication lines already dead. When the visitors demanded he sign a state of emergency declaration and transfer authority to Vice President Yanayev, Gorbachev refused, called them traitors, and expressed outrage at the whole affair. His refusal surprised several of the conspirators. Gorbachev and his family were subsequently placed under house arrest and later testified that they had expected to be executed.

### How did Boris Yeltsin use the coup attempt to his own advantage?

Yeltsin, as the popularly elected President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, went to the Russian parliament building on August 19 and publicly called for Gorbachev's release, framing the coup for what it was. The Soviet state news agency amplified his call — an extremely unusual move. As the coup collapsed by August 21, Yeltsin transferred control of Russia's economy and security forces from Gorbachev to himself and the office of the Russian President. This effectively reduced Gorbachev to a figurehead and positioned Yeltsin as the dominant political figure before the Soviet Union was even formally dissolved.

### Why did Soviet soldiers refuse to support the coup?

Soviet soldiers — Russian citizens themselves — overwhelmingly declined to fire on civilians in Moscow despite orders from the coup's leadership. High-ranking military officers also began defecting from the Gang of Eight to Yeltsin's side, taking their troops with them. Gorbachev's reforms had cultivated a sense among ordinary people that their voices mattered, and the soldiers reflected that broader public sentiment. The coup plotters had apparently not anticipated this level of opposition and were slow to take the most drastic repressive measures that might have consolidated their rule.

### What happened to the members of the Gang of Eight after the coup collapsed?

Interior Minister Boris Pugo shot and killed himself and his wife on August 22 — though questions about whether he was murdered have never been definitively resolved. The remaining seven were arrested and charged with treason. On February 23, 1994, all seven and their affiliates were granted amnesty by the Russian Duma. Several went on to fill roles in post-communist Russia's public and private sectors; former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov even became Vice President at an American software firm. The last surviving member, former Defense Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Baklanov, died in Russia on July 28, 2021.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
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- [Ukraine's Counteroffensive Has Failed...](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/ukraines-counteroffensive-has-failed)
- [How Russia Gaslights the World: Putin's Decades-Long Campaign of Denial and Disinformation](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/how-russia-gaslights-the-world-putin-denial-disinformation)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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[1]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17858981
[2]: https://www.rferl.org/a/what-happened-to-the-august-1991-coup-plotters/27933729.html
[3]: https://www.britannica.com/topic/1991-Soviet-coup-attempt
[4]: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/cold-war-history/valentin-pavlov
[5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/11/russia-afghanistan
[6]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/26/gennady-yanayev-obituary-communist-gorbachev
[7]: https://apnews.com/article/041446081e384177a58df3bd52d90b92
[8]: https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union
[9]: https://www.cer.eu/insights/moscow-coups-1991-who-won-and-why-does-it-still-matter
[10]: https://apnews.com/article/europe-aaf01f87bfed95e5bfcf23bdb0350085
[11]: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviet-hard-liners-launch-coup-against-gorbachev
[12]: https://apnews.com/article/europe-fca50dc443b66b53a67fc8043b9c2d2a
[13]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/20/communist-hardliners-stage-coup-against-gorbachev-russia-1991
[14]: https://www.npr.org/2021/08/19/1029437787/in-1991-soviet-citizens-saw-swans-on-the-tv-and-knew-it-meant-turmoil
[15]: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union
[16]: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Boris-Yeltsin
[17]: https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/5/1/94/12588/The-August-1991-Coup-and-Its-Impact-on-Soviet

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