The Battle of Khasham: When Wagner Commandos and US Special Operators Clashed

The Battle of Khasham: When Wagner Commandos and US Special Operators Clashed

March 4, 2026 24 min read
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It was 2018, and the blazing sun hung low in the sky over the Syrian desert. The location was the town of Khasham, pre-war population 7,000, in the Deir ez-Zor governorate. Khasham was a town on the front lines of Syria’s brutal civil war, and in 2018, that war still raged with a fury unmatched anywhere else on the planet.

To the north of Khasham were the Kurds, a Western-backed coalition of ethnic militias backed up by the United States of America. To the south were the forces of the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, backed up by a feared but then-obscure mercenary organization called the Wagner Group. Neither side understood fully what the night ahead would bring, but as sunset turned to twilight and twilight was replaced by the cold and quiet of the desert night, all hell was about to break loose.

The battle that ensued would go down in history as the first time a military force of Americans and a military force of Russians had fought each other directly since the Cold War. In the aftermath, dozens would lay dead—perhaps even hundreds—in a shocking first taste of a future that today is known all too well. This is the Battle of Conoco Fields, better known as the Battle of Khasham.

Key Takeaways

  • The Battle of Khasham on February 7-8, 2018 was the first direct ground engagement between American and Russian-linked military forces since the Cold War.
  • Roughly 30 US commandos from Delta Force, Army Rangers, Green Berets, and the 101st Airborne defended the Conoco gas refinery against approximately 500 Wagner mercenaries and Syrian troops with 27 vehicles including T-72 and T-55 tanks.
  • Not a single American was killed or seriously wounded, while Wagner and Syrian forces suffered an estimated 55 to 300-plus dead and lost nearly all of their armored vehicles.
  • An Air Force Combat Controller earned the Air Force Cross for directing the devastating air response that included F-22s, F-15Es, B-52 bombers, Ghostrider gunships, and Apache helicopters.
  • Russia’s Ministry of Defense allegedly powered down its mobile surface-to-air missile coverage mid-battle, effectively abandoning the Wagner column to American air power.

Syria’s Melting Pot: Foreign Powers and Competing Factions by 2018

By 2018, the Syrian Civil War had long since evolved from a nationwide revolt against a repressive regime to a melting pot of competing insurgencies, competing ideologies, and competing foreign powers trying to turn the situation to their favor. Foreign involvement had picked up in 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, better known as ISIS, had rapidly swallowed up territory and made global headlines for its unmatched brutality. But although a United States-led Western coalition had arrived with the primary focus of combating ISIS while working with local Kurdish allies, the reality hadn’t been so simple.

Russia was backing the ruling regime, ostensibly also to counter ISIS but taking a broad approach and punishing any faction that stood against the Assads, while the United States had found pro-government militias and even Syrian Army troops in its crosshairs more than just a few times. By late 2017, the United States had shifted its focus away from counter-ISIS operations. The group was still a threat, but it had been pushed out of most of the territory it controlled and was now on the run, with American and Kurdish forces poised to begin cleanup operations in the areas where ISIS still had influence.

With the jihadists routed, the US pivoted toward longer-term goals, and specifically, the prospect of starting negotiations with the Assad regime toward an end to the conflict. In hopes that those negotiations would take place on favorable terms for the United States, American forces began to take a more active role in countering local militias backed by Iran and granting support to the Kurds in locking down their territory and protecting their newly autonomous zone in the northeast. Although the situation would change significantly within the following two years, America’s intent at the time was to transform its military presence in Syria into an open-ended affair, with the expectation that they would stick around as long as was necessary for the Assad regime to agree to a peace.

But on the regime side of the conflict, the Assad family and their political allies were in far less of a compromising position than the United States may have hoped. Although they were far from establishing control over the whole of their country—something they still haven’t achieved—they had neutralized or found stalemate against any threat large enough to challenge their rule in Damascus, and they had worked to a diplomatic position where Assad himself could be assured that Western attempts to effect regime change would never get worldwide support. Assad had powerful allies: Iran, just two borders’ distance to the east, and Russia, lending direct military support not just through airstrikes and military advisors, but through a mercenary organization that would carry out Moscow’s will to the letter.

Wagner Group: From Obscure PMC to Moscow’s Expendable Instrument

At the time of the battle, few outside specialist circles were familiar with the private military company known as the Wagner Group. In those days, Wagner was a relatively new organization, born out of Russia’s low-grade war with Ukraine in the eastern Donbas long before the full-scale invasion began. Breathless exposé reports in Western media on these mysterious Russian mercenaries with their funny name were relegated to the back pages of news sites for the true enthusiasts of global affairs.

In Syria, the group had picked up valuable experience and taken hard losses fighting against the Islamic State and anybody else Moscow pointed them toward. By the end of 2017, their focus had shifted toward oil and gas assets in Syria, probably because of a suspected policy change in Moscow that established that private companies that could seize oil wells, gas assets, or mines from the Islamic State would be entitled to the rights to extract those very same resources. By then, a suspected five thousand or more Wagner fighters were in Syria, working for both the Russian Ministry of Defense and powerful companies that promised them a share of the profits from oil fields they captured.

Their ISIS Hunters unit, in particular, gained local notoriety, fighting alongside and incorporating Syrians into their ranks as they attempted to eviscerate the economic core of the short-lived caliphate. By February of 2018, Wagner and their Syrian allies were steamrolling ISIS forces across the countryside and coming right up to the conflict lines with US-backed Kurdish forces. They were separated by the Euphrates River, with Syrian regime forces and Wagner forming a hammer against ISIS, driving them into the anvil that was autonomous Kurdistan on the opposite shore.

Both sides had an understanding that the Americans and the Russians were to keep to opposite sides of the river, along with the local forces they supported, but Russia and Syria appeared intent on pushing that boundary—flying their planes over the conflict line, harassing American warplanes, and sometimes dropping bombs on places where closely allied forces and even American advisors were believed to be present. That wasn’t just simple bullying; it appeared to be an attempt to find out whether America really believed its own assertions that it would defend the Kurdish forces it was supporting. Kurdish forces had come into possession of some very lucrative gas and oil fields, Syria wanted them back, and reportedly, Wagner was offered a twenty-five-percent share of the revenues for any fields they helped to secure.

But the Americans weren’t giving their adversaries the reactions they needed in order to calculate the risk involved with seizing targets past the Euphrates.

The Target: Conoco Gas Fields and the Forces Arrayed at Khasham

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In order to get that information, it looked like Syria and Wagner would have to attack directly—and if their goal was to provoke and measure an American response, then attacking an easy target simply didn’t make sense. They’d have to attack someplace where the Americans had a presence, to see whether they’d stand and fight or abandon their Kurdish allies once the situation became more difficult than they had signed up for. The ideal target was located just outside Khasham, where the company Conoco harvested natural gas from a vast field and processed it in a refinery there that had the capability to churn through 450 tons of the stuff each day.

It was among one of the most lucrative single targets in all of Syria, and if the Americans weren’t going to defend that, then they probably wouldn’t defend anything. As the sun rose on the morning of February 7th, the American forces in Khasham already knew that something was coming. They’d seen a troop buildup over the course of the prior week, and in the public domain, it has been learned after the fact that intercepted Wagner chatter suggested that an as-yet-unclear attack was coming.

Per unnamed US intelligence sources interviewed by the Washington Post, America had a pretty clear understanding that the goal was a lightning attack. But how that assault would look was substantially less clear—and there was no way to find out until the attack began. Prior to the battle, the United States had maintained a small but significant outpost within the Conoco refinery.

The troops there weren’t numerous, but they were among the very best at America’s disposal: a roughly thirty-man contingent made up of operators from some of the most elite fighting forces. Within the refinery were members of the US Army Rangers, the shock-troop regiment used for shock-and-awe takeovers and full frontal assaults. Beside them were members of the US Army Special Forces, or Green Berets, experienced soldiers who carry out unconventional warfare operations, leading and training foreign insurgencies, carrying out direct raids and assaults in unexpected places, and operating far behind enemy lines.

They were backed up by members of the Screaming Eagles, the 101st Airborne Division, an elite air-assault division accustomed to fighting well behind enemy lines with little to no support. Also among the operators in Khasham were members of Delta Force, arguably the most capable known asset in the entire United States military, experts in carrying out the most dangerous and complex secret missions. Stationed in Khasham was at least one Air Force Combat Controller, elite fighters who can keep pace with Delta, the Rangers, and the Green Berets while directing airstrikes; the controller would be awarded the Air Force Cross for actions during the battle, although their name has never been revealed.

Also in close proximity was a base belonging to the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish coalition that the US was so closely partnered with. About twenty miles away, another small US force lay in wait—a quick reaction force made up of ten Green Berets who were ready to offer support if needed. A Marine infantry platoon was also on hand in the event that the battle spiraled out of control.

The Wagner Assault Column: 500 Fighters, Tanks, and Artillery

The force bearing down on the outpost was a hell of a lot bigger and more threatening. Not far from the refinery, some 500 or so ground troops had massed, in a formation comprised predominantly of Wagner Group mercenaries, but also including members of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division and two pro-government militias: the Baqir Brigade, hailing from the Syrian city of Aleppo, and the National Defense Forces, a part-time unit made up of volunteers from a range of Syrian cities and towns. Even compared to both the troops at the Khasham outpost and the quick reaction force nearby, the Wagner mercenaries and the Syrians outnumbered them by more than ten to one, and they had a hell of a lot more firepower on the ground.

The Wagner-led force had a total of twenty-seven vehicles at its disposal, including multiple Soviet-era T-72 main battle tanks, multiple T-55 tanks, and several armored personnel carriers. They had at least six artillery pieces, including howitzers and heavy artillery tubes, probably accompanied by a small arsenal of infantry mortars. Also at their disposal was at least one twin-barrel ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, taken by the Wagner troops and modified so that it could shoot level with the ground and take out hard-to-crack targets.

That gun could fire up to thirty-three rounds per second, and it is unclear whether Wagner forces had only one. At about three o’clock PM that day, the Wagner and Syrian force began creeping toward Khasham. Like many Wagner and Russian forces in assaults past, this group claimed to the Americans that it was taking part in a training exercise, but nobody on the ground was fooled.

A Green Beret who spoke to The War Horse in 2023 said: “I think part of the tell was that Russian doctrine says that they’re going to do things that look like exercises right up into the point.” The Americans and the Kurds near their position understood that these were no training exercises, and that an attack was coming within hours; the only questions were where and when. At just about 10 o’clock in the evening, local time, the United States got its answer—not at the Conoco plant but right at the American outpost itself.

The Battle of Khasham began with an encirclement, as the column of tanks and armored vehicles under Wagner’s control broke out from cover behind a neighborhood and took positions around the outpost.

Hellfire, Warning Shots, and the Race to Reinforce

For half an hour, the standoff held before all hell broke loose. The US outpost came under a barrage of tank, mortar, and artillery fire, and the American operators inside quickly took cover, moving under fire to defensive positions where anti-tank missiles and machine guns had been prepared in advance. For fifteen minutes, US operators held their fire as their commanding officers tried to reach Russian leaders and demand that they call off their attack.

A lone MQ-9 Reaper drone in the skies above launched its Hellfire missiles, causing some damage but not nearly enough to make the Russians back down. After that, the Americans on the ground fired warning shots, taking every last preventative measure to stave off what would become the first direct ground battle between nuclear-armed America and nuclear-armed Russia in generations. The drone above kept circling, beaming back video of the assault despite lacking any means to directly intervene.

But as the American operators on base were holding out, other US forces were surging into action. The rapid-reaction force of Green Berets nearby, as well as several Marines from the platoon they were stationed with, had already loaded their mine-resistant vehicles with the missiles, supplies, and optical gear they’d need and were now speeding at a breakneck pace through a war zone to get there. They were followed by a handful of Kurdish fighters in unarmored trucks, but not nearly enough to make a difference.

Driving without headlights and relying on thermal optics to dodge downed power lines and craters, the reaction force was going into a firefight where they’d be exposed and outmatched. As defense writer Alex Hollings put it in a 2023 article on the battle: “It’s important to recognize that they knew full well that they could only offer bodies and ammunition… They didn’t have nearly enough firepower to balance the scales of the fight, let alone tip them in their favor. Without additional support, they were willingly driving into an American bloodbath, intent on helping their brothers in arms, even if it came at the cost of their own lives.”

They weren’t alone. The cavalry was already on the way, comprising a who’s-who of American air assets that had been dispatched from all across the Middle East. Among their number were F-22 stealth fighters, F-15E Strike Eagle planes for ground-attack runs, heavy B-52 bombers, formidable Ghostrider gunships, and Apache attack helicopters, all equipped with the sorts of firepower that Wagner on the ground simply couldn’t match.

At this point in the battle, Wagner and their Syrian allies still hadn’t advanced to take the US outpost, kept at bay by the operators holding a perimeter. It is unclear whether the troops on the ground realized that an American air wing might be on the way to deal with them, but they had neither the preparation nor the military hardware to defend against the overflights that were incoming.

Cavalry from the Skies: Air Power Turns the Tide at Khasham

Perhaps, back in Wagner’s command centers and far away in the Kremlin, the fate of the mercenaries was irrelevant; after all, these were mercenaries, not Russian troops, and Russia had little reason to care if they were wiped out. The goal wasn’t simply to take the Conoco plant; the goal was to see how willing the Americans were to defend it, and these five hundred-odd fighters might have been seen inside the Russian Ministry of Defense as a blank canvas for the Americans to paint out a response protocol that the Russians could study. The ground force of Green Berets and Marines arrived about thirty minutes after the Americans at the outpost had started firing back, and roughly an hour and a half after the confrontation had begun.

When they got there, they were forced to wait, knowing all too well that the intense fire pouring in on the American outpost was too dangerous for even their armored trucks to pass through. The Kurdish fighters who had joined them chose to turn back, following a decision by a leader who one member of the reaction force would describe wryly as the “smartest man on the battlefield.” Pinned down, not far from the thresholds where ammunition would become too scarce to answer fire directly, the thirty-some American commandos at the outpost were weathering heavy artillery and tank fire.

Mercifully, none had died or been wounded yet, but with time running out, they’d soon have to switch gears and make ready for the ground assault they knew would come after their base had been adequately tenderized. Eventually, the response force worked out a way in, guided by infrared lasers with the help of the commandos in the compound, and they, along with the few Kurdish fighters who’d chosen to stay, took up defensive positions. Their armored trucks were lined up behind a defensive berm, pointing the machine gun turrets atop them toward the Russians, but that only drew the fire of the monstrous anti-aircraft gun, strafing that position with almost three dozen 23-millimeter rounds a second.

A couple of probing infantry attacks were beaten back, with inexperienced and reportedly undisciplined Wagner and Syrian troops chewed up by the fire coming back at them. But that defense wouldn’t hold in the event of the all-out assault that seemed sure to come next. A few minutes later, ten Russian tanks began advancing together toward the outpost, likely signaling the beginning of the end for the forces pinned down in their path.

Then the cavalry arrived, streaking in from overhead with afterburners roaring and onboard guns firing. The Air Force Combat Controller on the ground had been hard at work, marking targets and relaying information on proximity, position, and other targeting details. With the advancing tanks now less than a thousand meters away, the accounts of the American survivors make it abundantly clear what happened next: a rescue at the last possible second.

Four Apache helicopters were the first to arrive, and knowing the stakes of the moment, the operators on the ground began expending the last fifty-caliber ammunition they had, illuminating the battlefield so the helicopter pilots could get a better shot.

A Fucking Merry-Go-Round: Wagner’s Destruction from the Air

By the account of one operator after the fact, things might have gotten even worse a few moments later; the operator, identified only as Andrew, attested that allies over the radio had advised their force of an incoming Russian bomber. But the bomber never arrived, perhaps owing to the very obvious F-15E fighters that could have brought it down, and perhaps owing to the F-22 stealth fighters accompanying them—fighters that the Russian bomber wouldn’t have seen on radar but that could very easily have been worked out to be arriving. Once the American air power showed up, the tide was turned in a way that the Wagnerites and the Syrians stood no chance of getting back.

Leaked Wagner audio after the fact described the Apache attack in colorful terms as “a fucking merry-go-round with heavy-caliber machine guns,” and if that was bad, then precision-guided air-to-ground missiles were worse. The rest was elementary: a bombing run from an American B-52, and crippling destructive fire from a Ghostrider gunship circling overhead. Within forty-five minutes of the Apache helicopters’ arrival, the battle was over, with the attacking mercenaries and militias laid to waste.

Those who survived were forced to flee, although they’d come back throughout the night, far less confrontational in their approach, to collect their dead. By the time the sun finally rose again over the oil fields of Khasham, the Americans were firmly back in control. American sources have suggested that Russia’s Ministry of Defense may have chosen to abort its support for the Wagner column mid-way through the battle, allegedly powering down the mobile surface-to-air missile system that was providing coverage from aerial attack.

It is unclear why that would have happened, but if, indeed, Russia’s intent all along had been to assess whether the US would defend the oil and gas infrastructure Russia wanted, then by that point in the battle, perhaps Moscow had its answer. Perhaps it was better, in the minds of the Russian MoD, to abandon the Wagner fighters and let American air power wipe out all traces of their misadventure. It was only after the air-defense system was shut down that American aircraft had been cleared to come in, and once they did, the battle was all but decided.

Casualties, Consequences, and the Euphrates Line That Held

As American forces took stock of their situation at the battle’s end, they discovered what amounts to something of a miracle. Per official reports and witness accounts, not a single American on the ground had been killed or even injured, despite what seems to have been an incredible expenditure of ordnance by their adversaries. One fighter from the Syrian Democratic Forces had sustained minor injuries, and some of the Americans had taken damage that would leave them sore for a few days, but against all odds, that was the worst of it.

All that is even more impressive because, at least by American accounts, the tank assault and possible bomber run that might have occurred if US air power didn’t show up would probably have killed everyone there. On the opposing side, the Wagner and Syrian forces were not so lucky. Casualty figures on that side are tough to pin down, with estimates ranging from fifty-five dead on the low end to about three hundred on the high.

Syria claims fifty-five killed, Russia unofficially claims 80 to 100 killed, the United States claims between 100 and 200 killed, and intercepted audio from Wagner fighters who were present suggest losses potentially well north of that 200 estimate. The vehicles the Russians had brought with them suffered just as badly. Per a Wagner fighter overheard in leaked audio: “Out of all vehicles, only one tank survived and one BDRM—after the attack; all other BDRMs and tanks were destroyed in the first minutes of the fight, right away.”

The first minutes of the fight that the Wagner commando referenced were most likely the first minutes after air support began showing up. Said the same Wagner mercenary: “Well, to make it short, we’ve had our asses fucking kicked.” The lone surviving tank would be destroyed a few days later.

Russia would hardly acknowledge the battle in the aftermath and made only minimal attempts to explain the deaths of Russians in the incident, all the while firmly denying that any members of the Russian Armed Forces had been involved. Even during the battle, Russia had given the United States no information about what was going on, had completely refused to help draw down the fight, and had refused to claim the Wagner fighters as a component of the Russian military. In hindsight, that was precisely the point of Russia using Wagner at all—hiding their intentions behind a mercenary force whose actions, and whose lives, they didn’t have to take responsibility for.

If the Battle of Khasham had gone differently—if American troops had executed a tactical withdrawal and surrendered the Conoco gas fields to Syrian forces—then it likely would have been just the beginning. If the Americans would give up Khasham, then Russia would have had every reason to assume that they’d give up all the other oil and gas fields that were less important. After that might have come larger offensives into Kurdish territory and seizure of assets that would have handed major wealth back to the Syrian regime.

Instead, Wagner forces tried the same thing in Deir ez-Zor a couple of weeks later, and this time, when US officials called Russia to explain how such a confrontation would go, Russia listened. The Euphrates River still divides Syria between the Kurds and the regime, and all the natural resources behind the Euphrates remain firmly in Kurdish hands. American forces haven’t gone toe-to-toe with Wagner in the same way since the Battle of Khasham, and nor have they had to face troops that Russia does lay claim to.

As the United States and the nations of NATO make ready for the gruesome prospect of a possible all-out defense of the Alliance’s eastern flank, the Battle of Khasham provides the only basis available to map out what such a defense could one day become.

Simon Whistler
Presented by

Simon Whistler

Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Wagner Group attack the Conoco gas fields at Khasham?

Wagner and their Syrian allies attacked the Conoco refinery at Khasham because it was one of the most lucrative single targets in Syria and was guarded by a small American presence. Wagner had reportedly been promised a 25 percent share of revenues from any oil and gas fields they helped seize from Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates. The attack was also designed to test whether the US would actually defend its Kurdish partners under pressure.

How many forces were involved and what was the outcome?

Roughly 30 US commandos from Delta Force, the Army Rangers, Green Berets, and the 101st Airborne held the outpost against a force of approximately 500 Wagner mercenaries and Syrian troops equipped with 27 vehicles including T-72 and T-55 tanks, artillery, and at least one anti-aircraft gun. US air assets including F-22s, F-15Es, B-52 bombers, Ghostrider gunships, and Apache helicopters turned the tide. Not a single American was killed, while Wagner and Syrian forces suffered an estimated 55 to 300-plus dead and lost nearly all of their armored vehicles.

What role did the Air Force Combat Controller play at Khasham?

At least one Air Force Combat Controller embedded with the operators at the outpost directed the devastating American air response, marking targets and relaying position, proximity, and other targeting data to incoming aircraft. The controller was awarded the Air Force Cross for their actions during the battle — one of the highest decorations in the Air Force — though their identity has never been publicly revealed.

Did Russia try to stop the battle, and what happened to Wagner afterward?

American sources suggest that Russia’s Ministry of Defense may have powered down the mobile surface-to-air missile system that was providing coverage for the Wagner column mid-battle, effectively abandoning the mercenaries to American air power. Russia denied any involvement, refused to claim the dead fighters as members of its military, and made only minimal attempts to explain Russian deaths in the aftermath — which was precisely the point of using an ostensibly deniable mercenary force.

What were the strategic consequences of the Battle of Khasham?

The battle demonstrated that the US would defend its Kurdish partners and the oil and gas infrastructure they controlled. Wagner attempted a similar maneuver in Deir ez-Zor a few weeks later, but this time Russia backed down when US officials communicated the likely outcome. The Euphrates River boundary held, and all natural resources on the Kurdish side remained in Kurdish hands. The battle remains the only known direct ground engagement between American and Russian-linked forces since the Cold War.

Sources

  1. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria
  2. https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war
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  4. https://www.sandboxx.us/news/how-us-special-forces-took-on-wagner-group-mercenaries-in-an-intense-4-hour-battle/
  5. https://thewarhorse.org/special-forces-soldiers-reveal-first-details-of-battle-with-russian-mercenaries-in-syria/
  6. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html
  7. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-wagner-group-lost-syria
  8. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/battle-syria-us-russian-mercenaries-commandos-islamic-state-a8370781.html
  9. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/insight-russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DO/
  10. https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/introduction/
  11. https://www.thedailybeast.com/a-russian-blackwater-putins-secret-soldiers-in-ukraine-and-syria
  12. https://apnews.com/general-news-7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873
  13. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/middleeast/russia-syria-oil-isis.html
  14. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wagner-group-syria-profiting-failed-states
  15. https://www.reuters.com/world/syria-brought-wagner-group-fighters-heel-mutiny-unfolded-russia-2023-07-07/
  16. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-cross-syria-russia

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