---
title: The UAE is in MASSIVE Trouble.
description: "The UAE is in BIG Trouble. Introduction. 2025 was a banner year for the United Arab Emirates, a year when victory seemed all but assured, and the political masterminds of Abu Dhabi seemed truly unstoppable. And while the Emirates benefit massively from their close relationships with Israel and the United States, rest assured that NATO member Turkey, Trump ally Pakistan, Trump ally Saudi Arabia, and core strategic ally Egypt could easily reduce Abu Dhabi’s standing in Washington if they chose to.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- The UAE’s regional strategy relies on backing non-state, land-holding proxy forces in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya rather than supporting internationally recognized governments.\n- The Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council briefly seized most of Yemen including its oil fields before being routed by a massive Saudi-backed tribal counterattack with air support.\n- Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt are increasingly aligned against UAE interests, with the ability to choke off the Emirates’ access to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and Black Sea markets.\n- The UAE began withdrawing military hardware from Somalia’s Bosaso airfield after Somalia cut ties with Abu Dhabi, signaling a broader collapse of Emirati influence across the Horn of Africa.\n- The Emirates support the RSF in Sudan, which is perpetrating an ongoing genocide — a position that places Abu Dhabi in direct opposition to Egypt, Turkey, and Iran.\n\n## Key Developments\n\nIn Sudan, the Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces had engaged in some of the darkest acts known to mankind, and the Emirates had gotten off with hardly a slap on the wrist. In Yemen, a rebel group called the Southern Transitional Council had taken over nearly the entire country with the Emirates’ help, capturing oil, thwarting Saudi Arabia, and demanding recognition as a new sovereign state. In the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland, the UAE had transformed airports and seaports into the most important points in a new regional axis, and in Libya, it seemed clear just weeks ago, that the Emirates were going to make something big happen, very soon. But across the first few weeks of 2026, the true nature of Abu Dhabi’s new axis was revealed for the entire world to see: Not some grand political machination, but a paper tiger, an illusion that would fall apart when faced with even the slightest resistance. The United Arab Emirates have gone from ascendant, to retreating, in record time, and now, there’s a very real chance that the UAE will be made to pay for its transgressions…some of which, are deadly serious. There’s four little letters that really matter in geopolitics: F-A-F-O, and after years spent fucking around with international affairs across the wider region, it appears that the United Arab Emirates are about to find out. Finally, in Sudan, the Emirates support the Rapid Support Forces, a predominantly ethnic-Arab fighting force that’s claimed a major portion of Sudanese territory, carried out regular wartime atrocities, and is currently perpetrating a horrific genocide under the cover of that conflict. When the Emirates support the RSF in Sudan, they operate against the interests of Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, each of which is trying to support the Sudanese Armed Forces. The same is true for the Emirates’ support of its proxy forces, as well as its consistent support of other nations in the region that have a tendency to go rogue. And, number two: these proxy forces allow the Emirates to keep tabs on the specific parts of the world, and particularly the maritime shipping routes, that the Emirates needs to keep stable, in order to ensure the uninterrupted sale of its oil.\n\n## Strategic Implications\n\nYemen, Revived. On the eighteenth of December, 2025, our team at WarFronts published an episode: “Yemen is Dead. Here’s What Will Replace It.” At that time, a powerful breakaway Yemeni faction, the Southern Transitional Council or STC, was on the rise. With the help of Emirati armored vehicles, Emirati-supplied but Chinese-made howitzers, and Emirati advisors on the ground, the STC had thoroughly kicked the ass of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which is, in turn, backed up by Saudi Arabia. During its shock offensive, the STC had taken over most of Yemen’s oil fields, the entirety of its border with Oman and its southern coastline, and so much territory that it could now lay claim to the same area that had once been the former state of South Yemen. As the STC expelled the Republic of Yemen government from the port city of Aden, they proudly began laying out their case for Western onlookers: Recognize them as a sovereign nation, give them a few weapons, and they’d get to work kicking the ass of the Houthi rebels, al-Qaeda, and any other terrorist organization that dared step onto Yemeni soil. But even a quick glance at the run-time of this episode should probably make it clear: the story that we’re here to discuss today, goes well beyond the victory of Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. Now, we tell the story of the rise and fall of the STC, partially to correct the record; contrary to our earlier statements, it turns out Yemen isn’t dead at all; it just fell into a deep coma for a few weeks, and proceeded to make a full recovery. From Libya, the Emirates can influence the volatile southeastern Mediterranean; from Yemen and Somalia, the Emirates can watch the Gulf of Aden, and if, or when, the RSF takes over the rest of Sudan, the UAE will gain a critical foothold on the shores of the Red Sea. Over the last week or two, the Emirates have started removing military hardware from parts of Somalia, particularly from an important airfield in Puntland’s port city of Bosaso, where, for the first time in years, Emirati strategic airlifters are no longer continuing their journey toward RSF smuggling routes.\n\n## Risk and Uncertainty\n\nMake no mistake; at that moment, the STC really appeared to have done it. The Saudi-backed government, and, more important, the powerful tribal militias that backed it up, had practically retreated from their territory as the STC advanced, refusing to fight for cities or strategic highways, and even fleeing onto Saudi soil in order to get out of their way. But the STC, and the United Arab Emirates that had backed it for years, would soon find out that their celebration was very premature. We should mention, for our regular WarFronts viewers, that, yes, the plot twist that comes next, has been something we’ve wanted to share with you—but, as you’ve probably noticed, Venezuela, Iran, and the entire Western order have all found their way into the shitter. It has been a busy few weeks. But while the world has been transfixed on chaos and upheaval in other countries, Saudi Arabia and its tribal allies got to kicking some serious ass in Yemen. When it was the STC’s turn, Saudi-backed tribal forces had two choices: Fight exposed, in the open desert, at risk of being cut off and surrounded by attacking forces that were constantly on the move, or give up territory, and live to fight another day. Finally, in Yemen, the STC briefly threatened an internationally recognized government that’s become Saudi Arabia’s most important international project. In each of those nations, Abu Dhabi follows a broadly similar playbook, providing its support, not to the internationally recognized government, but to a powerful rival faction that holds land, exerts political control over that land, and has autonomous fighting forces at its disposal. They’d even stood to benefit from what appeared to be a very timely accident, when, on the twenty-eighth of December, the military chief in control of Libya’s other government, the internationally recognized one, was killed in a plane crash shortly after taking off from an airport in Turkey. As each of these regional power players tries to position themselves at the center of influence networks, they also come into conflict with each other: Israel versus Iran or Iran versus Saudi Arabia, but also Turkey versus Israel, Ethiopia versus Egypt, Saudi Arabia versus Qatar, and more.\n\n## Outlook\n\nWhen those tribes made their way onto Saudi soil, they weren’t in a state of retreat; they were regrouping, gathering into a single, united force that was tens of thousands strong, and preparing for a massive counterattack. Nor did they simply plan to carve out a buffer zone, or take enough of their own territory back that the Republic of Yemen government could still survive. They were coming for all of what the STC had taken, and even the territory that the STC had lived on for years…and this time, they had air support. In order to understand what happened next, we’ve got to understand a couple of things about the way that fighting works in Yemen, because it’s very different than anything you’d see, almost anywhere else on Earth. Military offensives in this part of Yemen take place across massive, empty stretches of desert, using relatively small groups of fighters who can move rapidly, in all directions, and who tend to travel fairly light. Because they don’t have very many people to spare, they avoid urban combat, where battles can become very costly, very quickly. But by joining forces, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can establish firm control of the Red Sea, the southeastern Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal; they can leverage Saudi-backed Yemen to control the Gulf of Aden, and they can even choke off the Emirates’ access to Black Sea markets, especially Russia, if they so choose. As for the Emirates, they didn’t decide to try and hold the line; they didn’t send air support, they didn’t send mercenaries, and they didn’t take any of the other steps that might have allowed their proxy allies to survive. Number one, the Emirates prefers to do business with non-state, landholding actors, because they don’t have to play by the rules of the international order, they don’t tend to have very strict limits on what the UAE can or can’t do on their territory, and because they’re largely ostracized by the rest of the world, the UAE can exert a controlling influence by providing them with any support at all.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n- [Yemen's December 2025 Crisis: How the STC's Blitz Threatens to Split the Nation](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/geopolitics/yemen-on-the-edge-southern-council-blitz-split)\n- [The UAE's Destabilizing Influence in the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uaes-destabilizing-influence-in-the-middle-east)\n- [The Emergence of a New Nation: The Rise of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/the-emergence-of-a-new-nation-the-rise-of-the-southern-transitional-council-in-yemen)\n- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What is the UAE’s general strategy for regional influence in the Middle East and Horn of Africa?\n\nThe Emirates prefer to back non-state, land-holding actors rather than internationally recognized governments. These proxies do not have to follow the rules of the international order, have few limits on what the UAE can do on their territory, and — being largely ostracized by the world — can be dominated through modest support. This approach gives Abu Dhabi influence over key maritime shipping routes and strategic ports from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.\n\n### What happened with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen?\n\nWith Emirati armored vehicles, Chinese-made howitzers, and advisors on the ground, the STC launched a shock offensive that captured most of Yemen’s oil fields, the country’s southern coast and border with Oman, and the port city of Aden — effectively seizing the territory of the former South Yemen. However, Saudi-backed tribal militias retreated rather than fight in the open desert, regrouped on Saudi soil into a force tens of thousands strong, then launched a massive counterattack with air support that reversed virtually all of the STC’s gains.\n\n### Why is the coalition of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt dangerous for the UAE?\n\nBy joining forces, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can establish control of the Red Sea, the southeastern Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal, leverage Saudi-backed Yemen to control the Gulf of Aden, and choke off Emirati access to Black Sea markets including Russia. Each of these pressure points threatens the UAE’s ability to protect the maritime shipping routes it depends on for the uninterrupted sale of its oil.\n\n### What is happening with the UAE’s position in Somalia and the Horn of Africa?\n\nSomalia cut ties with the UAE after the STC’s entry onto Somali territory, and the Emirates subsequently began removing military hardware from the important Bosaso airfield in Puntland. This marks the first time in years that Emirati strategic airlifters have stopped using that location, signaling a retreat from what had been a key node in the UAE’s regional axis and its RSF smuggling routes through Sudan.\n\n### How does UAE support for the RSF in Sudan complicate its regional relationships?\n\nThe Rapid Support Forces, which the UAE backs in Sudan, have engaged in large-scale wartime atrocities and are currently perpetrating what is described as a horrific genocide. This pits Abu Dhabi directly against Egypt, Turkey, and Iran — each of which is supporting the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE’s consistent willingness to back proxy forces that go rogue and act against the interests of neighboring major powers has eroded the alliances it needs to sustain its influence.\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://theconversation.com/saudi-uae-bust-up-over-yemen-was-only-a-matter-of-time-and-reflects-wider-rift-over-vision-for-the-region-273083>\n2. <https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-uae-tensions-relations-yemen-sudan-middle-east-cold-war/a-75409779>\n3. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/abu-dhabi-built-axis-secessionists-across-region-how>\n4. <https://www.iris-france.org/en/where-will-the-united-arab-emirates-destabilising-actions-stop/>\n5. <https://mei.edu/publications/coalition-confrontation-saudi-uae-rivalry-yemen-and-its-regional-implications>\n6. <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-9/>\n7. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states>\n8. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/what-comes-after-axis-resistance>\n9. <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/how-abu-dhabi-built-an-axis-of-secessionists-across-the-region/>\n10. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates-horn-africa/b065-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa>\n11. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/07/separatists-and-spoilers-the-uaes-way-of-proxy-warfare/>\n12. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjrz34qdr9no>\n13. <https://ecfr.eu/article/from-partners-to-rivals-what-the-saudi-uae-rupture-means-for-europeans/>\n14. <https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/proxy-warfare-in-the-greater-middle-east-and-its-periphery-an-atlas/>\n15. <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/world/middleeast/yemen-separatist-leader-zubaidi-saudi-arabia-uae.html>\n16. <https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/The-air-raid-in-the-Libya-Sudan-Egypt-triangle-rekindles-security-alarms./>\n17. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/somali-regions-reject-mogadishus-move-cut-ties-with-uae-2026-01-13/>\n18. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-removing-its-military-bosaso-after-angry-somalia-ends-agreement>\n19. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/>\n20. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pakistan-seals-4bn-arms-deal-sell-chinese-warplanes-libyas-khalifa-haftar-report>\n21. <https://www.newarab.com/news/egypt-bombs-rsf-convoy-days-saddam-haftars-cairo-visit>\n22. <https://jamestown.org/saddam-haftar-the-marshals-heir-apparent-in-libya/>\n23. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-shared-intelligence-saudi-arabia-uae-activities-yemen-and-sudan>\n24. <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/exposed-fault-lines-why-saudi-uae-alliance-has-ruptured>\n25. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-13/china-uae-lead-list-of-those-at-risk-from-trump-s-iran-tariff>\n26. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/saudi-money-pakistan-nukes-turkish-military-india-takes-note-of-islamic-nato-10745226>\n27. <https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-middle-east-about-to-get-an-islamic-nato/a-74111424>\n28. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2026/01/11/turkey-saudipakistan-pact-and-the-security-market-thats-replacing-old-certainties/>\n29. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact>\n30. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-hunts-new-security-partners-regional-tensions-rise>\n31. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-advanced-talks-join-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-defence-pact-report>\n32. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/13/last-straw-somalia-cuts-uae-ties-after-yemen-separatists-illegal-entry>\n33. <https://apnews.com/article/libya-military-chief-funeral-plane-crash-d4add13913b082e6e69a85984915fcc6>\n34. <https://x.com/egypt_warfare/status/2003679854869598366>\n35. <https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/2003372056646177279>\n\n[1]: https://theconversation.com/saudi-uae-bust-up-over-yemen-was-only-a-matter-of-time-and-reflects-wider-rift-over-vision-for-the-region-273083\n[2]: https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-uae-tensions-relations-yemen-sudan-middle-east-cold-war/a-75409779\n[3]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/abu-dhabi-built-axis-secessionists-across-region-how\n[4]: https://www.iris-france.org/en/where-will-the-united-arab-emirates-destabilising-actions-stop/\n[5]: https://mei.edu/publications/coalition-confrontation-saudi-uae-rivalry-yemen-and-its-regional-implications\n[6]: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-9/\n[7]: https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states\n[8]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/what-comes-after-axis-resistance\n[9]: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/how-abu-dhabi-built-an-axis-of-secessionists-across-the-region/\n[10]: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates-horn-africa/b065-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa\n[11]: https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/07/separatists-and-spoilers-the-uaes-way-of-proxy-warfare/\n[12]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjrz34qdr9no\n[13]: https://ecfr.eu/article/from-partners-to-rivals-what-the-saudi-uae-rupture-means-for-europeans/\n[14]: https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/proxy-warfare-in-the-greater-middle-east-and-its-periphery-an-atlas/\n[15]: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/world/middleeast/yemen-separatist-leader-zubaidi-saudi-arabia-uae.html\n[16]: https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/The-air-raid-in-the-Libya-Sudan-Egypt-triangle-rekindles-security-alarms./\n[17]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/somali-regions-reject-mogadishus-move-cut-ties-with-uae-2026-01-13/\n[18]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-removing-its-military-bosaso-after-angry-somalia-ends-agreement\n[19]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/\n[20]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pakistan-seals-4bn-arms-deal-sell-chinese-warplanes-libyas-khalifa-haftar-report\n[21]: https://www.newarab.com/news/egypt-bombs-rsf-convoy-days-saddam-haftars-cairo-visit\n[22]: https://jamestown.org/saddam-haftar-the-marshals-heir-apparent-in-libya/\n[23]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-shared-intelligence-saudi-arabia-uae-activities-yemen-and-sudan\n[24]: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/exposed-fault-lines-why-saudi-uae-alliance-has-ruptured\n[25]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-13/china-uae-lead-list-of-those-at-risk-from-trump-s-iran-tariff\n[26]: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/saudi-money-pakistan-nukes-turkish-military-india-takes-note-of-islamic-nato-10745226\n[27]: https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-middle-east-about-to-get-an-islamic-nato/a-74111424\n[28]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2026/01/11/turkey-saudipakistan-pact-and-the-security-market-thats-replacing-old-certainties/\n[29]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact\n[30]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-hunts-new-security-partners-regional-tensions-rise\n[31]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-advanced-talks-join-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-defence-pact-report\n[32]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/13/last-straw-somalia-cuts-uae-ties-after-yemen-separatists-illegal-entry\n[33]: https://apnews.com/article/libya-military-chief-funeral-plane-crash-d4add13913b082e6e69a85984915fcc6\n[34]: https://x.com/egypt_warfare/status/2003679854869598366\n[35]: https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/2003372056646177279\n\n<!-- youtube:wFAuZg1w_Gk -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/the-uae-is-in-massive-trouble.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/the-uae-is-in-massive-trouble
datePublished: 2026-02-25
dateModified: 2026-02-25
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  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
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<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
The UAE is in BIG Trouble. Introduction. 2025 was a banner year for the United Arab Emirates, a year when victory seemed all but assured, and the political masterminds of Abu Dhabi seemed truly unstoppable. And while the Emirates benefit massively from their close relationships with Israel and the United States, rest assured that NATO member Turkey, Trump ally Pakistan, Trump ally Saudi Arabia, and core strategic ally Egypt could easily reduce Abu Dhabi’s standing in Washington if they chose to.

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- The UAE’s regional strategy relies on backing non-state, land-holding proxy forces in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya rather than supporting internationally recognized governments.
- The Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council briefly seized most of Yemen including its oil fields before being routed by a massive Saudi-backed tribal counterattack with air support.
- Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt are increasingly aligned against UAE interests, with the ability to choke off the Emirates’ access to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and Black Sea markets.
- The UAE began withdrawing military hardware from Somalia’s Bosaso airfield after Somalia cut ties with Abu Dhabi, signaling a broader collapse of Emirati influence across the Horn of Africa.
- The Emirates support the RSF in Sudan, which is perpetrating an ongoing genocide — a position that places Abu Dhabi in direct opposition to Egypt, Turkey, and Iran.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-developments" -->
## Key Developments

In Sudan, the Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces had engaged in some of the darkest acts known to mankind, and the Emirates had gotten off with hardly a slap on the wrist. In Yemen, a rebel group called the Southern Transitional Council had taken over nearly the entire country with the Emirates’ help, capturing oil, thwarting Saudi Arabia, and demanding recognition as a new sovereign state. In the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland, the UAE had transformed airports and seaports into the most important points in a new regional axis, and in Libya, it seemed clear just weeks ago, that the Emirates were going to make something big happen, very soon. But across the first few weeks of 2026, the true nature of Abu Dhabi’s new axis was revealed for the entire world to see: Not some grand political machination, but a paper tiger, an illusion that would fall apart when faced with even the slightest resistance. The United Arab Emirates have gone from ascendant, to retreating, in record time, and now, there’s a very real chance that the UAE will be made to pay for its transgressions…some of which, are deadly serious. There’s four little letters that really matter in geopolitics: F-A-F-O, and after years spent fucking around with international affairs across the wider region, it appears that the United Arab Emirates are about to find out. Finally, in Sudan, the Emirates support the Rapid Support Forces, a predominantly ethnic-Arab fighting force that’s claimed a major portion of Sudanese territory, carried out regular wartime atrocities, and is currently perpetrating a horrific genocide under the cover of that conflict. When the Emirates support the RSF in Sudan, they operate against the interests of Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, each of which is trying to support the Sudanese Armed Forces. The same is true for the Emirates’ support of its proxy forces, as well as its consistent support of other nations in the region that have a tendency to go rogue. And, number two: these proxy forces allow the Emirates to keep tabs on the specific parts of the world, and particularly the maritime shipping routes, that the Emirates needs to keep stable, in order to ensure the uninterrupted sale of its oil.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-developments" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="strategic-implications" -->
## Strategic Implications

Yemen, Revived. On the eighteenth of December, 2025, our team at WarFronts published an episode: “Yemen is Dead. Here’s What Will Replace It.” At that time, a powerful breakaway Yemeni faction, the Southern Transitional Council or STC, was on the rise. With the help of Emirati armored vehicles, Emirati-supplied but Chinese-made howitzers, and Emirati advisors on the ground, the STC had thoroughly kicked the ass of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which is, in turn, backed up by Saudi Arabia. During its shock offensive, the STC had taken over most of Yemen’s oil fields, the entirety of its border with Oman and its southern coastline, and so much territory that it could now lay claim to the same area that had once been the former state of South Yemen. As the STC expelled the Republic of Yemen government from the port city of Aden, they proudly began laying out their case for Western onlookers: Recognize them as a sovereign nation, give them a few weapons, and they’d get to work kicking the ass of the Houthi rebels, al-Qaeda, and any other terrorist organization that dared step onto Yemeni soil. But even a quick glance at the run-time of this episode should probably make it clear: the story that we’re here to discuss today, goes well beyond the victory of Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. Now, we tell the story of the rise and fall of the STC, partially to correct the record; contrary to our earlier statements, it turns out Yemen isn’t dead at all; it just fell into a deep coma for a few weeks, and proceeded to make a full recovery. From Libya, the Emirates can influence the volatile southeastern Mediterranean; from Yemen and Somalia, the Emirates can watch the Gulf of Aden, and if, or when, the RSF takes over the rest of Sudan, the UAE will gain a critical foothold on the shores of the Red Sea. Over the last week or two, the Emirates have started removing military hardware from parts of Somalia, particularly from an important airfield in Puntland’s port city of Bosaso, where, for the first time in years, Emirati strategic airlifters are no longer continuing their journey toward RSF smuggling routes.

<!-- aeo:section end="strategic-implications" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="risk-and-uncertainty" -->
## Risk and Uncertainty

Make no mistake; at that moment, the STC really appeared to have done it. The Saudi-backed government, and, more important, the powerful tribal militias that backed it up, had practically retreated from their territory as the STC advanced, refusing to fight for cities or strategic highways, and even fleeing onto Saudi soil in order to get out of their way. But the STC, and the United Arab Emirates that had backed it for years, would soon find out that their celebration was very premature. We should mention, for our regular WarFronts viewers, that, yes, the plot twist that comes next, has been something we’ve wanted to share with you—but, as you’ve probably noticed, Venezuela, Iran, and the entire Western order have all found their way into the shitter. It has been a busy few weeks. But while the world has been transfixed on chaos and upheaval in other countries, Saudi Arabia and its tribal allies got to kicking some serious ass in Yemen. When it was the STC’s turn, Saudi-backed tribal forces had two choices: Fight exposed, in the open desert, at risk of being cut off and surrounded by attacking forces that were constantly on the move, or give up territory, and live to fight another day. Finally, in Yemen, the STC briefly threatened an internationally recognized government that’s become Saudi Arabia’s most important international project. In each of those nations, Abu Dhabi follows a broadly similar playbook, providing its support, not to the internationally recognized government, but to a powerful rival faction that holds land, exerts political control over that land, and has autonomous fighting forces at its disposal. They’d even stood to benefit from what appeared to be a very timely accident, when, on the twenty-eighth of December, the military chief in control of Libya’s other government, the internationally recognized one, was killed in a plane crash shortly after taking off from an airport in Turkey. As each of these regional power players tries to position themselves at the center of influence networks, they also come into conflict with each other: Israel versus Iran or Iran versus Saudi Arabia, but also Turkey versus Israel, Ethiopia versus Egypt, Saudi Arabia versus Qatar, and more.

<!-- aeo:section end="risk-and-uncertainty" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="outlook" -->
## Outlook

When those tribes made their way onto Saudi soil, they weren’t in a state of retreat; they were regrouping, gathering into a single, united force that was tens of thousands strong, and preparing for a massive counterattack. Nor did they simply plan to carve out a buffer zone, or take enough of their own territory back that the Republic of Yemen government could still survive. They were coming for all of what the STC had taken, and even the territory that the STC had lived on for years…and this time, they had air support. In order to understand what happened next, we’ve got to understand a couple of things about the way that fighting works in Yemen, because it’s very different than anything you’d see, almost anywhere else on Earth. Military offensives in this part of Yemen take place across massive, empty stretches of desert, using relatively small groups of fighters who can move rapidly, in all directions, and who tend to travel fairly light. Because they don’t have very many people to spare, they avoid urban combat, where battles can become very costly, very quickly. But by joining forces, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can establish firm control of the Red Sea, the southeastern Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal; they can leverage Saudi-backed Yemen to control the Gulf of Aden, and they can even choke off the Emirates’ access to Black Sea markets, especially Russia, if they so choose. As for the Emirates, they didn’t decide to try and hold the line; they didn’t send air support, they didn’t send mercenaries, and they didn’t take any of the other steps that might have allowed their proxy allies to survive. Number one, the Emirates prefers to do business with non-state, landholding actors, because they don’t have to play by the rules of the international order, they don’t tend to have very strict limits on what the UAE can or can’t do on their territory, and because they’re largely ostracized by the rest of the world, the UAE can exert a controlling influence by providing them with any support at all.

<!-- aeo:section end="outlook" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)
- [Yemen's December 2025 Crisis: How the STC's Blitz Threatens to Split the Nation](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/geopolitics/yemen-on-the-edge-southern-council-blitz-split)
- [The UAE's Destabilizing Influence in the Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uaes-destabilizing-influence-in-the-middle-east)
- [The Emergence of a New Nation: The Rise of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/the-emergence-of-a-new-nation-the-rise-of-the-southern-transitional-council-in-yemen)
- [The UAE's Regional Ambitions Collapse as Middle East Powers Push Back](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-regional-ambitions-collapse-middle-east-pushback)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the UAE’s general strategy for regional influence in the Middle East and Horn of Africa?

The Emirates prefer to back non-state, land-holding actors rather than internationally recognized governments. These proxies do not have to follow the rules of the international order, have few limits on what the UAE can do on their territory, and — being largely ostracized by the world — can be dominated through modest support. This approach gives Abu Dhabi influence over key maritime shipping routes and strategic ports from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

### What happened with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen?

With Emirati armored vehicles, Chinese-made howitzers, and advisors on the ground, the STC launched a shock offensive that captured most of Yemen’s oil fields, the country’s southern coast and border with Oman, and the port city of Aden — effectively seizing the territory of the former South Yemen. However, Saudi-backed tribal militias retreated rather than fight in the open desert, regrouped on Saudi soil into a force tens of thousands strong, then launched a massive counterattack with air support that reversed virtually all of the STC’s gains.

### Why is the coalition of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt dangerous for the UAE?

By joining forces, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can establish control of the Red Sea, the southeastern Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal, leverage Saudi-backed Yemen to control the Gulf of Aden, and choke off Emirati access to Black Sea markets including Russia. Each of these pressure points threatens the UAE’s ability to protect the maritime shipping routes it depends on for the uninterrupted sale of its oil.

### What is happening with the UAE’s position in Somalia and the Horn of Africa?

Somalia cut ties with the UAE after the STC’s entry onto Somali territory, and the Emirates subsequently began removing military hardware from the important Bosaso airfield in Puntland. This marks the first time in years that Emirati strategic airlifters have stopped using that location, signaling a retreat from what had been a key node in the UAE’s regional axis and its RSF smuggling routes through Sudan.

### How does UAE support for the RSF in Sudan complicate its regional relationships?

The Rapid Support Forces, which the UAE backs in Sudan, have engaged in large-scale wartime atrocities and are currently perpetrating what is described as a horrific genocide. This pits Abu Dhabi directly against Egypt, Turkey, and Iran — each of which is supporting the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE’s consistent willingness to back proxy forces that go rogue and act against the interests of neighboring major powers has eroded the alliances it needs to sustain its influence.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
## Sources
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35. <https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/2003372056646177279>

[1]: https://theconversation.com/saudi-uae-bust-up-over-yemen-was-only-a-matter-of-time-and-reflects-wider-rift-over-vision-for-the-region-273083
[2]: https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-uae-tensions-relations-yemen-sudan-middle-east-cold-war/a-75409779
[3]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/abu-dhabi-built-axis-secessionists-across-region-how
[4]: https://www.iris-france.org/en/where-will-the-united-arab-emirates-destabilising-actions-stop/
[5]: https://mei.edu/publications/coalition-confrontation-saudi-uae-rivalry-yemen-and-its-regional-implications
[6]: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-9/
[7]: https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states
[8]: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/what-comes-after-axis-resistance
[9]: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/how-abu-dhabi-built-an-axis-of-secessionists-across-the-region/
[10]: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates-horn-africa/b065-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa
[11]: https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/07/separatists-and-spoilers-the-uaes-way-of-proxy-warfare/
[12]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjrz34qdr9no
[13]: https://ecfr.eu/article/from-partners-to-rivals-what-the-saudi-uae-rupture-means-for-europeans/
[14]: https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/proxy-warfare-in-the-greater-middle-east-and-its-periphery-an-atlas/
[15]: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/world/middleeast/yemen-separatist-leader-zubaidi-saudi-arabia-uae.html
[16]: https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/The-air-raid-in-the-Libya-Sudan-Egypt-triangle-rekindles-security-alarms./
[17]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/somali-regions-reject-mogadishus-move-cut-ties-with-uae-2026-01-13/
[18]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-removing-its-military-bosaso-after-angry-somalia-ends-agreement
[19]: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dubais-dp-world-says-operations-somalilands-berbera-port-unaffected-by-uae-2026-01-13/
[20]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pakistan-seals-4bn-arms-deal-sell-chinese-warplanes-libyas-khalifa-haftar-report
[21]: https://www.newarab.com/news/egypt-bombs-rsf-convoy-days-saddam-haftars-cairo-visit
[22]: https://jamestown.org/saddam-haftar-the-marshals-heir-apparent-in-libya/
[23]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-shared-intelligence-saudi-arabia-uae-activities-yemen-and-sudan
[24]: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/exposed-fault-lines-why-saudi-uae-alliance-has-ruptured
[25]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-13/china-uae-lead-list-of-those-at-risk-from-trump-s-iran-tariff
[26]: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/saudi-money-pakistan-nukes-turkish-military-india-takes-note-of-islamic-nato-10745226
[27]: https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-middle-east-about-to-get-an-islamic-nato/a-74111424
[28]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2026/01/11/turkey-saudipakistan-pact-and-the-security-market-thats-replacing-old-certainties/
[29]: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact
[30]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-hunts-new-security-partners-regional-tensions-rise
[31]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-advanced-talks-join-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-defence-pact-report
[32]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/13/last-straw-somalia-cuts-uae-ties-after-yemen-separatists-illegal-entry
[33]: https://apnews.com/article/libya-military-chief-funeral-plane-crash-d4add13913b082e6e69a85984915fcc6
[34]: https://x.com/egypt_warfare/status/2003679854869598366
[35]: https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/2003372056646177279

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<!-- aeo:section end="sources" -->