---
title: "Will the F-16 Turn the Tide in Ukraine?"
description: "On May 19, 2023, the United States announced that it would supply Ukraine with a piece of hardware Ukraine had been requesting for months: Lockheed Martin's F-16 Fighting Falcon. A highly advanced, American-made warplane, the F-16 has a history of making big impacts wherever it flies, and well over a year into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the plane has the potential to change everything for the Ukrainian resistance. Over the course of the invasion, the F-16 has gone from being a pipe dream for Ukraine to seeming more and more feasible, as Western-made tanks, missile defense systems, and other elite war-fighting equipment have been approved for transfer. Now, with the United States finally relenting, one question remains: Can the F-16 really shift this entire war on its axis?\n\n## Key Takeaways\n- Russia's missile accuracy rate fell below forty percent in the first days of the invasion, contributing to a failure to establish air superiority over Ukraine.\n- Poland and Slovakia agreed to send seventeen Soviet-era MiG-29s to Ukraine in March 2023, but these jets have limited combat range and are well-known to Russian pilots.\n- The F-16 serves in some 25 global air forces and is available in surplus from Denmark (33 planes), the Netherlands (24), and Belgium (44), all replacing them with F-35s.\n- Two Ukrainian airmen trained covertly on F-16s in the United States and demonstrated above-average skills, leading the US to estimate a four-month training timeline.\n- F-16s could target previously well-insulated objectives like the Kerch Strait Bridge and Russian ships in the Black Sea from safely within Ukrainian airspace.\n- The US-made Patriot air-defense system has proven effective at protecting Ukrainian bases, which could ensure F-16s have safe runways for takeoff, landing, and maintenance.\n\n## Russia's Failure to Establish Air Superiority\n\nThe air war in Ukraine has been far less straightforward than either Ukraine, Russia, or the world could have anticipated before war broke out in 2022. Much like with the rest of the Ukrainian defense, Russia, the world, and seemingly even Ukrainians themselves believed that Russia would establish air superiority over Ukraine within days of a ground invasion. The Russian Air Force was exponentially larger, more modern, better equipped, and far more versatile than Ukraine's, and by all accounts, Russian forces should have been able to use those capabilities to wipe out Ukrainian resistance in the sky, or even destroy the Ukrainian Air Force on the tarmac before it could ever take off. But that didn't happen. There are a few reasons why not, and most of them are a black eye for the Russian military. In the first days of the war, Russian missiles largely failed to find their targets, with a missile accuracy rate of below forty percent. They were unable or unwilling to commit Russian planes to direct, air-to-ground attacks that would have been more accurate or reliable. The Russians failed to integrate fresh intelligence with their list of targets and locations, they failed to adapt their battle plans in the face of a changing situation on the ground, and they struggled to maintain clear command-and-control over their own forces in the air and on the ground. That's not to say that Russia failed entirely; indeed, Russian planes were able to attack well over a hundred air-defense sites in Ukraine during those first few days. But between the Russian Air Force's failure to establish clear superiority in those first few days, and the subsequent, near-complete breakdown of their ground offensive, the Ukrainian defense was able to regroup effectively and secure enough aircraft to continue to threaten Russia by air.\n\n## Ukraine's Adaptive Air Defense and the Contested Skies\n\nSince then, the air war has been contested across Ukraine, even as one side or the other maintains air superiority over specific areas of the country. Although it seems fair to reason that a full commitment of Russia's air force could still overwhelm Ukraine, at least on paper, Russia hasn't wanted to commit to that attack—maybe for fear of losing too many of their warplanes, or maybe because either those planes or their pilots aren't in flying shape. But Ukrainian air defenses have been just as valuable, if not more so, in keeping those Russian planes mostly away from the most important Ukrainian military targets and from major population centers. What Russian bombing has taken place has been mainly directed at Ukraine's power grid or at individual battlefields, with the rest of its air attacks coming by way of missiles—but even those missiles, Ukraine has been increasingly able to deal with. Ukraine has adapted in other ways, too. They've taken on a decentralized approach to their own air assets and made sure not to concentrate too many of their air defenses in one spot at a time. They've been able to do the same with surface-to-air missile launchers, popping them up unexpectedly, which has in turn forced Russian pilots to fly so low that they come into range of shoulder-launched rockets. And Ukraine's own maintenance ground crews, at times, have borne a striking resemblance to NASCAR pit mechanics, quickly patching up planes and getting them back into the skies amid active hostilities. In a global first for a war of this size, both sides have also resorted to the use of drones for both reconnaissance and direct attacks on ground targets. Since drones are far less expensive than warplanes and don't require putting a pilot in harm's way, they've further incentivized both the Russians and the Ukrainians to avoid direct confrontations between manned aircraft. But it's important to keep in mind that even despite everything they've done, the Ukrainians have had to fight a fundamentally defensive air war, doing their best to level the playing field, but with little hope of securing their national airspace completely. To do that would require air power that Ukraine just doesn't have right now—but if they did have that air power, if they had enough warplanes of a consistently high-enough quality, then a whole lot of elements of this war could change very quickly. Long, intractable battles like the one in Bakhmut could be expedited, Ukraine could gain powerful air support for an expected summer offensive, and long-occupied territory like Crimea could quickly come within range of Ukrainian forces.\n\n## Why the F-16 Over Soviet-Era MiGs and Other Western Jets\n\nUkrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been vocal for some time in expressing his country's urgent need for fighter aircraft, but those requests went unheard for the first year of Russian invasion, until March of 2023. Two European nations—Poland and Slovakia—agreed to send a total of seventeen Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets, including some that are in flying shape and some that are meant to be cannibalized for spare parts. Ukraine is used to the MiG-29, with fifty-one in its inventory before the war began, but roughly half of those planes are believed to have been lost, along with dozens of other fighter and close-air-support aircraft. Ukraine isn't likely to say no to the donation of more MiG-29s, but these particular planes come with a few problems. First, they're widespread in the Russian Air Force as well as the Ukrainian Air Force, meaning that Russian pilots in the sky are intimately familiar with what the planes can and can't do. MiG-29s aren't exactly fantastic at air-to-ground attacks, either, and they've got a limited combat range, which other Russian planes—planes that the Ukrainians don't have—can easily outmatch. And lastly, there simply aren't that many MiG-29 aircraft that are in NATO's sphere of influence, rather than Russia's, meaning that they're hard for Ukraine to source given that Russia explicitly doesn't want Ukraine to have them. But if Ukraine were to obtain Western fighter jets, a lot of those problems could go away, and of all the fighter planes in Western inventories, there is no clearer match for Ukraine's needs than the American-made F-16. The F-16 is a highly effective multirole aircraft, something of a Swiss Army Knife of the skies, that can excel in air-to-air combat against the Soviet-era jets Russia flies, attack ground targets, or engage in electronic warfare and communications-jamming. They're also the most widely-used combat aircraft in the world today, and can be found in some 25 global air forces, most of whom are NATO members or part of the global coalition supporting Ukraine. While other aircraft, for example the Swedish-made Saab Gripen, might fit Ukraine's combat needs a little bit better, it's the F-16 that is available in surplus, able to be prepped for transfer, and could even be purchased off the production line. They aren't the best aircraft in the world, but they're a significant improvement on Ukraine's current inventory, and there are enough of them, with flexible-enough export controls, that dozens could find their way into the Ukrainian Air Force without the rest of the world breaking a sweat.\n\n## Obstacles to Integration: Training, Runways, and Supply Chains\n\nThere are no shortage of obstacles for Ukraine as it tries to bring F-16s into its airfleet. The Ukrainian Air Force has no way to train pilots on a plane it doesn't have, and the planes come with long supply chains which have to be kept up precisely. They're fairly finicky jets, ones that need long, immaculate runways to take off, and according to American Air Force personnel, maintaining F-16s requires a lot more training than actually flying them. F-16 munitions are expensive, and only a limited number are in circulation, meaning that if other countries deplete their inventories to donate missiles and bombs, their own stock might not be replenished for some time. But over the last several months, Ukraine has laid the groundwork to successfully convince the US and other allies that it can handle the F-16. Two Ukrainian airmen were sent to the United States to train covertly on the F-16, and apparently demonstrated above-average skills, encouraging enough that the US now believes that Ukrainian F-16 pilots could be trained in as little as four months, as long as interpreters can help streamline the process. And even though the US has repeatedly voiced concern that F-16 transfers could spark an escalation from Russia, specifically because F-16s could very well be used to strike targets in Russia, Ukraine has given assurances that they'll only be used in defense of Ukrainian territory. This consent from the US is critical, because F-16s around the world are still subject to US export controls, but now that America is on board with the idea of sending F-16s to Ukraine, it appears that the majority of this new inventory will come from NATO member-states in Europe or allies around the world. By example, Denmark has 33 of the planes, which are expected to soon be replaced by a nearly equal number of fifth-generation F-35s; the Netherlands have two dozen, but have already received more than enough F-35s to replace them; and Belgium is preparing to replace their forty-four F-16s with thirty-four F-35s. Ukraine has asked for some two hundred F-16s in total, but just the F-16s from these three NATO member-nations, all due for replacement, would make up more than half that total if they were sent directly. With the first deliveries of F-16s expected as early as August of 2023, with direct commitments from the UK and all three of those aforementioned nations to help train pilots, it may not be long until the first few Ukrainian airmen are ready to take to the skies.\n\n## Potential Battlefield Impact: From Deterrence to Offensive Power\n\nThe planes have the potential to impact every sphere of the war. At a base level, many Western analysts hope that the mere presence of F-16s will be enough to deter Russian planes from attempting to enter combat zones, especially considering that Russia has already been cautious in committing its planes to areas where they might be shot down. Beyond a simple deterrent effect, F-16s have the potential to use their sophisticated radar to identify ground targets at a range of hundreds of miles, launching weapons against Russian positions far in their back lines while remaining safely over Ukrainian airspace. The planes are also more than able to help clean up incoming Russian drones and cruise missiles, and they can jam Russian communications on the ground or in the air. F-16s could play a potentially massive role in dealing with dug-in Russian troops on the ground, especially in the trench warfare that has dominated the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. They can also counter the planes Russia uses for a similar purpose, keeping them away from the front lines or forcing them into direct contests to determine control of the airspace. F-16s have the range, speed, and onboard defenses to be able to target Russian ships in the Black Sea or even targets in Crimea, where previously well-insulated targets like the Kerch Strait Bridge would be just an airstrike away. Finally, the presence of F-16s over Ukraine could relieve pressure on the world's supply of air-defense missiles, which have begun to deplete as more and more of the West's stockpiles have been committed to the war. What all of this means is that the presence of F-16s in the skies could single-handedly break the stalemate that currently exists over Ukraine. Even though both sides are making their fullest possible use of air attack and defense capabilities, Russia and Ukraine have fallen into a balance that would be hard to shake out of without some sea change—but that's precisely what the F-16 could be. In a best-case scenario, the plane could hand Ukraine air superiority all the way to within just a couple of dozen miles from its border with Russia, meaning that any Russian troops caught on the ground would have a far more difficult time defending themselves or their positions. Strategic offensives, tactical advances, and logistical resupply could become all but impossible, forcing a quick and potentially disorganized withdrawal from Ukraine's sovereign territory.\n\n## Arguments Against the F-16's Effectiveness\n\nIn terms of the arguments against the F-16's effectiveness, many of them come down to how difficult the planes will be to operate and maintain in practice. For the F-16 in particular, learning how to fly the thing isn't the most major problem; the real issue is keeping it airworthy, and keeping runways open for it to get into the skies. Ukraine has a limited number of runways that are long enough and flat enough to support F-16 operations, meaning that Russia has a very short list of targets for their missiles to strike if they'd like to keep F-16s on the ground. The F-16s are also difficult to maintain, meaning that if the planes are flown and damaged before ground crews are ready to deal with them, they could turn into very expensive, single-use weapons. On top of that, it's an open question as to whether the F-16's attack capabilities would be enough to shift the balance of power during land battles, and it's not guaranteed that they'd be able to meet Russian pilots in air-to-air combat, either. Russia has already proven conservative about when and where it dispatches manned aircraft, and while the presence of F-16s could be a deterrent that keeps those pilots on the ground, it could also set up a situation where F-16s are damaged or taken out of service by Russian air defenses, without meaningfully reducing Russia's own fleet of warplanes. Worst-case scenario, this could even set up a situation where overzealous Ukrainian pilots are whittled down, clearing the way for a Russian counterattack once the stock of F-16s drops low enough. But pessimism about Ukraine's runways fails to acknowledge one recent development of the war: the effectiveness of Ukraine's air defenses, particularly the US-made Patriot air-defense system, in keeping Russian missiles and drones from impacting their targets. If those systems can keep Ukrainian airbases safe, they ensure that F-16s can take off and land, while also giving ground crews a safe place to carry out repairs. And Ukrainian troops have shown an ability to rapidly develop new capabilities and technical skills throughout this conflict. While the F-16 is certainly a complex piece of equipment, there's always room for Ukrainian ground crews to surpass expectations—or, as they've already been doing, they can find ways to do more with less.\n\n## Two Postulates on the F-16's Long-Term Strategic Impact\n\nAt present, it appears that the decision to send F-16s to Ukraine is set in stone. After all, the United States' opposition to the idea has been very firm, for a very long time, and a Herculean effort like getting the American intelligence apparatus to change its mind isn't likely to be undone anytime soon. And as long as F-16s do enter the conflict in some form, it seems all but certain that they'll have an immediate effect on the air war. When a dozen, or two dozen, or a hundred F-16s can fly into battle, they'll be able to shift the momentum of Ukraine's entire front, and they'll open up Russian targets that have been nearly untouchable thus far in the war. The real question isn't whether the F-16 will have a material impact in the war, but instead, whether that impact will have any staying power. In a scenario in which the West is able to deliver dozens of F-16s and competent pilots all at once, setting them loose on the battlefield where they can oversee a cascading Ukrainian offensive that puts the thunder runs of 2022 to shame, those F-16s would very quickly begin to collect the sorts of routine, expected wear-and-tear that should be addressed through routine, expected maintenance. Ukraine's air superiority quickly becomes unsustainable, and once it does, F-16s become functionally irrelevant until both competent ground crews and secure, stable supply lines can be routed to the relevant airfields. Ukraine's quick use of the F-16 and the resulting battlefield gains would be a major victory, and could either redraw the lines of the war entirely or incentivize one or both sides of the war to sue for peace. But far more reasonable is a staggered entry of F-16s to the war, in ones or twos or fives rather than dozens. This piecemeal introduction, without logistical or maintenance support, could be the worst of both worlds, as Ukraine would either be forced to hide its F-16s and protect their few serviceable runways until enough of the planes arrived, or otherwise use them in such small numbers that they might only be able to make limited gains on the battlefield. The determining factor in all of this isn't the F-16's ability to break the stalemate over Ukraine, but the Ukrainians' ability to keep the planes flying for the duration of the war. If that happens, even a piecemeal introduction of the planes could be a non-issue, with their cumulative air power growing in a snowball effect until they number in the dozens or even the hundreds. The introduction of dozens at once could turn the tide in a far more enduring way, and help Ukraine take back the land east of the Dnipro River, force Russia out of the Donbas, and even claim air superiority in advance of a final attack on Crimea. It's highly unlikely that Russia would reverse its decision to play it safe with its own combat aircraft, as long as Ukrainian F-16s aren't used to attack targets situated too far inside Russia, and since that appears to be a precondition in America's and NATO's willingness to provide the planes, it can reasonably be assumed that F-16s won't be involved in too many air-to-air battles. And if Russia doesn't contest Ukrainian air power in the areas they still occupy, then the forces on the ground will be left even more ill-equipped for survival than they already have been. Russia has been effective in shooting down Ukrainian aircraft when they come too close to the front lines, but F-16s have the range, electronic jamming technology, and munitions to take out Russian surface-to-air missile launch sites before they cause too much of a problem. With those F-16s providing overwatch, Ukraine's other Soviet-era fighters and ground-attack aircraft come back into play, and if that happens, Russian soldiers may find themselves in the same situation as Iraqi soldiers did during the Gulf War: running toward the border as fast as they can as advanced warplanes attack with impunity from above. Two postulates, and with them, two conclusions: If Ukraine and its Western allies are able to deliver F-16s, along with the logistical, supply, and maintenance support necessary to keep them flying for long periods, then the F-16 will, indeed, turn the tide of battle. It will break the tenuous stalemate that currently exists over Ukrainian skies, and it will break that stalemate in Ukraine's favor, with authority. If the arrival of these planes can further be coordinated with a major forward push on the ground, then the F-16 may well precipitate massive territorial gains for Ukraine, and provide enough pressure to send Russia's military into the collapse it's seemed to only narrowly escape. But if Ukraine and the West are unable to provide the ground support to keep these planes in the skies, then they will become a flash in the pan, at least for the months or years of latency that it takes for competent support to arrive. In that time, the role of such a sophisticated aircraft would be profoundly limited, in a situation where that apparent failure to turn the tide could cause Western support for the project to dry up. If Ukraine can retain its sovereignty into the future, then it will still receive a powerful fleet of fighter aircraft, but if those aircraft can't stay airworthy, then that Ukrainian sovereignty will have to be protected in some other way, by some other air defense, for as long as it takes for the F-16 to become the weapon it's meant to be.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### Why did Russia fail to establish air superiority over Ukraine in the opening days of the invasion?\n\nRussian missiles achieved an accuracy rate of below forty percent in the opening days, and Russian forces were unable or unwilling to commit planes to direct air-to-ground attacks. They failed to integrate fresh intelligence with their target list, failed to adapt battle plans to a changing situation, and struggled to maintain clear command-and-control over forces in the air and on the ground — allowing Ukrainian defenses to regroup and secure enough aircraft to remain a threat.\n\n### Why is the F-16 a better fit for Ukraine than the donated MiG-29s?\n\nMiG-29s are well known to Russian pilots and come with a limited combat range that Russian aircraft can easily outmatch. They are not optimized for air-to-ground attack and are in short supply in NATO-aligned inventories. The F-16, by contrast, is a multirole aircraft that can excel in air-to-air combat against Soviet-era jets, attack ground targets, and conduct electronic warfare and communications jamming — and is available in surplus from Denmark (33 planes), the Netherlands (24), and Belgium (44), all replacing them with F-35s.\n\n### What are the main obstacles to getting F-16s flying in Ukraine?\n\nUkraine has no way to train pilots on a plane it doesn't yet have, F-16s require long and well-maintained runways — creating a short list of easy targets for Russian missiles — and maintenance demands significantly more training than actually flying the jets. Munitions are expensive and stocks limited. US export controls also apply to all F-16s worldwide, meaning America's approval was a prerequisite before any NATO ally could transfer theirs.\n\n### What battlefield impact could F-16s realistically have?\n\nF-16s could deter Russian planes from entering combat zones, use sophisticated radar to identify and strike ground targets from hundreds of miles away while remaining over Ukrainian airspace, shoot down incoming drones and cruise missiles, jam Russian communications, and provide air support for ground operations in eastern Ukraine. They also have the range and speed to target Russian ships in the Black Sea and previously well-insulated objectives like the Kerch Strait Bridge.\n\n### What determines whether F-16s will genuinely turn the tide of the war?\n\nThe decisive factor is not the aircraft's capability but Ukraine's ability to keep the planes airworthy over time. If delivered alongside robust logistical, supply-chain, and maintenance support — and coordinated with a ground offensive — F-16s could break the air stalemate decisively and enable large-scale territorial gains. Delivered piecemeal without that support, they risk becoming expensive single-use weapons whose apparent failure to shift the war causes Western backing for the program to erode.\n\n## Related Coverage\n- [Ukraine's Counteroffensive Has Failed...](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/ukraines-counteroffensive-has-failed)\n- [Could (and Should) Ukraine Join Nato?](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/could-and-should-ukraine-join-nato)\n- [Europe's Air Defenses Aren't Ready for War: NATO's Vulnerability to Russian Drone Swarms](https://warfronts.pub/defense/europes-air-defenses-arent-ready-for-war)\n- [Russia Launches Unprecedented Drone Attack on NATO Member Poland](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/russia-drone-attack-poland-nato-response)\n- [Playing for Points: How Ukraine Turned Its Front Line Into a Video Game](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraine-army-of-drones-gamification-warfare)\n\n## Sources\n1. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-happened-to-the-air-war-in-ukraine>\n2. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war>\n3. <https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612>\n4. <https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/22/europe/f-16-jets-ukraine-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>\n5. <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months>\n6. <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/swiss-army-knife-of-the-battlefield-characterized-as-game-changer-for-ukraine-in-bid-to-oust-russian-invaders-b7a94330>\n7. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/21/world/europe/ukraine-f16-air-force.html>\n8. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russia-control-skies-over-ukraine>\n9. <https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-somme-in-the-sky-lessons-from-the-russo-ukrainian-air-war/>\n10. <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/in-ukraine-fight-integrated-air-defense-has-made-many-aircraft-worthless-us-air-force-general/>\n11. <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence>\n12. <https://www.japcc.org/articles/russian-air-forces-performance-in-ukraine-air-operations-the-fall-of-a-myth/>\n13. <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/airpower-ukraine-air-superiority-hecker/>\n14. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/16/ukraine-poland-fighter-jets-mig-29>\n15. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovakia-joins-poland-in-agreeing-to-give-fighter-jets-to-ukraine>\n16. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/what-difference-will-polish-and-slovakian-fighter-jets.html>\n17. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/17/world/europe/ukraine-f-16-biden-netherlands-britain.html>\n18. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65649471>\n19. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/us-allies-plan-provide-ukrainian-pilots-f-16-fighter-jets-official-say-rcna85270>\n20. <https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-f16-biden-a281e3cd1474b2e6f453946075824565>\n21. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65656356>\n22. <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-su35-fighter-jet-ukraine-f16-1801830>\n23. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-f-16-transfer-ukraine-would-raise-questions-natos-involvement-2023-05-22/>\n24. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/providing-ukraine-with-f-16-jets-a-colossal-risk-for-west-russia-says>\n25. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-the-plan-to-provide-f-16-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-means-for-the-war-against-russia>\n\n[1]: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-happened-to-the-air-war-in-ukraine\n[2]: https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war\n[3]: https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612\n[4]: https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/22/europe/f-16-jets-ukraine-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html\n[5]: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months\n[6]: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/swiss-army-knife-of-the-battlefield-characterized-as-game-changer-for-ukraine-in-bid-to-oust-russian-invaders-b7a94330\n[7]: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/21/world/europe/ukraine-f16-air-force.html\n[8]: https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russia-control-skies-over-ukraine\n[9]: https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-somme-in-the-sky-lessons-from-the-russo-ukrainian-air-war/\n[10]: https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/in-ukraine-fight-integrated-air-defense-has-made-many-aircraft-worthless-us-air-force-general/\n[11]: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence\n[12]: https://www.japcc.org/articles/russian-air-forces-performance-in-ukraine-air-operations-the-fall-of-a-myth/\n[13]: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/airpower-ukraine-air-superiority-hecker/\n[14]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/16/ukraine-poland-fighter-jets-mig-29\n[15]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovakia-joins-poland-in-agreeing-to-give-fighter-jets-to-ukraine\n[16]: https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/what-difference-will-polish-and-slovakian-fighter-jets.html\n[17]: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/17/world/europe/ukraine-f-16-biden-netherlands-britain.html\n[18]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65649471\n[19]: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/us-allies-plan-provide-ukrainian-pilots-f-16-fighter-jets-official-say-rcna85270\n[20]: https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-f16-biden-a281e3cd1474b2e6f453946075824565\n[21]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65656356\n[22]: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-su35-fighter-jet-ukraine-f16-1801830\n[23]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-f-16-transfer-ukraine-would-raise-questions-natos-involvement-2023-05-22/\n[24]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/providing-ukraine-with-f-16-jets-a-colossal-risk-for-west-russia-says\n[25]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-the-plan-to-provide-f-16-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-means-for-the-war-against-russia\n\n<!-- youtube:kSvf_iOBTCc -->"
url: https://warfronts.pub/article/will-f16-turn-tide-ukraine-analysis.md
canonical: https://warfronts.pub/article/will-f16-turn-tide-ukraine-analysis
datePublished: 2026-03-04
dateModified: 2026-03-04
author:
  - name: Simon Whistler
    url: https://warfronts.pub/author/simon-whistler
publisher: Warfronts
image: "https://media.warfronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/kSvf_iOBTCc/hero.jpg"
type: NewsArticle
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summaryUrl: https://warfronts.pub/article/will-f16-turn-tide-ukraine-analysis.md.summary.md
---

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On May 19, 2023, the United States announced that it would supply Ukraine with a piece of hardware Ukraine had been requesting for months: Lockheed Martin's F-16 Fighting Falcon. A highly advanced, American-made warplane, the F-16 has a history of making big impacts wherever it flies, and well over a year into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the plane has the potential to change everything for the Ukrainian resistance. Over the course of the invasion, the F-16 has gone from being a pipe dream for Ukraine to seeming more and more feasible, as Western-made tanks, missile defense systems, and other elite war-fighting equipment have been approved for transfer. Now, with the United States finally relenting, one question remains: Can the F-16 really shift this entire war on its axis?

<!-- aeo:section end="lede" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="key-takeaways" -->
## Key Takeaways
- Russia's missile accuracy rate fell below forty percent in the first days of the invasion, contributing to a failure to establish air superiority over Ukraine.
- Poland and Slovakia agreed to send seventeen Soviet-era MiG-29s to Ukraine in March 2023, but these jets have limited combat range and are well-known to Russian pilots.
- The F-16 serves in some 25 global air forces and is available in surplus from Denmark (33 planes), the Netherlands (24), and Belgium (44), all replacing them with F-35s.
- Two Ukrainian airmen trained covertly on F-16s in the United States and demonstrated above-average skills, leading the US to estimate a four-month training timeline.
- F-16s could target previously well-insulated objectives like the Kerch Strait Bridge and Russian ships in the Black Sea from safely within Ukrainian airspace.
- The US-made Patriot air-defense system has proven effective at protecting Ukrainian bases, which could ensure F-16s have safe runways for takeoff, landing, and maintenance.

<!-- aeo:section end="key-takeaways" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="russia-s-failure-to-establish-air-superiority" -->
## Russia's Failure to Establish Air Superiority

The air war in Ukraine has been far less straightforward than either Ukraine, Russia, or the world could have anticipated before war broke out in 2022. Much like with the rest of the Ukrainian defense, Russia, the world, and seemingly even Ukrainians themselves believed that Russia would establish air superiority over Ukraine within days of a ground invasion. The Russian Air Force was exponentially larger, more modern, better equipped, and far more versatile than Ukraine's, and by all accounts, Russian forces should have been able to use those capabilities to wipe out Ukrainian resistance in the sky, or even destroy the Ukrainian Air Force on the tarmac before it could ever take off. But that didn't happen. There are a few reasons why not, and most of them are a black eye for the Russian military. In the first days of the war, Russian missiles largely failed to find their targets, with a missile accuracy rate of below forty percent. They were unable or unwilling to commit Russian planes to direct, air-to-ground attacks that would have been more accurate or reliable. The Russians failed to integrate fresh intelligence with their list of targets and locations, they failed to adapt their battle plans in the face of a changing situation on the ground, and they struggled to maintain clear command-and-control over their own forces in the air and on the ground. That's not to say that Russia failed entirely; indeed, Russian planes were able to attack well over a hundred air-defense sites in Ukraine during those first few days. But between the Russian Air Force's failure to establish clear superiority in those first few days, and the subsequent, near-complete breakdown of their ground offensive, the Ukrainian defense was able to regroup effectively and secure enough aircraft to continue to threaten Russia by air.

<!-- aeo:section end="russia-s-failure-to-establish-air-superiority" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="ukraine-s-adaptive-air-defense-and-the-contested-skies" -->
## Ukraine's Adaptive Air Defense and the Contested Skies

Since then, the air war has been contested across Ukraine, even as one side or the other maintains air superiority over specific areas of the country. Although it seems fair to reason that a full commitment of Russia's air force could still overwhelm Ukraine, at least on paper, Russia hasn't wanted to commit to that attack—maybe for fear of losing too many of their warplanes, or maybe because either those planes or their pilots aren't in flying shape. But Ukrainian air defenses have been just as valuable, if not more so, in keeping those Russian planes mostly away from the most important Ukrainian military targets and from major population centers. What Russian bombing has taken place has been mainly directed at Ukraine's power grid or at individual battlefields, with the rest of its air attacks coming by way of missiles—but even those missiles, Ukraine has been increasingly able to deal with. Ukraine has adapted in other ways, too. They've taken on a decentralized approach to their own air assets and made sure not to concentrate too many of their air defenses in one spot at a time. They've been able to do the same with surface-to-air missile launchers, popping them up unexpectedly, which has in turn forced Russian pilots to fly so low that they come into range of shoulder-launched rockets. And Ukraine's own maintenance ground crews, at times, have borne a striking resemblance to NASCAR pit mechanics, quickly patching up planes and getting them back into the skies amid active hostilities. In a global first for a war of this size, both sides have also resorted to the use of drones for both reconnaissance and direct attacks on ground targets. Since drones are far less expensive than warplanes and don't require putting a pilot in harm's way, they've further incentivized both the Russians and the Ukrainians to avoid direct confrontations between manned aircraft. But it's important to keep in mind that even despite everything they've done, the Ukrainians have had to fight a fundamentally defensive air war, doing their best to level the playing field, but with little hope of securing their national airspace completely. To do that would require air power that Ukraine just doesn't have right now—but if they did have that air power, if they had enough warplanes of a consistently high-enough quality, then a whole lot of elements of this war could change very quickly. Long, intractable battles like the one in Bakhmut could be expedited, Ukraine could gain powerful air support for an expected summer offensive, and long-occupied territory like Crimea could quickly come within range of Ukrainian forces.

<!-- aeo:section end="ukraine-s-adaptive-air-defense-and-the-contested-skies" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="why-the-f-16-over-soviet-era-migs-and-other-western-jets" -->
## Why the F-16 Over Soviet-Era MiGs and Other Western Jets

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been vocal for some time in expressing his country's urgent need for fighter aircraft, but those requests went unheard for the first year of Russian invasion, until March of 2023. Two European nations—Poland and Slovakia—agreed to send a total of seventeen Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets, including some that are in flying shape and some that are meant to be cannibalized for spare parts. Ukraine is used to the MiG-29, with fifty-one in its inventory before the war began, but roughly half of those planes are believed to have been lost, along with dozens of other fighter and close-air-support aircraft. Ukraine isn't likely to say no to the donation of more MiG-29s, but these particular planes come with a few problems. First, they're widespread in the Russian Air Force as well as the Ukrainian Air Force, meaning that Russian pilots in the sky are intimately familiar with what the planes can and can't do. MiG-29s aren't exactly fantastic at air-to-ground attacks, either, and they've got a limited combat range, which other Russian planes—planes that the Ukrainians don't have—can easily outmatch. And lastly, there simply aren't that many MiG-29 aircraft that are in NATO's sphere of influence, rather than Russia's, meaning that they're hard for Ukraine to source given that Russia explicitly doesn't want Ukraine to have them. But if Ukraine were to obtain Western fighter jets, a lot of those problems could go away, and of all the fighter planes in Western inventories, there is no clearer match for Ukraine's needs than the American-made F-16. The F-16 is a highly effective multirole aircraft, something of a Swiss Army Knife of the skies, that can excel in air-to-air combat against the Soviet-era jets Russia flies, attack ground targets, or engage in electronic warfare and communications-jamming. They're also the most widely-used combat aircraft in the world today, and can be found in some 25 global air forces, most of whom are NATO members or part of the global coalition supporting Ukraine. While other aircraft, for example the Swedish-made Saab Gripen, might fit Ukraine's combat needs a little bit better, it's the F-16 that is available in surplus, able to be prepped for transfer, and could even be purchased off the production line. They aren't the best aircraft in the world, but they're a significant improvement on Ukraine's current inventory, and there are enough of them, with flexible-enough export controls, that dozens could find their way into the Ukrainian Air Force without the rest of the world breaking a sweat.

<!-- aeo:section end="why-the-f-16-over-soviet-era-migs-and-other-western-jets" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="obstacles-to-integration-training-runways-and-supply-chains" -->
## Obstacles to Integration: Training, Runways, and Supply Chains

There are no shortage of obstacles for Ukraine as it tries to bring F-16s into its airfleet. The Ukrainian Air Force has no way to train pilots on a plane it doesn't have, and the planes come with long supply chains which have to be kept up precisely. They're fairly finicky jets, ones that need long, immaculate runways to take off, and according to American Air Force personnel, maintaining F-16s requires a lot more training than actually flying them. F-16 munitions are expensive, and only a limited number are in circulation, meaning that if other countries deplete their inventories to donate missiles and bombs, their own stock might not be replenished for some time. But over the last several months, Ukraine has laid the groundwork to successfully convince the US and other allies that it can handle the F-16. Two Ukrainian airmen were sent to the United States to train covertly on the F-16, and apparently demonstrated above-average skills, encouraging enough that the US now believes that Ukrainian F-16 pilots could be trained in as little as four months, as long as interpreters can help streamline the process. And even though the US has repeatedly voiced concern that F-16 transfers could spark an escalation from Russia, specifically because F-16s could very well be used to strike targets in Russia, Ukraine has given assurances that they'll only be used in defense of Ukrainian territory. This consent from the US is critical, because F-16s around the world are still subject to US export controls, but now that America is on board with the idea of sending F-16s to Ukraine, it appears that the majority of this new inventory will come from NATO member-states in Europe or allies around the world. By example, Denmark has 33 of the planes, which are expected to soon be replaced by a nearly equal number of fifth-generation F-35s; the Netherlands have two dozen, but have already received more than enough F-35s to replace them; and Belgium is preparing to replace their forty-four F-16s with thirty-four F-35s. Ukraine has asked for some two hundred F-16s in total, but just the F-16s from these three NATO member-nations, all due for replacement, would make up more than half that total if they were sent directly. With the first deliveries of F-16s expected as early as August of 2023, with direct commitments from the UK and all three of those aforementioned nations to help train pilots, it may not be long until the first few Ukrainian airmen are ready to take to the skies.

<!-- aeo:section end="obstacles-to-integration-training-runways-and-supply-chains" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="potential-battlefield-impact-from-deterrence-to-offensive-power" -->
## Potential Battlefield Impact: From Deterrence to Offensive Power

The planes have the potential to impact every sphere of the war. At a base level, many Western analysts hope that the mere presence of F-16s will be enough to deter Russian planes from attempting to enter combat zones, especially considering that Russia has already been cautious in committing its planes to areas where they might be shot down. Beyond a simple deterrent effect, F-16s have the potential to use their sophisticated radar to identify ground targets at a range of hundreds of miles, launching weapons against Russian positions far in their back lines while remaining safely over Ukrainian airspace. The planes are also more than able to help clean up incoming Russian drones and cruise missiles, and they can jam Russian communications on the ground or in the air. F-16s could play a potentially massive role in dealing with dug-in Russian troops on the ground, especially in the trench warfare that has dominated the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. They can also counter the planes Russia uses for a similar purpose, keeping them away from the front lines or forcing them into direct contests to determine control of the airspace. F-16s have the range, speed, and onboard defenses to be able to target Russian ships in the Black Sea or even targets in Crimea, where previously well-insulated targets like the Kerch Strait Bridge would be just an airstrike away. Finally, the presence of F-16s over Ukraine could relieve pressure on the world's supply of air-defense missiles, which have begun to deplete as more and more of the West's stockpiles have been committed to the war. What all of this means is that the presence of F-16s in the skies could single-handedly break the stalemate that currently exists over Ukraine. Even though both sides are making their fullest possible use of air attack and defense capabilities, Russia and Ukraine have fallen into a balance that would be hard to shake out of without some sea change—but that's precisely what the F-16 could be. In a best-case scenario, the plane could hand Ukraine air superiority all the way to within just a couple of dozen miles from its border with Russia, meaning that any Russian troops caught on the ground would have a far more difficult time defending themselves or their positions. Strategic offensives, tactical advances, and logistical resupply could become all but impossible, forcing a quick and potentially disorganized withdrawal from Ukraine's sovereign territory.

<!-- aeo:section end="potential-battlefield-impact-from-deterrence-to-offensive-power" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="arguments-against-the-f-16-s-effectiveness" -->
## Arguments Against the F-16's Effectiveness

In terms of the arguments against the F-16's effectiveness, many of them come down to how difficult the planes will be to operate and maintain in practice. For the F-16 in particular, learning how to fly the thing isn't the most major problem; the real issue is keeping it airworthy, and keeping runways open for it to get into the skies. Ukraine has a limited number of runways that are long enough and flat enough to support F-16 operations, meaning that Russia has a very short list of targets for their missiles to strike if they'd like to keep F-16s on the ground. The F-16s are also difficult to maintain, meaning that if the planes are flown and damaged before ground crews are ready to deal with them, they could turn into very expensive, single-use weapons. On top of that, it's an open question as to whether the F-16's attack capabilities would be enough to shift the balance of power during land battles, and it's not guaranteed that they'd be able to meet Russian pilots in air-to-air combat, either. Russia has already proven conservative about when and where it dispatches manned aircraft, and while the presence of F-16s could be a deterrent that keeps those pilots on the ground, it could also set up a situation where F-16s are damaged or taken out of service by Russian air defenses, without meaningfully reducing Russia's own fleet of warplanes. Worst-case scenario, this could even set up a situation where overzealous Ukrainian pilots are whittled down, clearing the way for a Russian counterattack once the stock of F-16s drops low enough. But pessimism about Ukraine's runways fails to acknowledge one recent development of the war: the effectiveness of Ukraine's air defenses, particularly the US-made Patriot air-defense system, in keeping Russian missiles and drones from impacting their targets. If those systems can keep Ukrainian airbases safe, they ensure that F-16s can take off and land, while also giving ground crews a safe place to carry out repairs. And Ukrainian troops have shown an ability to rapidly develop new capabilities and technical skills throughout this conflict. While the F-16 is certainly a complex piece of equipment, there's always room for Ukrainian ground crews to surpass expectations—or, as they've already been doing, they can find ways to do more with less.

<!-- aeo:section end="arguments-against-the-f-16-s-effectiveness" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="two-postulates-on-the-f-16-s-long-term-strategic-impact" -->
## Two Postulates on the F-16's Long-Term Strategic Impact

At present, it appears that the decision to send F-16s to Ukraine is set in stone. After all, the United States' opposition to the idea has been very firm, for a very long time, and a Herculean effort like getting the American intelligence apparatus to change its mind isn't likely to be undone anytime soon. And as long as F-16s do enter the conflict in some form, it seems all but certain that they'll have an immediate effect on the air war. When a dozen, or two dozen, or a hundred F-16s can fly into battle, they'll be able to shift the momentum of Ukraine's entire front, and they'll open up Russian targets that have been nearly untouchable thus far in the war. The real question isn't whether the F-16 will have a material impact in the war, but instead, whether that impact will have any staying power. In a scenario in which the West is able to deliver dozens of F-16s and competent pilots all at once, setting them loose on the battlefield where they can oversee a cascading Ukrainian offensive that puts the thunder runs of 2022 to shame, those F-16s would very quickly begin to collect the sorts of routine, expected wear-and-tear that should be addressed through routine, expected maintenance. Ukraine's air superiority quickly becomes unsustainable, and once it does, F-16s become functionally irrelevant until both competent ground crews and secure, stable supply lines can be routed to the relevant airfields. Ukraine's quick use of the F-16 and the resulting battlefield gains would be a major victory, and could either redraw the lines of the war entirely or incentivize one or both sides of the war to sue for peace. But far more reasonable is a staggered entry of F-16s to the war, in ones or twos or fives rather than dozens. This piecemeal introduction, without logistical or maintenance support, could be the worst of both worlds, as Ukraine would either be forced to hide its F-16s and protect their few serviceable runways until enough of the planes arrived, or otherwise use them in such small numbers that they might only be able to make limited gains on the battlefield. The determining factor in all of this isn't the F-16's ability to break the stalemate over Ukraine, but the Ukrainians' ability to keep the planes flying for the duration of the war. If that happens, even a piecemeal introduction of the planes could be a non-issue, with their cumulative air power growing in a snowball effect until they number in the dozens or even the hundreds. The introduction of dozens at once could turn the tide in a far more enduring way, and help Ukraine take back the land east of the Dnipro River, force Russia out of the Donbas, and even claim air superiority in advance of a final attack on Crimea. It's highly unlikely that Russia would reverse its decision to play it safe with its own combat aircraft, as long as Ukrainian F-16s aren't used to attack targets situated too far inside Russia, and since that appears to be a precondition in America's and NATO's willingness to provide the planes, it can reasonably be assumed that F-16s won't be involved in too many air-to-air battles. And if Russia doesn't contest Ukrainian air power in the areas they still occupy, then the forces on the ground will be left even more ill-equipped for survival than they already have been. Russia has been effective in shooting down Ukrainian aircraft when they come too close to the front lines, but F-16s have the range, electronic jamming technology, and munitions to take out Russian surface-to-air missile launch sites before they cause too much of a problem. With those F-16s providing overwatch, Ukraine's other Soviet-era fighters and ground-attack aircraft come back into play, and if that happens, Russian soldiers may find themselves in the same situation as Iraqi soldiers did during the Gulf War: running toward the border as fast as they can as advanced warplanes attack with impunity from above. Two postulates, and with them, two conclusions: If Ukraine and its Western allies are able to deliver F-16s, along with the logistical, supply, and maintenance support necessary to keep them flying for long periods, then the F-16 will, indeed, turn the tide of battle. It will break the tenuous stalemate that currently exists over Ukrainian skies, and it will break that stalemate in Ukraine's favor, with authority. If the arrival of these planes can further be coordinated with a major forward push on the ground, then the F-16 may well precipitate massive territorial gains for Ukraine, and provide enough pressure to send Russia's military into the collapse it's seemed to only narrowly escape. But if Ukraine and the West are unable to provide the ground support to keep these planes in the skies, then they will become a flash in the pan, at least for the months or years of latency that it takes for competent support to arrive. In that time, the role of such a sophisticated aircraft would be profoundly limited, in a situation where that apparent failure to turn the tide could cause Western support for the project to dry up. If Ukraine can retain its sovereignty into the future, then it will still receive a powerful fleet of fighter aircraft, but if those aircraft can't stay airworthy, then that Ukrainian sovereignty will have to be protected in some other way, by some other air defense, for as long as it takes for the F-16 to become the weapon it's meant to be.

<!-- aeo:section end="two-postulates-on-the-f-16-s-long-term-strategic-impact" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="frequently-asked-questions" -->
## Frequently Asked Questions

### Why did Russia fail to establish air superiority over Ukraine in the opening days of the invasion?

Russian missiles achieved an accuracy rate of below forty percent in the opening days, and Russian forces were unable or unwilling to commit planes to direct air-to-ground attacks. They failed to integrate fresh intelligence with their target list, failed to adapt battle plans to a changing situation, and struggled to maintain clear command-and-control over forces in the air and on the ground — allowing Ukrainian defenses to regroup and secure enough aircraft to remain a threat.

### Why is the F-16 a better fit for Ukraine than the donated MiG-29s?

MiG-29s are well known to Russian pilots and come with a limited combat range that Russian aircraft can easily outmatch. They are not optimized for air-to-ground attack and are in short supply in NATO-aligned inventories. The F-16, by contrast, is a multirole aircraft that can excel in air-to-air combat against Soviet-era jets, attack ground targets, and conduct electronic warfare and communications jamming — and is available in surplus from Denmark (33 planes), the Netherlands (24), and Belgium (44), all replacing them with F-35s.

### What are the main obstacles to getting F-16s flying in Ukraine?

Ukraine has no way to train pilots on a plane it doesn't yet have, F-16s require long and well-maintained runways — creating a short list of easy targets for Russian missiles — and maintenance demands significantly more training than actually flying the jets. Munitions are expensive and stocks limited. US export controls also apply to all F-16s worldwide, meaning America's approval was a prerequisite before any NATO ally could transfer theirs.

### What battlefield impact could F-16s realistically have?

F-16s could deter Russian planes from entering combat zones, use sophisticated radar to identify and strike ground targets from hundreds of miles away while remaining over Ukrainian airspace, shoot down incoming drones and cruise missiles, jam Russian communications, and provide air support for ground operations in eastern Ukraine. They also have the range and speed to target Russian ships in the Black Sea and previously well-insulated objectives like the Kerch Strait Bridge.

### What determines whether F-16s will genuinely turn the tide of the war?

The decisive factor is not the aircraft's capability but Ukraine's ability to keep the planes airworthy over time. If delivered alongside robust logistical, supply-chain, and maintenance support — and coordinated with a ground offensive — F-16s could break the air stalemate decisively and enable large-scale territorial gains. Delivered piecemeal without that support, they risk becoming expensive single-use weapons whose apparent failure to shift the war causes Western backing for the program to erode.

<!-- aeo:section end="frequently-asked-questions" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="related-coverage" -->
## Related Coverage
- [Ukraine's Counteroffensive Has Failed...](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/ukraines-counteroffensive-has-failed)
- [Could (and Should) Ukraine Join Nato?](https://warfronts.pub/analysis/could-and-should-ukraine-join-nato)
- [Europe's Air Defenses Aren't Ready for War: NATO's Vulnerability to Russian Drone Swarms](https://warfronts.pub/defense/europes-air-defenses-arent-ready-for-war)
- [Russia Launches Unprecedented Drone Attack on NATO Member Poland](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/russia-drone-attack-poland-nato-response)
- [Playing for Points: How Ukraine Turned Its Front Line Into a Video Game](https://warfronts.pub/conflicts/ukraine-army-of-drones-gamification-warfare)

<!-- aeo:section end="related-coverage" -->
<!-- aeo:section start="sources" -->
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[1]: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-happened-to-the-air-war-in-ukraine
[2]: https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war
[3]: https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612
[4]: https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/22/europe/f-16-jets-ukraine-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
[5]: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months
[6]: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/swiss-army-knife-of-the-battlefield-characterized-as-game-changer-for-ukraine-in-bid-to-oust-russian-invaders-b7a94330
[7]: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/21/world/europe/ukraine-f16-air-force.html
[8]: https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-russia-control-skies-over-ukraine
[9]: https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-somme-in-the-sky-lessons-from-the-russo-ukrainian-air-war/
[10]: https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/in-ukraine-fight-integrated-air-defense-has-made-many-aircraft-worthless-us-air-force-general/
[11]: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence
[12]: https://www.japcc.org/articles/russian-air-forces-performance-in-ukraine-air-operations-the-fall-of-a-myth/
[13]: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/airpower-ukraine-air-superiority-hecker/
[14]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/16/ukraine-poland-fighter-jets-mig-29
[15]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovakia-joins-poland-in-agreeing-to-give-fighter-jets-to-ukraine
[16]: https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/what-difference-will-polish-and-slovakian-fighter-jets.html
[17]: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/17/world/europe/ukraine-f-16-biden-netherlands-britain.html
[18]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65649471
[19]: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/us-allies-plan-provide-ukrainian-pilots-f-16-fighter-jets-official-say-rcna85270
[20]: https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-f16-biden-a281e3cd1474b2e6f453946075824565
[21]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65656356
[22]: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-su35-fighter-jet-ukraine-f16-1801830
[23]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-f-16-transfer-ukraine-would-raise-questions-natos-involvement-2023-05-22/
[24]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/providing-ukraine-with-f-16-jets-a-colossal-risk-for-west-russia-says
[25]: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-the-plan-to-provide-f-16-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-means-for-the-war-against-russia

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