--- title: "Ukraine's Kursk Incursion Is Over. Was It Worth It?" description: "Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion is (Mostly) Over. Was it Worth It? (Author: Morris M.) “Bold, brilliant, beautiful.” Those were the words Republican senator Lindsey Graham used back in August to describe Ukraine’s shock invasion of Kursk. As the Telegraph writes of Kursk: “Zelensky wanted to again show the world that Ukraine was still in the fight and could win, if only provided the tools to do so.” But dispute the effusive quote from Senator Graham that we opened this video with, Kursk did little to move the dial in either America or Europe.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- For the first time since World War Two, a foreign army didn’t just cross onto Russian territory, but actively held it — controlling a swathe of land that, at its maximum extent, covered 1,300 sq km.\n- Ukraine’s hold on Kursk grew increasingly tenuous as Russia repeatedly chipped away at the flanks of the pocket until it suddenly gave way in March 2025.\n- North Korean troops, though initially dismissed, acted as a force multiplier that gave Russia a decisive advantage it could not have achieved with its own numbers alone.\n- By the end of the operation, roughly 12,000 Ukrainian troops were attempting to hold back a combined force of around 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans.\n- The Kursk incursion briefly created panic in Russian high command but ultimately did not divert enough Russian resources to change the trajectory of the broader conflict.\n\n## Key Developments\n\nFor the first time since World War Two, a foreign army didn’t just cross onto Russian territory, but actively held it - controlling a swathe of land that, at its maximum extent, covered 1,300 sq km. By any definition, this made the Kursk offensive an historic moment. A daring attempt by Kyiv to strike back at the aggressor, and take the fight onto the Kremlin’s turf. But, while the moment may indeed have been historic, that still leaves a key question: was it worth it? Did those seven months on Russian soil have an overall positive, or negative impact on Ukraine’s chances in its war for survival? With the Kursk incursion effectively over, now seems the perfect time to reflect on one of the biggest gambles in recent military history. And while we’ve long been sympathetic to the position that diverting troops to Kursk weakened Ukraine in the Donbas, we should acknowledge the argument that tying Russian forces down on Russian territory stopped them from being deployed elsewhere. For the first time since the Wagner Mutiny in summer of 2023, it was possible to see panic in Russian high command.\n\n## Strategic Implications\n\nA gamble that humiliated Moscow and stunned the world… but that may have also left Kyiv in a more-precarious position than ever before. (TITLE): The End of the Road For anyone not following the war all that closely, it might have seemed like the story of the Kursk offensive was settled history. One in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine had stormed onto Russian territory and captured a pocket of land - a pocket that had reduced in size since its August heyday, but from which it also appeared Kyiv’s forces had become impossible to dislodge. After all, by dawn of March 6th, the AFU had occupied the region around the town of Sudzha for seven months. Seven months, in which repeated Russian assaults had failed to drive them over the border. In which North Korean troops had tried - and failed - to make an impact. If you’ve been following the performance of Pyongyang’s soldiers in Kursk, you might have the impression that they were a bunch of buffoons who ran into gunfire and got slaughtered. But if you’ve been following accounts of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground, you might have a different impression.\n\n## Risk and Uncertainty\n\nYet, for anyone keeping more than half-an-eye on the conflict, it was clear that things were not as settled as they seemed. That Ukraine’s hold on Kursk was growing increasingly tenuous, even as the rest of the front line remained largely stable. “The pocket was always relatively small,” analyst Rob Lee later told the Financial Times. “Russia then repeatedly just chipped away at it at the flanks.” By the second week of March 2025, that ‘chipping’ had turned into full-bore drilling. As the sides of the pocket began to suddenly give way, independent Russian outlet Meduza describes what happened next: “As has often happened over the past two years of the war, Ukrainian forces withdrew under the threat of encirclement — likely later than they should have. Some equipment was left behind, and many soldiers were killed or captured, but most of Ukraine’s troops managed to escape.” At time of writing, those surviving troops are still clinging to a sliver of Russian land along the border. One soldier who fought for Ukraine in Kursk - and posts on social media as Kriegsforscher - had this to say on X: “(The) Ukrainian army showed that they can fight bravely literally everywhere.\n\n## Outlook\n\nDesperately trying to hold off what will presumably become a combined Russian and North Korean invasion of Ukraine’s Sumy region. But the point of this video isn’t to predict what will happen next. Rather, it’s to look back on the last seven months, and try to figure out if it was worth it. If the positive effects of the Kursk incursion outweigh - or are overshadowed by - its downsides. Because it’s only by trying to honestly appraise what went right and what went wrong that any lessons will be learned. That militaries will be able to draw any conclusions. By the end of the operation, some 12,000 Ukrainian troops were trying to hold back a combined force of 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans. Quote: “Ukraine failed to expand and secure the flanks of the Kursk perimeter, and as Russian reinforcements kept trickling in, the Ukrainian operation turned to a defensive one.” This was a crucial moment, because it meant the pocket got increasingly narrower as Russian forces crept forwards. Others, like analyst Rob Lee, suggest the real turning point was the arrival of North Korean troops. Back in early January, analyst John Helin noted on X that, while the DPRK’s troops were suffering high casualties: “North Koreans are lacking supporting fires, but they've been surprisingly successful.” In effect, the 12,000 DPRK soldiers acted as a force multiplier, giving Russia an advantage not conveyed by the stories of North Koreans marching straight into gunfire.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth)\n- [Russia’s Death Toll Tops 100,000 as Ukraine War’s Human Cost Deepens](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/russias-death-toll-tops-100k-ukraine-war-human-cost)\n- [Did Rich Foreigners Pay to Shoot Civilians in Bosnia?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/did-rich-foreigners-pay-to-shoot-civilians-in-bosnia)\n- [Inside Ukraine's Growing Manpower Crisis. And More.](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/inside-ukraines-growing-manpower-crisis-and-more-s7lqzj09)\n- [Inside Ukraine's Growing Manpower Crisis. And More.](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/inside-ukraines-growing-manpower-crisis-and-more)\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What did Ukraine actually achieve during the Kursk incursion?\n\nFor the first time since World War Two, a foreign army crossed onto Russian territory and actively held it, with the Kursk pocket reaching a maximum extent of about 1,300 square kilometers and centered around the town of Sudzha. The operation humiliated Moscow, briefly created visible panic in Russian high command, and demonstrated that Ukraine was still capable of bold offensive action. At its height, Ukraine held this ground for roughly seven months despite repeated Russian attempts to dislodge it.\n\n### How did the Kursk pocket eventually collapse?\n\nRussia repeatedly chipped away at the flanks of the pocket rather than attempting a single frontal assault, steadily narrowing it until the sides gave way in early March 2025. Ukrainian forces withdrew under the threat of encirclement, with independent Russian outlet Meduza reporting that some equipment was left behind and soldiers were killed or captured, though most managed to escape. The arrival of North Korean troops had been a key turning point, with roughly 12,000 DPRK soldiers acting as a force multiplier that offset the high casualties they were absorbing.\n\n### What role did North Korean troops play in ending the incursion?\n\nAlthough initial coverage portrayed North Korean soldiers as largely ineffective, Ukrainian soldiers on the ground described a different picture. Analyst John Helin noted that while the DPRK’s troops suffered high casualties and lacked supporting fires, they had been surprisingly successful, and their numbers gave Russia a combined force of approximately 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans to pit against roughly 12,000 Ukrainian defenders — an overwhelming disparity that eventually made the pocket untenable.\n\n### Did the Kursk incursion succeed in diverting Russian forces from the Donbas?\n\nThe argument that tying Russian forces down on Russian territory prevented their deployment elsewhere has merit, but the counterargument is that diverting Ukraine’s own troops to Kursk weakened its defenses in the Donbas at a critical moment. Ukraine failed to expand and secure the flanks of the Kursk perimeter, and as Russian reinforcements arrived the operation shifted from offensive to defensive, meaning the intended pressure on Russian command had limited lasting strategic effect.\n\n### What are the likely consequences for Ukraine’s Sumy region?\n\nWith the Kursk pocket effectively gone, surviving Ukrainian troops are left clinging to a thin sliver of Russian land along the border while facing what analysts expect to become a combined Russian and North Korean push into Ukraine’s Sumy region. The loss of the initiative in Kursk, combined with the troops and equipment expended there, leaves Kyiv in a more precarious defensive position than it was in before the operation began.\n\n## Sources\n1. \n2. \n3. \n4. \n5. \n6. \n7. \n8. \n9. \n10. \n11. \n12. \n13. \n14. \n15. \n\n[1]: https://blackbirdgroup.substack.com/p/ukraine-withdraws-from-kursk\n[2]: https://x.com/J_JHelin/status/1900251481674309891\n[3]: https://www.ft.com/content/f3b3d3f9-2c55-45f4-a11d-2e12feeb1018\n[4]: https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/03/17/ukraines-army-escapes-from-kursk-by-the-skin-of-its-teeth\n[5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/14/ukraine-kursk-retreat-russia-incursion-peace-negotiations\n[6]: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/03/17/a-costly-gamble\n[7]: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/15/ukraine-kursk-russian-territory-maps-sudzha-north-korea/\n[8]: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/03/13/the-kursk-offensive-was-ukraines-biggest-mistake/\n[9]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q198zyppqo\n[10]: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-kursk-retreat-russia.html\n[11]: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment\n[12]: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ukraines-kursk-offensive-symbolic-gains-strategic-costs/\n[13]: https://x.com/ChristopherJM/status/1901781884906152262\n[14]: https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1899845234978075039\n[15]: https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1901810769156825291\n\n" url: https://warfronts.pub/article/ukraines-kursk-incursion-is-over-was-it-worth-it.md canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/ukraines-kursk-incursion-is-over-was-it-worth-it datePublished: 2026-02-25 dateModified: 2026-02-25 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Warfronts image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/NfNxYSK7AC0/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: b1d79c6979560a8177bf3d5aa76422edcd4fa5fd89f3b408366e7c0a9ccbd16a tokens: 3133 summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/ukraines-kursk-incursion-is-over-was-it-worth-it.md.summary.md --- Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion is (Mostly) Over. Was it Worth It? (Author: Morris M.) “Bold, brilliant, beautiful.” Those were the words Republican senator Lindsey Graham used back in August to describe Ukraine’s shock invasion of Kursk. As the Telegraph writes of Kursk: “Zelensky wanted to again show the world that Ukraine was still in the fight and could win, if only provided the tools to do so.” But dispute the effusive quote from Senator Graham that we opened this video with, Kursk did little to move the dial in either America or Europe. ## Key Takeaways - For the first time since World War Two, a foreign army didn’t just cross onto Russian territory, but actively held it — controlling a swathe of land that, at its maximum extent, covered 1,300 sq km. - Ukraine’s hold on Kursk grew increasingly tenuous as Russia repeatedly chipped away at the flanks of the pocket until it suddenly gave way in March 2025. - North Korean troops, though initially dismissed, acted as a force multiplier that gave Russia a decisive advantage it could not have achieved with its own numbers alone. - By the end of the operation, roughly 12,000 Ukrainian troops were attempting to hold back a combined force of around 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans. - The Kursk incursion briefly created panic in Russian high command but ultimately did not divert enough Russian resources to change the trajectory of the broader conflict. ## Key Developments For the first time since World War Two, a foreign army didn’t just cross onto Russian territory, but actively held it - controlling a swathe of land that, at its maximum extent, covered 1,300 sq km. By any definition, this made the Kursk offensive an historic moment. A daring attempt by Kyiv to strike back at the aggressor, and take the fight onto the Kremlin’s turf. But, while the moment may indeed have been historic, that still leaves a key question: was it worth it? Did those seven months on Russian soil have an overall positive, or negative impact on Ukraine’s chances in its war for survival? With the Kursk incursion effectively over, now seems the perfect time to reflect on one of the biggest gambles in recent military history. And while we’ve long been sympathetic to the position that diverting troops to Kursk weakened Ukraine in the Donbas, we should acknowledge the argument that tying Russian forces down on Russian territory stopped them from being deployed elsewhere. For the first time since the Wagner Mutiny in summer of 2023, it was possible to see panic in Russian high command. ## Strategic Implications A gamble that humiliated Moscow and stunned the world… but that may have also left Kyiv in a more-precarious position than ever before. (TITLE): The End of the Road For anyone not following the war all that closely, it might have seemed like the story of the Kursk offensive was settled history. One in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine had stormed onto Russian territory and captured a pocket of land - a pocket that had reduced in size since its August heyday, but from which it also appeared Kyiv’s forces had become impossible to dislodge. After all, by dawn of March 6th, the AFU had occupied the region around the town of Sudzha for seven months. Seven months, in which repeated Russian assaults had failed to drive them over the border. In which North Korean troops had tried - and failed - to make an impact. If you’ve been following the performance of Pyongyang’s soldiers in Kursk, you might have the impression that they were a bunch of buffoons who ran into gunfire and got slaughtered. But if you’ve been following accounts of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground, you might have a different impression. ## Risk and Uncertainty Yet, for anyone keeping more than half-an-eye on the conflict, it was clear that things were not as settled as they seemed. That Ukraine’s hold on Kursk was growing increasingly tenuous, even as the rest of the front line remained largely stable. “The pocket was always relatively small,” analyst Rob Lee later told the Financial Times. “Russia then repeatedly just chipped away at it at the flanks.” By the second week of March 2025, that ‘chipping’ had turned into full-bore drilling. As the sides of the pocket began to suddenly give way, independent Russian outlet Meduza describes what happened next: “As has often happened over the past two years of the war, Ukrainian forces withdrew under the threat of encirclement — likely later than they should have. Some equipment was left behind, and many soldiers were killed or captured, but most of Ukraine’s troops managed to escape.” At time of writing, those surviving troops are still clinging to a sliver of Russian land along the border. One soldier who fought for Ukraine in Kursk - and posts on social media as Kriegsforscher - had this to say on X: “(The) Ukrainian army showed that they can fight bravely literally everywhere. ## Outlook Desperately trying to hold off what will presumably become a combined Russian and North Korean invasion of Ukraine’s Sumy region. But the point of this video isn’t to predict what will happen next. Rather, it’s to look back on the last seven months, and try to figure out if it was worth it. If the positive effects of the Kursk incursion outweigh - or are overshadowed by - its downsides. Because it’s only by trying to honestly appraise what went right and what went wrong that any lessons will be learned. That militaries will be able to draw any conclusions. By the end of the operation, some 12,000 Ukrainian troops were trying to hold back a combined force of 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans. Quote: “Ukraine failed to expand and secure the flanks of the Kursk perimeter, and as Russian reinforcements kept trickling in, the Ukrainian operation turned to a defensive one.” This was a crucial moment, because it meant the pocket got increasingly narrower as Russian forces crept forwards. Others, like analyst Rob Lee, suggest the real turning point was the arrival of North Korean troops. Back in early January, analyst John Helin noted on X that, while the DPRK’s troops were suffering high casualties: “North Koreans are lacking supporting fires, but they've been surprisingly successful.” In effect, the 12,000 DPRK soldiers acted as a force multiplier, giving Russia an advantage not conveyed by the stories of North Koreans marching straight into gunfire. ## Related Coverage - [This Is Ukraine’s Moment of Truth.](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/this-is-ukraines-moment-of-truth) - [Russia’s Death Toll Tops 100,000 as Ukraine War’s Human Cost Deepens](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/russias-death-toll-tops-100k-ukraine-war-human-cost) - [Did Rich Foreigners Pay to Shoot Civilians in Bosnia?](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/did-rich-foreigners-pay-to-shoot-civilians-in-bosnia) - [Inside Ukraine's Growing Manpower Crisis. And More.](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/inside-ukraines-growing-manpower-crisis-and-more-s7lqzj09) - [Inside Ukraine's Growing Manpower Crisis. And More.](https://warfronts-prod.fulcrum-labs.workers.dev/conflicts/inside-ukraines-growing-manpower-crisis-and-more) ## Frequently Asked Questions ### What did Ukraine actually achieve during the Kursk incursion? For the first time since World War Two, a foreign army crossed onto Russian territory and actively held it, with the Kursk pocket reaching a maximum extent of about 1,300 square kilometers and centered around the town of Sudzha. The operation humiliated Moscow, briefly created visible panic in Russian high command, and demonstrated that Ukraine was still capable of bold offensive action. At its height, Ukraine held this ground for roughly seven months despite repeated Russian attempts to dislodge it. ### How did the Kursk pocket eventually collapse? Russia repeatedly chipped away at the flanks of the pocket rather than attempting a single frontal assault, steadily narrowing it until the sides gave way in early March 2025. Ukrainian forces withdrew under the threat of encirclement, with independent Russian outlet Meduza reporting that some equipment was left behind and soldiers were killed or captured, though most managed to escape. The arrival of North Korean troops had been a key turning point, with roughly 12,000 DPRK soldiers acting as a force multiplier that offset the high casualties they were absorbing. ### What role did North Korean troops play in ending the incursion? Although initial coverage portrayed North Korean soldiers as largely ineffective, Ukrainian soldiers on the ground described a different picture. Analyst John Helin noted that while the DPRK’s troops suffered high casualties and lacked supporting fires, they had been surprisingly successful, and their numbers gave Russia a combined force of approximately 50,000 Russians and 12,000 North Koreans to pit against roughly 12,000 Ukrainian defenders — an overwhelming disparity that eventually made the pocket untenable. ### Did the Kursk incursion succeed in diverting Russian forces from the Donbas? The argument that tying Russian forces down on Russian territory prevented their deployment elsewhere has merit, but the counterargument is that diverting Ukraine’s own troops to Kursk weakened its defenses in the Donbas at a critical moment. Ukraine failed to expand and secure the flanks of the Kursk perimeter, and as Russian reinforcements arrived the operation shifted from offensive to defensive, meaning the intended pressure on Russian command had limited lasting strategic effect. ### What are the likely consequences for Ukraine’s Sumy region? With the Kursk pocket effectively gone, surviving Ukrainian troops are left clinging to a thin sliver of Russian land along the border while facing what analysts expect to become a combined Russian and North Korean push into Ukraine’s Sumy region. The loss of the initiative in Kursk, combined with the troops and equipment expended there, leaves Kyiv in a more precarious defensive position than it was in before the operation began. ## Sources 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. [1]: https://blackbirdgroup.substack.com/p/ukraine-withdraws-from-kursk [2]: https://x.com/J_JHelin/status/1900251481674309891 [3]: https://www.ft.com/content/f3b3d3f9-2c55-45f4-a11d-2e12feeb1018 [4]: https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/03/17/ukraines-army-escapes-from-kursk-by-the-skin-of-its-teeth [5]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/14/ukraine-kursk-retreat-russia-incursion-peace-negotiations [6]: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/03/17/a-costly-gamble [7]: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/15/ukraine-kursk-russian-territory-maps-sudzha-north-korea/ [8]: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/03/13/the-kursk-offensive-was-ukraines-biggest-mistake/ [9]: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q198zyppqo [10]: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-kursk-retreat-russia.html [11]: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [12]: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ukraines-kursk-offensive-symbolic-gains-strategic-costs/ [13]: https://x.com/ChristopherJM/status/1901781884906152262 [14]: https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1899845234978075039 [15]: https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1901810769156825291