The Autocratic Social Contract: How Dictators Hold on to Power

What would an individual do to possess unmitigated control right in the palm of their hand? Many would engage in frankly unspeakable actions for such a privilege. However, an arguably more important question arises once power is attained: what must be done to keep it? Dictators and autocrats across the globe, asking themselves that very question, have consistently come to the same conclusion.

They must make a deal with their people—not out loud, but implicitly through their actions and with the inferred support from their citizens. Some promise wealth, some promise stability, and others promise everything under the sun. Understanding the deep weeds of power politics requires investigating the very fabric of what holds authoritarian regimes together and, eventually, how it all comes apart at the seams. It is a deal with the devil: the autocratic social contract.

Origins and the Hobbesian Framework

The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed social contract theory was Thomas Hobbes, a political philosopher who lived during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England. According to Hobbes, before the concept of a nation came to be, people lived in a state of total anarchy known as the “state of nature.” The result of this, Hobbes stated, were lives of individuals that were solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

In his seminal political work, Leviathan, Hobbes argues that a “Leviathan”—a stand-in for a government apparatus—must exist to bring order to the state of nature through a social contract, which will allow society to grow in relative peace. The state creates this environment by maintaining total, brutal authority over the people who live within it and holding a complete monopoly over organized violence. However, what Hobbes did not account for was that the same anarchy would transcend from the individual level to the state level.

It is no longer a war of all against all, but rather a system of states competing against each other for power. This framework informs the political theories of realism in modern international relations today; any hawkish geopolitical strategist may be speaking as a realist in this exact sense. Future philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and John Rawls all subsequently adapted the idea of the social contract in their own writings to better reflect the place that the state held in their respective eras.

When examining the modern autocratic social contract, the Hobbesian framework remains the most relevant. It is applied not strictly in the sense of a state providing solace from complete anarchy, but in the simple concept that people within a society must collectively choose to sacrifice something for a greater benefit. In Hobbes’s case, that sacrifice is freedom in exchange for safety.

In the modern day, certain autocratic entities have created their own informal bargains that they have established with their citizens in order to hold onto power. Various modern leaders are playing Hobbes and Rousseau in real time, offering unique social contracts to their citizens with varying degrees of success.

Vladimir Putin and the Depoliticization Bargain

One of the most prominent modern examples of an autocrat presenting his citizens with a social contract is Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. One recognizable trait of a dictator who has established a social contract with their citizens is the origin of that contract’s influence. Putin came to power in 1999 as the Russian Prime Minister, almost a decade after the Soviet collapse.

Under President Boris Yeltsin, Russia had thrown open the doors to free-market capitalism, and opportunistic figures descended on the vulnerable Russian state. National assets were sold off in secret meetings to oligarchs for pennies on the dollar. Corruption was endemic, the economy was in profound disarray, basic services could not operate, and Russia was highly unstable.

This era is arguably the closest modern Russia has ever been to Hobbes’s state of nature, and it forms the foundation of Vladimir Putin’s social contract. He rose to power in a country that was unstable, corrupt, militarily weak, and potentially even revolutionary, as demonstrated by the conflict in Chechnya. It aligns with his background that Putin emerged as a counter-revolutionary figure.

Early in his reign, he attempted to crack down on the endemic corruption within his country. He sought to bring national stability and national pride back to Russia through the Second Chechen War. Putin also strengthened federal institutions, undermined independent ones, and, crucially, depoliticized his population.

This was the birth of Putin’s social contract. The informal bargain made between Putin and Russian citizens dictated that the government would largely stay out of the people’s lives as much as it could, and in return, there was no need for the populace to engage in politics. Putin’s state apparatus would handle all political matters.

The Russian people, apathetic towards politics given the severe decline since the Soviet collapse and desperate for national stability, accepted the offer. This dynamic explains why the Russian populace has not risen up en masse against Putin over the war in Ukraine; they have been systemically depoliticized and rendered apathetic. Putin successfully consolidated control over the entire Russian state, manipulating political parties, the media, and electoral law in his favor.

When faced with the might of a state with near-endless resources that openly and flagrantly demonizes political activism to the point of illegality, it becomes easier for the average Russian citizen to simply accept the deal. Ultimately, the populace desires safety for their families, food on the table, and well-paying work. Putin’s state provided those foundational necessities, but the populace was required to surrender their political agency in exchange.

Not everyone was entirely on board with Putin’s social contract. No matter how much a population is depoliticized, there will always be a small subsection of individuals unafraid to challenge the state and speak openly about their disapproval of the government. This included prominent Russian oligarchs.

Putin managed to bring many oligarchs to his side by issuing an ultimatum similar to the one given to the general citizenry: they could generate vast wealth from their acquired state enterprises, and the state would mostly leave them alone, provided they did not engage in politics. Most followed that directive, unwilling to risk their fortunes. However, some did not comply, and Putin felt compelled to act.

While a politicized populace is detrimental to the regime, a wealthy, politically motivated oligarch presents a far more dangerous, immediate threat to regime security. In 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a politically motivated oligarch and the former head of Yukos—one of Russia’s largest oil companies—was arrested on charges of fraud and tax evasion. In reality, Khodorkovsky’s primary offense was funding opposition parties and criticizing the Kremlin.

Khodorkovsky’s assets were seized, and Yukos was broken up. The enforcement did not stop there. In 2013, the influential 1990s Russian political kingmaker and Kremlin-critical oligarch Boris Berezovsky was mysteriously found dead in his flat in Ascot, near London.

Given the demonstrated willingness of the Russian state in subsequent years to target individuals living in the United Kingdom, state involvement remains highly suspected. These two cases, occurring ten years apart, illustrate the brutal enforcement of Putin’s social contract and send a clear message to other powerful figures in Russia: accept the terms of the deal.

The Fraying Consensus and the Ukraine War

Wealthy oligarchs presented one challenge, but politically motivated individuals with a dedicated grievance against the state presented another. A smaller subsection of the population remained unafraid of the consequences in their fight against state tyranny. One such figure, who recently lost his life in a Russian prison, was Alexei Navalny.

Arguably the most vocal critic of Putin, Navalny campaigned extensively as an anti-corruption activist. His team brought to light many of the Kremlin’s operational shortfalls, notably exposing Putin’s Palace, a $1.3 billion estate situated on the Black Sea, reportedly earmarked for the President. He also exposed former President Dmitry Medvedev’s alleged financial corruption in 2017, a claim that Medvedev dismissed as nonsense, according to the BBC.

Navalny faced exile, poisoning, imprisonment, and eventually death at the hands of the Russian state. However, Navalny’s legacy persists. He famously referred to Putin’s political faction, United Russia, as a party of crooks and thieves, a sentiment that over half of polled Russians agreed with in 2013, according to reports by The Atlantic.

Putin’s handling of these dissidents demonstrates the severe consequences for standing up to the regime and daring to raise a profile above the political parapet. Despite decades of stability, there is mounting evidence that Putin’s social contract is starting to fray at the seams. This deterioration centers on the largest geopolitical gamble of his entire political career: the invasion of Ukraine.

A planned three-day special military operation transformed into a multi-year, ongoing quagmire resulting in thousands of Russian casualties every month. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine posed a particularly difficult challenge that the Kremlin did not anticipate. To sustain the conflict, Putin needed to gather vast numbers of soldiers.

In this scenario, Putin’s focus on regime security fundamentally trumped the established social contract, leading to Russia’s mass mobilization in September of 2022. The unstated agreement had been broken. It became increasingly difficult for the state to justify the citizens’ forced depoliticization when it was actively sending their sons, fathers, and brothers to die in an innately political war.

This friction was exacerbated by the Ukrainian counter-invasion in 2024, which brought the reality of the conflict directly into Russian territory. The rally-around-the-flag effect of the war bolstered Putin’s approval ratings initially. Statista reported that his approval rating scarcely dropped below 80 percent since the war began; however, specific demographics are becoming increasingly disgruntled as the conflict drags on.

Putin faced direct questioning from the mothers and wives of mobilized soldiers in November of 2022, and the resulting Council of Mothers and Wives has maintained its presence. In late 2023, The Guardian reported women outwardly protesting against the Russian government. One demonstrator explicitly called for a total demobilization, stating that civilians should not be engaged in the fighting and warning that their protest numbers would only grow.

As the war extends and the domestic population grows frustrated with the slow pace of military progress, passive support will likely erode, prompting the population to increasingly turn to political means to demand change. Putin’s social contract has endured for a long time, but the conflict in Ukraine has provided its most significant challenge yet. The Russian leadership is forced to choose between facing severe manpower shortages on the battlefield or triggering the increased politicization of the citizenry at home.

Neither outcome serves the overarching priority of regime security. It remains to be seen whether further major mobilizations will take place, but given the Kremlin’s heavy reliance on volunteer battalions, climbing wages for contract soldiers, and the absorption of the Wagner Group, it is clear the state wishes to avoid further compulsory drafts. The genie of domestic politicization is extremely difficult to put back into the bottle.

Whenever a lasting peace eventually materializes, the Russian state will face an immense challenge in returning domestic politicization to pre-invasion levels, if such a regression is even possible anymore. Yet, Putin is not the sole autocrat who has laid out an extensive and enduring social contract. Another prominent leader has adapted multiple pages from the Russian playbook.

Mohammed bin Salman and the Vision 2030 Gamble

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has executed a meteoric and well-documented rise to power. Despite initially being a relative outsider for the throne, he secured his father’s position as Crown Prince before systematically ousting his political rivals. He emerged as the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia in his thirties as his father’s health began to decline.

The social contract implemented by MBS arises from both his personal experiences and the broader political situation within Saudi Arabia prior to his consolidation of power. The situation in Saudi Arabia pre-MBS was characterized by immense national wealth, but it came at a significant societal cost. Possessing the second-largest oil reserves on earth behind Venezuela, Saudi Arabia operates as an oil juggernaut in every sense of the word.

The kingdom has long maintained an extensive economic dependence on this petroleum wealth, which has continually fueled both its domestic and foreign policies. Within the kingdom, a rudimentary social contract was already firmly in place. The Saudi royal family governed exclusively, and in exchange, citizens of the kingdom benefited from a generous welfare state.

This included free education and healthcare, alongside heavily subsidized utilities and fuel. Furthermore, the public sector operated as the largest employer in the kingdom; Saudi government jobs provided high salaries, reliable job security, and extensive benefits. However, the severe dependence on oil persisted, alongside the highly conservative social policies of the state.

Secret religious police roamed the streets, and women’s rights were severely curtailed under the Wahhabi-supported regime. MBS grew up on the outskirts of power in the capital of Riyadh, where his father served as governor. The young prince recognized that Saudi Arabia needed to modernize in a manner that aligned with an emerging generation.

Saudi Arabia’s population pyramid demonstrated that a massive proportion of its citizens were under the age of thirty. Concurrently, the unemployment rate for young Saudis between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four stood at a staggering 30 percent in 2015 when MBS began his ascent. By 2023, that metric had decreased to just over 16 percent, representing a sizable economic reduction.

MBS framed his new social contract alongside an aggressive campaign of modernization, intending to build a post-oil future for the state through Vision 2030. According to the project’s official doctrines, the initiative aims to create a vibrant society, a thriving economy, and an ambitious nation. Saudi Arabia’s rapid modernization has subsequently unfolded in real time.

This includes sweeping social reforms such as allowing women to drive, curtailing the pervasive power of the religious police, and permitting men and women to mix in designated public spaces. While it might appear that these shifts represent an enlightened utilitarian approach, many of the liberal reforms are deeply rooted in the pragmatic desire for economic security. If women are barred from driving, half of the nation’s potential labor force remains restricted to the home, unable to contribute to broader economic growth.

Concurrently, Saudi Arabia launched an extensive international charm offensive to boost its diplomatic and cultural standing on the world stage. The kingdom successfully secured the bid for the 2034 FIFA World Cup, its sovereign wealth fund purchased a large controlling stake in the English Premier League’s Newcastle United Football Club, and a planned mega-museum in Riyadh is slated to house the most expensive painting ever sold—Leonardo da Vinci’s $450 million Salvator Mundi. The Saudi Public Investment Fund has also poured capital into the WWE, brought international conventions like Comic Con to the nation, and initiated vast public infrastructure projects.

These initiatives form the core of the Crown Prince’s social contract. The state stipulates that it will provide everything the young Saudi population could desire: social reforms, economic freedom, a robust post-oil economy, stability, jobs, international entertainment, and a defining, respected place on the world stage. In exchange, there is absolutely no space for democracy or political dissent.

It is a framework strikingly similar to the Russian social contract, but accelerated by vast economic leverage. The state will not leave its citizens alone, but the citizens are incentivized to accept state presence because of the lavish benefits provided. The inherent downside to this dynamic is that MBS rules entirely unopposed.

Historically, various factions of the sprawling Saudi royal family—which boasts thousands of members—wielded significant influence over domestic politics and could bend state policy to their collective will. MBS, however, has made it definitively clear that his social contract applies strictly to the royal elite as well. There was no greater demonstration of this consolidated power than the events of 2020.

MBS locked up as many as 500 of the kingdom’s political and wealthy elites in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton in what was officially dubbed an anti-corruption drive. According to eyewitness reports published in The Guardian, the country’s elite were held, and many were subjected to physical coercion and intimidation. The objective was to force them to surrender vast portions of their personal fortunes to the state or to definitively abandon any future political ambitions.

The purge established absolute clarity regarding who controlled the kingdom. Even the sitting Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, who held dual Saudi citizenship, was caught in the geopolitical sweep and forced to resign after being held for several weeks in Riyadh. This intense crackdown operated behind the scenes for several years, presenting a stark, binary carrot-and-stick approach to governance.

Loyalists receive unprecedented access and wealth, while opponents lose everything. The most devastating example of this enforcement was the assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, whose vocal critiques of the regime cost him his life at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018. Khashoggi was summoned to the diplomatic facility before being brutally murdered and dismembered by Saudi state agents.

While widely assessed by international intelligence communities that the directive originated from the highest levels of Saudi leadership, official statements state there is no evidence formally linking the Crown Prince to the operation.

Economic Realities and the Limits of Authoritarian Mega-Projects

The Saudi leadership must also exercise extreme caution regarding state spending. Attempting to wean the country off of oil dependence is a strategic necessity, as the catastrophic mismanagement of natural wealth in nations like Venezuela serves as a stark warning. However, if the trillion-dollar economic facelift fails to improve the daily lives of Saudi citizens in the long term, these sprawling initiatives could be exposed as expensive gimmicks.

Such a failure would invariably grow dissent among the population and severely fracture the new social contract. A prominent example of this risk is Saudi Arabia’s under-construction super-city, The Line. Designed as a futuristically planned, 170-kilometer-long mirrored glass city with no cars, streets, or carbon emissions, the metropolis was slated to run from the Neom development to the Red Sea.

However, in recent years, the profoundly ambitious project has become bogged down by logistical realities. Constructing a continuous 170-kilometer urban structure is an unprecedented feat of engineering that is neither cheap nor practically straightforward. In 2024, The Telegraph reported that The Line had been dramatically scaled back to a little over two kilometers on its western section, with its projected initial population dropping to 300,000 residents rather than the previously advertised 1.5 million.

A 98 percent reduction in the project’s physical scope does not bode well for its future viability, though Saudi officials have continually denied claims that the overarching master plan is being permanently curtailed. The relevance of Da Vinci paintings, international wrestling contracts, political assassinations, and sprawling glass cities directly ties back to the viability of the Saudi social contract. Vision 2030 carries immense foundational risks.

Al Jazeera reports that phases of the modernization project may involve the privatization of essential services like education and healthcare, converting them away from the universally free institutions that ordinary Saudi citizens rely upon and do not wish to lose. Following his rise to prominence, the Crown Prince oversaw public sector pay modifications, alongside calculated cuts to legacy fuel and energy subsidies. In 2018, the government introduced a value-added tax of 5 percent on most goods and services, directly extracting wealth from the general population to fund state diversification.

Consequently, the cost of basic commodities and general living expenses are now notably higher for ordinary citizens. This economic pressure exists in a nation where approximately 34 million people reside, and poverty remains a heavily suppressed domestic issue. Al Jazeera states that roughly 20 percent of the country’s citizens live in poverty.

The World Bank considers the kingdom to have a looming poverty problem, a metric that should raise severe alarm bells for the leadership. The state intentionally dismantled the former social contract—where vast oil wealth was distributed among the people in exchange for total political compliance—and replaced it with a promise of futuristic modernization. While the kingdom has rapidly modernized, the economic reality for the lower classes has, in some respects, regressed.

In 2016, emerging economic difficulties combined with domestic crackdowns led to over one million people emigrating from the kingdom to secure better stability. While international spectacles are effective for global branding, when segments of a nation’s population struggle with rising costs and the primary deliverables are highly condensed glass infrastructure, foreign art, and imported athletes, an atmosphere of bread and circuses takes hold—often lacking sufficient bread. The Saudi social contract mirrors the Russian model in several critical aspects, and the young leader clearly shares an affinity for the Russian President’s heavy-handed methodology.

However, the cracks in the foundation are already visible. Vision 2030 is a massive geopolitical gamble, and if the economic deliverables fail to materialize, the regime will have nowhere else to deflect the blame. Yet, the Middle East is not the only region where an autocrat has aggressively rewritten the national social contract.

To examine the absolute zenith of this phenomenon, the focus must shift to Beijing and the People’s Republic of China.

Xi Jinping and the Technocratic Social Contract

As the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and de facto President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping casts a formidable shadow. He commands the second-largest economy on earth, flexes military influence across contested borders, and oversees a population of over a billion citizens navigating an increasingly technocratic society. A social contract is fundamentally implicit in the sheer logistical reality of governing a nation of that magnitude.

Before Xi’s consolidation of power, a longstanding social contract already existed between the ruling CCP and Chinese citizens. It was an agreement structurally comparable to the Russian model: the CCP would observe certain boundaries in exchange for society observing its own strict political limits. Under the previous paradigm, Chinese citizens were broadly free to pursue advanced education, launch private businesses, and acquire property, provided that their individual freedoms and wealth did not threaten the ultimate authority of the CCP.

In practical application, this meant the Chinese government tolerated minor, localized grievances, and the populace tolerated the macro-level policy changes enacted by the party apparatus. This system effectively kept the vast country politically compartmentalized but economically expanding, deliberately avoiding unified mass protests. However, by the time Xi assumed supreme leadership, China had reached a structural crossroads.

The existing social contract was struggling to manage the consequences of decades of unbridled expansion. While the country was booming economically, severe concerns regarding the byproduct of that boom were emerging across Chinese society. The most pressing initial concern was corruption.

Widespread graft prior to Xi Jinping’s premiership was completely endemic, resulting in numerous localized mass incidents—the official Beijing terminology for civilian protests. These protests frequently stemmed from local party officials overtly enriching themselves at the direct expense of the public. The second major systemic issue was environmental pollution.

China’s rapid industrialization positioned it as the world’s greatest polluter, resulting in catastrophic levels of environmental degradation. According to data from the World Health Organization, concentrations of dangerous particulate matter were roughly four times higher than recommended guidelines in major industrial hubs like Beijing and Shenyang. A comprehensive study by the Health Effects Institute determined that extraordinarily high levels of particulate matter contributed to roughly 1.42 million premature deaths in China in 2019 alone.

These severe societal fractures dictated the terms of the revised social contract that Xi would ultimately impose upon the population. The new mandate prioritized unified prosperity and rigid stability, characterized by intense nationalism, sweeping anti-corruption purges, and aggressive pollution controls. In exchange for addressing these issues, the Chinese state rapidly transitioned into a highly technocratic, rigorously authoritarian apparatus with zero tolerance for political dissent.

These principles have dominated civilian life since Xi’s ascension to CCP Chairman. According to analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations, Xi successfully implemented notable climate reforms, lowering localized air pollution and increasing overall air quality. Similarly, BP’s 2024 Energy Outlook noted that China alone is driving the global decline in coal reliance.

Furthermore, Xi launched sweeping anti-corruption measures to eliminate graft within the state system, establishing new investigatory institutions and severely penalizing the lavish, highly visible lifestyles of corrupt CCP officials. This specific initiative was initially highly popular among the Chinese citizenry. Xi has aggressively promoted the China Dream, projecting strength regarding territorial interests in Kashmir, the South China Sea, and Taiwan.

The People’s Liberation Army’s vastly increased military spending has allowed Beijing to project power against global competitors. However, the implementation of Xi’s rigid social contract has faced massive internal disruptions, leaving citizens increasingly frustrated. Mass incidents have occurred with greater frequency in the decade since he secured power.

Following explosive expansion in the 2000s and early 2010s, China’s economic growth has slowed significantly, squeezing the domestic middle class and exacerbating conditions for those in poverty. The catastrophic implosion of the Chinese real estate sector saddled massive developers with insurmountable debt, triggering profound economic instability across connected heavy industries. While China’s economy continues to grow, it does so at a drastically reduced pace, posting a GDP growth rate of just under 3 percent in 2022.

This relative loss of economic momentum directly undermines the most critical pillar of Xi’s social contract: prosperous stability. Income inequality remains stark; China ranks second only to the United States in its total number of billionaires. Despite historically unprecedented state efforts to lift hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty, approximately 13 percent of the nation still lives below the poverty line, according to NPR.

Personal freedoms are overtly constrained by the state, but the suppression of individual rights is only tolerated by the populace if economic progress and baseline stability are reliably delivered in exchange. Because of this dynamic, Freedom House reported a marked increase in protests across the country in 2022 as economic struggles compounded. The state’s pervasive technocratic surveillance and micro-management of civilian life continually sow deep discontent.

Furthermore, Xi’s highly touted anti-corruption drive is frequently criticized as selectively weaponized, predominantly targeting his internal political rivals rather than rooting out systemic graft. In 2024, the BBC reported that corruption remains endemic within the state, particularly inside major banks and the People’s Liberation Army. Politico noted that Xi has utilized anti-corruption mechanisms to purge adversaries continuously since taking office.

The statistical data suggests the root problem remains unresolved; the Corruption Perception Index gave China a score of 40 out of 100 in 2013, shortly after Xi took power. A decade later, in 2023, the score sat virtually unchanged at 42. The anti-corruption mandate appears to serve as an instrument of regime survival rather than genuine institutional reform.

Xi’s absolute consolidation of power also fundamentally contradicts the social contract’s core promise of long-term stability. Having abolished presidential term limits in 2018, the 71-year-old leader has ensured that his inevitable departure or replacement will lack a structured transitional framework, guaranteeing future instability at the absolute pinnacle of Beijing’s power structure. Additionally, the sweeping public backlash to Xi’s draconian zero-COVID policies in 2022 united the population against the central government to a degree unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests.

During the pandemic, millions were forcibly confined to their apartments or hastily constructed field hospitals, where many perished in dangerous, unsanitary conditions. The catastrophic policy failures gave a wealthy businessman in Shanghai the exact same grievance against the state as an ethnic Uyghur in Urumqi, demographic groups that traditionally share little political common ground. Previous Chinese regimes successfully utilized divide-and-conquer strategies to manage the vast population, but the sheer rigidity of Xi’s governance has inadvertently united disparate factions in mutual frustration.

As the state’s trajectory falters, the narrative of China’s inevitable global supremacy is increasingly questioned by its own citizens. The military remains untested against peer adversaries, the economy is visibly cooling, and India has officially surpassed China in total population. With a rapidly aging demographic that has already peaked, profound domestic fears are mounting that the People’s Republic has already seen its most prosperous days.

Consequently, the rising tide of internal protests is a logical outcome of Xi’s unfulfilled social contract. An increasing number of Chinese citizens are actively questioning the terms of their subjugation. The trade-off between surrendered liberties and state-provided prosperity no longer balances, heavily suggesting that the technocratic social contract is actively failing.

Ultimately, autocratic social contracts are highly volatile mechanisms precisely because they operate as unstated, non-verbal agreements. When effectively managed, they keep populations depoliticized and insulate leaders from catastrophic revolution. However, maintaining this dynamic is an inherently dangerous geopolitical game.

Dictators frequently enter office wielding lofty reformist ideals to secure initial popular support—as seen with the anti-corruption pledges central to Putin, MBS, and Xi’s early mandates. Yet, acquiring support and sustaining it over decades are entirely different endeavors. The ability to consistently deliver on the monumental promises embedded within the social contract dictates whether an autocrat faces a disgruntled citizenry or a full-scale uprising.

In their endless bid to secure lifelong power, limitless wealth, or historical legacy, autocrats inevitably push the boundaries of their control. They warp the unspoken agreement until the sacrifices demanded become completely untenable for the population. When that fragile arrangement finally shatters, the resulting collapse dictates the violent, unpredictable trajectory of the nation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the autocratic social contract, and how does it differ from classical social contract theory?

The autocratic social contract is an informal, unspoken arrangement between an authoritarian ruler and their citizens, in which the state provides stability, economic benefits, or prestige in exchange for the population’s withdrawal from political engagement. It differs from classical Hobbesian theory in that citizens surrender not just some freedom in exchange for safety, but often their entire political agency in exchange for prosperity and order—and enforcement is brutal rather than consensual.

How did Vladimir Putin’s social contract with Russian citizens form, and why has the Ukraine war strained it?

Putin’s social contract took shape against the backdrop of the chaotic 1990s, when Russia’s economy collapsed and corruption was endemic. He offered stability, national pride, and material security in exchange for the population’s depoliticization. The Ukraine war strained this bargain because the September 2022 mass mobilization forced ordinary Russians to bear the direct costs of a political decision they had been told was none of their concern—sending sons, fathers, and brothers to die in what they were supposed to remain indifferent to.

How did Mohammed bin Salman restructure Saudi Arabia’s social contract through Vision 2030?

MBS dismantled the old welfare state—where oil wealth was distributed broadly in exchange for political compliance—and replaced it with a promise of futuristic modernization. He introduced sweeping social reforms such as allowing women to drive and loosening the religious police, while pouring sovereign wealth into global spectacles like the FIFA World Cup bid, Newcastle United, and The Line. In exchange, political dissent remains absolutely prohibited, as illustrated by the 2020 Ritz-Carlton detention of 500 elites and the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

What specific terms define Xi Jinping’s technocratic social contract with Chinese citizens?

Xi’s revised social contract demanded stricter technocratic obedience in exchange for addressing the two most urgent grievances of the pre-Xi era: endemic corruption and catastrophic pollution. He launched sweeping anti-corruption purges and achieved measurable reductions in air pollution. In return, the state intensified authoritarian control, eliminated presidential term limits, deployed pervasive surveillance, and imposed zero tolerance for political dissent—including the draconian zero-COVID policies that united disparate groups against the government in 2022.

What causes autocratic social contracts to collapse, and what are the warning signs?

Autocratic social contracts fracture when rulers consistently fail to deliver their core promises—whether prosperity, stability, or national prestige. Warning signs include rising mass incidents and protests, visible economic deterioration affecting daily life, policy failures that create shared grievances across previously divided demographic groups, and elite defections that signal weakening enforcement. All three social contracts examined—Putin’s, MBS’s, and Xi’s—are showing some of these warning signs simultaneously, suggesting that the period of their greatest volatility may be approaching.

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30. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-68213161