How Can Ukraine Protect Itself After the War? A Strategic Analysis

The war in Ukraine will not last forever. For nearly three years, the beleaguered forces of Kyiv have stood firm against the tide of a hungry, ruthless, and exponentially more powerful neighbor. Russia has worked to take everything that Ukraine has and everything that Ukraine is, but its initial plans have long since gone to ruin.

As a blunted offensive gave way to a calcified front line, and peripheral exchanges of territory proved insufficient to upset the balance, both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian War have felt themselves slip into a grinding stalemate. Both sides maintain visions for peace that remain starkly and irreconcilably opposed. Yet, the critical question is what will come after the fighting stops.

Once this war concludes, the nation of Ukraine will face a near-impossible task: to put itself back together while simultaneously standing on guard against an enemy it cannot trust to cease hostilities. From the moment Kyiv signs whatever peace accord it ultimately agrees to, an all-out sprint will begin for Ukraine to arm and prepare itself for a second Russian invasion fast enough that it can stop such an attack from ever taking place. Securing the nation requires examining how Ukraine can protect itself once this war ends, and assessing how each available option might either keep it safe for decades to come, or doom it to obliteration.

Defining the Parameters of a Post-War Peace Settlement

When discussing how Ukraine might guarantee its security after the war, the most important factor to note is that it all depends on how the conflict ends. It is easy to propose a ceasefire, but it is far harder to articulate what that actually means. The cessation of hostilities could mean the guns fall silent tomorrow along the line of contact, leaving a chunk of Russia’s Kursk region in Kyiv’s hands, and a far bigger chunk of Ukraine in Moscow’s.

Alternatively, it could mean protracted negotiations and difficult strategic tradeoffs. Given this complexity, exploring all the different ways the conflict might end is necessary to determine who might hold the upper hand in any peace talks. Broadly speaking, there are four possibilities defining the spectrum of outcomes.

One scenario, considered among the least likely, envisions Ukraine regaining the upper hand on the battlefield, driving Russia back in key areas, and winding up regaining all territory lost since February of 2022—or potentially even since 2014. To be blunt, this would take a miracle, such as Vladimir Putin being felled by a stroke, or a sudden political shift resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars in equipment flowing into Ukraine. Because black swan events cannot be predicted, analysts largely discount this outcome.

Likewise, the scenario of a total Russian victory can be heavily discounted. This outcome is still anticipated by observers on social media who claim every Kremlin setback is part of Putin’s masterplan, and that Kyiv is perpetually three days from Putin’s grasp. However, even if the Ukrainian army completely collapsed in one sector of the front, Russia’s military is still so battered and incohesive today that a full victory is a remote possibility.

That leaves just two realistic scenarios: a stalemate in which Ukraine has the upper hand, and one in which Russia is on top. While such outcomes both involve effective stalemates and negotiations to end the fighting, the flavor of ceasefire varies wildly between the two. In an optimistic scenario for Kyiv, Moscow might be forced to withdraw from the parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts that it has conquered, thereby breaking Putin’s land bridge to Crimea.

In an optimistic outcome for Moscow, Ukraine might be forced to surrender all four annexed oblasts, plus Crimea, to the war criminal in the Kremlin. Beyond that territorial calculus, the strength or weakness of Kyiv in negotiations could have outsize impacts. A weak Ukraine forced into neutrality will have a much harder time defending its sovereignty than a Ukraine which is able to pivot to the West and secure a defense pact with NATO.

Analyzing the military trajectories is essential to determine whether a ceasefire will favor a stronger Russia or a fortified Ukraine.

The Manpower Crisis and the Weight of Attrition

Arguments supporting an unfavorable outcome for Kyiv center heavily on the exhaustion and overextension of the Ukrainian armed forces. After a new mobilization bill failed to generate the expected number of reserves, manpower is running dangerously low, and as a result, morale is starting to crater. John Helin of the Black Bird Group recently wrote that painting the current situation as anything but bleak for Ukraine is downright irresponsible.

While official casualty figures are not publicly released, analysts who have visited the frontlines report that the effects are all too obvious. Dara Massicot, who shared her observations after returning from a research trip, noted that Ukraine is facing a severe shortage of manpower, particularly in infantry. Mobilization has not brought relief, leaving force employment issues as a critical challenge and manpower precariously stretched across the front.

Exactly why mobilization has not brought the expected relief remains up for debate. The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) has noted the problems with exempting Ukraine’s 18-to-24 demographic from combat, a policy driven by low birth rates dating back to 2006. While conscription has been extended to men aged 25 to 27, bringing thousands more into the ranks, an unknown number are dodging the draft.

Furthermore, Kyiv’s choice in how to deploy mobilized personnel has drawn scrutiny. The military has often opted to form brand-new brigades rather than incorporating recruits into existing formations. Analysts on the War on the Rocks podcast frequently criticize this approach, noting that inexperienced new brigades are unlikely to be fully effective, while highly valuable veteran soldiers are steadily attrited out of the fight.

Compounding the manpower crisis is the sheer length of the frontline Ukraine must defend. Stretching from the south of Kherson oblast all the way up to Kharkiv, securing this swath of land requires unbelievable numbers of troops. Adding the estimated 30,000 personnel currently holding territory in Russia’s Kursk oblast clarifies why a lack of manpower is a major issue.

Russia is concurrently experiencing its own immense manpower issues. British intelligence estimates that Moscow has been losing an average of over 1,000 men a day killed and wounded since late spring of 2024, a phenomenal number. Skyrocketing signing bonuses attest to the difficulties the Kremlin faces in attracting new recruits.

Yet, those difficulties are so far not insurmountable. Most analysts estimate that Russia is still managing to bring in around 25,000 new men each month, almost as many as it needs to replace battlefield losses. While these recruits are of painfully low quality, they are still able to make headway against exhausted and undermanned Ukrainian units despite devastating losses.

This disparity illustrates why an unfavorable ceasefire may be likely for Kyiv. Regardless of fighting spirit or innovative drone warfare, holding the frontline requires sufficient personnel. As analyst Michael Kofman quoted a Slavic proverb regarding Russian and Ukrainian attrition rates: while the fat man gets thinner, the thin man starves to death.

In a grinding war, Russia’s greater population reserves mean it can simply outlast Kyiv.

Bottlenecks in the Russian Defense Industry

Despite the grim manpower calculus facing Ukraine, a counter-argument emerges when analyzing the state of Russia’s economy and arms production. Ever since Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed in the summer of 2023, a growing chorus of onlookers has claimed that the war is effectively unwinnable. Observing the performance of the Russian economy under sanctions and the massive uptick in weaponry production, many conclude that Moscow simply has more stamina.

However, this is not the only way of interpreting the data. Recent deep-dive analyses published by The Economist and Foreign Policy suggest that while the short-term outlook appears stable, the Kremlin is likely to soon face spectacularly painful bottlenecks. Marc R.

DeVore from the University of St. Andrews’ School of International Relations and finance professor Alexander Mertens specifically highlight looming crises in the production of large-caliber cannons and infantry fighting vehicles. Large-caliber cannons are essential for artillery systems and main battle tanks.

Manufacturing these barrels requires highly specialized rotary forges, of which Russia possesses only two. Importing additional machinery is virtually impossible, as the market is dominated by GFM, an Austrian company. Working at full capacity, each of these domestic forges can produce roughly ten barrels a month.

This output starkly contrasts with battlefield attrition. Analysts estimate that Russia has been losing an average of more than 100 tanks and roughly 220 artillery pieces per month. Consequently, Russia is losing approximately 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels a month while possessing the industrial capacity to produce only 20.

A parallel crisis is unfolding within the production of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Moscow has lost nearly 5,000 of these crucial assets since the war began, averaging 155 vehicle losses per month. Russian defense contractors can produce an estimated 200 IFVs per year, or about 17 per month, an output entirely insufficient to offset battlefield destruction.

At the outset of the war, Russia boasted massive stockpiles of weapons and vehicles left over from the Soviet era, which it eagerly utilized to offset equipment losses. However, these deep reserves are not inexhaustible. As Mertens and DeVore write, the Kremlin cannot expand production fast enough to replace weapons at the rate they are being lost.

Sometime in the second half of 2025, Russia will face severe shortages across several weapon categories, potentially culminating its offensive capability and handing Ukraine crucial leverage.

The Ticking Clock on Russia’s Economic Stability

The industrial shortfalls facing the Russian military are dangerously compounded by emerging macroeconomic instabilities. Agathe Demarais, a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the Russian economy is significantly more fragile than official Kremlin figures suggest. Moscow is spending aggressively to simultaneously prosecute the war and shield its citizens from the impact of sanctions.

This involves forcing banks to issue real estate loans at 8 percent, despite base interest rates exceeding 20 percent, with the state subsidizing the difference. The government also plans to spend $431 billion over six years on domestic initiatives, including youth camps in Crimea, annual ten percent minimum wage hikes, and new student accommodations. Furthermore, the Russian government has allocated 40 percent of all public spending in 2025 specifically for military expenses, with additional funds earmarked for national security.

Sustaining this largesse requires robust financing mechanisms, which are rapidly eroding. Revenues from the state gas monopoly, Gazprom, have severely dried up after cutting Europe off, resulting in annual company losses approaching $6 billion. Efforts to issue sovereign debt on global bond markets have been hampered by Western sanctions, while domestic bond sales have been canceled due to a lack of investor interest.

To keep the wartime economy afloat, Moscow is aggressively depleting its National Wealth Fund (NWF). The liquid reserves of the NWF have shrunk by more than half since the start of the conflict, dropping to just $54 billion by September 2024. The government has entirely ceased saving money.

Looking ahead, the remaining liquid reserves of the NWF cover only about a year and a half of the projected budget deficit. The Central Bank of Russia has warned that if global growth were to contract, these liquid reserves could vanish in less than a year. Combined with stubbornly high inflation, an overheating economy, and what appears to be a housing bubble, Russia may be heading for painful economic dislocations in late 2025.

If these financial crises coincide with critical bottlenecks in heavy weapons manufacturing, the Kremlin could be compelled to rapidly terminate the war, allowing Ukraine to secure a favorable ceasefire.

The Imperative of Western Security Guarantees

If Ukraine is to successfully protect its sovereignty after the war, any peace settlement must include robust security guarantees. Vladimir Putin has consistently stated that guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality will be a core part of any peace deal, asserting in late 2024 that good-neighborly relations are impossible without it. The Kremlin’s resistance to security guarantees helped sink early peace negotiations in the spring of 2022.

For Kyiv, neutrality is effectively code for defenselessness. Without allies, possessing a battered military, and lacking the vast resources required to reconstruct at Russia’s pace, any neutral Ukraine will only remain sovereign until Russia inevitably regroups and re-invades. As the Atlantic Council assessed, imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring durable peace to Europe; it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion.

Consequently, any viable peace outcome must permit Ukraine to forge enduring strategic alliances. The most definitive guarantee would be full membership in NATO. For all his bluster, Putin knows that Russia would lose a war with NATO as surely as Bluey would lose a fight with Cujo.

There is a reason Moscow has not tried to do to the Baltic States what it is doing to Ukraine. However, securing unanimous consent for Ukrainian ascension remains a formidable diplomatic hurdle, as most NATO states are not keen on a direct war with Russia. Hungarian leader Viktor Orban has been open about blocking such a move, while Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico stated he would never agree to Ukraine in NATO.

Other member states, including Germany, the United States, Slovenia, Spain, and Belgium, have also expressed deep doubts. To bypass these political obstacles, strategists have proposed variations of the Cold War-era West Germany model, where only the democratic half of the country was placed under the NATO umbrella. Czech President Petr Pavel recently advocated for a similar framework, suggesting that full restoration of territorial control is not a strict prerequisite for NATO entry.

A temporary demarcation line could be established, bringing the Ukrainian-controlled territory into the alliance. This would mean Russia effectively declares war on NATO if it moved one inch west of the ceasefire line, while the alliance would have no duty to step in over events in occupied regions like Crimea or Donbas. Historian Mary Sarotte outlined how this could work, suggesting Ukraine define a militarily defensible border and agree not to permanently station troops or nuclear weapons unless threatened.

Even a NATO-lite model, where robust support ensures that any renewed attack quickly escalates into a wider conflict, could provide the security necessary for reconstruction and refugee return.

Active Deterrence and the Demilitarized Zone Strategy

Establishing a secure border requires practical tactical strategies alongside political alliances. Assuming Ukraine is not completely isolated from Western partners, Kyiv must approach the challenge of physical defense from day one. Russia could simply sign a peace accord, reconsolidate its forces after learning the lessons of its failed 2022 blitzkrieg, and return for a favorable second attempt.

The traditional response would involve surging troops to fortified forward operating bases, building physical defenses, and preparing for a head-on rematch. A more experienced Ukrainian military, equipped with thousands of NATO-style tanks and modern combat jets, would attempt to hold the line. However, returning to grinding attritional warfare ignores Ukraine’s severe demographic constraints and the realities of modern missile warfare.

Instead, Ukraine can look to the historical precedent established on the Korean Peninsula. North and South Korea are separated by a heavily fortified, highly dangerous demilitarized zone (DMZ). While both sides maintain manned fortifications and guard towers, the most effective deterrents are passive: dense minefields, anti-tank barriers, and a geographic buffer completely devoid of civilians.

This zone can be pounded by artillery or tactical missiles without collateral damage. Ukraine and Russia could replicate this model, potentially designating a wide strip of land as a demilitarized zone during peace negotiations. Alternatively, Ukraine could unilaterally carve out a fortified band of its own territory—spanning a few dozen or over a hundred kilometers deep—creating a passive defensive perimeter that neutralizes Russia’s initial strike capabilities.

Top strategic voices endorse this approach. Mykhailo Podolyak, a top advisor to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, advocated for a demilitarized zone of 100 to 120 kilometers inside Russia along the shared border. Practically, a DMZ might have to be established on Ukrainian territory.

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis suggested creating a patrol strip, potentially five to ten miles wide, separating the opposing forces, possibly monitored by neutral United Nations peacekeepers from Latin America or Africa. Furthermore, Ukraine retains the option to foster long-running insurgencies within the occupied territories. Although eastern regions like the Donbas are heavily Russified, cultivating an asymmetric insurgent movement would present a constant strategic thorn in Moscow’s side, degrading its military readiness and complicating any preparations for a renewed invasion.

Building a Porcupine Defense Architecture

In a scenario where immediate, full-scale NATO membership is off the table, Ukraine must adopt an alternative deterrence framework. The most compelling model is Taiwan’s porcupine strategy, designed to counter the People’s Republic of China. Acknowledging that it cannot defeat a vastly larger adversary in a symmetric conventional war, Taiwan focuses on stockpiling massive quantities of specialized munitions.

The strategic objective is to ensure that even in victory, the invading force would suffer unrecoverable losses, compelling Beijing to continually reassess the cost of invasion. For Ukraine to pursue a similar strategy, it requires specific, highly lethal weapons to overwhelm local Russian defenses and filet advancing columns. Central to this architecture is the massive proliferation of drones and precision fires.

Medium-range missiles and advanced autonomous systems would grant Ukraine the ability to launch preemptive strikes against Russian troop buildups. On the tactical level, swarms of short-range consumer drones, highly mobile light vehicles, and specialized asymmetric units would enable Ukraine to bleed Russian armored columns on their way in. By concentrating advanced tanks, precision artillery, and explosive kamikaze drones closer to the capital and key logistical hubs, Ukraine can maximize defensive efficiency against an enemy that has already sustained heavy attrition traversing a fortified border.

The ultimate deterrent within this porcupine strategy relies on deep-strike capabilities. If Ukraine can ensure that a theoretical march on Kyiv simultaneously results in the devastating bombardment of targets deep inside Moscow, it provides an unprecedented deterrent against a second invasion. While Russia relies on nuclear posturing to deter such strikes, a Ukraine already fighting an existential conventional invasion will see little practical difference between conventional destruction and nuclear annihilation.

Furthermore, Ukraine faces internal demographic and training constraints that necessitate asymmetric solutions. The country has struggled to get personnel into complex combat roles; for example, a relative lack of pilot recruits for its F-16s combined with a lack of NATO training capacity led Ukraine to tell American legislators in mid-2024 that it would happily enlist retired NATO F-16 pilots. Addressing these fundamental weaknesses through a technology-heavy porcupine strategy allows Ukraine to do more with significantly fewer warm bodies.

Forging Independent Global Arms Partnerships

The strategic implications of Ukraine’s post-war trajectory extend globally. As the nation pivots toward reconstruction, it will not operate as a passive dependent. Ukraine has taken proactive steps to ensure its defense industry can become a powerhouse during peacetime.

In 2023, a full thirty-seven percent of Ukraine’s GDP was funneled into its military, equivalent to over sixty-four billion dollars before international aid. The nation expanded domestic weapons production by an incredible six hundred percent. By late 2024, President Zelenskyy announced the capacity to produce four million drones annually.

NATO members will likely be overjoyed to accept a new defense-industrial partner and sign contracts to procure Ukrainian drones and munitions. Crucially, Ukraine is strategically positioned to forge powerful bilateral arms relationships that bypass the NATO alliance structure. NATO is not constrained by rules except those it chooses, and routinely interacts with Global Partners like Australia, Pakistan, and Japan, or via the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Beyond NATO, South Korea is expanding its footprint as a global arms supplier, offering platforms like the FA-50 fighter jet, K-9 self-propelled howitzers, and air defense systems. These provide low-cost, highly effective tools for rapid Ukrainian rearmament. Concurrently, Poland is positioning itself as Europe’s leader on continental defense, creating the foundation for profound bilateral cooperation between Warsaw and Kyiv.

Turkey is also collaborating with Ukraine on critical aerospace projects, including engines for its forthcoming fifth-generation Kaan fighter aircraft. By embedding itself within the global arms market as a major player, Ukraine can overcome Russia’s economic advantage. Furthermore, the persistent presence of Western special operations forces—acknowledged in 2023 leaked documents indicating troops from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Latvia, and the Netherlands in advisory roles—guarantees ongoing tactical interoperability.

Russia will still retain some capacity to meddle, relying on economic leverage, sabotage, or international pressure at the United Nations. Russia can attempt to set terms prohibiting NATO membership or insisting on arms controls, but it cannot force Ukraine to choose appeasement. After spending decades tiptoeing through the post-Soviet international order only to be invaded, Ukraine’s leaders and people have no appetite left to appease a man in Moscow who has proven his appetite insatiable.

Armed with domestic innovation and powerful global partnerships, Ukraine will play to win its long-term sovereignty.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are the four possible outcomes for how the war in Ukraine might end?

Analysts broadly define a spectrum of four scenarios. The least likely envisions Ukraine regaining all territory lost since 2022, which would require an extraordinary black swan event. An outright Russian total victory is also heavily discounted given how battered the Russian military has become. The two realistic scenarios are a stalemate favoring Ukraine—potentially forcing Moscow to withdraw from parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia—and a stalemate favoring Russia, which could compel Kyiv to surrender all four annexed oblasts and Crimea.

Why does Ukraine face such a severe manpower shortage?

Ukraine’s mobilization has failed to generate the expected number of reserves for several reasons. The country has exempted its 18-to-24 demographic from combat due to low birth rates dating back to 2006, an unknown number of eligible men are dodging the draft, and the military has often formed new brigades rather than reinforcing veteran units. Analysts describe the resulting force employment as critically stretched, with the frontline running from southern Kherson all the way to Kharkiv plus roughly 30,000 troops holding territory in Russia’s Kursk oblast.

What are Russia’s looming industrial and economic vulnerabilities?

Russia is losing roughly 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels per month but can produce only 20, because it possesses only two specialized rotary forges. A parallel crisis exists in infantry fighting vehicles, with Moscow losing about 155 per month against a production capacity of roughly 17. At the macroeconomic level, the liquid reserves of the National Wealth Fund have shrunk by more than half to $54 billion, covering only about a year and a half of the projected budget deficit, with the Central Bank warning that a global growth contraction could exhaust those reserves in under a year.

What is the West Germany model proposed for Ukrainian NATO membership?

Czech President Petr Pavel and historian Mary Sarotte have advocated extending NATO’s security umbrella only to the territory firmly under Ukrainian control, drawing on how West Germany joined NATO during the Cold War without reunifying the country first. A temporary demarcation line would be established bringing Ukrainian-controlled territory into the alliance, meaning Russia would effectively be declaring war on NATO if it moved west of the ceasefire line, while the alliance would have no obligation to intervene in occupied regions like Crimea or Donbas.

What is the porcupine strategy and how would it apply to Ukraine?

Taiwan’s porcupine strategy focuses on stockpiling massive quantities of specialized munitions to ensure that even a victorious invader suffers unrecoverable losses. For Ukraine, this means proliferating medium-range missiles, autonomous drone swarms, and deep-strike capabilities able to bombard targets deep inside Russia, deterring a second invasion by making the cost prohibitive. Ukraine already has the capacity to produce four million drones annually and has expanded its domestic weapons production by 600 percent, providing a strong foundation for this approach.

Sources

1. https://x.com/MassDara/status/1856793585225797796
2. https://x.com/J_JHelin/status/1857051722679504985
3. https://cepa.org/article/a-sobering-moment-in-the-ukraine-war/
4. https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/32799/ukraine-research-trip-notes-fall-2024-part-1/
5. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/imposing-neutrality-on-ukraine-will-not-stop-putin-or-bring-peace-to-europe/
6. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/14/russia-war-putin-economy-weapons-production-labor-shortage-demographics/
7. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/11/18/vladimir-putin-is-in-a-painful-economic-bind
8. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/europe/trump-ukraine-russia-peace.html
9. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/28/russia-economy-spending-sanctions-budget-war-ukraine/
10. https://www.ft.com/content/b70972d6-3e7f-4a87-8bc5-ac0699f6e7fc
11. https://x.com/shashj/status/1857066380933190108
12. https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-ukraine-nato-membership-aspirations-twitter/
13. https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-nato-bid-us-germany/
14. https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-pavel-do-nato-by-mohla-vstoupit-i-okupovana-ukrajina-40484662
15. https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1857531422740791590
16. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-aide-proposes-post-war-demilitarised-zone-russia-2023-05-29/
17. https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/ukraine-and-russia-can-find-peace-with-a-dmz/
18. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/coming-ukrainian-insurgency
19. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/05/russia-ukraine-insurgency/
20. https://www.csis.org/analysis/scenario-analysis-ukrainian-insurgency
21. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/22/ukraine-russia-war-weapons-nato-f16-tanks-deterrence-peace-strategy/
22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/08/putin-russia-ukraine-war-strategy/
23. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-porcupine-model-nato-membership-russia-invasion/32429441.html
24. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ending-the-war-in-ukraine-requires-something-for-everyone-to-hate/
25. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2510-2.html
26. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2500/RRA2510-2/RAND_RRA2510-2.pdf
27. https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/eight-new-points-on-the-porcupine-more-ukrainian-lessons-for-taiwan/
28. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/backstopping-ukraines-long-term-security-toward-an-atlantic-asian-security-community/
29. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/looking-beyond-the-war-planning-for-ukraines-reconstruction.html
30. https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2024/postwar-ukraine-planning-for-a-successful-and-secure.html
31. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-wartime-economy-is-performing-surprisingly-well/
32. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/747858/IPOL_BRI
33. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/ukraine-whats-the-global-economic-impact-of-russias-invasion
34. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ramps-up-arms-production-can-produce-4-million-drones-year-zelenskiy-2024-10-02/
35. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-targets-value-added-production-reshape-wartime-economy-2024-11-12/
36. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/ukraine-seeks-retired-pilots-capable-of-flying-f16fighters
37. https://thedefensepost.com/2024/06/07/ukraine-pilots-f16-training/
38. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218
39. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-make-fresh-push-common-arms-standards-2024-10-16/
40. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69269.htm
41. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1303432/total-bilateral-aid-to-ukraine/
42. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/11/taking-the-pulse-would-freezing-ukraines-nato-membership-process-advance-peace?lang=en
43. https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-nato-membership-summit-4156df4062e69e0da38e7c18bf657285
44. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
45. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-innovative-defense-industry-can-play-a-key-role-in-western-security/
46. https://www.csis.org/events/future-ukraines-defense-industrial-base
47. https://warontherocks.com/2024/08/south-koreas-growing-role-as-a-major-arms-exporter-future-prospects-in-latin-america/
48. https://www.stimson.org/2024/will-south-koreas-defense-industry-boom-change-u-s-rok-military-relations/
49. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65245065