---
title: "The United States Wants Out of Iran. Can It Actually Leave?"
description: "As the fifth week of the war in Iran drags to a close, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: American President Donald Trump wants to get out of Iran, and fast. It is a message he has sent loud and clear, in three different ways.\n\nFirst, according to a senior White House official who spoke to MSNow, formerly MSNBC, the president is getting bored with the war. In the official's own words, \"Not that he regrets it or something, he's just bored and wants to move on.\" A second White House official agreed, telling the outlet that Trump had begun to move on from the conflict and started shifting his focus toward the economy, domestic issues, and the upcoming midterm elections. Second, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump told aides he is now willing to end the campaign even if the Strait of Hormuz remains mostly closed, a stunning compromise with the clear end goal of removing Washington from the fight. And third, Trump said as much himself, telling Americans in a recent address that the war was two to three weeks from a conclusion.\n\nAdd a measure of support from Washington's partners, at a moment when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is telling his own people that Iran is no longer an existential threat, and the writing is on the wall. After a month of war, the United States is preparing to make an exit.\n\nThe question that follows is harder than the decision itself: what does that exit look like, and is it even possible?\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- Trump has signaled through three channels — anonymous White House officials, a Wall Street Journal report, and his own public address — that he wants to wind the war down within two to three weeks, even if the Strait of Hormuz stays closed.\n- A ceasefire remains distant: U.S. intelligence agencies assess that Iran believes it holds the upper hand and is unwilling to enter substantial negotiations, and Tehran publicly denies Trump's claim that it requested a ceasefire.\n- The Strait of Hormuz is the central sticking point; Iran will reopen it only to those who comply with its new transit laws and pay a toll, prompting the UAE to lobby for a coalition to force it open and Britain to convene 35 nations to discuss the same.\n- On the battlefield, Israel has expanded strikes to Iran's steel industry, an attack on Saudi Arabia's Prince Sultan Air Base wounded U.S. troops and destroyed an E-3 Sentry, and a drone strike targeted the home of Iraqi Kurdistan's president.\n- Vice President JD Vance, once a war skeptic, now leads the negotiations, a role Trump has framed as a make-or-break gamble for which he will assign blame if a deal fails and claim credit if one succeeds.\n\n## A Straight Peace Deal\n\nGiven everything above, you would be forgiven for assuming a peace deal between the conflict's warring parties was imminent. If Trump is truly bored of the war, the fastest exit short of unilateral withdrawal would be a ceasefire. Yet right now, signals from all sides indicate a deal is still a long way off.\n\nOn Wednesday, Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran's new president had asked for a ceasefire. Encouraging in theory, except that Iran does not have a new president. It has a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who replaced his father Ali Khamenei, but its president is still Masoud Pezeshkian. Nor does this read as a simple mix-up: Mojtaba Khamenei is known to represent Iran's militaristic hardliners, yet Trump described his supposed \"new president\" as far less radicalized and more intelligent than his predecessors.\n\nIn the same post, Trump contradicted his own aides. Online, he insisted he would consider a ceasefire only once the Strait of Hormuz was opened, and that until then Washington would keep \"blasting Iran into oblivion or, as they say, back to the Stone Ages!!!\" He reiterated the threat in his address, vowing to hit Iran extremely hard over the coming two to three weeks while discussions continued behind the scenes.\n\n## Tehran's Calculus\n\nIran's position is no more conducive to a quick settlement. According to Reuters, Tehran has demanded a comprehensive ceasefire laden with guarantees, meant to permanently end hostilities with the United States and Israel and make a return to war far harder in the future.\n\nOther outlets tell a different story. The New York Times reported that multiple U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the Iranian government is not, in fact, willing to engage in substantial negotiations. They say Tehran believes it is in a strong position and need not accede to America's diplomatic demands. That assessment aligns with what analysts such as the Atlantic Council's Danny Citrinowicz have argued: that despite its losses, Iran still believes it holds the upper hand.\n\nWhile Tehran is willing to keep channels open, it does not trust the United States and does not think Trump is serious about negotiations, and the record gives that distrust weight. In the past twelve months, Trump has twice ordered attacks on Iran in the middle of negotiations. Publicly, Iranian officials reject Trump's claim of progress; a foreign ministry spokesman said Wednesday that Tehran had not asked for a ceasefire at all.\n\n## The Strait of Hormuz\n\nThe Strait of Hormuz sits at the heart of the impasse. Trump has repeatedly demanded it be opened completely, and Iran has categorically refused. Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security Commission and one of the most powerful people in the country, wrote on X that the Strait would not be open to Trump. Instead, it would be open only to those who comply with Iran's new laws governing the waterway, which would include paying a toll to Tehran.\n\nGiven the Strait's economic weight and Iran's ability to control it, the United Arab Emirates has signaled it is preparing to help the U.S. open the Strait by force. According to the Wall Street Journal, Emirati diplomats have urged the United States, along with military powers in Europe and Asia, to form a coalition and intervene. To that end, the Emirates are lobbying for a United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize an operation, even though permanent members Russia and China are likely to veto it.\n\nThe Emirates are not alone. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK would host a meeting of 35 countries to discuss reopening the Strait, a gathering meant to clear the way for large-scale military cooperation to lock down the waterway and make it safe and accessible once the fighting subsides.\n\n## Pakistan's Five Points\n\nAmid the deadlock, Pakistan is still pushing for peace. Despite the gulf between the American and Iranian positions, Islamabad is advertising a five-point proposal, hoping to leverage its relationships with both nations and gain diplomatic clout in the process. The proposal also carries the backing of China, a new development after Pakistan's foreign minister flew to Beijing on Tuesday.\n\nThe plan calls for an immediate end to all hostilities and the start of peace talks as soon as possible. Attacks on civilians and non-military targets would pause right away, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and other critical waterways would be guaranteed, and any lasting agreement would rest on international law. If it sounds overly optimistic, that is because, given the entrenched positions on every side, it is.\n\n## On the Battlefield\n\nFrom negotiations the picture turns to the battlefield, where the situation only continues to deteriorate. On Friday the 27th of March, Israel broadened its attacks on Iranian economic targets, striking two of the country's largest steel factories in Ahvaz and Isfahan. Israeli security sources said the strikes on the plants, partially owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, were expected to cause billions of dollars in damage and paralyze Iran's steel industry.\n\nArgus Media, which tracks global energy and commodity markets, reported that the strikes damaged storage facilities and power infrastructure at both Khuzestan Steel and Mobarakeh, and were expected to cut Iran's production and export capacity. Iran has one of the world's largest steel industries, and by expert estimates steel accounts for roughly 14 percent of the nation's non-oil and natural gas exports.\n\nOne analyst told the Jerusalem Post that the strikes point to a broader U.S.-Israeli strategy aimed at reducing Iran's foreign currency revenues to near zero. In his words, \"These sectors form the backbone of the country's foreign currency income. Cutting off these vital economic arteries would effectively aim to trigger a collapse of the Iranian economy, something that may not be far off, given its already weakened state.\" The point matters because several analysts had previously accused the U.S. of putting money in Iran's pockets by allowing Iranian oil onto the international market after the war sent oil prices soaring.\n\nIran swiftly threatened full-scale retaliation, vowing to attack six steel plants in Israel and the Gulf states, a move that would have shocked global markets. At the time of writing it had not done so. On the 31st of March, Iranian media reported that the Mobarakeh steel complex had again been struck.\n\n## Air Base Strikes and the Houthis\n\nOn the same day as the steel-plant strikes, a missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia wounded at least 15 American service members, five of them seriously. The attack damaged several U.S. refueling aircraft, with satellite imagery showing damage on the apron used by American aircraft and a heat signature consistent with flames. More significant still, the attack destroyed an immensely valuable E-3 Sentry, an early-warning and control plane that the U.S. flies in relatively small numbers.\n\nFurther from Iran, the Houthis have made their presence felt, but only barely. About a week after announcing they would enter the battle, their influence has been limited. They have launched three small waves of attacks, all targeting Israel, including one joint operation coordinated with Hezbollah. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree announced in a televised statement that the attack had achieved its objectives, yet the Israeli military claims the Houthis have scored zero hits.\n\nFor now the Houthis appear to be avoiding a target much closer to home: the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a critical waterway they could shut to cut off access to the Red Sea, much as Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to choke the Persian Gulf. Rather than striking it directly, the Houthis seem focused on noisemaking, reminding the world that they are still around, still dangerous, and still willing to join the fight.\n\n## Escalation in Iraqi Kurdistan\n\nIn Iraq, a drone strike on the 28th of March targeted the home of Nechirvan Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan. A local official told the Associated Press that there was property damage but no casualties. The attack matters for two reasons, but mostly because of who was targeted.\n\nAside from going after each other's leadership, Israel and Iran have largely avoided attacks on prominent Middle Eastern figures, even when Iran has tried to punish the Gulf States by striking their infrastructure. Targeting a high-profile leader, even a regional figure like Barzani, marks a major escalation. He is a deeply important Kurdish official, grandson of the founder of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and enjoys immense popularity among Kurds and minority groups living on Iraqi Kurdish territory. Had the attack succeeded, Kurdish forces would have retaliated immediately, though against whom is unclear.\n\nThat uncertainty is the second reason the story stands out: no one has claimed responsibility. Iran's Revolutionary Guard even released a statement calling the drone attack an act of terrorism, according to the semi-official Mehr News agency. Even so, most fingers point toward Iran or an Iranian-backed militia, based on their prior attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan, and Washington did not mince words, directly accusing Iran's proxies. Nechirvan was not the only target: security sources told Reuters that air defenses shot down a drone near the residence of Masoud Barzani, the former Kurdish president, ruling-party leader, and Nechirvan's uncle.\n\n## The Ground Assault That May Be Coming\n\nFinally, there is an attack that has not happened yet but looks likelier with every passing day. On the 1st of April, the Atlantic reported that military officials are planning for two potential ground assaults inside Iran: one on Kharg Island, the hub of the country's energy industry, and the other to seize enriched uranium and hobble Iran's nuclear-development program. The only thing they are waiting for is President Trump's approval.\n\nPutting troops on Iranian territory would be one of the most dangerous missions of either of Trump's terms. Capturing Kharg Island would expose U.S. troops to Iranian missiles and drones for a prolonged period, and holding it would require a sustained American presence on Iranian soil. A mission to recover the nuclear material would be no less perilous: U.S. forces would have to operate deep inside Iran, potentially under fire, while specialized teams searched through rubble for the material.\n\nDespite the danger, the reward is not guaranteed. The Atlantic notes that neither operation would reliably force the war to end within the weeks Trump has promised. Neither would likely cause the regime's collapse, nor the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which is precisely the point of leverage that started the standoff.\n\n## The Precarious Rise of JD Vance\n\nThe exit, if it comes, may run through Vice President JD Vance. In the lead-up to the war, Vance was among the more skeptical voices in the White House; Axios reported that he questioned the war's duration, purpose, and likely toll on U.S. munitions stockpiles. Trump seemed to allude to that reluctance, telling reporters that Vance had been, philosophically, a little bit different from his own position at the outset. Once Trump decided on war, Vance fell in line and advocated overwhelming force to end the conflict quickly, but he was effectively sidelined in favor of more hawkish figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who made far more media appearances defending the war.\n\nThings changed when Washington turned to negotiations in search of an off-ramp. Iran indicated it did not want to re-enter talks with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, who had been leading negotiations when the war erupted. A Gulf source told the Telegraph, \"They don't want to work with Jared and Witkoff because they stabbed them in the back.\" Although the Iranians preferred Vance, the VP made clear he would not be a walkover; sources told CNN he had delivered a stern message to Tehran that pressure on its infrastructure would increase because Trump was impatient for a deal.\n\nVance has been equally tough on Israel. According to Axios, he took Netanyahu to task in a Monday phone call for overstating the chance that the U.S.-Israeli campaign could topple Iran's regime. The relationship between Vance and Jerusalem has been acrimonious for a while, with the VP's advisers believing some in Israel were trying to undermine him for being insufficiently hawkish, a claim Israeli officials deny.\n\nLeading the negotiations has nonetheless given Vance a more public-facing role in a war that had mostly kept him in the back seat. Trump made the role official in a Thursday Cabinet meeting, asking Vance to brief on Iran and noting he was working with Witkoff and Kushner. But the elevated role carries greater political risk. Speaking at a White House Easter lunch, Trump said that if a deal failed he would blame Vance, and if it succeeded he would take full credit. It may have been a joke, but Trump has a long-documented history of claiming others' achievements and distancing himself from failure. For JD Vance, the war in Iran may make or break his political future.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why does Trump want out of the war in Iran?\n\nThree signals point to an exit drive: a senior White House official told MSNow that Trump is bored and wants to move on; the Wall Street Journal reported he is willing to end the campaign even with the Strait of Hormuz mostly closed; and Trump himself said publicly that the war was two to three weeks from a conclusion. His focus has reportedly shifted toward the economy, domestic issues, and the upcoming midterm elections.\n\n### What makes the Strait of Hormuz the central obstacle to a ceasefire?\n\nTrump has demanded the Strait be opened completely, and Iran has categorically refused. Ebrahim Azizi, head of Iran's Parliament's National Security Commission, wrote that the Strait would reopen only to those who comply with Iran's new transit laws and pay a toll to Tehran. Withdrawing without reopening it would leave U.S. objectives only partially achieved at best, which is why the UAE is lobbying for a military coalition to force it open and Britain has convened 35 nations to discuss the same.\n\n### Did Iran request a ceasefire?\n\nNo. Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran's \"new president\" asked for one, but Iran has no new president; it has a new Supreme Leader in Mojtaba Khamenei while Masoud Pezeshkian remains president. A foreign ministry spokesman publicly denied any ceasefire request. Multiple U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Iran believes it holds the upper hand and is not willing to engage in substantial negotiations, a view reinforced by Trump having ordered attacks on Iran twice during negotiations in the past twelve months.\n\n### What ground operations are U.S. planners preparing inside Iran?\n\nThe Atlantic reported that military officials are planning two potential assaults awaiting Trump's approval: one targeting Kharg Island, the hub of Iran's energy industry, and another to seize enriched uranium and set back the nuclear program. Both are highly dangerous — holding Kharg Island would expose troops to sustained Iranian fire, while a nuclear-material mission would require operating deep inside Iran under potential fire. Neither operation is likely to force the war to a quick end or topple the regime.\n\n### What is JD Vance's role in the negotiations, and what does it mean for him politically?\n\nVance was initially skeptical about the war, questioning its duration, purpose, and toll on U.S. munitions stockpiles before falling in line once Trump decided to fight. He was sidelined in favor of hawkish figures like Marco Rubio until Iran indicated it did not want to negotiate with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Tehran's preference for Vance gave him the lead role in talks. Trump formally confirmed the elevated position at a Cabinet meeting, but said publicly that if a deal fails he will blame Vance and if it succeeds he will take full credit, leaving the negotiations a high-stakes gamble for the vice president's political future.\n\n## Sources\n\n1. https://archive.is/zdt4r\n2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/uk-to-host-meeting-of-35-countries-on-reopening-strait-of-hormuz\n3. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/27/raising-10-red-flags-is-israels-army-exhausted\n4. https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-trump/card/without-a-deal-i-m-blaming-jd-vance-trump-says-M2Ak4GoLwoEtftM75PET\n5. https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2025/03/trump-biden-ceasefire-astronauts-insulin/682099/\n6. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/27/vance-iran-peace-talks\n7. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/01/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil?post-id=cmngbwm17000c3d5uuvz3oefh\n8. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-war-us-vice-president-jd-vance-issues-stern-message-to-iran-over-deal-11299338\n9. https://www.thedailybeast.com/iran-gives-trump-a-negotiation-ultimatum-on-jd-vance-sidelining-steve-witkoff-and-jared-kushner/\n10. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/apr/1/vances-rubios-differing-postures-iran-war-highlight-challenges-ahead/\n11. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/13/politics/jd-vance-iran-war\n12. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iran-prefers-negotiations-with-vice-president-vance-over-kushner-and-witkoff-in-us-talks/articleshow/129789622.cms?from=mdr\n\n<!-- youtube:YaG8qRj2Ipg -->"
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dateModified: 2026-06-02
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---

<!-- aeo:section start="lede" -->
As the fifth week of the war in Iran drags to a close, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: American President Donald Trump wants to get out of Iran, and fast. It is a message he has sent loud and clear, in three different ways.

First, according to a senior White House official who spoke to MSNow, formerly MSNBC, the president is getting bored with the war. In the official's own words, "Not that he regrets it or something, he's just bored and wants to move on." A second White House official agreed, telling the outlet that Trump had begun to move on from the conflict and started shifting his focus toward the economy, domestic issues, and the upcoming midterm elections. Second, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump told aides he is now willing to end the campaign even if the Strait of Hormuz remains mostly closed, a stunning compromise with the clear end goal of removing Washington from the fight. And third, Trump said as much himself, telling Americans in a recent address that the war was two to three weeks from a conclusion.

Add a measure of support from Washington's partners, at a moment when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is telling his own people that Iran is no longer an existential threat, and the writing is on the wall. After a month of war, the United States is preparing to make an exit.

The question that follows is harder than the decision itself: what does that exit look like, and is it even possible?

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways

- Trump has signaled through three channels — anonymous White House officials, a Wall Street Journal report, and his own public address — that he wants to wind the war down within two to three weeks, even if the Strait of Hormuz stays closed.
- A ceasefire remains distant: U.S. intelligence agencies assess that Iran believes it holds the upper hand and is unwilling to enter substantial negotiations, and Tehran publicly denies Trump's claim that it requested a ceasefire.
- The Strait of Hormuz is the central sticking point; Iran will reopen it only to those who comply with its new transit laws and pay a toll, prompting the UAE to lobby for a coalition to force it open and Britain to convene 35 nations to discuss the same.
- On the battlefield, Israel has expanded strikes to Iran's steel industry, an attack on Saudi Arabia's Prince Sultan Air Base wounded U.S. troops and destroyed an E-3 Sentry, and a drone strike targeted the home of Iraqi Kurdistan's president.
- Vice President JD Vance, once a war skeptic, now leads the negotiations, a role Trump has framed as a make-or-break gamble for which he will assign blame if a deal fails and claim credit if one succeeds.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="a-straight-peace-deal" -->
## A Straight Peace Deal

Given everything above, you would be forgiven for assuming a peace deal between the conflict's warring parties was imminent. If Trump is truly bored of the war, the fastest exit short of unilateral withdrawal would be a ceasefire. Yet right now, signals from all sides indicate a deal is still a long way off.

On Wednesday, Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran's new president had asked for a ceasefire. Encouraging in theory, except that Iran does not have a new president. It has a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who replaced his father Ali Khamenei, but its president is still Masoud Pezeshkian. Nor does this read as a simple mix-up: Mojtaba Khamenei is known to represent Iran's militaristic hardliners, yet Trump described his supposed "new president" as far less radicalized and more intelligent than his predecessors.

In the same post, Trump contradicted his own aides. Online, he insisted he would consider a ceasefire only once the Strait of Hormuz was opened, and that until then Washington would keep "blasting Iran into oblivion or, as they say, back to the Stone Ages!!!" He reiterated the threat in his address, vowing to hit Iran extremely hard over the coming two to three weeks while discussions continued behind the scenes.

<!-- aeo:section end="a-straight-peace-deal" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="tehran-s-calculus" -->
## Tehran's Calculus

Iran's position is no more conducive to a quick settlement. According to Reuters, Tehran has demanded a comprehensive ceasefire laden with guarantees, meant to permanently end hostilities with the United States and Israel and make a return to war far harder in the future.

Other outlets tell a different story. The New York Times reported that multiple U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the Iranian government is not, in fact, willing to engage in substantial negotiations. They say Tehran believes it is in a strong position and need not accede to America's diplomatic demands. That assessment aligns with what analysts such as the Atlantic Council's Danny Citrinowicz have argued: that despite its losses, Iran still believes it holds the upper hand.

While Tehran is willing to keep channels open, it does not trust the United States and does not think Trump is serious about negotiations, and the record gives that distrust weight. In the past twelve months, Trump has twice ordered attacks on Iran in the middle of negotiations. Publicly, Iranian officials reject Trump's claim of progress; a foreign ministry spokesman said Wednesday that Tehran had not asked for a ceasefire at all.

<!-- aeo:section end="tehran-s-calculus" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-strait-of-hormuz" -->
## The Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz sits at the heart of the impasse. Trump has repeatedly demanded it be opened completely, and Iran has categorically refused. Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security Commission and one of the most powerful people in the country, wrote on X that the Strait would not be open to Trump. Instead, it would be open only to those who comply with Iran's new laws governing the waterway, which would include paying a toll to Tehran.

Given the Strait's economic weight and Iran's ability to control it, the United Arab Emirates has signaled it is preparing to help the U.S. open the Strait by force. According to the Wall Street Journal, Emirati diplomats have urged the United States, along with military powers in Europe and Asia, to form a coalition and intervene. To that end, the Emirates are lobbying for a United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize an operation, even though permanent members Russia and China are likely to veto it.

The Emirates are not alone. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK would host a meeting of 35 countries to discuss reopening the Strait, a gathering meant to clear the way for large-scale military cooperation to lock down the waterway and make it safe and accessible once the fighting subsides.

<!-- aeo:section end="the-strait-of-hormuz" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="pakistan-s-five-points" -->
## Pakistan's Five Points

Amid the deadlock, Pakistan is still pushing for peace. Despite the gulf between the American and Iranian positions, Islamabad is advertising a five-point proposal, hoping to leverage its relationships with both nations and gain diplomatic clout in the process. The proposal also carries the backing of China, a new development after Pakistan's foreign minister flew to Beijing on Tuesday.

The plan calls for an immediate end to all hostilities and the start of peace talks as soon as possible. Attacks on civilians and non-military targets would pause right away, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and other critical waterways would be guaranteed, and any lasting agreement would rest on international law. If it sounds overly optimistic, that is because, given the entrenched positions on every side, it is.

<!-- aeo:section end="pakistan-s-five-points" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="on-the-battlefield" -->
## On the Battlefield

From negotiations the picture turns to the battlefield, where the situation only continues to deteriorate. On Friday the 27th of March, Israel broadened its attacks on Iranian economic targets, striking two of the country's largest steel factories in Ahvaz and Isfahan. Israeli security sources said the strikes on the plants, partially owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, were expected to cause billions of dollars in damage and paralyze Iran's steel industry.

Argus Media, which tracks global energy and commodity markets, reported that the strikes damaged storage facilities and power infrastructure at both Khuzestan Steel and Mobarakeh, and were expected to cut Iran's production and export capacity. Iran has one of the world's largest steel industries, and by expert estimates steel accounts for roughly 14 percent of the nation's non-oil and natural gas exports.

One analyst told the Jerusalem Post that the strikes point to a broader U.S.-Israeli strategy aimed at reducing Iran's foreign currency revenues to near zero. In his words, "These sectors form the backbone of the country's foreign currency income. Cutting off these vital economic arteries would effectively aim to trigger a collapse of the Iranian economy, something that may not be far off, given its already weakened state." The point matters because several analysts had previously accused the U.S. of putting money in Iran's pockets by allowing Iranian oil onto the international market after the war sent oil prices soaring.

Iran swiftly threatened full-scale retaliation, vowing to attack six steel plants in Israel and the Gulf states, a move that would have shocked global markets. At the time of writing it had not done so. On the 31st of March, Iranian media reported that the Mobarakeh steel complex had again been struck.

<!-- aeo:section end="on-the-battlefield" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="air-base-strikes-and-the-houthis" -->
## Air Base Strikes and the Houthis

On the same day as the steel-plant strikes, a missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia wounded at least 15 American service members, five of them seriously. The attack damaged several U.S. refueling aircraft, with satellite imagery showing damage on the apron used by American aircraft and a heat signature consistent with flames. More significant still, the attack destroyed an immensely valuable E-3 Sentry, an early-warning and control plane that the U.S. flies in relatively small numbers.

Further from Iran, the Houthis have made their presence felt, but only barely. About a week after announcing they would enter the battle, their influence has been limited. They have launched three small waves of attacks, all targeting Israel, including one joint operation coordinated with Hezbollah. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree announced in a televised statement that the attack had achieved its objectives, yet the Israeli military claims the Houthis have scored zero hits.

For now the Houthis appear to be avoiding a target much closer to home: the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a critical waterway they could shut to cut off access to the Red Sea, much as Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to choke the Persian Gulf. Rather than striking it directly, the Houthis seem focused on noisemaking, reminding the world that they are still around, still dangerous, and still willing to join the fight.

<!-- aeo:section end="air-base-strikes-and-the-houthis" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="escalation-in-iraqi-kurdistan" -->
## Escalation in Iraqi Kurdistan

In Iraq, a drone strike on the 28th of March targeted the home of Nechirvan Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan. A local official told the Associated Press that there was property damage but no casualties. The attack matters for two reasons, but mostly because of who was targeted.

Aside from going after each other's leadership, Israel and Iran have largely avoided attacks on prominent Middle Eastern figures, even when Iran has tried to punish the Gulf States by striking their infrastructure. Targeting a high-profile leader, even a regional figure like Barzani, marks a major escalation. He is a deeply important Kurdish official, grandson of the founder of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and enjoys immense popularity among Kurds and minority groups living on Iraqi Kurdish territory. Had the attack succeeded, Kurdish forces would have retaliated immediately, though against whom is unclear.

That uncertainty is the second reason the story stands out: no one has claimed responsibility. Iran's Revolutionary Guard even released a statement calling the drone attack an act of terrorism, according to the semi-official Mehr News agency. Even so, most fingers point toward Iran or an Iranian-backed militia, based on their prior attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan, and Washington did not mince words, directly accusing Iran's proxies. Nechirvan was not the only target: security sources told Reuters that air defenses shot down a drone near the residence of Masoud Barzani, the former Kurdish president, ruling-party leader, and Nechirvan's uncle.

<!-- aeo:section end="escalation-in-iraqi-kurdistan" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="the-ground-assault-that-may-be-coming" -->
## The Ground Assault That May Be Coming

Finally, there is an attack that has not happened yet but looks likelier with every passing day. On the 1st of April, the Atlantic reported that military officials are planning for two potential ground assaults inside Iran: one on Kharg Island, the hub of the country's energy industry, and the other to seize enriched uranium and hobble Iran's nuclear-development program. The only thing they are waiting for is President Trump's approval.

Putting troops on Iranian territory would be one of the most dangerous missions of either of Trump's terms. Capturing Kharg Island would expose U.S. troops to Iranian missiles and drones for a prolonged period, and holding it would require a sustained American presence on Iranian soil. A mission to recover the nuclear material would be no less perilous: U.S. forces would have to operate deep inside Iran, potentially under fire, while specialized teams searched through rubble for the material.

Despite the danger, the reward is not guaranteed. The Atlantic notes that neither operation would reliably force the war to end within the weeks Trump has promised. Neither would likely cause the regime's collapse, nor the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which is precisely the point of leverage that started the standoff.

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## The Precarious Rise of JD Vance

The exit, if it comes, may run through Vice President JD Vance. In the lead-up to the war, Vance was among the more skeptical voices in the White House; Axios reported that he questioned the war's duration, purpose, and likely toll on U.S. munitions stockpiles. Trump seemed to allude to that reluctance, telling reporters that Vance had been, philosophically, a little bit different from his own position at the outset. Once Trump decided on war, Vance fell in line and advocated overwhelming force to end the conflict quickly, but he was effectively sidelined in favor of more hawkish figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who made far more media appearances defending the war.

Things changed when Washington turned to negotiations in search of an off-ramp. Iran indicated it did not want to re-enter talks with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, who had been leading negotiations when the war erupted. A Gulf source told the Telegraph, "They don't want to work with Jared and Witkoff because they stabbed them in the back." Although the Iranians preferred Vance, the VP made clear he would not be a walkover; sources told CNN he had delivered a stern message to Tehran that pressure on its infrastructure would increase because Trump was impatient for a deal.

Vance has been equally tough on Israel. According to Axios, he took Netanyahu to task in a Monday phone call for overstating the chance that the U.S.-Israeli campaign could topple Iran's regime. The relationship between Vance and Jerusalem has been acrimonious for a while, with the VP's advisers believing some in Israel were trying to undermine him for being insufficiently hawkish, a claim Israeli officials deny.

Leading the negotiations has nonetheless given Vance a more public-facing role in a war that had mostly kept him in the back seat. Trump made the role official in a Thursday Cabinet meeting, asking Vance to brief on Iran and noting he was working with Witkoff and Kushner. But the elevated role carries greater political risk. Speaking at a White House Easter lunch, Trump said that if a deal failed he would blame Vance, and if it succeeded he would take full credit. It may have been a joke, but Trump has a long-documented history of claiming others' achievements and distancing himself from failure. For JD Vance, the war in Iran may make or break his political future.

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## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why does Trump want out of the war in Iran?

Three signals point to an exit drive: a senior White House official told MSNow that Trump is bored and wants to move on; the Wall Street Journal reported he is willing to end the campaign even with the Strait of Hormuz mostly closed; and Trump himself said publicly that the war was two to three weeks from a conclusion. His focus has reportedly shifted toward the economy, domestic issues, and the upcoming midterm elections.

### What makes the Strait of Hormuz the central obstacle to a ceasefire?

Trump has demanded the Strait be opened completely, and Iran has categorically refused. Ebrahim Azizi, head of Iran's Parliament's National Security Commission, wrote that the Strait would reopen only to those who comply with Iran's new transit laws and pay a toll to Tehran. Withdrawing without reopening it would leave U.S. objectives only partially achieved at best, which is why the UAE is lobbying for a military coalition to force it open and Britain has convened 35 nations to discuss the same.

### Did Iran request a ceasefire?

No. Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran's "new president" asked for one, but Iran has no new president; it has a new Supreme Leader in Mojtaba Khamenei while Masoud Pezeshkian remains president. A foreign ministry spokesman publicly denied any ceasefire request. Multiple U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Iran believes it holds the upper hand and is not willing to engage in substantial negotiations, a view reinforced by Trump having ordered attacks on Iran twice during negotiations in the past twelve months.

### What ground operations are U.S. planners preparing inside Iran?

The Atlantic reported that military officials are planning two potential assaults awaiting Trump's approval: one targeting Kharg Island, the hub of Iran's energy industry, and another to seize enriched uranium and set back the nuclear program. Both are highly dangerous — holding Kharg Island would expose troops to sustained Iranian fire, while a nuclear-material mission would require operating deep inside Iran under potential fire. Neither operation is likely to force the war to a quick end or topple the regime.

### What is JD Vance's role in the negotiations, and what does it mean for him politically?

Vance was initially skeptical about the war, questioning its duration, purpose, and toll on U.S. munitions stockpiles before falling in line once Trump decided to fight. He was sidelined in favor of hawkish figures like Marco Rubio until Iran indicated it did not want to negotiate with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Tehran's preference for Vance gave him the lead role in talks. Trump formally confirmed the elevated position at a Cabinet meeting, but said publicly that if a deal fails he will blame Vance and if it succeeds he will take full credit, leaving the negotiations a high-stakes gamble for the vice president's political future.

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## Sources

1. https://archive.is/zdt4r
2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/uk-to-host-meeting-of-35-countries-on-reopening-strait-of-hormuz
3. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/27/raising-10-red-flags-is-israels-army-exhausted
4. https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-news-trump/card/without-a-deal-i-m-blaming-jd-vance-trump-says-M2Ak4GoLwoEtftM75PET
5. https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2025/03/trump-biden-ceasefire-astronauts-insulin/682099/
6. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/27/vance-iran-peace-talks
7. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/01/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil?post-id=cmngbwm17000c3d5uuvz3oefh
8. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-war-us-vice-president-jd-vance-issues-stern-message-to-iran-over-deal-11299338
9. https://www.thedailybeast.com/iran-gives-trump-a-negotiation-ultimatum-on-jd-vance-sidelining-steve-witkoff-and-jared-kushner/
10. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/apr/1/vances-rubios-differing-postures-iran-war-highlight-challenges-ahead/
11. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/13/politics/jd-vance-iran-war
12. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iran-prefers-negotiations-with-vice-president-vance-over-kushner-and-witkoff-in-us-talks/articleshow/129789622.cms?from=mdr

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