--- title: "The UAE's Covert War: Funding the RSF and Fueling Genocide in Sudan" description: "On Friday, the 21st of November, roughly three weeks had passed since the Sudanese city of El Fasher fell, marking the beginning of one of the largest massacres in human history. About a week after the city fell, Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab, stated words that will perhaps come to define this conflict more than any other: \"More people could have died in the past week in El Fasher, and this is without hyperbole, than died in the past two years in Gaza.\" If that claim is accurate, the numbers are staggering. The Palestinian Health Authority estimated that by October 2025, more than 67,000 people had died in Gaza, which the U.N. human rights office believes is probably an undercount. Consequently, in one week, in one single city, more than 67,000 people have died. The death toll is undoubtedly far higher by now. In the words of Dr. Mohamed Osman Akasha, Sudan's Chargé d'Affaires in Kenya, \"This is not a conflict. It is for extermination.\"\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- The fall of El Fasher in November initiated a massacre where death tolls may outpace two years of conflict in Gaza in just a single week.\n- The Sudanese government accuses the UAE of heavily backing the RSF with weapons, funding, and mercenaries, allegations supported by UN and media investigations.\n- UAE support for the RSF operates through covert transshipment points in Uganda, Chad, and Somalia to maintain plausible deniability.\n- Amnesty International confirmed the RSF's use of Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers supplied via Saudi Arabia.\n- Gold is a primary driver for UAE involvement, with approximately 90 percent of Sudan's $13 billion gold output reportedly smuggled to the Emirates.\n- Abu Dhabi's strategic interests include massive agricultural investments in northern Sudan and securing influence over the vital Red Sea maritime corridor.\n\n## The Accumulating Evidence of Foreign Intervention\n\nThis is an ongoing crisis that has no end in sight. While the international community has largely looked away from this conflict, certain countries have invested heavily in propping up the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the group perpetrating the genocide in El Fasher and the wider Darfur region. According to the Sudanese government, no country has done more to support the RSF than the United Arab Emirates. Sudan has accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, financing their operations, and even sending mercenaries to fight alongside the paramilitary group. The UAE, for its part, has consistently denied those allegations. Emirati government officials maintain that their nation has not taken sides in the conflict, and has instead focused on humanitarian efforts and diplomatic mediation. However, competing narratives aside, the evidence that the UAE is backing the RSF is overwhelming and comes from a wide range of sources from Sudan and across the globe. The earliest indications of this covert support began emerging in the international press shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. On the 10th of August 2023, barely four months since the war had first started, the Wall Street Journal published an exclusive report detailing a covert arms pipeline. A cargo plane from the UAE that was ostensibly carrying humanitarian aid for the Sudanese people had landed in Uganda. Instead of finding the expected relief cargo, local officials discovered weapons. According to Ugandan officials, the plane was subsequently allowed to continue its trip to Eastern Chad, and they received direct orders from their superiors to stop inspecting flights stopping over from the UAE.\n\n## Covert Logistics and International Corroboration\n\nA month after the initial Ugandan incident, the New York Times published a piece alleging that the UAE was running an elaborate covert operation to support the RSF. According to the report, the UAE was supplying the paramilitary group with powerful weapons and drones, treating injured fighters, and airlifting the most serious medical cases to one of its military hospitals. The operation was reportedly based in a remote town across the border in Chad equipped with a hospital and an airfield. Satellite imagery and conversations with officials from various countries, including the United States, revealed that cargo planes from the Emirates had been landing at the airfield on a near-daily basis since June. These reports revealed something that would come to be a hallmark of the UAE's Sudan strategy: the use of other countries as intermediaries and transshipment points to maintain plausible deniability. Following these initial disclosures, outlets such as Kenya's Daily Nation, the UK-based Middle East Eye, and the international investigative organization Bellingcat all published detailed investigations corroborating and expanding on these findings. In October, Middle East Eye published an article exploring the UAE's operations in the Somali port city of Bossaso. The report alleges that for the past two years, the UAE has funneled hundreds of thousands of containers, some marked hazardous, through the port. It also claims that Colombian mercenaries, recruited by the UAE to assist the RSF, have built a base in the city that includes a hospital to treat those wounded in Sudan. Abdullahi, a senior maritime commander at Bossaso Airport, stated, \"I recall one occasion when a plane carrying injured soldiers landed at Bossaso airport and the aircraft door was visibly stained with blood.\" Beyond media investigations, the international community has presented its own findings. A United Nations panel of experts investigated claims of UAE support for the RSF in 2023. After speaking to sources in Chad and Darfur, the panel concluded that the RSF was receiving weapons and ammunition several times per week from the UAE. The shipments reportedly arrive at Amdjarass Airport in Chad before being transported by road to RSF positions. More recently, Amnesty International provided further evidence of the UAE's involvement in the war. By analyzing pictures and videos showing the aftermath of RSF attacks, Amnesty researchers found that the paramilitary group was using Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers. This marks the first time that the GB50A bombs have been documented in active use in any conflict worldwide. The weapons are manufactured by a Chinese state-owned defense corporation and sold to Saudi Arabia, which then provides them to the RSF. The accumulation of this evidence indicates that the UAE is not merely involved in the conflict; it is perhaps the greatest enabler of the massacres witnessed in El Fasher.\n\n## Historical Context of Gold, Agriculture, and Ideology\n\nUnderstanding the motivations behind the UAE's involvement requires examining the historical context of its economic and strategic interests in Sudan. Natural resources are invariably cited as the primary driver. Following South Sudan's secession in 2011, Sudan lost approximately 75 percent of its oil reserves and 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. This devastating economic crisis pushed the country to pivot toward gold mining, and by 2012, gold constituted 60 percent of the country's exports. According to official estimates, gold currently makes up 70 percent of Sudan's exports, with production surging from 41.8 metric tonnes in 2022 to 64 metric tonnes in 2024. Most of this gold is produced in areas currently controlled by the RSF. According to the Guardian, about 90 percent of this gold, valued at more than $13 billion, has been smuggled directly to the UAE. Consequently, analysts routinely point to gold as the UAE's primary motivating factor. However, the economic calculus extends beyond precious metals to agriculture and long-term food security. Because water is scarce and little of its land is arable, the UAE imports more than 90 percent of its food. Since the global food crisis in 2007, the UAE has made food security a highest priority, ramping up investments in farmlands abroad. Sudan has been a core component of Abu Dhabi's agricultural strategy since the 1970s, when Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri promised that Gulf investment could transform Sudan into the breadbasket of the Arab world. Emirati investment in Sudan's agriculture rapidly accelerated after South Sudan's independence in 2011 left Khartoum scrambling for new revenue sources. Today, two Emirati firms—International Holding Company (IHC) and Jenaan Investment—farm over 500 square kilometers in northern Sudan, with plans to expand their holdings by more than 1,600 square kilometers. For context, this planned expansion is larger than the city of Abu Dhabi itself. Beyond resources, there is a distinct ideological dimension shaping the UAE's strategy. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have longstanding links to political Islam that date back to the presidency of Omar al-Bashir. Those links proved crucial when Islamist forces helped the SAF retake Khartoum earlier in the conflict. For the UAE, which has aggressively positioned itself as a bulwark against Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa, these connections meant that the SAF could not be trusted. Furthermore, the UAE views RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, alias Hemedti, as a reliable custodian of Emirati interests. According to Talal Mohammad, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, the UAE began viewing Hemedti in this light after RSF fighters played a significant role supporting Emirati objectives in the Yemeni civil war. By backing the RSF, Abu Dhabi could potentially install a government fundamentally opposed to political Islam.\n\n## Geopolitical Implications and the Path to Peace\n\nThe geopolitical implications of the conflict heavily involve Sudan's 700-kilometer shoreline along the Red Sea. As one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, the Red Sea sees roughly a third of global container traffic pass through its waters, connecting Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. For the UAE, positioning itself as a premier global logistics and trade hub requires controlling ports along this corridor. Controlling these maritime nodes translates into managing the flow of goods and wielding immense economic and political influence. Critically, the Emirates are not the only Middle Eastern power seeking to exploit the Sudan war for regional leverage, as Iran is also looking to expand its proxy network into Sudan in the coming years. Alex De Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, noted in an interview with Middle East Eye, \"The Sudanese Red Sea shores are the pass key of over 60 percent of international trade. By fuelling instability in Sudan, the UAE has a chance to control these shores.\" Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, an analyst and former senior aide to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, concurs, noting that this strategy is consistent with previous UAE actions in Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia. Ultimately, the conflict serves as a vital arena for the UAE to project its power. Increased competition between Saudi Arabia, which supports the SAF, and the UAE transformed the war into a proxy conflict as both nations vie to become the dominant power in the region. This regional rivalry reflects a broader shift in global power dynamics, where assertive middle powers are actively carving out their own spheres of influence. Finding a lasting resolution depends heavily on leveraging this international involvement. All observers agree that true peace requires bringing both the SAF and RSF to the negotiating table. However, with the conflict locked in a functional stalemate where both sides still believe military victory is attainable, voluntary negotiations appear highly unlikely. Dr. Akasha stated that the SAF would only agree to stop fighting if the RSF is dismantled, surrenders its weapons, and sees its leadership held accountable. Conversely, the RSF is unlikely to disarm willingly following significant battlefield victories like the capture of El Fasher. Cutting off external support remains the most viable method to force negotiations. Without the weapons, money, and logistical backing provided by foreign actors, both factions would be compelled to compromise. The odds of foreign powers voluntarily withdrawing their support are generally low, as every intervening nation has distinct strategic goals. However, mounting international pressure could force a shift. Following the public outcry over the fall of El Fasher and the ensuing massacres, Anwar Gargash, the UAE's senior diplomatic envoy, made a rare statement while in Bahrain appearing to admit mistakes in Abu Dhabi's strategy. \"We all made a mistake when the two generals who are fighting the civil war today overthrew the civilian government,\" Gargash said. \"That was, looking back, a critical mistake. We should have put our foot down collectively. We did not call it a coup.\" Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor, views this as a striking reversal given the UAE's vast investment in the RSF. If the UAE is genuinely reconsidering its position under diplomatic pressure, a viable path to peace may open. As Cameron Hudson, a former chief of staff to successive U.S. presidential envoys for Sudan, emphasized, \"The war would be over if not for the UAE. The only thing that is keeping [the RSF] in this war is the overwhelming amount of military support that they're receiving from the UAE.\"\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What evidence exists that the UAE is supplying the RSF in Sudan?\n\nEvidence comes from multiple independent sources. A 2023 Wall Street Journal investigation described a UAE cargo plane ostensibly carrying humanitarian aid that landed in Uganda and was found to contain weapons. A UN panel of experts concluded that the RSF was receiving weapons and ammunition several times per week from the UAE, arriving via Amdjarass Airport in Chad. Amnesty International confirmed the RSF's use of Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers traceable through Saudi Arabia. Middle East Eye also reported Colombian mercenaries recruited by the UAE operating out of the Somali port city of Bossaso.\n\n### How does the UAE maintain plausible deniability for its support of the RSF?\n\nThe UAE routes weapons and supplies through intermediary countries — Uganda, Chad, and Somalia — rather than directly into Sudan. Cargo planes from the Emirates have been landing at a remote airfield in Chad equipped with a hospital, and some injured RSF fighters have reportedly been airlifted to UAE military hospitals. Emirati government officials consistently deny taking sides, insisting the country is focused on humanitarian aid and diplomatic mediation.\n\n### What economic interests does the UAE have in Sudan?\n\nGold is the primary driver: approximately 90 percent of Sudan's $13 billion annual gold output, most of it produced in RSF-controlled areas, has reportedly been smuggled directly to the UAE. Beyond gold, Abu Dhabi has major agricultural investments through two Emirati firms — International Holding Company and Jenaan Investment — that farm over 500 square kilometers in northern Sudan, with plans to expand by more than 1,600 square kilometers, an area larger than the city of Abu Dhabi itself.\n\n### Why does control of Sudan matter for the UAE's broader regional strategy?\n\nSudan's 700-kilometer Red Sea coastline sits along one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, through which roughly a third of global container traffic flows toward the Suez Canal. Controlling or influencing ports along this corridor would strengthen the UAE's position as a global logistics and trade hub. Alex De Waal of the World Peace Foundation noted that by fueling instability in Sudan, the UAE has a chance to control shores through which over 60 percent of international trade passes.\n\n### What would it take to end the war in Sudan?\n\nAll observers agree that true peace requires bringing both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF to the negotiating table, but with the conflict in functional stalemate and both sides believing military victory is still attainable, voluntary negotiations appear highly unlikely. Cutting off external support — principally from the UAE — is considered the most viable mechanism to force compromise. As Cameron Hudson, a former chief of staff to successive US presidential envoys for Sudan, stated: \"The war would be over if not for the UAE. The only thing that is keeping the RSF in this war is the overwhelming amount of military support that they're receiving from the UAE.\"\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [South Sudan is on Fire. Here's Why. (And More)](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-is-on-fire-heres-why-and-more)\n- [Sudan's Ignored Genocide and the Tragic Fall of El-Fasher](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/sudans-ignored-genocide-and-tragic-fall-of-el-fasher)\n- [Is the 21st Century's Deadliest War about to Restart? And More.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-the-21st-centurys-deadliest-war-about-to-restart-and-more)\n- [UAE's Regional Proxy Network Collapses: Middle East Realignment Against Abu Dhabi](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-proxy-network-collapse-middle-east-realignment)\n- [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east)\n\n## Sources\n1. \n2. \n3. \n4. \n5. \n6. \n7. \n8. \n9. \n10. \n11. \n12. \n13. \n14. \n15. \n16. \n\n[1]: https://www.theafricareport.com/397930/uae-denies-complicity-as-new-report-ties-bosaso-flights-to-sudan-atrocities/\n[2]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/inside-uae-secret-operation-somalia-sudan-bosaso\n[3]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-role-outside-powers-are-playing-in-sudans-continued-brutal-war\n[4]: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195?ln=en&v=pdf\n[5]: https://archive.is/kZKc5\n[6]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html\n[7]: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/06/15/kenya-weapons-sudan-civil-war-conflict-khartoum-omdurman-munitions-ammunition/\n[8]: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/nov/16/australia-dubai-international-airshow-defence-weapons-arms-fair-sudan-uae\n[9]: https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/07/27/five-reasons-why-the-uae-is-fixated-on-sudan/\n[10]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/explainers/why-uae-involved-sudans-bloody-civil-war\n[11]: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250327-sudan-s-booming-wartime-gold-trade-flows-through-the-uae\n[12]: https://e360.yale.edu/features/sudan-war-gold-mining\n[13]: https://thedialectics.org/power-ports-and-gold-the-real-reasons-behind-the-uaes-role-in-sudan/\n[14]: https://theconversation.com/sudan-is-burning-and-foreign-powers-are-benefiting-whats-in-it-for-the-uae-238695\n[15]: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/cameron-hudson-outside-backers-perpetuate-sudan-stalemate\n[16]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/31/sudan-war-trump-white-house/\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/uae-covert-war-funding-rsf-sudan-genocide.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/uae-covert-war-funding-rsf-sudan-genocide datePublished: 2026-03-04 dateModified: 2026-03-04 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/GIPeNc9uod0/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: d5e2d633dabfc80eb49231cd0087388d2d6a418d3c747c302f3bc393ce349bfa tokens: 5118 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/uae-covert-war-funding-rsf-sudan-genocide.md.summary.md --- On Friday, the 21st of November, roughly three weeks had passed since the Sudanese city of El Fasher fell, marking the beginning of one of the largest massacres in human history. About a week after the city fell, Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab, stated words that will perhaps come to define this conflict more than any other: "More people could have died in the past week in El Fasher, and this is without hyperbole, than died in the past two years in Gaza." If that claim is accurate, the numbers are staggering. The Palestinian Health Authority estimated that by October 2025, more than 67,000 people had died in Gaza, which the U.N. human rights office believes is probably an undercount. Consequently, in one week, in one single city, more than 67,000 people have died. The death toll is undoubtedly far higher by now. In the words of Dr. Mohamed Osman Akasha, Sudan's Chargé d'Affaires in Kenya, "This is not a conflict. It is for extermination." ## Key Takeaways - The fall of El Fasher in November initiated a massacre where death tolls may outpace two years of conflict in Gaza in just a single week. - The Sudanese government accuses the UAE of heavily backing the RSF with weapons, funding, and mercenaries, allegations supported by UN and media investigations. - UAE support for the RSF operates through covert transshipment points in Uganda, Chad, and Somalia to maintain plausible deniability. - Amnesty International confirmed the RSF's use of Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers supplied via Saudi Arabia. - Gold is a primary driver for UAE involvement, with approximately 90 percent of Sudan's $13 billion gold output reportedly smuggled to the Emirates. - Abu Dhabi's strategic interests include massive agricultural investments in northern Sudan and securing influence over the vital Red Sea maritime corridor. ## The Accumulating Evidence of Foreign Intervention This is an ongoing crisis that has no end in sight. While the international community has largely looked away from this conflict, certain countries have invested heavily in propping up the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the group perpetrating the genocide in El Fasher and the wider Darfur region. According to the Sudanese government, no country has done more to support the RSF than the United Arab Emirates. Sudan has accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, financing their operations, and even sending mercenaries to fight alongside the paramilitary group. The UAE, for its part, has consistently denied those allegations. Emirati government officials maintain that their nation has not taken sides in the conflict, and has instead focused on humanitarian efforts and diplomatic mediation. However, competing narratives aside, the evidence that the UAE is backing the RSF is overwhelming and comes from a wide range of sources from Sudan and across the globe. The earliest indications of this covert support began emerging in the international press shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. On the 10th of August 2023, barely four months since the war had first started, the Wall Street Journal published an exclusive report detailing a covert arms pipeline. A cargo plane from the UAE that was ostensibly carrying humanitarian aid for the Sudanese people had landed in Uganda. Instead of finding the expected relief cargo, local officials discovered weapons. According to Ugandan officials, the plane was subsequently allowed to continue its trip to Eastern Chad, and they received direct orders from their superiors to stop inspecting flights stopping over from the UAE. ## Covert Logistics and International Corroboration A month after the initial Ugandan incident, the New York Times published a piece alleging that the UAE was running an elaborate covert operation to support the RSF. According to the report, the UAE was supplying the paramilitary group with powerful weapons and drones, treating injured fighters, and airlifting the most serious medical cases to one of its military hospitals. The operation was reportedly based in a remote town across the border in Chad equipped with a hospital and an airfield. Satellite imagery and conversations with officials from various countries, including the United States, revealed that cargo planes from the Emirates had been landing at the airfield on a near-daily basis since June. These reports revealed something that would come to be a hallmark of the UAE's Sudan strategy: the use of other countries as intermediaries and transshipment points to maintain plausible deniability. Following these initial disclosures, outlets such as Kenya's Daily Nation, the UK-based Middle East Eye, and the international investigative organization Bellingcat all published detailed investigations corroborating and expanding on these findings. In October, Middle East Eye published an article exploring the UAE's operations in the Somali port city of Bossaso. The report alleges that for the past two years, the UAE has funneled hundreds of thousands of containers, some marked hazardous, through the port. It also claims that Colombian mercenaries, recruited by the UAE to assist the RSF, have built a base in the city that includes a hospital to treat those wounded in Sudan. Abdullahi, a senior maritime commander at Bossaso Airport, stated, "I recall one occasion when a plane carrying injured soldiers landed at Bossaso airport and the aircraft door was visibly stained with blood." Beyond media investigations, the international community has presented its own findings. A United Nations panel of experts investigated claims of UAE support for the RSF in 2023. After speaking to sources in Chad and Darfur, the panel concluded that the RSF was receiving weapons and ammunition several times per week from the UAE. The shipments reportedly arrive at Amdjarass Airport in Chad before being transported by road to RSF positions. More recently, Amnesty International provided further evidence of the UAE's involvement in the war. By analyzing pictures and videos showing the aftermath of RSF attacks, Amnesty researchers found that the paramilitary group was using Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers. This marks the first time that the GB50A bombs have been documented in active use in any conflict worldwide. The weapons are manufactured by a Chinese state-owned defense corporation and sold to Saudi Arabia, which then provides them to the RSF. The accumulation of this evidence indicates that the UAE is not merely involved in the conflict; it is perhaps the greatest enabler of the massacres witnessed in El Fasher. ## Historical Context of Gold, Agriculture, and Ideology Understanding the motivations behind the UAE's involvement requires examining the historical context of its economic and strategic interests in Sudan. Natural resources are invariably cited as the primary driver. Following South Sudan's secession in 2011, Sudan lost approximately 75 percent of its oil reserves and 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. This devastating economic crisis pushed the country to pivot toward gold mining, and by 2012, gold constituted 60 percent of the country's exports. According to official estimates, gold currently makes up 70 percent of Sudan's exports, with production surging from 41.8 metric tonnes in 2022 to 64 metric tonnes in 2024. Most of this gold is produced in areas currently controlled by the RSF. According to the Guardian, about 90 percent of this gold, valued at more than $13 billion, has been smuggled directly to the UAE. Consequently, analysts routinely point to gold as the UAE's primary motivating factor. However, the economic calculus extends beyond precious metals to agriculture and long-term food security. Because water is scarce and little of its land is arable, the UAE imports more than 90 percent of its food. Since the global food crisis in 2007, the UAE has made food security a highest priority, ramping up investments in farmlands abroad. Sudan has been a core component of Abu Dhabi's agricultural strategy since the 1970s, when Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri promised that Gulf investment could transform Sudan into the breadbasket of the Arab world. Emirati investment in Sudan's agriculture rapidly accelerated after South Sudan's independence in 2011 left Khartoum scrambling for new revenue sources. Today, two Emirati firms—International Holding Company (IHC) and Jenaan Investment—farm over 500 square kilometers in northern Sudan, with plans to expand their holdings by more than 1,600 square kilometers. For context, this planned expansion is larger than the city of Abu Dhabi itself. Beyond resources, there is a distinct ideological dimension shaping the UAE's strategy. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have longstanding links to political Islam that date back to the presidency of Omar al-Bashir. Those links proved crucial when Islamist forces helped the SAF retake Khartoum earlier in the conflict. For the UAE, which has aggressively positioned itself as a bulwark against Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa, these connections meant that the SAF could not be trusted. Furthermore, the UAE views RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, alias Hemedti, as a reliable custodian of Emirati interests. According to Talal Mohammad, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, the UAE began viewing Hemedti in this light after RSF fighters played a significant role supporting Emirati objectives in the Yemeni civil war. By backing the RSF, Abu Dhabi could potentially install a government fundamentally opposed to political Islam. ## Geopolitical Implications and the Path to Peace The geopolitical implications of the conflict heavily involve Sudan's 700-kilometer shoreline along the Red Sea. As one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, the Red Sea sees roughly a third of global container traffic pass through its waters, connecting Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. For the UAE, positioning itself as a premier global logistics and trade hub requires controlling ports along this corridor. Controlling these maritime nodes translates into managing the flow of goods and wielding immense economic and political influence. Critically, the Emirates are not the only Middle Eastern power seeking to exploit the Sudan war for regional leverage, as Iran is also looking to expand its proxy network into Sudan in the coming years. Alex De Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, noted in an interview with Middle East Eye, "The Sudanese Red Sea shores are the pass key of over 60 percent of international trade. By fuelling instability in Sudan, the UAE has a chance to control these shores." Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, an analyst and former senior aide to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, concurs, noting that this strategy is consistent with previous UAE actions in Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia. Ultimately, the conflict serves as a vital arena for the UAE to project its power. Increased competition between Saudi Arabia, which supports the SAF, and the UAE transformed the war into a proxy conflict as both nations vie to become the dominant power in the region. This regional rivalry reflects a broader shift in global power dynamics, where assertive middle powers are actively carving out their own spheres of influence. Finding a lasting resolution depends heavily on leveraging this international involvement. All observers agree that true peace requires bringing both the SAF and RSF to the negotiating table. However, with the conflict locked in a functional stalemate where both sides still believe military victory is attainable, voluntary negotiations appear highly unlikely. Dr. Akasha stated that the SAF would only agree to stop fighting if the RSF is dismantled, surrenders its weapons, and sees its leadership held accountable. Conversely, the RSF is unlikely to disarm willingly following significant battlefield victories like the capture of El Fasher. Cutting off external support remains the most viable method to force negotiations. Without the weapons, money, and logistical backing provided by foreign actors, both factions would be compelled to compromise. The odds of foreign powers voluntarily withdrawing their support are generally low, as every intervening nation has distinct strategic goals. However, mounting international pressure could force a shift. Following the public outcry over the fall of El Fasher and the ensuing massacres, Anwar Gargash, the UAE's senior diplomatic envoy, made a rare statement while in Bahrain appearing to admit mistakes in Abu Dhabi's strategy. "We all made a mistake when the two generals who are fighting the civil war today overthrew the civilian government," Gargash said. "That was, looking back, a critical mistake. We should have put our foot down collectively. We did not call it a coup." Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor, views this as a striking reversal given the UAE's vast investment in the RSF. If the UAE is genuinely reconsidering its position under diplomatic pressure, a viable path to peace may open. As Cameron Hudson, a former chief of staff to successive U.S. presidential envoys for Sudan, emphasized, "The war would be over if not for the UAE. The only thing that is keeping [the RSF] in this war is the overwhelming amount of military support that they're receiving from the UAE." ## Frequently Asked Questions ### What evidence exists that the UAE is supplying the RSF in Sudan? Evidence comes from multiple independent sources. A 2023 Wall Street Journal investigation described a UAE cargo plane ostensibly carrying humanitarian aid that landed in Uganda and was found to contain weapons. A UN panel of experts concluded that the RSF was receiving weapons and ammunition several times per week from the UAE, arriving via Amdjarass Airport in Chad. Amnesty International confirmed the RSF's use of Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers traceable through Saudi Arabia. Middle East Eye also reported Colombian mercenaries recruited by the UAE operating out of the Somali port city of Bossaso. ### How does the UAE maintain plausible deniability for its support of the RSF? The UAE routes weapons and supplies through intermediary countries — Uganda, Chad, and Somalia — rather than directly into Sudan. Cargo planes from the Emirates have been landing at a remote airfield in Chad equipped with a hospital, and some injured RSF fighters have reportedly been airlifted to UAE military hospitals. Emirati government officials consistently deny taking sides, insisting the country is focused on humanitarian aid and diplomatic mediation. ### What economic interests does the UAE have in Sudan? Gold is the primary driver: approximately 90 percent of Sudan's $13 billion annual gold output, most of it produced in RSF-controlled areas, has reportedly been smuggled directly to the UAE. Beyond gold, Abu Dhabi has major agricultural investments through two Emirati firms — International Holding Company and Jenaan Investment — that farm over 500 square kilometers in northern Sudan, with plans to expand by more than 1,600 square kilometers, an area larger than the city of Abu Dhabi itself. ### Why does control of Sudan matter for the UAE's broader regional strategy? Sudan's 700-kilometer Red Sea coastline sits along one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, through which roughly a third of global container traffic flows toward the Suez Canal. Controlling or influencing ports along this corridor would strengthen the UAE's position as a global logistics and trade hub. Alex De Waal of the World Peace Foundation noted that by fueling instability in Sudan, the UAE has a chance to control shores through which over 60 percent of international trade passes. ### What would it take to end the war in Sudan? All observers agree that true peace requires bringing both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF to the negotiating table, but with the conflict in functional stalemate and both sides believing military victory is still attainable, voluntary negotiations appear highly unlikely. Cutting off external support — principally from the UAE — is considered the most viable mechanism to force compromise. As Cameron Hudson, a former chief of staff to successive US presidential envoys for Sudan, stated: "The war would be over if not for the UAE. The only thing that is keeping the RSF in this war is the overwhelming amount of military support that they're receiving from the UAE." ## Related Coverage - [South Sudan is on Fire. Here's Why. (And More)](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/south-sudan-is-on-fire-heres-why-and-more) - [Sudan's Ignored Genocide and the Tragic Fall of El-Fasher](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/sudans-ignored-genocide-and-tragic-fall-of-el-fasher) - [Is the 21st Century's Deadliest War about to Restart? And More.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/is-the-21st-centurys-deadliest-war-about-to-restart-and-more) - [UAE's Regional Proxy Network Collapses: Middle East Realignment Against Abu Dhabi](https://warfronts.pub/geopolitics/uae-proxy-network-collapse-middle-east-realignment) - [The UAE is Destabilizing the Entire Middle East](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/the-uae-is-destabilizing-the-entire-middle-east) ## Sources 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. [1]: https://www.theafricareport.com/397930/uae-denies-complicity-as-new-report-ties-bosaso-flights-to-sudan-atrocities/ [2]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/inside-uae-secret-operation-somalia-sudan-bosaso [3]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-role-outside-powers-are-playing-in-sudans-continued-brutal-war [4]: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195?ln=en&v=pdf [5]: https://archive.is/kZKc5 [6]: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html [7]: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/06/15/kenya-weapons-sudan-civil-war-conflict-khartoum-omdurman-munitions-ammunition/ [8]: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/nov/16/australia-dubai-international-airshow-defence-weapons-arms-fair-sudan-uae [9]: https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/07/27/five-reasons-why-the-uae-is-fixated-on-sudan/ [10]: https://www.middleeasteye.net/explainers/why-uae-involved-sudans-bloody-civil-war [11]: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250327-sudan-s-booming-wartime-gold-trade-flows-through-the-uae [12]: https://e360.yale.edu/features/sudan-war-gold-mining [13]: https://thedialectics.org/power-ports-and-gold-the-real-reasons-behind-the-uaes-role-in-sudan/ [14]: https://theconversation.com/sudan-is-burning-and-foreign-powers-are-benefiting-whats-in-it-for-the-uae-238695 [15]: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/cameron-hudson-outside-backers-perpetuate-sudan-stalemate [16]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/31/sudan-war-trump-white-house/ <!-- youtube:GIPeNc9uod0 -->