The Gaza Disarmament Deadline: Why the Ceasefire Could Split the Strip in Two

The deadline is here, and the ceasefire is not looking promising. While the world’s attention has been fixed for six weeks on the US-Israeli war against Iran, a second looming deadline has been quietly counting down, one that also pulls in Washington and Jerusalem: Gaza.

The ceasefire that ended the war there last October is now entering a mission-critical stress test. The strip itself is roughly 80 percent rubble, with nearly two million people still displaced into makeshift tents and overcrowded shelters. The diplomats have drawn up their plans; the deadline is closing; and almost none of it matches the reality on the ground.

What happens in the coming days will determine whether Gaza gets to rebuild, or instead gets split in two: one half under Israeli control and receiving aid, the other blockaded under Hamas and left to deteriorate. The cycle of negotiation, agreement, and collapse that has defined this conflict for two decades is about to be tested again, against a deadline neither side trusts.

Key Takeaways

The October 2025 ceasefire flowed from the Trump administration’s 20-point plan, with Phase 1 (hostage releases, aid, halt to hostilities) completed on paper by January, when the last hostages were returned; the UN Security Council endorsed the framework in November via Resolution 2803.
Phase 2 is where it breaks down: it demands full demilitarization of Hamas and every armed faction, a transitional government, and reconstruction estimated at over $70 billion, with a deadline falling on Saturday, April 11th.
There is a genuine dispute over whether Hamas ever agreed to disarm. The White House and UN resolution say yes; senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzouk insists it “was never even presented to us.”
The Board of Peace, Trump’s quasi-replacement for the UN with Trump as chair, oversees the process; the leaked plan demands “one authority, one law, one weapon” and front-loads Hamas’s concessions before any reward.
The plan requires every armed group to disarm, yet Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, and the Democratic Front have all already refused, making compliance structurally impossible even if Hamas agreed.
On the ground, the governing committee operates from Cairo, the transitional police force has zero recruits deployed, and Hamas retains de facto control everywhere outside direct Israeli occupation.
The fallback being gamed out in Washington would skip disarmament entirely and rebuild only Israeli-controlled areas, producing the “two Gazas” outcome mediators have warned against.

Where Things Stand

For the past six weeks, most of the world’s attention has been locked on the US-Israeli war against Iran, and understandably so. But 2026 has not been a year content to deliver a single major crisis. While the Iran war unfolded, Gaza continued to evolve in dramatic ways.

Back in September last year, the Trump administration unveiled a 20-point plan to end the war. Israel and Hamas both agreed to at least its initial stage, and the ceasefire took effect in early October. Phase 1 covered the immediate priorities: hostage releases, increased humanitarian aid, and a halt to major hostilities. The UN Security Council endorsed the whole thing in November with Resolution 2803, and by January this year, the last hostages had been returned. Phase 1 was done, at least on paper.

Phase 2 is where things get complicated, and where matters now stand. This phase includes the harder questions: full demilitarization of Hamas and every other armed group in Gaza, the establishment of a transitional government, and large-scale reconstruction estimated at over $70 billion. The deadline for Phase 2’s implementation comes due Saturday, April 11th.

A Dispute Over What Was Agreed

If demilitarization sounds wildly ambitious, given that it involves Hamas voluntarily surrendering its weapons, that is precisely because there is a genuine dispute over whether Hamas ever agreed to it.

The White House has repeatedly stated that the 20-point framework Hamas endorsed in October encompasses disarmament as a Phase 2 requirement, and the UN resolution backing the plan includes it. Hamas sees things very differently. Senior officials, including Musa Abu Marzouk, have insisted that disarmament “was never even presented to us,” and that while they have agreed to cede governance of the strip, they never agreed to lay down their arms. They blame the variations on edits made after the fact, pointing the finger at Netanyahu.

Whether that is true comes down to who you ask. It is a familiar pattern: two sides reading the same document and finding two incompatible agreements inside it. And it is this ambiguity, more than any single clause, that the entire process now hangs on.

The Board of Peace

The mechanism created to oversee all of this, including the disarmament Hamas says it never signed up for, is the Board of Peace. Previously covered here on WarFronts, it is essentially Trump’s quasi-replacement for the United Nations, built by and for a friendlier audience, with Trump himself as chair.

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The Board has notable sign-ups, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE. It features figures like Nickolay Mladenov as High Representative, with Tony Blair and Jared Kushner handling portfolios across governance and security. Most of the G7 and NATO allies declined to join, with Bulgaria and Hungary the exceptions, citing concerns that the charter could sideline the UN or expand the body’s mandate beyond Gaza.

Mladenov has been pushing this for weeks, shuttling between Cairo, Ankara, and the Security Council. On Saturday, the deadline he set for Hamas’s formal answer arrives. He is not optimistic. Few observers are.

The Plan

On March 26th, Al Jazeera published the leaked text of a document that had been circulating between mediators for weeks. It represents the Board’s attempt to turn the originally agreed-upon plan into something they can actually action.

At its heart is a five-stage, eight-month sequence built around one core principle: “one authority, one law, one weapon.” The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, usually called the NCGA, would take security control. Heavy weapons and tunnel networks would be promptly destroyed.

Only then would Israel proceed with a phased withdrawal tied to verified demilitarization milestones. Ultimately, if all goes to plan, Israel would complete its pullout after independent confirmation that Gaza is entirely weapons-free, though the plan carves out an exception allowing the IDF to maintain a presence in a security perimeter.

Reconstruction, including the concrete, steel, and fuel Gaza desperately needs to begin rebuilding, would then be released only in areas verified as demilitarized. The thinking is to prevent Hamas from siphoning supplies off for its own purposes, a concern Jerusalem holds given the group’s longstanding practice of doing exactly that.

Why Hamas Says No

The document was not well received by Hamas, who saw it as a new demand amounting to political surrender rather than anything they ever signed onto. Looking at the incentive structure, it is not hard to see why.

The plan does offer real carrots, including amnesty for fighters, reintegration programs, and other points representing meaningful concessions from Jerusalem’s perspective, concessions that have not gone over well with the more hardline members of Netanyahu’s government. But the plan also leans heavily on Hamas to act first and be rewarded only later.

To be fair, Hamas is not famous for honoring the terms of agreements it makes. But their trust in Israel to uphold its end of the bargain after they have laid down their weapons and surrendered their ability to fight back is close to zero.

At the Security Council on March 24th, Mladenov made the case directly to skeptics on both sides. Israel has conducted multiple military operations in Gaza over the past two decades, he noted, and the weapons have always returned, no matter what was agreed. Only verified decommissioning combined with a professional police force, he argued, breaks that cycle permanently. To Israeli hawks who insist military control is the only option, he said the evidence of the last twenty years shows the complete opposite.

Every Faction Must Disarm

The plan demands participation not just from Hamas, but from every armed faction in Gaza, and three of them have already said no. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front, and the Democratic Front all issued statements declaring that the “weapons of the resistance” belong to the Palestinian people, not Hamas, and will not be surrendered before a Palestinian state exists. Islamic Jihad went further, calling the plan a formula for ensuring Israeli aggression can proceed unchecked.

PIJ is particularly interesting because, despite being smaller than Hamas, one of its claims to fame is that it considers Hamas too moderate. “Moderate” is not a term usually associated with Hamas, but this moment does present a vulnerability: if Hamas is seen to have caved to Israel, PIJ might convince others there was something to its hardline argument after all.

That dynamic feeds a broader split widening between Gaza’s two main armed factions. Hamas has been broadening its international connections, especially by cozying up to Turkey, which has reciprocated, hosting senior leadership this month and pushing for the group’s political wing to be involved in any post-war governance. This is a departure from Hamas’s long-standing allegiance to Tehran. Last month the group even criticized Iran for targeting neighboring states like Turkey and Qatar, a remarkable moment.

PIJ has shown zero interest in any of that. It remains completely loyal to Tehran, receiving roughly $70 million a year in direct Iranian funding plus IRGC training. PIJ has said it will “cooperate” with the transitional committee and “monitor its work,” which is about where the cooperation ends. The plan requires every group to disarm; even if Hamas’s entire leadership agreed tomorrow, it still would not work unless PIJ and the others followed.

On the Ground

All of this, the plans drawn up between diplomats and the conditions for aid, feels almost as if it is being written in a parallel universe. On the ground in Gaza, almost none of it exists, and some of what does exist directly contradicts it.

Consider who is supposed to be running things. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, consisting of 15 Palestinian technocrats thoroughly vetted by Israel, formally launched on January 15th and proceeded to set up shop, in Cairo, some 360 kilometers away. Part of this comes down to the security situation in the strip, which is far from iron-clad. One unnamed Arab diplomat said the committee will not enter Gaza until it is “equipped to govern.”

It would not receive a warm welcome anyway. While Hamas has publicly said multiple times that it is “ready to transfer governance,” it has privately done nearly everything possible to ensure that transfer never happens. The group ran incitement campaigns against the committee’s internal security appointee, Sami Nasman, accused him of collaboration, tried and convicted him in absentia, and allegedly threatened to execute him if he returns. The Palestinian Authority is not thrilled either, given its claim to be the legitimate governing body for all Palestinian lands.

The result of this mutual sabotage: the one tangible step the committee has taken, opening recruitment in February for a 5,000-person transitional police force, has produced zero boots on the ground. Hamas retains de facto control everywhere outside direct Israeli control. The international stabilization force meant to backstop the whole arrangement has no troops deployed either; its rollout was postponed indefinitely when the Iran war kicked off in late February.

A Militia Israel Helped Create

The one armed group active lately runs contrary to the agreement itself, and Israel helped get it started. The Popular Forces, a militia of roughly 500 to 700 men under a former Salafi-jihadist fighter named Ghassan Duhine, who has alleged past ties to Islamic State, has been conducting anti-Hamas raids in eastern Rafah and guarding parts of the crossing with Israeli backing.

It is a striking contradiction. A plan built on the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon” is unfolding alongside an Israeli-backed armed faction operating outside any of the structures the plan envisions. The disorder on the ground does not just lag the diplomacy; in places, it points in the opposite direction.

A Physical Reality Words Struggle to Capture

All of this plays out against a physical reality difficult for words alone to convey. Around 81 percent of all structures in the Gaza Strip have been damaged or destroyed, including 58 percent of housing, 87 percent of farmland, and a similar share of school buildings. Only 18 of the 36 hospitals still function beyond basic triage.

The rubble alone is staggering: between 55 and 61 million tonnes of it, concentrated heaviest in Rafah, Khan Younis, and Gaza City, which works out to roughly 30 tonnes for every person still living there. The UN Development Program estimates that clearing this under optimal conditions would take five to seven years, and these are not optimal conditions. Realistically, the reconstruction period will likely last over a decade.

The ceasefire has brought the killing down dramatically, though strikes have continued. But 1.9 million people remain displaced, many of them ten or more times over, crammed into makeshift tents and overcrowded shelters that do not hold up well over the long haul. This is the human ledger against which every clause of the plan must be weighed.

What Happens When the Deadline Passes

Nothing in the Middle East is simple, and Hamas does not appear inclined to change that. The group is highly likely to deliver something between a clear yes and a no. It has been doing exactly this for weeks: at the April 3rd Cairo meeting, Hamas “refrained from outright rejecting” the framework, which is legal-speak for dragging its feet as long as humanly possible.

Hamas’s counter-proposal, calling for three years instead of eight months and a carve-out allowing it to keep lighter arms, is essentially dead on arrival. The Board of Peace has said it will consider minor amendments but not fundamental ones, and it is clear which camp this falls into.

The formal deadline is Saturday, but Mladenov was in Turkey on Thursday to receive Hamas’s answer, and Israel is not waiting on the weekend. The pro-Netanyahu outlet Israel Hayom reported that preparations are already underway to resume combat operations. Yet rolling back into Gaza heavy-handedly is not the most realistic near-term prospect, because Israel’s hands are full elsewhere.

A Stretched IDF and the “Two Gazas” Fallback

The ceasefire with Iran has eased the pressure on the IDF for now, but it rests on an unstable foundation and is time-limited to just two weeks, so it is not hard to imagine Israel resuming waves of attacks on the Islamic Republic. While its strikes on Iran were air-based only, IDF ground forces have been deploying elsewhere: they have operated for several weeks in southern Lebanon, where a semi-permanent “buffer zone” has repeatedly been floated, and reservist service has been extended from six to nine weeks. The IDF is stretched, so the more likely near-term outcome is an intensification of what is already happening rather than a full-scale return to Gaza.

There is a fallback being discussed in Washington that tells you where this might actually land. According to Reuters, the alternative would simply skip the disarmament clause entirely and proceed with reconstruction only in Israeli-controlled areas behind the Yellow Line. Netanyahu has publicly called this a non-starter, but it is clearly being gamed out as a plan B, and it would produce exactly what Mladenov and others have warned against: two Gazas. One side under Israeli military control, receiving reconstruction and aid; the other under Hamas’s de facto authority, blockaded, and left to deteriorate.

Riding Iran’s Coattails

Hamas’s own bet, according to Asharq al-Awsat, is that the Iran ceasefire talks could reshape the disarmament conversation entirely. The wager is that Tehran will link any deal to all “axis of resistance” fronts, and that Hamas can ride Iran’s coattails out of this mess without having to make the choice itself. There may be something to it: Iran has so far been willing to stake the entire ceasefire agreement on the condition that Israel stop attacking Lebanon.

But Hamas field sources fear the opposite. Once Iran settles, Israel could turn its full attention back to Gaza with nothing left to distract it, and with the Islamic Republic in a far weaker position to respond conventionally than it otherwise would be.

Mladenov, who may have the most difficult job on Earth right now, has been arguing that this time has to be different, that the cycle of violence can be broken if both sides commit to the process. He is probably right. But he is negotiating one severe crisis under a looming deadline, with two sides notorious for their stubbornness. Whatever answer Hamas gives, the people living here, the ones who will feel the consequences, are not the ones who get to decide.

Presented by

Simon Whistler

Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire plan, and why is it so difficult?

Phase 2 requires full demilitarization of Hamas and every other armed group in Gaza, establishment of a transitional government, and reconstruction estimated at over $70 billion. The deadline for implementation was Saturday, April 11th. It is difficult because Hamas disputes ever agreeing to disarm, three other factions have already refused, and the governing committee set up to manage the transition has not yet entered the strip.

Did Hamas actually agree to disarm?

This is genuinely disputed. The White House says the 20-point framework Hamas endorsed in October includes disarmament as a Phase 2 requirement, and UN Resolution 2803 includes it. Hamas disagrees: senior official Musa Abu Marzouk insists disarmament “was never even presented to us,” arguing the group agreed to cede governance but never to lay down arms and blaming post-agreement edits on Netanyahu.

What is the Board of Peace, and who runs it?

The Board of Peace is the mechanism overseeing the ceasefire and disarmament process, essentially Trump’s quasi-replacement for the United Nations, with Trump as chair. Member states include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE. Nickolay Mladenov serves as High Representative, while Tony Blair and Jared Kushner handle governance and security portfolios. Most G7 and NATO allies declined to join.

Why might the plan fail even if Hamas agrees?

Because the plan requires every armed faction to disarm, and three have already refused. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, and the Democratic Front all declared that the “weapons of the resistance” belong to the Palestinian people and will not be surrendered before a Palestinian state exists. Even total Hamas compliance would leave the plan structurally unsatisfied.

What is the “two Gazas” fallback scenario?

It is the alternative being gamed out in Washington, reported by Reuters, that would skip disarmament entirely and proceed with reconstruction only in Israeli-controlled areas behind the Yellow Line. One Gaza would be under Israeli military control, receiving aid and reconstruction; the other would remain under Hamas’s de facto authority, blockaded and left to deteriorate. Mladenov and other mediators have specifically warned against this outcome.