Chinese hegemony might be happening. That was the headline of a recent Foreign Policy article by Stephen Walt, the Harvard international relations scholar, warning that China’s rise—at least in Asia—now looks inevitable. Walt’s argument is blunt: through a series of decisions, including withdrawing from international organizations, imposing tariffs on nearly every country on Earth, and starting a war in Iran that has spiked global fuel prices, President Donald Trump has effectively handed the region to Beijing on a silver platter. As Walt puts it, “Trump has done just about everything someone would do if they consciously wanted China to supplant the United States and establish a dominant position in its immediate region.”
Walt is not alone. Kishore Mahbubani, the Singaporean diplomat and former President of the United Nations Security Council, has made a similar case for years, including in his book “Has China Won?” What makes this moment notable is that for decades American policy toward Asia was built around a single imperative: to stop, or at least delay, China’s rise. For Washington to abandon that goal would be the Trump team’s most consequential pivot yet.
But even if Walt is right, and the United States is no longer working to contain Beijing, that does not mean nobody is on the case. The region’s best hope may now lie with an island nation twenty-five times smaller than China—a former military powerhouse called Japan.
Key Takeaways
- With Washington’s commitment to Asia in doubt, Japan has emerged as the region’s leading counterweight to China despite being roughly twenty-five times smaller in landmass.
- Japan’s remilitarization began with Shinzo Abe—the 2015 collective self-defense law, the 2017 scrapping of the 1% defense-spending cap, and the 2018 creation of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade—but is being driven hardest by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in office since October.
- Takaichi has lifted Japan’s arms-export restrictions, raised defense spending to 2% of GDP, and stated in parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan—infuriating Beijing.
- Tokyo is assembling a regional coalition, repairing ties with South Korea, deepening defense links with the Philippines and Australia, and launching a $10 billion energy-security program called POWERR Asia.
- China has retaliated with trade restrictions, radar lock-ons, a 7% defense-spending increase, and massed maritime-militia formations in the East China Sea apparently rehearsing for a Taiwan blockade.
- By raw metrics—$336 billion in Chinese defense spending versus $62.2 billion for Japan, 234 Chinese warships versus 154 Japanese vessels—Tokyo is clearly the underdog and cannot match Beijing outright.
- Japan’s more realistic path is not to rival China but to offer regional states a credible alternative, and potentially to anchor a NATO-style alliance capable of collective deterrence.
This is the story of how Japan is trying to do what Washington may no longer be willing to: stand up to China in Asia, and whether it can possibly succeed.
The Rising Sun: From Host Nation to Military Actor
For most of its post-World War II history, Japan’s role in regional security was simple. It hosted American troops, paid a share of the costs, and left the heavy lifting to Washington. The arrangement worked well enough during the Cold War, but it depended entirely on the United States remaining a willing, committed partner. Japan’s political class was never fully convinced that arrangement would last forever.
The shift began in 2015, when then–Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government pushed through legislation allowing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fight in limited cases of collective self-defense—instances where an attack on an allied nation posed a threat to Japan’s own survival. Previously, the law permitted force only if Japan itself came under attack. The change was deeply controversial at the time, but it passed, and it opened the floodgates for further reform.
In 2017, Abe scrapped Japan’s 1% defense-spending cap. Though never enshrined in law, that cap had long been seen as one of the greatest obstacles to meaningful defense reform. The following year, Tokyo created the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, a force designed to defend and retake remote islands—a not-so-subtle reference to the contested islands in the East China Sea that both Tokyo and Beijing claim.
The Carrier Question and Abe’s Legacy
Also in 2018, Tokyo announced plans to modify its Izumo-class destroyers so they could operate F-35B fighter jets, of which Japan planned to buy 147 units. Stretching the term somewhat, this led some observers to declare that Tokyo now possessed its first aircraft carrier since the end of World War II. It was a symbolic milestone as much as a military one: a country whose postwar constitution renounced offensive war was, step by step, rebuilding the tools of one.
But while Abe may have started Japan’s remilitarization, it is his newly elected protégé who looks likely to finish the job. According to Daisuke Kawai, a professor at the University of Tokyo, no one has been more committed to this shift than Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who took office in October last year. Where Abe laid the legal and institutional groundwork over the better part of a decade, Takaichi has moved with a speed that has unsettled both allies and adversaries—turning a gradual evolution into something closer to a sprint.
Takaichi’s Push: Arms Exports and the Taiwan Line
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This April, Takaichi unveiled the largest overhaul of Tokyo’s defense-export rules in decades. Her government removed restrictions on the sale of arms overseas, paving the way for the export of missiles, warships, and other weapon systems. Much of the region welcomed the change, especially the Philippines. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro told the press the move would give Manila access to high-quality weapons to strengthen domestic defense and contribute to regional security through deterrence—a quote many interpreted as a thinly veiled shot at China.
Beyond opening its defense industry, Takaichi raised defense spending to 2% of Japan’s GDP and pledged to spend more. But nothing raised Beijing’s hackles like a statement she made in parliament last November, when she declared that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a survival-threatening situation for Japan—implying Tokyo might invoke the 2015 collective self-defense law to come to Taiwan’s aid.
China was, to put it mildly, livid. Beijing accused Takaichi of attempting to revive Japan’s colonial past—a highly charged claim given the war crimes Imperial Japan committed in China. It discouraged Chinese tourists from traveling to Japan, suspended seafood imports, and banned the export of dual-use items to 20 Japanese companies it claimed were supplying the Japanese military.
Beijing’s Pressure Campaign and Takaichi’s Resolve
China’s response was not limited to diplomacy and trade. In December last year, Chinese fighter jets locked their radar onto Japanese aircraft, forcing Japan to scramble its own jets in response. The episode marked an escalation from economic coercion to direct military signaling—an unmistakable warning shot delivered in the skies near Okinawa.
The entire campaign amounted to an effort to force Takaichi to apologize. So far, she has resisted. Crucially, the pressure does not appear to have cost her at home: polling conducted in December showed 70% of the country backing her, a figure most Western governments would envy. That domestic strength matters, because it means Beijing’s coercion has not achieved its central political aim. A leader buckling under 30% approval might have offered concessions; a leader commanding 70% has little incentive to bend.
Antagonizing Beijing and revitalizing the defense industry is one thing. Far more consequential in the long run may be Takaichi’s attempt to build a regional coalition that can stand up to China—a project that turns Japan from a single rearming state into the potential hub of a broader balancing effort.
Allies and Partners: Building a Coalition
Given the long memories of Japanese wartime atrocities across the region, the identity of some members of Takaichi’s coalition is surprising—above all the biggest partner, South Korea. Tokyo and Seoul have a complicated relationship, and even that feels like an understatement. Japan colonized Korea from 1910 to 1945 and committed atrocities so horrific they cannot be detailed here. Those wounds have never fully healed.
In 2018, tensions came to a head after South Korea’s Supreme Court ordered a Japanese company to compensate South Koreans for forced labor during World War II. The ruling triggered a chain reaction in which both countries downgraded each other’s trade status, and Seoul even threatened to scrap an intelligence-sharing agreement with Tokyo—a step that ultimately did not happen, owing to American pressure.
Although that crisis unfolded under her mentor Abe, Takaichi has worked tirelessly to change the dynamic. Since taking office, she and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung have met four times in roughly six months, a pace that would have been unthinkable a few short years ago. At their January meeting in Nara—Takaichi’s hometown—the two leaders agreed to deepen security ties to counter growing concerns in East Asia, a nod to China reaffirmed in their most recent meeting about a week ago.
Manila, Canberra, and the Architecture of Cooperation
South Korea is not the only piece Takaichi has been methodically slotting into place. Japan’s decision to open its defense industry for global exports has drawn attention from Manila, but that is just one strand of a broader partnership. In January, Tokyo and Manila signed an agreement permitting the tax-free provision of ammunition, fuel, food, and other necessities when the two nations’ troops train together. The deal was designed to support implementation of the 2025 Reciprocal Access Agreement, which allows both countries to deploy forces to each other’s territory for joint exercises, disaster response, and other missions to enhance interoperability.
Further south, Tokyo has pursued closer ties with Australia, signing a deal worth $6.5 billion for the delivery of a fleet of Japanese-designed warships. Takaichi has also launched POWERR Asia—a torturous acronym for Partnership on Wide Energy and Resources Resilience Asia—a $10 billion financing program aimed at boosting energy security across the continent.
Each of these moves is significant on its own. Taken together, they suggest Japan is actively working to challenge Chinese dominance in the region. That raises two questions: how will China respond, and will Japan’s efforts be enough to stop it?
A Defiant China: From Bilateral Anger to Maritime Muscle
Beijing’s response to Japan’s military resurgence goes well beyond trade restrictions and radar lock-ons. During President Trump’s meeting with President Xi in mid-May, Xi criticized Takaichi’s defense push. According to the Financial Times, Xi grew agitated discussing Japan’s increased military spending—the most heated part of the meeting—and Trump administration officials were caught off guard by his annoyance, as Japan had not been a topic in the talks leading up to the summit.
Xi works hard to project the image of a leader who is cool, calm, and always in control. For that mask to slip, even in a private meeting, is a glaring admission that China is worried about Japan’s actions.
China has done more than complain. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Beijing increased defense spending by 7.4% in 2025, bringing its estimated total to $336 billion—though SIPRI and other analysts note China does not fully disclose its military expenditure, meaning the real figure could be orders of magnitude higher. For 2026, Beijing announced another 7% boost.
Though Reuters called it the lowest increase in five years, it still outstripped military spending across the rest of the continent. At the opening of China’s parliament, Premier Li Qiang said Beijing was focused on improving combat readiness and developing advanced combat capabilities.
The Fishing-Fleet Armadas and Grey-Zone Tactics
Beyond budgets, China has been sending pointed signals about its capabilities. On Christmas Day 2025, roughly 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels abruptly stopped normal activities and assembled into two parallel formations in the East China Sea, each stretching more than 400 kilometers. According to The New York Times, the ships did it again on January 11, forming a rectangle so dense that approaching cargo ships had to skirt around it or zigzag through. They repeated the maneuver in March: Jason Wang, chief operating officer of ingeniSPACE, a firm that analyzes satellite imagery and ship-signals data, told the AFP that around 1,200 boats massed in two parallel lines further east and held position for about 30 hours.
These vessels are part of China’s maritime militia—fishermen with some military training who can be called up to fight alongside the navy. While the purpose was not immediately clear, Gregory Pauling of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative wrote in the Times that he believed it was a test of how civilian vessels would respond if ordered to assemble in a future crisis, such as a blockade of Taiwan.
That China can coordinate thousands of civilian vessels at sea, while Japan fields just 154 vessels in its entire navy, underscores the gap between the two—and that is before counting China’s 234 warships. Beijing routinely uses this fleet for grey-zone pressure: per the East Asia Forum, in 2025 the Chinese Coast Guard spent 335 consecutive days in waters around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, up from 215 consecutive days in 2024.
Pressure Across the Region and the Economic Front
Such tactics are not limited to Japan. In 2025, China violated Taiwanese airspace more than 3,700 times and, according to Reuters, launched more than 2.8 million cyberattacks per day—up from 2.4 million in 2024. In the South China Sea, Chinese vessels harass Philippine ships, and Chinese aircraft continue to challenge Australian air patrols with unsafe maneuvers. The pattern is consistent: constant, calibrated pressure designed to wear down adversaries below the threshold of open war.
Away from the military domain, Beijing also competes with Japan economically, using its Belt and Road Initiative—and the debt attached to those projects—to build an influence network larger than anything Tokyo currently commands. Whether those indebted nations would rush to Beijing’s aid in a confrontation with Japan is an open question, especially given how poorly Chinese debt is regarded in many places saddled with it. But that does not mean Beijing lacks the ability to exert influence over them. Money buys leverage even when it does not buy loyalty, and China has spent freely to acquire both.
Is It Enough? The Verdict on the Numbers
Right off the bat: Japan has not done enough to counter China. What Tokyo has built over the past decade is genuinely impressive, but it falls well short of matching Beijing, let alone positioning Japan as China’s equal in the region. The main reason is time. China has spent decades shoring up its military, building its economy, coordinating the Belt and Road Initiative, and raising its profile worldwide. Japan only began in earnest in 2015, and even then progress was gradual until Takaichi arrived.
Beijing’s head start is enormous. China has 234 warships, and its shipyards add more each year. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study, between 2019 and 2023 China’s four largest shipyards produced 39 warships. Japan is investing in its navy but simply lacks the capacity to match that rate. The spending gap tells the same story: Japan’s 2% of GDP comes to about $62.2 billion, while China spent nearly five times more at $336 billion—and may be underreporting.
There is also economic might. China is the main trading partner for many regional states, and Japan’s economy is nowhere near large enough to absorb that trade or replace what China produces. And there is demography: in 2024 Japan recorded nearly a million more deaths than births, the steepest decline since the government began surveys in 1968. China has its own demographic crisis, but it is less acute than Japan’s.
Reframing the Question: A Credible Alternative
Military spending and population alone cannot determine who wins a war. If they could, Russia would be holding victory parades in Kyiv rather than begging President Zelensky not to attack its parades in Moscow, and America would be dictating terms to Iran rather than giving ground in negotiations. Still, these are useful metrics, and by them Tokyo is clearly the underdog.
Yet the framing of whether Japan can match China may be the wrong question entirely. Instead of trying to rival Beijing, Japan could position itself as a credible alternative for countries uncomfortable with Chinese dominance but with no one else to turn to. For years, many Asian governments have walked a careful line—accepting Chinese trade and infrastructure investment while resisting Chinese influence and aggression.
Consider the Philippines. Despite the clashes between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea, China is Manila’s largest trading partner. The Philippines is also a major buckle in the Belt and Road Initiative, with projects including the Sangley Point International Airport and the Binondo-Intramuros Bridge built with Chinese funding and expertise. If Japan can offer countries like the Philippines a choice between Tokyo and Beijing—rather than a choice between Beijing or rotting infrastructure—that could go a long way toward curbing Chinese influence.
Through initiatives like POWERR Asia, Tokyo is already trying.
Toward a NATO of Asia
Perhaps the best thing Tokyo could do would be to assemble the region’s countries into a NATO-style alliance capable of standing up to Chinese aggression. The framework is already taking shape. Japan has deepened military ties with nearly every nation in the region, and with its defense industry open for business, those ties are bound to strengthen. Most of these countries are also already bound together, to varying degrees, by bilateral defense agreements with the United States—a latticework that a formal alliance could consolidate.
The question is whether the political will exists to form such an organization. Any country that hints at joining or forming one will have to weather unprecedented levels of Chinese harassment. In the worst case, Beijing might refuse to trade with it altogether—a threat that carries real weight given how many regional economies depend on the Chinese market.
Still, that may be a price worth paying to build an alliance that can effectively stand up to China. Because, at least in Asia, one country—no matter how powerful—cannot do it alone. Japan’s wager is that by knitting its neighbors together, it can achieve collectively what it could never manage by itself.
Simon Whistler
Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is Japan, rather than the United States, leading the effort to counter China?
A series of Trump administration decisions — withdrawing from international organizations, imposing sweeping tariffs, and starting a war in Iran that spiked fuel prices — has led analysts like Harvard’s Stephen Walt to conclude Washington is no longer working to contain Beijing. With that traditional American imperative in doubt, Japan has stepped forward as the region’s most committed counterweight.
What did Prime Minister Takaichi say about Taiwan that angered China?
In parliament last November, Takaichi declared that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, implying Tokyo might invoke Abe’s 2015 collective self-defense law to aid Taiwan. Beijing responded by accusing her of reviving Japan’s colonial past, discouraging tourism, suspending seafood imports, and banning dual-use exports to 20 Japanese companies. Despite that pressure, 70% of Japanese voters backed Takaichi in December polling.
Which countries are part of Takaichi’s regional coalition?
South Korea is the most significant partner — Takaichi and President Lee Jae-myung have met four times in roughly six months, a pace unthinkable a few years ago. Tokyo also signed a logistics agreement with the Philippines supporting the 2025 Reciprocal Access Agreement, inked a $6.5 billion warship deal with Australia, and launched the $10 billion POWERR Asia energy-security program.
How has China demonstrated its military strength in response to Japan’s moves?
Beijing raised defense spending 7.4% in 2025 to an estimated $336 billion and announced another 7% for 2026. It locked radar onto Japanese aircraft, kept its Coast Guard in Senkaku-area waters for 335 consecutive days in 2025, and massed roughly 2,000 maritime-militia fishing vessels in the East China Sea on multiple occasions — a maneuver analysts believe rehearses a possible Taiwan blockade.
What is Japan’s most realistic strategy for countering China?
Japan cannot match China outright — China fields 234 warships to Japan’s 154, and spent nearly five times more on defense in 2025. Japan’s best path is to position itself as a credible alternative for countries uncomfortable with Chinese dominance, offering nations like the Philippines a real choice through programs like POWERR Asia, and ultimately assembling regional states into a NATO-style alliance capable of collective deterrence.
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