The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation: Over a Thousand Civilians Killed at Aid Distribution Sites

Survival in the rubble of the Gaza Strip has become a matter of sheer luck, with civilians facing constant bombardment, scarce medicine and shelter, and areas flickering in and out of famine conditions. But now, even the decision to stand in line for aid deliveries has become potentially fatal. Since the US-based Gaza Humanitarian Foundation took over aid distribution operations in May 2025, mass killings at distribution sites have become alarmingly common.

At last count, over a thousand Palestinian civilians have been killed while approaching or waiting in line to receive lifesaving food supplies, with over five thousand more injured. Roughly seven out of every ten of these casualties occurred at Gaza Humanitarian Foundation distribution sites, creating a terrifying situation for civilians already navigating one of the most dangerous places on Earth.

The Humanitarian Crisis and Aid Distribution Controversy

The question of food aid distribution in Gaza has been one of the most sensitive issues since the Israel-Hamas War began following the October 7, 2023 terror attack. Two fundamentally opposing positions have shaped the conflict over humanitarian assistance. For the Israeli government, the Israel Defense Forces, and their supporters, sending unrestricted aid into Gaza would be tantamount to feeding and sustaining Hamas itself, allowing the terrorist insurgency to fight more capably and for far longer than they otherwise could. For the civilian population of Gaza and concerned parties worldwide, food aid is absolutely essential—before the war began, Gaza was sustained by a constant flow of five to six hundred trucks of aid and other supplies per day, accounting for the vast majority of the population’s needs in a notoriously overcrowded territory with very little food production capacity of its own.

These two positions exist in direct conflict with one another, making food aid the focus of some of the most enduring controversies since the war began. On several occasions, Israel has instituted long, total blockades of incoming aid shipments, cutting off the only source of food for the Palestinian population. For much of the war, the IDF has limited incoming aid deliveries to just a fraction of Gaza’s actual need.

According to the United Nations’ World Food Programme, every single person in Gaza today is facing acute levels of food insecurity, while seventy thousand children need urgent treatment for acute malnutrition. Parts of Gaza have been on the brink of famine for quite some time, and some zones have intermittently slipped in and out of true famine conditions, with just barely enough aid trickling in to prevent the territory from entering a prolonged state of famine based on available data.

Nearly five hundred thousand people in total are facing catastrophic hunger conditions across Gaza, and it’s not for a lack of available resources. The World Food Programme has stated that more than 116,000 metric tons of food assistance—enough to feed 1 million people for up to 4 months—is ready to be brought into Gaza if the blockade is lifted. Nonetheless, the IDF and the wider Israeli government have continued to stand in the way of aid deliveries, citing the need to keep up pressure on Hamas and its allies, and withhold aid as a coercive tool to force Hamas to release its remaining hostages.

The Creation and Structure of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation was founded in February 2025, based in the US state of Delaware and additionally incorporated in Geneva, Switzerland. The GHF is backed by both the Israeli government in Jerusalem and the United States government under Donald Trump. The circumstances behind the GHF’s founding remain murky to this day, as do the specifics of the decision-making and key figures behind the scenes who were ultimately responsible for creating it. Many of the details that would provide fuller context for the organization’s creation simply aren’t available in the public domain.

What is known is that the organization was initially led by American veteran and philanthropist Jake Wood, co-founder of the international disaster response group Team Rubicon. Wood is no longer part of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, having resigned under circumstances that will be detailed later. The organization now operates under the guidance of former USAID manager John Acree and an American evangelical Christian leader and Trump ally named Johnnie Moore.

Of the GHF’s initial funding, there was an allocation of thirty million dollars provided by the United States and rushed through the State Department’s vetting processes, although it’s believed to have had far more than thirty million at its disposal initially. As of the time of writing, the GHF receives 140 million US dollars a month to sustain its operations, which it attributes mostly to unnamed private donors.

According to a New York Times report published in June 2025, the goal of creating a private food distribution program under Israel’s direct oversight has been around since at least December 2023. At that time, Israel began outreach and coordination with a number of primarily American partners, many of whom had a background in private security contracting. Both the program’s advocates and high-ranking figures in the US government generally describe the GHF as an American initiative, but outside reporting suggests that it was both an Israeli program in origin and is guided by Israel in the ongoing execution of its stated mission.

The Strategic Framework and Tactical Benefits

Once American partners were looped in, the plan for the GHF slowly took shape: Construct an organization that could manage its own distribution of food and critical aid, concentrate that aid at a small number of key distribution points, protect that aid with the help of private security companies, and ensure that Hamas and other armed groups within Gaza couldn’t benefit from the supplies.

From Israel’s perspective, each step of the process came with tactical and strategic benefits for its anti-Hamas operations. By concentrating aid in just a few locations, rather than across hundreds of sites in the way that the United Nations and its partners had done, Israel could install monitoring technologies to identify people coming to receive aid, weeding out known members of Hamas or other groups in the process. Beyond identification capabilities, they could guide and dictate the locations of Gaza’s population, most of whom have been permanently displaced from their pre-war communities, and who Israel is working to cordon off into a few small chunks of Gazan territory in order to clear out and depopulate the rest.

By ensuring that the organization had a monopoly on aid entering Gaza, Israel could keep food out of the black market and prevent it from being taken by Hamas or otherwise distributed to the group’s fighters. At the same time, they could ice out the UN, often accused by Jerusalem of bias against Israel and interference with the Israeli war effort. Finally, by staffing distribution sites with private security and monitoring the surrounding area with the IDF, Israel could, hypothetically speaking, ensure that food distribution remained a safe and secure process, while at the same time weeding out any members of Hamas or other militant groups who showed up.

International Concerns and Institutional Rejection

Even on the basic description of the plan, numerous potential pitfalls were immediately apparent to international observers. As a chorus of international experts pointed out when the plan’s details became clear, concentrating aid in so few places would force malnourished Gazans to travel considerable distances while in very poor health, at risk both because of the adverse health effects and because they’d be walking miles through a war zone. If Israel was so concerned about Hamas stealing aid, then certainly frail, defenseless civilians walking all that way with food on their person would be sitting ducks for theft or attack.

Constraining aid deliveries to so few points would mean massive crowds, likely chaos, and lines many hours long. Beyond the logistical concerns, the plan sounded a hell of a lot like using humanitarian aid as a weapon of both war and forced displacement. It would starve out an entire civilian population and force them into tightly controlled checkpoints, where perceived threats among them could be picked off, while simultaneously coercing civilians into southern Gaza, and eventually into a small pocket of the territory that Israel otherwise planned to completely and permanently depopulate.

Ultimately, although American officials urged the United Nations and other humanitarian groups to cooperate with the GHF and facilitate its distribution plans, the UN, the Red Cross, and other major organizations forcefully condemned the plan, refusing to participate in what they described as an obviously broken, unsafe, and quite likely coercive system. This institutional rejection by experienced humanitarian organizations would prove prescient as operations began.

The First Distribution and Jake Wood’s Resignation

The first aid distributions by the GHF took place on May 26, 2025, when a center in Rafah handed out eight thousand boxes of food, enough to feed a bit over forty thousand people for half a week. Within a few weeks, the GHF had opened up a total of four distribution points, each of which would open just once a week, often with very limited prior notification to Gazans—ostensibly to ensure that Hamas and other militant groups wouldn’t have time to plan attacks. People in need of aid were kept at a considerable distance from sites before they opened and were forced to travel into what Israel had previously classified as mandatory evacuation zones, in which all of the GHF’s distribution points are now located.

In the hours before the GHF began its first aid deliveries in Gaza, there were already signs that something was amiss within the organization. On Sunday, May 25, less than a day before operations were set to begin and just two days before the killings started, the group’s director Jake Wood unexpectedly submitted his resignation. As an experienced leader of humanitarian and philanthropic groups, having provided direct support through one of his organizations in the wake of hundreds of national disasters worldwide, Wood’s sudden departure was significant.

In his resignation, Wood explained that he had been asked to build the GHF to “feed hungry people, address security concerns about diversion, and complement the work of longstanding NGOs in Gaza.” But on the eve of the start of GHF operations, Wood explained: “it is clear that it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which I will not abandon.” That particular description of the GHF’s situation was damning, even by itself—with the implication being that either humanitarian principles could be respected, or the GHF could move forward as planned, but those possibilities were mutually exclusive.

The Tel al-Sultan Incident: May 27, 2025

Two days after Wood’s resignation, the worst fears of GHF skeptics would be realized. On May 27, the GHF began operations at a center in the refugee camp of Tel al-Sultan, under heavy guard from the IDF as many thousands of Palestinians came to receive aid. Crowd control at the site was nowhere near what was required, and American contractors withdrew from the area surrounding the aid boxes they’d laid out nearly as soon as distribution efforts had begun.

With the aid abandoned, the crowd crushing forward, and no mechanism to maintain an orderly process, fear, starvation, and scarcity took over as the crowd surged forward in an attempt to get whatever aid they could. With no coordinated rationing process and no security to protect people who did get their hands on the aid, anybody who couldn’t get to the front of the crowd, take what they could carry, and make a quick exit were at risk of either having aid taken from them by other desperate people or getting nothing at all.

Before long, the IDF troops in the surrounding area started letting off gunshots, in what they described as a warning for the crowd to keep order. With no clear direction and no easy way to confirm from within the crowd who was firing or why, panic began to spread. What happened after that is a matter of some dispute. According to eyewitnesses and the Hamas-run Gaza Government Media Office, IDF tanks used their machine guns to fire into the crowd, while other sources suggested that IDF foot soldiers also fired their weapons at civilians.

The Gaza Health Ministry, also part of the Hamas-led civil administration in the territory, released a final casualty count of seventeen people killed, eighty-six wounded, and five missing, while United Nations officials indicated that most people who had come to medical facilities seeking treatment for their injuries had been wounded by IDF gunfire. Israel denied that it had fired upon the crowd. The killings would come with major implications for the GHF itself, as Boston Consulting Group, previously handling the logistical planning for the foundation, stopped all work on the project three days later and withdrew from the effort.

The June 1 Rafah Incident and IDF Denials

If the chaos on May 27 had been an isolated incident, then perhaps the IDF’s account of the situation may have held some weight. After all, the Gaza Health Ministry is a subordinate of Gaza’s Hamas-run government, and although the Gaza Health Ministry’s casualty counts are frequently corroborated by outside observers when there’s enough data available, the organization has been frequently accused of duplicity by Israel. But with the benefit of hindsight after quite literally dozens of additional incidents, claims of only limited IDF intervention have gotten harder and harder to believe.

The next incident took place on June 1, when at least thirty-two civilians were killed and over 250 were wounded in a hazy incident in Rafah. According to the Red Cross, which received twenty-one bodies dead on arrival and 179 other casualties including women and children, all patients had confirmed that they had been trying to reach a GHF distribution site. The specifics of what happened in the chaos couldn’t quickly be established, but most of the wounded bore gunshot or shrapnel wounds and confirmed that IDF soldiers, tanks, and drones had fired upon them, as well as naval warships according to some eyewitnesses.

The GHF denied that anything had happened at all and insisted that aid distribution had taken place “without incident.” Multiple members of the global press were able to reach the site shortly afterward and observed dozens of wounded. Said an IDF spokesman when asked to account for the incident: “This week, it was claimed that the IDF fired at civilians in an aid distribution area. This report is entirely false and echoes the propaganda of the terrorist organization Hamas… Regarding the incident on Sunday – it simply didn’t happen!”

The June 3 Incident and Combat Zone Designation

Two days later, another mass-casualty event unfolded near a distribution center in Rafah, this time at a location about a kilometer away, as crowds attempted to move toward the center before it was scheduled to open. That opening was supposed to take place at six in the morning, and civilians who were close to the front of the pack had greater odds of actually getting supplies for themselves and their families—but there was more to the situation than that.

From the hours of six at night until six in the morning, the distribution point and the surrounding area were designated off-limits to civilians, meaning that by trying to get in line before the site opened, Gazans were technically violating that order—even though it was after dawn, things were relatively orderly, and the site was about to open, as was known to the IDF. Nonetheless, at least twenty-seven people were killed by IDF troops, and the Red Cross reported 184 wounded. The incident would lead the IDF to classify the roads leading up to distribution sites as combat zones.

In both the killings discussed so far and the ones that would follow, reports from the ground suggest that on many occasions, there have been no clear security threats prior to the IDF and contractors opening fire. At least for now, it’s important to understand that in most of these cases, soldiers and contractors don’t appear to be shooting because some civilian is waving a gun around or because some Hamas cell is trying to stage an attack. According to eyewitness accounts, reports from medical workers, and more recently testimony from some of the soldiers and contractors involved, soldiers are often firing on unarmed crowds without direct provocation.

A Systematic Pattern: June and July Mass Casualty Events

There were simply too many of these incidents through June and July to give an exhaustive list, but some of the most stunning can be documented. On June 10, thirty-six people were killed and over two hundred wounded across multiple sites, and twenty-six more people would be killed on the following day by Israeli drones while they waited to access a distribution site. In the following four days, at least seventy more people would be killed.

On June 17, Gaza witnessed the worst incident yet. On that date, near Khan Younis, eyewitnesses reported that Israeli tanks fired multiple shells into a crowd, along with infantry and drone fire, killing nearly sixty in a single incident according to the Gaza Health Ministry. This represented the single deadliest day at a GHF distribution site up to that point in the operation.

Later in the month and into July, the pattern continued with horrifying consistency. At least forty people would be gunned down on June 24, and twenty-three more were killed on June 30. Over thirty more people died on July 12, and over twenty more on July 16 after crowds were driven into a stampede by the launch of tear gas. On July 19, the IDF reportedly killed over thirty civilians across two sites.

On July 20, Gazan officials reported over ninety Palestinians killed that day, including over eighty trying to get to aid that was coming in through a border crossing. The World Food Programme confirmed that its aid workers witnessed crowds being fired upon. To be clear, there were smaller mass-fatality incidents on most of the days not specifically mentioned, as well as individual killings that are likely being undercounted due to the chaos that’s taken hold across the territory.

Internal US Analysis Contradicts Aid Theft Justification

Just as important as the mounting political pressure against the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation comes new evidence fundamentally undercutting Israel’s primary justification for its reliance on the organization. According to exclusive reporting by Reuters, an internal analysis within the US government—particularly by the remnants of the USAID organization—found in late June that there was no evidence of systemic theft of humanitarian aid by Hamas.

According to Reuters, that analysis catalogued 156 incidents in which US-funded aid had been stolen or lost between October 2023 and May of 2025, and found no indication that Hamas benefited at large scale from having stolen, or otherwise obtained that aid. In fact, it found that over a quarter of those incidents were attributable to the actions of the Israeli military, rather than Hamas. The Reuters report was disputed by the US State Department, but it indicates that even analysis by Israel’s most important backer has undercut the premise that Israel has used to justify the GHF’s existence.

To be clear, Israel has never actually produced conclusive evidence to support its claims of systemic aid theft by Hamas, despite claiming regularly that it does have evidence to that effect. After that article came out, the New York Times issued an even more damning report to back it up, stating that according to two senior Israeli military officials, even the IDF itself has never found proof of systemic aid theft by Hamas. Those officials, as well as a pair of other Israeli sources in the know, told the Times that the UN’s aid delivery systems have actually been quite effective overall.

Deteriorating Conditions and Starvation Statistics

As pressure mounts on Israel to change its course of action, the situation for ordinary Palestinians has grown even more dire. According to the World Food Programme, almost a third of Gaza’s population is now not eating anything for consecutive days in a row, an even more sobering statistic in a place where, for months, many people have been trying to survive on scavenged items that most of the world would regard as inedible.

On average, aid groups estimate that the food now being distributed in Gaza amounts to just twenty-eight trucks of aid per day, less than six percent of the five hundred trucks per day that would be required to actually meet demand. The number of people dying from malnutrition has been gradually ticking upward in recent weeks, and after months in which parts of Gaza have approached, and then been pulled back from the brink of famine again and again, humanitarian groups are insisting that the situation simply cannot hold for much longer.

International Aid Organizations Issue Joint Condemnation

Most recently, over a hundred aid groups signed on to yet another condemnation of Israel’s aid restrictions, calling for those restrictions to be lifted so that proven, competent aid groups can resume their work. According to Israel, however, those condemnations just serve Hamas, and elevate Hamas’ talking points against the government in Jerusalem. Quoting the Foreign Ministry on social media: “These organizations are serving the propaganda of Hamas, using their numbers, justifying their horrors, instead of challenging the terror organization.”

As Israel frames the situation, these organizations are more than capable of distributing the thousands of aid trucks’ worth of food that are already in the area, if only they’d agree to work within the GHF’s new system. Said another government spokesman: “In Gaza today, there is no famine caused by Israel. There is, however, a man-made shortage engineered by Hamas.”

But for international humanitarian foundations to essentially throw their endorsement behind a system that now bears responsibility for over a thousand deaths of Palestinian civilians in just the last two months, would be unthinkable. It’s an impossible situation for those groups, who have the aid available, even as their colleagues send back urgent reports of children wasting away and dying in their parents’ arms. But those organizations have no reason to trust that the GHF would distribute that aid peacefully and in a responsible fashion, when mass-casualty incidents are still happening every day.

Limited Resumption: Parachute Drops and Daily Pauses

At the time of writing, however, it appears that Jerusalem is recognizing that stubborn refusal to change won’t yield positive results. On Sunday, July twenty-seventh, Israel allowed the United Arab Emirates and Jordan to parachute a combined twenty-five tons of aid into the Gaza Strip, in the first such parachute operation in several months. Jordan and the UAE are the only nations, as of now, to be cleared for aerial operations over Gaza.

But although parachute drops represent at least some movement toward a resumption of humanitarian aid, they aren’t enough to make much difference. Twenty-five tons of aid is the equivalent of just a handful of aid trucks driving across the border, and the practice of parachute-dropping aid comes with a laundry list of concerns, not least the risk that people will be harmed by falling aid, or that aid could be captured by Hamas in the way that Israel has claimed UN aid is siphoned away. There are limits to the amount of aid that can be airdropped on a short timeline, and if this first day’s haul of twenty-five tons is any indication, then deliveries will fall well short of the actual need in Gaza. Nor are Jordan or the Emirates particularly good candidates for this kind of operation; the Emirates have only about a dozen suitable tactical or strategic airlifters at their disposal, while Jordan has even fewer.

The most promising sign of real change came on the very day that this episode was written, July the twenty-seventh, when the IDF announced a ten-hour-long halt of its military operations in Gaza. On the twenty-seventh, that pause was meant to coincide with the drop of Jordanian and Emirati aid, but according to Israeli officials, those stops will now happen daily in several areas, while the IDF establishes secure routes for convoys to bring food and medicine into Gaza from six in the morning, to eleven at night, each day.

According to Israel, those aid shipments will include deliveries from the United Nations, in what the chief of aid for the UN, Tom Fletcher, described to international press as a one-week window to drastically scale up aid deliveries. Fletcher indicated that up to a hundred truckloads of aid could move into Gaza, which they will have done by the time this episode is released, if Israel’s statements are genuine. At the time of writing, there are still many important details that have yet to be revealed to the public, but by the time this episode is released, we hope that global headlines will show that food and medicine really is being surged into Gaza by legitimate humanitarian groups.

Ceasefire Talks Collapse and Uncertain Future

Nevertheless, the outcome that international advocacy groups want most of all, a ceasefire to end the war and start a more permanent surge of humanitarian aid, appears no closer today than it’s ever been. On the twenty-fourth of July, the United States announced that it was withdrawing from the latest round of ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas in Qatar, with special envoy Steve Witkoff accusing Hamas of a “lack of desire to reach a ceasefire.”

Said Witkoff: “While the mediators have made a great effort, Hamas does not appear to be coordinated or acting in good faith. We will now consider alternative options to bring the hostages home and try to create a more stable environment for the people of Gaza.” Israel confirmed that it, too, had withdrawn its negotiators from the talks, after Hamas issued its response to a ceasefire proposal that Israel and the US had put forward.

The nature of the ‘alternative options’ that Israel and the US will pursue is currently unknown, but the options could be anything from a renewed campaign of airstrikes, to an expanded ground invasion, to the start of implementation of a plan that would see Gaza entirely depopulated, and its people resettled to third nations against their will. Said US President Donald Trump on Friday the twenty-fifth: “I think they want to die. And it’s very bad. And it got to be to a point where you’re going to have to finish the job.”

The Fundamental Reality: Israel’s Control Over Gaza’s Fate

Despite the international backlash, despite the intense outcry by humanitarian organizations, the reality of Gaza’s situation is quite simple. Until, and unless, Israel decides to drastically overhaul its approach to aid distribution, this situation will not change. A drip-feeding of aid, through a single week of ground deliveries and intermittent airdrops, will not be enough.

It’s Israel, backed up by the United States, that chooses how aid is distributed in Gaza, when and where it’s distributed, and how many people are going to die while aid distribution takes place. This, the current state of affairs in the Gaza Strip, is what Israel has chosen, and no matter how forceful the denials from Jerusalem or the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, the overwhelming evidence shows that over a thousand Gazan civilians have been killed.

The situation now is untenable, and it’s impossible to say for sure what might happen if things continue to evolve on their current course. But unless something changes fast, this situation will find ways to keep on getting worse, and it’ll be the civilian population of Gaza that pays the price.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)?

The GHF is a US-based aid distribution organization founded in February 2025, incorporated in Delaware and Geneva, backed by both the Israeli government and the Trump administration. It operates four distribution points in Gaza that open once weekly, replacing the previous UN system. The organization receives $140 million monthly, attributed mostly to unnamed private donors, and is currently led by former USAID manager John Acree and evangelical Christian leader Johnnie Moore after founding director Jake Wood resigned.

Why did Jake Wood resign from the GHF?

Jake Wood, co-founder of Team Rubicon and the GHF’s initial director, resigned on May 25, 2025, just one day before operations began. He stated that while he was asked to build the GHF to feed hungry people and address security concerns, it became clear that implementing the plan while strictly adhering to humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence was impossible — meaning those goals were mutually exclusive.

What happened at the first GHF distribution on May 27, 2025?

At Tel al-Sultan refugee camp, crowd control was inadequate and American contractors withdrew almost immediately after laying out aid boxes. As the crowd surged forward, IDF troops fired warning shots, and according to eyewitnesses and the Gaza Health Ministry, IDF tanks and soldiers fired into the crowd. The final count was 17 killed, 86 wounded, and 5 missing, with UN officials confirming most injuries came from IDF gunfire. Israel denied firing on the crowd.

Is there evidence that Hamas is systematically stealing aid?

No. An internal US government analysis in late June 2025 catalogued 156 incidents of stolen or lost US-funded aid between October 2023 and May 2025 and found no indication Hamas benefited at large scale — in fact, over a quarter of those incidents were attributable to the Israeli military. Two senior IDF officials also told the New York Times that the IDF itself has never found proof of systemic Hamas aid theft and that the UN’s delivery systems were actually quite effective.

What is the current food situation in Gaza?

Gaza receives approximately 28 trucks of aid daily — less than 6% of the 500 trucks needed. Every person in Gaza faces acute food insecurity, 70,000 children need urgent treatment for acute malnutrition, and nearly one-third of the population is not eating for consecutive days. Over 116,000 metric tons of food, enough to feed one million people for four months, is ready to enter Gaza if the blockade is lifted.

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• https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165396
• https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4rwrkdlzxo
• https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-gaza-humanitarian-foundation-says-20-people-killed-crush-2025-07-16/
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/11/killed-gaza-food-hubs-aid-convoy-routes-since-end-may-un
• https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3n04w19qlo
• https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-07-20-2025-2b494af89d710793bc6933f5ae437566
• https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/20/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-military-evacuation.html
• https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/16/world/middleeast/gaza-aid-site-stampede-ghf.html
• https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-gaza-ghf-aid-un-3c1bef17093a2a3eeda0764c220b857b
• https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-deliberately-at-unarmed-gazans-waiting-for-humanitarian-aid/00000197-ad8e-de01-a39f-ffbe33780000
• https://www.npr.org/2025/06/28/nx-s1-5448875/netanyahu-slams-israeli-media-report-that-idf-soldiers-were-ordered-to-shoot-at-aid-sites
• https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/gaza-evidence-points-to-israels-continued-use-of-starvation-to-inflict-genocide-against-palestinians/
• https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp863mln0pmo
• https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/27/israeli-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-at-unarmed-gaza-aid-seekers-report
• https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/27/middleeast/idf-gaza-aid-distribution-orders-intl-latam