Ethiopia’s federal government, emboldened by the decisive role drones played in ending the Tigray War, has increasingly turned to unmanned aerial vehicles as its primary weapon against guerrilla insurgencies in the Amhara and Oromia regions. But what worked against a conventional-style army moving in identifiable columns has proven catastrophic when deployed against decentralized rebel groups that blend into civilian populations. The result is a mounting toll of dead civilians — including children, pregnant women, and health workers — struck in marketplaces, schools, hospitals, and homes. With both the government and rebel forces showing no appetite for negotiation, and with drone strikes escalating to levels approaching the height of the Tigray War, Ethiopia’s air campaign threatens to deepen a humanitarian crisis that has already claimed thousands of lives.
The Tigray War: Where Ethiopia Learned to Love Drones
The roots of Ethiopia’s current drone strategy trace back to the summer of 2021, during what was perhaps only the second major conflict in history — after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War — to be decided by the use of drones. As a Tigrayan column advanced on the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, threatening to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the government responded by unleashing newly acquired UAVs from Turkey and the UAE. The Tigrayan army, which had been functioning more like a state military than an insurgent group — well-armed, well-trained, and moving in identifiable columns — was devastated. The rebels were driven all the way back to their stronghold in Tigray Region, and when the war concluded a year later, it ended in a government victory.
For most military analysts in the pre-Ukraine era, the fate of the Tigrayan forces was simply another data point confirming that drones were poised to change the face of warfare. But for the Ethiopian government, the lesson apparently went much deeper. They appear to have become convinced that UAVs were a magic bullet for any conflict.
Key Takeaways
- Ethiopia’s federal government established a dedicated drone unit after the Tigray War, primarily using Turkish TB2s and Chinese models, and has made airstrikes a central pillar of its counterinsurgency strategy.
- According to ACLED data, at least 52 drone strikes were recorded in Amhara region as of December 3rd, with a combined death toll of nearly 450 — a figure some advocacy groups say is closer to 750.
- Drone strikes have hit marketplaces, elementary schools, health centers, and civilian vehicles, killing farm laborers, children, pregnant women, and health workers.
- The current conflicts in Amhara and Oromia are guerrilla insurgencies where rebels blend with civilian populations, unlike the Tigray War where Tigrayan forces operated like a conventional state army moving in identifiable columns.
- The Fano militias rose up against the government after feeling betrayed by the Tigray peace agreement’s implication that Western Tigray would be removed from Amhara control, and by orders to disarm while Tigrayan forces retained 200,000 soldiers.
Not long after the Tigray War ended, the Ethiopian air force established a dedicated drone unit, mostly equipped with Turkish TB2s and Chinese models. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), airstrikes from drones have since become ‘a key part of the government’s strategy to combat anti-government militias.‘
From Conventional War to Guerrilla Insurgency: A Fatal Mismatch
The critical problem with Ethiopia’s drone-centric approach is that the current conflicts bear almost no resemblance to the Tigray War. In that earlier conflict, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front fielded forces that operated like a conventional state army, moving in columns that could be identified and targeted from the air. Drones were devastatingly effective in that context.
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By contrast, the civil conflicts now gripping Ethiopia are guerrilla insurgencies. In Amhara region, the Fano militias operate with a decentralized structure and enjoy broad support in the countryside — by some estimates, as much as 80 percent of rural areas in Amhara region are either contested or still under Fano control. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) tends to operate in remote areas that are difficult for soldiers to access on the ground.
In both cases, rebels blend in with — and overlap with — the civilian population. Deploying precision strike weapons against such targets, in populated areas, has led to what can only be described as inevitable tragedies.
The Civilian Death Toll: Marketplaces, Schools, and Hospitals
The scale of civilian harm from Ethiopia’s drone campaign is staggering and well-documented by multiple independent sources. On November 5th, drones bombed the town of Zibist in the restive Amhara region. According to the government, the target was members of the Fano militias. But ACLED reports that the strikes hit a marketplace, an elementary school, and a health center, killing 43 people. Among the dead were thirteen children and several pregnant women, including health workers.
This was far from an isolated incident. New Humanitarian reported in March that a drone strike on a town in the South Wollo zone of Amhara region destroyed a truck carrying dozens of civilians. DW has documented that drones have killed farm laborers and have targeted essential facilities including schools, hospitals, and private homes.
As of December 3rd, ACLED had recorded 52 drone strikes in Amhara region since the rebellion erupted, with a combined death toll of nearly 450. The Amhara Association in North America claims this is an undercount, putting the real death toll closer to 750. In Oromia, the picture is similarly grim. New Humanitarian reports that drones have become an integral part of the military’s efforts against the OLA, and that in one of the bloodiest strikes, at least nearly 70 people were killed in a village in Oromia’s West Shewa district in October 2022.
Cavalier Warfare or Collective Punishment?
The mounting civilian casualties have raised two grim possibilities. The first is that Ethiopia’s federal government is prosecuting the rebellion in such a cavalier manner that it is simply oblivious to the growing civilian toll. The second — and more disturbing — possibility is that ordinary Amhara civilians are being targeted as part of a deliberate strategy of collective punishment, not unlike how the Burmese junta bombs villages in rebel-held areas.
The independent Ethiopian Human Rights Commission appeared to hint at the latter when it declared that ‘large numbers of civilians have been brutally killed by heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombardments mostly by drones.’ Given that the rebels have no access to UAVs, the only forces conducting these strikes are federal forces. Deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch, Laetitia Bader, has written that ‘the Ethiopian armed forces’ brutal killings of civilians in Amhara undercut government claims that it’s trying to bring law and order to the region.’
The government strenuously denies targeting civilians. Army chief Field Marshal Birhanu Jula recently told media that ‘when we find a group of extremists, we strike with drones. But civilians will not be targeted.’ However, such assurances ring hollow given the Ethiopian government’s track record — particularly during the Tigray War, in which a deliberate blockade and starvation campaign led to the deaths of perhaps 600,000 people, more than died during the thirteen years of Syria’s civil war.
The Roots of the Amhara Insurgency
Understanding why the Fano militias rose up against the government requires understanding the Tigray War and its aftermath. That conflict didn’t just pit Tigray region against the federal government — it also pulled in the army of neighboring Eritrea and the Fano militias of Amhara region. For the Fano, the war was an opportunity to claim the disputed land of Western Tigray, known to Amhara as Welkait. This goal was accomplished through what have been described as awful war crimes, supported by the central government, which saw the area ethnically cleansed.
It is important to note that atrocities were not committed by one side alone. A phase of the war involved a Tigrayan invasion of Amhara region in which civilians suffered devastating violence. As early as the first week of conflict, Tigrayan forces massacred dozens of Amhara in the village of Mai Kadra, triggering a revenge massacre of Tigrayans just hours later.
When the Tigray conflict ended in late 2022, one key provision of the peace agreement implied that Western Tigray would be removed from Amhara control. This caused uproar among the Fano, who had fought and died based on a government promise that Welkait would be theirs. The sense of betrayal deepened in 2023 when Addis Ababa announced it was disarming all regional militias. From the Amhara perspective, disarming would leave them vulnerable to a second invasion by Tigrayan forces, which ended the war with some 200,000 soldiers still under arms.
Rather than comply, the Fano rose up against the government.
In August 2023, a coordinated assault saw Fano militias briefly seize major cities and airports in Amhara region. Although Addis Ababa retook most urban areas within days, the Fano retreated into the mountainous countryside where they enjoy strong support. Faced with such a widespread insurgency in difficult terrain, federal forces quickly turned to the tool that had so recently won the Tigray War: drone strikes.
An Escalating Air Campaign With No End in Sight
The drone campaign is not only continuing — it is intensifying. ACLED data shows that incidents of what they classify as ‘explosives and remote violence’ in Ethiopia are now almost at the level they were during the height of the Tigray War. ACLED has also noted that clashes between Ethiopia’s army and Fano militias surged in October and appear to have stayed at high levels since.
Critically, there is little evidence that the escalation is achieving its military objectives. Braden Fuller, a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Peace Observatory, told DW: ‘I don’t see any evidence that the drone strikes are having any effect at all on the ongoing clashes involving the Fano militants in Amhara region and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia regions.’ Yet Fuller cautioned that he expected the government to keep using UAVs regardless, even as the civilian death toll mounts and the killings breed yet more resentment of Addis Ababa.
Neither side shows any inclination toward peace. At a recent event, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared: ‘As I have repeatedly stated, our brothers in the Amhara and Oromia regions will not defeat us, even if they fight for a thousand years.’ The Fano are equally defiant. One prominent militia leader told the Economist in October: ‘We believe we are months away from removing [the national government] from power.‘
The Crux of the Problem: A Strategy That Cannot Win but Will Not Stop
The fundamental dilemma at the heart of Ethiopia’s drone war is strategic as much as it is humanitarian. With a decentralized structure and broad support in the countryside, the Fano likely cannot be defeated by long-range strikes and intermittent clashes. The same applies to the OLA in Oromia’s remote terrain. Yet federal forces appear committed to this approach, suggesting that more civilian massacres are likely in the months to come.
In July, the UN marked the one-year anniversary of the Amhara conflict by somberly noting that two thousand civilians had already been killed. Unless something drastic changes — whether through negotiation, international pressure, or a fundamental shift in military strategy — it is likely that by the second anniversary, that number will be significantly higher. Ethiopia’s drone war, born from the lessons of one conflict, is now fueling the fires of another, with civilians paying the heaviest price.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What types of drones is Ethiopia using in its counterinsurgency operations?
Ethiopia’s dedicated drone unit primarily uses Turkish TB2s and Chinese models. The unit was established after the Tigray War ended, when the government concluded that UAVs were a central tool for combating anti-government militias.
How many drone strikes have occurred in Amhara region and what is the death toll?
As of December 3rd, ACLED recorded 52 drone strikes in Amhara region since the rebellion erupted, with a combined death toll of nearly 450. The Amhara Association in North America claims the real death toll is closer to 750.
What happened in the November 5th drone strike on Zibist?
Drones bombed the town of Zibist in Amhara region, hitting a marketplace, an elementary school, and a health center. The strikes killed 43 people, including thirteen children and several pregnant women, including health workers.
Why were drones so effective in the Tigray War but ineffective in the current conflicts?
In the Tigray War, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front operated like a conventional state army, moving in identifiable columns that could be targeted from the air. The current conflicts in Amhara and Oromia are guerrilla insurgencies where rebels blend with civilian populations, making drone strikes far less effective and far more likely to cause civilian casualties.
What sparked the Fano uprising in Amhara region?
The Fano rose up after feeling betrayed by two key developments: the Tigray peace agreement’s implication that Western Tigray (Welkait) would be removed from Amhara control despite their fighting for it, and the 2023 announcement that all regional militias would be disarmed while Tigrayan forces retained 200,000 soldiers under arms.
Sources
- https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-civilian-deaths-mount-from-drone-strikes-in-amhara/a-70946525
- https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/11/13/ethiopia-weekly-update-12-november-2024/
- https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-s-escalating-conflicts-leave-civilians-in-crossfire/7889328.html
- https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/05/magazine/ethiopia-civil-war-crimes.html
- https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2024/03/05/horrific-civilian-toll-ethiopia-combat-drones-local-insurgencies
- https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/12/who-fano-inside-ethiopia-amhara-rebellion
- https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/10/27/another-african-war-looms
- https://adf-magazine.com/2024/11/amhara-region-is-ethiopias-latest-battleground/
- https://acleddata.com/2024/12/09/africa-overview-november-2024/#keytrends3
