The Forgotten US Invasion of Russia, 1918–1920

It was 1984. The Cold War was still at risk of flaring up, and Mutually Assured Destruction hung as a sword of Damocles over the world. But in that year, US President Ronald Reagan reassured the people of the USSR: “It’s true that our governments have had serious differences. But our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war.

And if we Americans have our way, they never will.” The problem is: they already had. Decades before the beginning of the Cold War, the relationship between the US and the Soviet Government had already become heated. President Reagan had forgot to mention — or had simply forgotten — that American and Soviet troops had already engaged in active combat on several occasions, from August 1918 to April 1920.

This is the story of the almost forgotten American invasion of Soviet Russia.

A Rather Confusing Prologue: From World War to Revolution

The American expedition to Russia stemmed from the complex and confusing events of the last months of WWI. In 1917, the former Russian Empire was rocked by not one, but two revolutions. The first one, in February, toppled the Czarist regime, installing a provisional government headed by Alexander Kerensky.

The new Prime Minister committed to continuing the fight in the Great War, alongside its Entente allies and against the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. But in October, the Bolshevik Revolution took place. Lenin’s new government was opposed to the war, and on the 3rd of March 1918 signed the peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Empires.

The German Reich was now able to move sizeable reinforcements to the Western Front, ready for an offensive which could have knocked France and Britain out of the war. The Western Allies were understandably concerned. In June 1918, their Supreme War Council formulated a plan to intervene in Russia and re-open the Eastern Front.

Their plan included other mid-term objectives. First, stage landings to protect stockpiles of weapons and other supplies. These stores were located in the ports of Archangel, on the White Sea, and Vladivostok, on the Pacific Ocean — and both were at risk of being seized by the Germans or the newly formed Bolshevik armed forces.

The second objective was to aid the Czecho-Slovak Legion. This legion, numbering between 50 and 70 thousand troops, consisted of former POWs from the Austro-Hungarian Army. After the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, they had been stranded in Russia and wished to return to France to join the Allies against the Central Empire.

In their plight, they had forged an uneasy alliance with so-called ‘White Russians’, anti-Communist forces who had sparked the Russian Civil War. The Supreme War Council appealed for the US to join this new adventure in Russia, but President Woodrow Wilson was not very sure about it.

Wilson’s Reluctant Decision to Intervene

Wilson saw the intervention as a disguised means to meddle into Russian internal affairs. And this contradicted one of his ‘14 Points’, which should have guided the world towards an enduring peace. In particular, point 6, which called for Russia to independently determine its own “political development and national policy.”

But he gradually changed his mind. Edgar Sisson, an officer with the US Committee on Public Information stationed in Petrograd — now St. Petersburg — informed Wilson that Lenin and the Bolsheviks had been installed in power by a German plot.

US Ambassador to Russia David R. Francis piled on with another report: “I have seen evidence that the Soviet government submits to German demands without protest and am almost convinced that Lenin and possibly Trotsky are pliable tools if not responsive German agents.” These reports convinced Wilson that the Russian people were not truly represented by the Bolsheviks, themselves pawns of a hostile power.

Wilson became more inclined to joining operations in Russia. But he needed the right pretext to justify the intervention, as the Republican opposition and a large part of public opinion were favourable to American isolationism. The right pretext came from Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

In a memo dated 23rd of June 1918, he informed Wilson that the Czecho-Slovak Legion was stranded alongside the Trans-Siberian railway. They were heading towards the port of Vladivostok, in Siberia, where they were hoping to embark towards France. Helping the Legion resume the fight against Germany: that was the ‘just cause’ that could justify American intervention.

Wilson agreed to send two Expeditionary Forces to Russia: one to Archangel, Northern Russia, and one to Vladivostok.

The Polar Bears in Northern Russia

The right opportunity for the Allies to land in Northern Russia presented itself in July 1918. A Soviet Government — autonomous from Moscow — had installed itself in Murmansk, on the Barents Sea. On the 6th of July, Murmansk signed an agreement with the Western allies, inviting them to send an expeditionary force.

Lenin was furious. How did they dare invite Imperialist British and French boots on their soil? The Murmansk Soviet needed allied protection, as they were still under attack from the Germans — even after the peace of Brest-Litovsk.

Their reply to Lenin was, “It is all very well for you to talk that way, sitting there in Moscow!” The agreement allowed a British Expeditionary Force to land also in Archangel, some 1,000 km to the southwest, on the White Sea coast. The British arrived on the 2nd of August 1918, led by General Poole.

On the 4th of September, they were joined by the US contingent, the ‘Polar Bears’. This force consisted of the 339th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of Engineers and two medical companies, numbering 5,000 ‘doughboys’ — as American servicemen were known back then. The men selected were mainly from Michigan and Wisconsin, as it was believed they could better cope with the harsh conditions of the Arctic.

Short hours of daylight and temperatures plummeting to minus 50 degrees as early as November clearly posed a challenge. When the British under General Poole arrived in Archangel, they soon realised that the weapons depots had already been seized by the Bolsheviks. One of their mission objectives had already failed.

Moreover, the British forces supported a new provisional government in Archangel, led by an anti-Bolshevik Socialist, Nicholas Chaikovski. As a result of the situation, Poole and his men actively fought the Bolsheviks, chasing them to the south. When the Polar Bears arrived in September, they were embroiled in this dangerous and confusing affair.

As a result of negotiations with the Supreme War Council, President Wilson had ceded leadership of his Expeditionary Force to the British. Hence, General Poole could order the doughboys into joining battle. As early as the 16th of September, US troops under British command fought against the Bolsheviks at Obozerskaya, suffering their first casualties.

More small-scale operations and skirmishes followed in September and October.

Armistice Day and the Battle of Tulgas

On the 11th of November 1918, the guns on the Western Front fell silent. The Armistice had been signed. The Great War was over — but for the doughboys’ compatriots in Russia, bullets were still flying.

In fact, on the very Armistice Day, some 2,500 Bolshevik troops attacked US, Canadian, British and White Russian positions at the Battle of Tulgas, on the Dvina River. The Polar Bears were the first to bear the brunt of the offensive: heavily outnumbered, they had to retreat. But three days later, on the 14th, a platoon of doughboys under Lieutenant Cudahy attacked the Bolshevik camp by surprise.

The fierce raid convinced the Bolsheviks that they had been outnumbered, and they retreated across the river. Despite this early victory, the Polar Bears were restless. Captain H.S.

Martin of the expeditionary force captured their sentiment: “They stated that they were drafted to fight Germany, not the Bolsheviks. That they had been sent here to guard supplies and not carry on aggressive warfare; that after the signing of the Armistice with Germany their job was finished and if the government wanted them to stay on and fight Bolshevism it should say so and announce some definite policy regarding Russia.” But the Americans did not receive such orders — and yet they found themselves at open war with the Bolsheviks.

On the 19th of January 1919, the Reds launched an offensive north of the Dvina River. Shortly before dawn, their artillery shells fell on the American trenches. After an hour-long barrage, the Bolshevik soldiers fixed bayonets and attacked, clad in their white uniforms.

The Polar Bears opened fire with their machine guns, but wave after wave of attackers kept pushing against their positions. Eventually, the Americans, British, Canadian, and White Russian troops had to retreat northwards. The Bears lost 39 dead and 100 wounded.

Mutiny, Public Outcry, and Withdrawal from Archangel

All the while, the home front had been brewing with discontent. On February 14, 1919, Republicans in the US Senate voted on a bill to withdraw American troops from Russia. The vote resulted in a tie, which Vice President Marshall resolved by voting against the bill.

Morale amongst the Polar Bears continued to decline, until the incident of March 30. On that day, a Sergeant ordered four of his men to load their sleds and head to the front. The soldiers, exhausted and demoralised, refused to obey, prompting their captain to organise a meeting with his superior, Colonel Stewart.

Stewart listened to the men’s grievances. According to a lieutenant present at the meeting, the soldiers complained that nobody had given them a clear answer as to why they were still there. They remonstrated that they had no reasons to fight against the Bolsheviks, and yet Communist troops were trying to push them back into the White Sea.

Eventually, Colonel Stewart convinced them to execute their orders, and no disciplinary action was taken for their insubordination. Despite the swift resolution of the event, consequences escalated out of proportion. A report reached the desk of Secretary of War Newton Baker, according to which a mutiny had occurred in Archangel.

This account was further exaggerated by the press: on April 11, the Washington Post claimed that four men had started the mutiny, but further 250 had been involved. More headlines throughout the nation piled on, creating a whirlwind of hostile public opinion against the expedition in Northern Russia. The Republican Senator for California, Hiram Johnson, became the voice of public resentment against US interventionism in Russia, adding pressure on Wilson’s administration to consider a withdrawal.

Secretary Baker dispatched Brigadier General Richardson to Archangel to assess the situation. Before he could arrive, the doughboys fought their last major battle, around the village of Bolshie Ozerki, from the 31st of March to the 2nd of April. The Bolsheviks’ advance was halted, but it was only a matter of time before the next offensive.

When General Richardson landed on April 17, he immediately realised that the Polar Bears severely lacked in numbers, weapons, supplies, and morale compared to the Bolshevik forces. His recommendation was to withdraw — and fast. Over the following weeks, the Polar Bears repelled several attacks, the fiercest one taking place on May 1st on the Vaga River.

Gradually, the Bears withdrew from their positions and reassembled at Archangel. Unit by unit, they sailed for France. On August 5th, 1919, the headquarters of the American force in Northern Russia were officially closed.

The 5,000-strong Polar Bear expedition had finally left behind them the frozen hell of Archangel. But they also left behind 553 of their brothers-in-arms: 163 killed in action, 81 lost to the Spanish Flu pandemic, 305 wounded and 4 POWs.

The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia

The second American expedition to Russia, the one to Siberia, was led by Army Major General William Graves. In August 1918, the Secretary of War Newton Baker met with Graves to personally hand him Wilson’s orders concerning the mission. The main goals were to support the Czech-Slovak Legion, to maintain order in Vladivostok, and to ensure that the Trans-Siberian Railway remained in operation.

Graves, however, was also instructed not to actively get involved in the Russian Civil War. This made the whole set of directives ambiguous and difficult to interpret. For example, the Trans-Siberian was the main logistics lifeline used by the Czech-Slovak Legion and the White Russian forces.

By ensuring that the rail link remained operative, the US troops would be actively supporting one side in the Civil War. Secretary Baker must have realised the contradictory nature of the orders, as well as the delicate nature of the expedition. In fact, this is how he warned General Graves: “Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite.”

The transport of the AEF — the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia — was swiftly organised. The 27th and 37th Regiments of Infantry, reinforced by 5,000 troops from the 8th Division, were dispatched from their bases in the Philippines. These first units landed in Vladivostok on the 15th of August 1918.

They would be later joined, on the 2nd of September, by further 1,889 troops sailing off San Francisco. The maximum effective strength of the AEF in Siberia would total 8,831 doughboys — a sizeable force to be shipped across the Pacific Ocean. But the AEF strength paled in comparison to the Japanese expeditionary corps, numbering about 72,000 troops.

In WWI, Japan and the US were allies, although their relationship would be an uneasy one in Siberia. When the 27th and 37th Regiments docked in Vladivostok, the man in charge was Colonel Henry Styre, as General Graves was still in transit. Styre was welcomed by the Japanese commander, General Otani, who immediately warned him that Vladivostok was at risk of imminent Bolshevik invasion.

The US troops were needed to defend the city. In reality, the Japanese General had cunningly roped in the US troops into joining an offensive, not defensive campaign. The Ussuri and Amur provinces north of Vladivostok had been partially occupied by bands of Bolshevik partisans, led by some 15,000 Austrian and German prisoners of war now on the Red Russian side.

The Czech-Slovak Legion — also technically former prisoners of war belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire — were on the White Russian side and had been actively fighting the Austro-German-Bolshevik alliance, but had been on the backfoot, cornered along the Ussuri River.

Scattered Along the Trans-Siberian Railway

From the 26th of August to the 12th of September, Japanese cavalry swept into the region and successfully pushed back the Austro-Germans and the Bolsheviks. During their advance, the US 27th Infantry regiment protected their flanks and rear and was eventually ordered to occupy the vital rail node of Habarovsk. The AEF did not engage in fighting with the Bolsheviks on this occasion, but it may be argued that they did play an active role in the Russian Civil War — contrary to their directives.

In the following weeks and months, the AEF got further entangled in the conflict, as it was deployed to protect several segments of the Trans-Siberian, according to the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. Some 2,150 troops were dispatched to protect the Soucha coalmines and an adjacent branch line, which were part of the White Russian supply network. Another 2,250 soldiers protected the length of railways running from Vladivostok to the Ussuri river.

Finally, 2,000 doughboys were sent 1,700 miles west, guarding the stretch linking Verkhe-Udinsk and Mysovaya. An ill-prepared, ill-briefed force had been scattered over an immensely vast territory, guarding a set of infrastructures which benefitted only the White side in the Civil War. While Graves was deploying his troops along the Trans-Siberian, political complications arose.

In November 1918, a local provisional government in Siberia, supported by the Czech-Slovak Legion, was overthrown by Admiral Kolchak, a White Russian officer with authoritarian designs. This coup left many Legionnaires disillusioned. Was it worth fighting against the Bolsheviks to support this new unpopular warlord?

In the meanwhile, the Armistice in Europe had been declared. The Great War was over, and most legionnaires wanted to return home. The Legion was out of the picture.

In theory, Graves’ mission had no reason to continue. And yet, he was pressured by Baker and Wilson to remain and ensure the security of the Siberian Railway. A further, undeclared goal was to stem Japanese influence in Siberia.

The US and Japan were allies, but Washington did not trust Tokyo’s intentions: Japan had sent more than 70,000 troops to Siberia, a sizeable force which, if left unchecked, could extend excessive influence over the region and its railways.

The Ambush at Romanovka and Cossack Brutality

From January to June 1919, Graves and his troops stuck to their somewhat limited brief of guarding the railways, whilst keeping an eye on the Japanese. The latter, alongside Britain, France, and the White Russians, pressured the AEF into joining their fight against Bolshevik partisans, who frequently staged raids and sabotage missions against Kolchak’s convoys. The first Partisan attacks took place on the 14th of March 1919 and increased throughout April.

Finally, in May, Graves issued orders to his men to repel the Bolsheviks and chase them back into the surrounding countryside. The first offensive actions by the AEF took place on May 21st, in the sector of the Soucha coal mines. On May 23, 1919, Bolshevik leader Yakov Triapitsyn retaliated by threatening to murder every American soldier in the area.

Graves ordered that all Partisans be removed by force from Soucha. Captain Roads, leading a 40-man unit, executed the order, chasing Triapitsyn away from the Soucha sector. Throughout June 1919, the AEF doughboys continued pursuing Bolshevik raiders and saboteurs, until it was time for them to suffer a devastating attack.

At 4am on June 25th, 70 soldiers from the 31st Regiment, encamped in the village of Romanovka, were ambushed by a Bolshevik force numbering more than 1,000 men. The Partisans surrounded the American camp, releasing volleys of rifle fire into the sleeping soldiers’ tents. The men of the 31st Regiment faced almost certain slaughter.

One corporal, Brodnicki, although seriously wounded, managed to escape the encirclement and returned with reinforcements. A platoon of machine gunners, led by Lieutenant Lorimer, rushed to Romanovka and hit the Bolsheviks on their flank, causing them to withdraw. The 31st Regiment endured heavy casualties: their 70-man detachment suffered 26 dead and 26 wounded, 74% of their initial strength.

The attack also inflicted a heavy blow on the men’s morale: among the dead Partisans, they recognised a supposedly friendly local who had sold them milk the day before. In addition to contending with the Bolshevik partisans, the AEF had to guard their backs against the White Russians, too, and especially their Cossack units. Under Admiral Kolchak’s leadership, they had launched a reign of terror over Siberia, harassing, torturing and executing their Bolshevik foes — as well as civilians caught in the crossfire.

General Graves took note of the brutality, especially the crimes perpetrated by Kolchak’s seconds-in-command, Generals Kalmikov and Semenov. In his memoir he wrote: “Their troops, under the protection of Japanese troops, were roaming the country like wild animals, killing and robbing the people. If questions were asked about these brutal murders, the reply was that the people murdered were Bolsheviks and this explanation, apparently, satisfied the world.”

These warlords commanded a fleet of 14 armoured trains, with names such as ‘The Merciless’, ‘The Terrible’ and ‘The Destroyer’. Their convoys shuttled along the Trans-Siberian, terrifying local civilians, harassing Bolshevik guerrillas, and — on more than one occasion — even the US troops.

Confrontation with Cossacks and the Fall of Kolchak

On the 1st of October 1919, Kalmikov’s men arrested a US captain and a corporal in Iman, just north of Vladivostok, on charges of not having a valid passport. Captain Johns escaped, but Corporal Sperling remained in custody. His commanding officer, Major Shamotulski, descended on Iman with 150 men, demanding that the Cossacks release Sperling.

The Cossacks refused, and Japanese troops joined the confrontation. If fighting broke out, they would side against the Americans. Tensions de-escalated when it was revealed that Corporal Sperling had been moved to General Kalmikov’s headquarters and that he was about to be freed.

When the unlucky corporal returned to his barracks, his superiors found he had been flogged by the Russians. This may have been grounds for another confrontation, which was avoided at the last minute when Kalmikov offered an apology. In the following months, Graves feared an attack from the White Russians more so than the Bolshevik incursions.

But open battle with Kolchak and friends was not to happen. In January of 1920, the Bolshevik forces started gaining ground in Siberia, and Admiral Kolchak realised defeat was imminent. The bulk of the Czech-Slovak Legion had not yet managed to return home, so Kolchak asked for their protection against the Red Army.

The Legion, appalled at his war crimes, killed two birds with one stone: they handed him over to the Bolsheviks, negotiating a safe passage home in exchange. The Admiral was executed on the 7th of February 1920. In the meanwhile, the Wilson administration had realised that the anti-Bolshevik cause was a lost one, and there was no reason to justify the presence of the AEF in Siberia.

The US troops started pulling out, with the last doughboys leaving Vladivostok on the 1st of April 1920. They had left behind between 189 and 353 of their comrades, according to sources, lost to enemy fire, frostbite, and the Spanish Flu.

Legacy and Historical Implications of the Intervention

The US invasion of Russia would be largely forgotten or relegated to the status of footnote in history books, despite the constant efforts of veterans and their descendants to memorialize their expedition. Scholarship on the North Russian and Siberian adventures has debated why Wilson decided to intervene in Russia, and whether the missions in Archangel and Siberia were a success or a disaster. According to historians George Kennan and Betty Unterberger, Wilson never really had a full understanding of events unfolding in Russia, and did not know that his troops would engage — and did engage — in combat with the Bolsheviks.

The President’s final decision to intervene was informed by intelligence claiming that the Bolsheviks were a pawn of the German Reich, and was intended to appease pressure from Western Allies. On the other hand, authors William Appleman Williams, George Schild, and David Foglesong claim that Wilson followed a clear anti-Bolshevik strategy. According to William Appleman Williams, at least the Siberian mission can be considered a partial success, as the Expeditionary Force managed not to get too involved with the Civil War and the most anti-democratic elements of the White Russian side.

Moreover, the AEF managed to pull out before the ultimate defeat of the counter-revolutionary forces. The widespread consensus is that the only mission objective accomplished during the US expedition was the repatriation of the Czech-Slovak Legion — an objective which the Legion achieved through negotiation with the Bolsheviks, and regardless of Allied support. Otherwise, the US units dispatched to Russia were too small, ill-supplied and ill-prepared to achieve their operational goals, themselves founded on unclear and contradictory strategic directives.

According to James Carl Nelson, author of “The Polar Bear Expedition: The Heroes of America’s Forgotten Invasion of Russia,” Wilson’s decision to send troops to Russia without a clear strategy and end objectives in mind foreshadowed other poorly planned American foreign interventions. In Nelson’s words: “It didn’t really achieve anything — it was ill-conceived. The lessons were there that could’ve been applied in Vietnam and could’ve been applied in Iraq.”

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did President Wilson agree to send US troops to Russia in 1918?

Wilson initially opposed intervention as a violation of his Fourteen Points, specifically the sixth point calling for Russia to determine its own political development. He changed his mind after intelligence from Edgar Sisson and Ambassador David R. Francis portrayed Lenin and the Bolsheviks as pawns of the German Reich, and after Secretary of State Lansing offered helping the Czecho-Slovak Legion as a publicly defensible justification.

What were the main battles fought by the Polar Bears in Northern Russia?

The 339th Infantry Regiment engaged in numerous skirmishes after arriving in September 1918. Major engagements included the Battle of Tulgas on November 11, 1918, where heavily outnumbered Americans repelled a 2,500-strong Bolshevik assault; a January 1919 Red offensive that pushed Allied lines northward; and the Battle of Bolshie Ozerki from March 31 to April 2, 1919, before the final withdrawal on August 5, 1919.

What triggered the withdrawal of US forces from Northern Russia?

Mounting pressure came from multiple directions: the Armistice ending WWI in November 1918 removed the original stated rationale; a February 1919 Senate vote to withdraw failed by only a tie; a March 1919 refusal by soldiers to advance was exaggerated by the press as a mutiny; and public outrage led by Senator Hiram Johnson forced the Wilson administration’s hand. General Richardson, sent to assess conditions, immediately recommended withdrawal.

What were the key challenges faced by the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia?

General Graves operated under contradictory orders: protect the Trans-Siberian Railway without taking sides in the Russian Civil War, yet the railway was the main supply line for the White Russian cause. The AEF also had to contend with Cossack warlords Kalmikov and Semenov, whose forces terrorized civilians and even arrested US soldiers, with Japanese troops siding against the Americans in confrontations.

What is the historical legacy of the American intervention in Russia?

Historians remain divided on Wilson’s motives, with some like Kennan arguing he never fully understood the situation, while others like Williams argue he pursued a deliberate anti-Bolshevik strategy. The intervention accomplished virtually nothing except the repatriation of the Czech-Slovak Legion, which the Legion itself negotiated with the Bolsheviks. Author James Carl Nelson has argued that the poorly planned, unclear-objective mission foreshadowed later American foreign interventions in Vietnam and Iraq.

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