The Complete History of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: From Cold War Origins to the JCPOA Collapse

Iranian nuclear weapons represent a terrifying prospect for many in the twenty-first century. The thought of Iran gaining the bomb sends shivers down the spines of policymakers from Washington to Tel-Aviv and beyond. It is undoubtable that rogue states armed with nuclear weapons make the world less safe; it only takes one demagogue with enough power and a grudge to end human civilization as we know it.

The most alarming aspect is that leaders in Tehran may already possess the material needed to build the bomb. Iranian nuclear weapons development has been one of the most consequential, and predictable, crises of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Years of careful diplomacy and negotiation have continually faced the threat of disaster.

Understanding how the situation reached this point requires examining who started this process and why, time after time, Washington, Tehran, and other global partners could not slow an escalation that holds global implications.

The Cold War Origins of Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure

The historical context begins in 1967, the era of the space race, the Cold War, and nuclear power. The United States had just supplied one of its closest Middle East allies with a five-megawatt nuclear reactor. But this ally was not a modern partner like Israel or Saudi Arabia.

Rather, it was a state widely considered one of Washington’s greatest adversaries today: Iran. In the geopolitics of the era, today’s friends often become tomorrow’s enemies. This was not Iran as it is recognized today, a Shia republic ruled by an almighty Ayatollah.

Tehran back then was secular, with close ties to the West, especially the United States. A nuclear reactor is not given to just anyone, especially one that required weapons-grade uranium in order to work. The reasoning behind the U.S. decision was rooted in the Cold War.

The politics of the Middle East circa 1967 were unrecognizable compared to the present. Iran was a key ally of the U.S. and an important energy partner, and its pro-Western leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, acted as a bulwark against Soviet influence. By 1967, only fourteen years had passed since Operation AJAX, a CIA and MI6-backed coup that toppled the democratically elected prime minister of Iran.

The Shah was installed as a friendlier face to Western governments, and as such, Washington wanted to continue to bolster support for the regime. It was important to keep relations with Iran positive, and the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) was a way to accomplish that. The payback was the Shah putting Iran on a distinctly Western course.

His rule was characterized by cooperation with Western nations, oil wealth, and economic modernization. In 1963, for example, the White Revolution aimed to bring Iran into the modern era with land reforms, literacy campaigns, health programs, and the expansion of women’s rights.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution and Shifting Global Alliances

This historical foundation raises an obvious question regarding how relations shifted from a world where the United States freely provided a nuclear reactor to one where the idea of Tehran possessing weapons-grade uranium causes severe alarm among Pentagon planners. The shift can largely be attributed to the Shah’s growing autocratic tendencies. By 1979, the Shah had been in power for a generation, and for all his enlightened policy, he spent most of that time consolidating power.

As he centralized his strength, the Shah’s role became increasingly authoritarian. One-party rule was established in 1975, and his secret police, known as the SAVAK, became infamous for brutal repression, surveillance, torture, and the imprisonment of everyday Iranians. This dynamic, combined with widespread social reforms that had mixed popularity and an uneven wealth boom owing to the country’s vast natural resources, caused the population to become disaffected and deeply angered.

Whole segments of society turned against the Shah: intellectuals, leftists, students, lawyers, political activists, and, most importantly for the nuclear trajectory, the Islamic clergy. Protests erupted in 1978 following a series of open letters published by these groups criticizing the Shah’s accumulation of power. A cycle of protests, violence, and repression spread across the nation, with many demonstrators losing their lives in the crackdown.

On September 8, 1978, the pressure finally reached a breaking point. The Shah declared martial law, causing security forces to fire on a protest in Tehran’s Jaleh Square. One hundred people were killed in the event, now known as Black Friday.

Although the government attempted to broker peace in the aftermath, the citizens were ready to force through change by any means necessary. They wanted the Shah removed, and they had a replacement candidate: the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The situation boiled over in January 1979.

The Shah fled into self-imposed exile, Khomeini returned to overwhelming fanfare, and in March, Iranian citizens participated in a national referendum on whether to become an Islamic Republic. The referendum offered no alternatives; the Iranian people were essentially replacing one authoritarian with another. Regardless, it received national support despite tens of thousands of women taking to the streets that month to oppose the mandatory wearing of the veil.

Iran became a Shia Islamic republic under the control of a supreme leader and Ayatollah. The revolution severely affected Iran’s foreign relations. In November 1979, Iranian protestors overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding fifty-two hostages for 444 days.

This incident, combined with a growing anti-Western streak, resulted in all diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Iran being severed. From a one-time recipient of advanced American nuclear technology, Iran had fallen to the status of a U.S. adversary with remarkable speed.

The Iran-Iraq War and the Secret Pursuit of Uranium Enrichment

Relations did not improve in the 1980s, with the U.S. Department of State adding Iran to its state sponsors of terrorism list and imposing severe sanctions. Regional dynamics also deteriorated rapidly.

The Iran-Iraq War began in 1980 with Iraq’s surprise invasion. The conflict dragged on for eight long years in a brutal war of attrition. The death toll was astronomical, with estimations ranging from a minimum of 500,000 dead all the way up to two million.

This immense loss of life is critical for understanding the mentality of the Iranian leadership during this era, specifically by 1987. Iran was an international pariah that no longer had friends in Western capitals. As one of the few Shia-majority countries in the world, it was outnumbered in the Middle East by majority-Sunni nations like Saudi Arabia, not to mention Western-backed Israel.

Iran was deeply isolated and fighting a war that had killed hundreds of thousands of its people, leaving its very existence seemingly at stake. In 1987, when a Pakistani nuclear scientist offered to share secrets that could potentially help defend it from surrounding enemies, Iran accepted. Through the network of infamous nuclear proliferator Abdul Qadeer Khan, Iran gained access to designs for centrifuges capable of enriching nuclear material.

The internal message was clear: Tehran would never be so weakened again. Furthermore, Iran still possessed the nuclear reactor gifted two decades prior by the United States, a reactor that ran on weapons-grade uranium. Understanding the mechanics of weapons-grade uranium is essential to grasp exactly what Iran was pursuing.

The international community spent much of the second half of the twentieth century trying to curb nuclear proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly drafted what became the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968.

The treaty was designed to stop nations from gathering and spreading nuclear materials, requiring all signatories to submit to safeguards established by the IAEA. Iran ratified the treaty in 1970. Receiving centrifuge designs from the Qadeer Khan network was a flagrant violation of this agreement.

Prior to the revolution, Tehran’s Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) had been a major proponent of nuclear power. The Shah had announced plans in 1974 to generate 23,000 megawatts of nuclear energy over two decades. However, after 1979, that atomic potential was controlled by a new regime with different strategic purposes for uranium.

Uranium naturally contains mostly the U-238 isotope, with only about one percent being U-235, which is fissile. Introducing a neutron into a U-235 atom causes it to split, releasing energy and more neutrons in a chain reaction. To achieve a successful chain reaction for weapons, the concentration of U-235 must be artificially increased through enrichment using high-speed centrifuges.

Low-enriched uranium is around 3 to 5 percent U-235, medium is above 20 percent, and highly enriched, or weapons-grade, uranium is anything above 90 percent. Although fuel from existing reactors could theoretically be converted into weapons-grade material, doing so discreetly and at scale required Iran to enrich its own uranium from scratch. By the 1990s, this covert enrichment program was actively underway.

Exposure, Isolation, and the Early 2000s Diplomatic Impasse

Owing to the extreme secrecy of these facilities, the true extent of Iran’s nuclear proliferation remained largely hidden throughout the 1990s. In the early 2000s, however, the realities of the program were exposed to the global community. In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the Mujahideen-e Khalq organization, held a press conference revealing covert Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak.

The revelation immediately prompted intervention from the IAEA, which called for the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment a month later. This demand did little to curtail Tehran’s ambitions; in 2006, Iran announced that it had successfully enriched uranium to a low level for the first time. For Iran, pursuing nuclear capabilities was about ensuring regime security and projecting strength.

Iraq was no longer a major regional rival, but Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States all presented possible threats to Tehran. Recognizing that a nuclear-armed state has never been successfully invaded and conquered, Iran’s public announcement served as a strategic warning. The consequence of this strategy was severe international isolation.

North Korea was already facing heavy sanctions for its own nuclear tests, and the global community was unwilling to tolerate another rogue nuclear power. The permanent five members of the UN Security Council and Germany, known collectively as the P5+1, made demands that Tehran categorically refused out of principle. By 2011, Iran found itself more isolated than ever.

The U.S. Congress passed legislation cutting off the Iranian central bank from the global financial system, the European Union banned all member states from importing Iranian oil, and a total arms embargo was implemented. The impasse persisted until 2008, when the incoming Obama administration recognized the escalating danger.

By 2009, Iran had successfully launched a satellite into orbit, demonstrating the potential capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. This advancement, combined with a rapidly expanding nuclear program, presented a severe threat to Middle East stability. It threatened the sovereignty of neighboring nations and the existence of Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned in 2012 that the only way to halt Iranian proliferation was by placing a clear red line on the program. Israel’s containment strategy eventually expanded to include covert bombing campaigns, assassinations, and cyber-attacks. Western nations understood that a diplomatic solution was required before Iran could reach the point of rapid nuclear breakout.

Early negotiations collapsed, with Iran demanding the unanimous lifting of sanctions and the recognition of its right to enrich uranium. When the P5+1 rejected these conditions, Iran retaliated by announcing plans to triple its production of 20 percent enriched uranium. The subsequent banking and oil sanctions forced a reluctant Iran to allow the IAEA to investigate the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.

Negotiating with Iran proved immensely difficult, as positive diplomatic discussions were frequently undermined by further escalations, such as the opening of the Bushehr enrichment facility and the expansion of centrifuge production at Fordow and Natanz.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Breakthrough

Despite the stagnation and tension of the early 2010s, a breakthrough emerged with the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian President in June 2013. A former nuclear negotiator, Rouhani campaigned on a promise to rescue an economy that had been decimated by international sanctions. He was committed to ending Iranian isolation and brought a different approach to the heavily stalled negotiations.

Rouhani called for the resumption of serious talks with the P5+1. During the UN General Assembly that year, Iran presented a plan that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry described as a very different vision of future possibilities.

Progress aligned with the interests of all parties: Rouhani needed a domestic political victory by easing economic hardships, while the UN sought to curtail Iran’s nuclear advancements. President Obama held a direct phone call with Rouhani, marking the highest level of engagement between the United States and Iran since 1979. Shortly thereafter, the IAEA signed an interim deal with Tehran.

This momentum culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), finalized in July 2015. The terms of the agreement required Iran to blend down its stockpile of enriched uranium and adhere to strict developmental limits under intense scrutiny from IAEA inspectors. In exchange, Western nations agreed to lift the crippling economic sanctions.

The JCPOA was widely hailed as a monumental diplomatic achievement that drastically reduced the immediate threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. However, the agreement faced severe structural and political challenges from its inception. In the United States, congressional opposition was fierce.

Before the deal was even formally announced, several senators published an open letter directly to the Iranian leadership, warning that any agreement reached without legislative approval could be unilaterally reversed by the next U.S. president. Because the JCPOA was a political commitment rather than a legally binding treaty ratified by the Senate, it remained highly vulnerable to domestic political shifts. Many U.S. lawmakers distrusted Iran and argued that the deal still endangered regional allies, particularly Israel.

Furthermore, the period preceding the deal had been marked by intensive covert warfare, including cyber-attacks, assassinations, and drone strikes targeting Iranian infrastructure. Iran’s concurrent actions further eroded trust; the nation continued to ramp up its ballistic missile program, launching nuclear-capable missiles in direct violation of existing arms embargoes. While Tehran viewed these tests as necessary displays of strength, the West perceived them as provocations.

Recognizing the limits of the JCPOA, the Obama administration imposed new sanctions specifically targeting Iran’s missile program immediately after the nuclear deal was implemented. Although the agreement successfully reached its implementation day, leading to tentative sanctions relief from the U.S. and the EU, its long-term viability remained deeply uncertain.

The Trump Administration’s Withdrawal and the Death of the Deal

The fragile stability achieved by the JCPOA unraveled following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Donald Trump took a drastically different approach to the agreement, stating before his election that his primary priority was to dismantle what he termed a disastrous deal. Operating under an America First foreign policy framework, Trump criticized the JCPOA for offering the United States no tangible benefits while allowing Iran to regain access to the global economy.

Although Iran had adhered to the specific nuclear limitations, its continued ballistic missile testing suggested a lack of commitment to broader regional peace. The Trump administration argued that the financial relief provided by the deal merely fueled an anti-American regime. Viewing the agreement as fundamentally flawed because it placed Iran on an equal footing with the United States, Trump sought to negotiate from a position of maximum strength.

In May 2018, the Trump administration officially withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, initiating a process to re-impose the maximum level of economic sanctions on Iran. This decision triggered a cycle of escalation that ultimately destroyed the agreement. The withdrawal aligned with broader U.S. foreign policy objectives at the time, particularly the establishment of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab nations to create an anti-Iranian regional alliance.

However, dismantling the JCPOA severely damaged diplomatic relations between Washington and its European allies, who had previously signaled their resistance to abandoning the deal. European powers scrambled to establish financial mechanisms allowing their companies to bypass U.S. sanctions and continue legitimate business with Iran, desperate to salvage the non-proliferation safeguards. Iranian President Rouhani capitalized on the diplomatic rift by stating Iran would continue negotiations with the remaining JCPOA signatories.

By keeping France, Germany, and the United Kingdom committed to the deal, Tehran successfully drove a wedge between the United States and Europe. The Trump administration’s expectation that unprecedented sanctions would force Iran to accept a more restrictive agreement proved incorrect. Instead, Iran retaliated through aggressive escalation.

Tehran threatened to research nuclear propulsion for marine vessels, continued testing ICBMs, supplied weapons to Houthi forces in violation of arms embargoes, and systematically obstructed IAEA inspections. As the COVID-19 pandemic temporarily shifted global attention, Iran used the resulting geopolitical pause to quietly advance its nuclear priorities. The collapse of the JCPOA left the United States with no agreement, alienated allies, and a rapidly advancing Iranian nuclear program.

Nuclear Ambiguity and the Future Impact on Middle East Security

As the Biden administration assumed office in 2021, attempts were made to steer diplomatic relations back toward the JCPOA framework. Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated that the United States would honor its obligations if Iran returned to compliance. The Joint Commission of the JCPOA convened in Vienna to evaluate which sanctions required lifting and which nuclear limits needed reimposition.

However, these efforts proved insufficient. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that Iran possessed the right to enrich uranium to whatever level the country required. Geopolitical shifts further undermined negotiations; in January 2022, China imported four million barrels of Iranian oil into state reserves, bypassing U.S. sanctions and drawing Tehran closer to Beijing.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 subsequently diverted global diplomatic focus, leaving the Iranian nuclear crisis unaddressed at a critical juncture. From the Iranian perspective, returning to an agreement that could easily be nullified by a future U.S. administration offered little strategic value. Consequently, Tehran adopted a strategy of deliberate delay, advancing its nuclear capabilities while systematically renouncing its JCPOA commitments.

Iran severely curtailed its cooperation with the IAEA, demanding the permanent closure of investigations into its pre-2003 nuclear activities. The regime removed designations from senior inspectors, deactivated monitoring cameras, and blocked oversight mechanisms mandated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite facing severe censure from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States, Iran’s progress remained undeterred.

Iranian state sources indicated that the nation already possessed the necessary materials for a nuclear weapon but maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding actual weaponization. This ambiguity allows Iran to project the deterrent threat of a nuclear arsenal without openly testing a device, which would invite devastating preemptive military strikes, particularly from Israel. While Secretary Blinken warned in 2024 that Iran’s breakout time to enrich sufficient weapons-grade uranium had shrunk to mere weeks, the actual weaponization process requires additional technological advancements.

Military assessments, including those from former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley in 2023, suggested Iran could become fully nuclear-capable within months, though other estimates extend that timeline. The historical trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program—from its Cold War origins through the fraught negotiations of the 2010s and the collapse of the JCPOA—demonstrates a persistent pattern of escalation. With regional adversaries positioned well within the range of Iranian ballistic missiles, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran presents a profound threat to global stability, raising enduring questions about whether this path of atomic escalation could have been prevented.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did the United States give Iran its first nuclear reactor in 1967?

The U.S. supplied Iran with a five-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor in 1967 because Iran was then a key Cold War ally under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who acted as a bulwark against Soviet influence. Washington wanted to strengthen ties with the Shah’s pro-Western government, which cooperated on oil and modernization, and only fourteen years had passed since the CIA and MI6-backed Operation AJAX coup that installed him.

How did the 1979 Islamic Revolution transform Iran’s nuclear trajectory?

The Shah’s growing authoritarianism — one-party rule, brutal secret police, and uneven modernization — fueled a revolution that replaced his regime with Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. The new government severed diplomatic ties with the United States after Iranian protesters held fifty-two American hostages for 444 days, turning a recipient of U.S. nuclear technology into one of Washington’s greatest adversaries and dramatically reshaping the program’s purpose.

How did Iran secretly obtain centrifuge technology and why?

In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran accepted centrifuge designs from the network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan — a flagrant violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Iran had ratified in 1970. By that point Iran was an international pariah fighting an eight-year war with casualties estimated at 500,000 to two million, and isolated from both Western and many Middle Eastern nations, making nuclear capability appear essential for regime survival.

What were the terms and structural weaknesses of the 2015 JCPOA?

The JCPOA required Iran to blend down its enriched uranium stockpile and accept strict limits under intense IAEA inspection, in exchange for lifting crippling economic sanctions. However, because it was a political commitment rather than a Senate-ratified treaty, it could be reversed by any future U.S. president — a vulnerability senators warned Iran about before the deal was even announced, and which proved fatal when the Trump administration withdrew in May 2018.

What happened to Iran’s nuclear program after the JCPOA collapsed?

Following the U.S. withdrawal, Iran systematically abandoned its JCPOA commitments, severely curtailed IAEA cooperation, removed inspector designations, deactivated monitoring cameras, and dramatically accelerated uranium enrichment. Iranian state sources indicated the country possessed the necessary materials for a nuclear weapon while maintaining strategic ambiguity about weaponization. Secretary Blinken warned in 2024 that Iran’s breakout time to enrich sufficient weapons-grade uranium had shrunk to mere weeks.

Sources

1. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran
2. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisories/transcript-of-the-director-generals-press-statement-on-iran-24-september-2005
3. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/aug/08/energy.iran
4. https://www.rferl.org/a/1067592.html
5. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1747-%282007%29
6. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1737-%282006%29
7. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/cia-support-to-policymakers-the-2007-nie-on-irans-nuclear-intentions-and-capabilities/
8. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/the-new-national-intelligence-estimate-on-iran-a-step-in-the-right-directio/
9. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1803-%282008%29
10. https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=2009-004A
11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/13/iran-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-riots-tehran-election
12. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-10/secret-iranian-enrichment-facility-revealed
13. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/deal-got-away-2009-nuclear-fuel-swap-iran
14. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/2/11/iran-produces-20-per-cent-uranium
15. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1929-%282010%29
16. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11809827
17. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13351134
18. https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/fuel-plate-fabrication-plant-fpfp
19. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-05/p51-and-iran-hold-positive-talks
20. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-israel-iran/netanyahu-draws-red-line-on-irans-nuclear-program-idUSBRE88Q0GI20120928/
21. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-04/amano-reports-no-progress-iran
22. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/iran-hassan-rouhani-path-moderation
23. https://www.npr.org/2013/09/27/226716506/kerry-to-continue-looking-into-irans-nuclear-intentions
24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/22/iran-nuclear-deal-close-diplomats-geneva
25. https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive#:~:text=On%20January%2012%2C%202014%2C%20the,beginning%20on%20January%2020%2C%202014
26. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg31273/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg31273.pdf
27. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34555008
28. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/jan/17/us-sanctions-iran-ballistic-missile-program
29. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/16/iran-ballistic-missile-test-violation-un-sanctions
30. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-politics/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427D/
31. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6297
32. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iran-to-work-on-nuclear-powered-vessels-after-us-violation-of-deal-idUSKBN14213P/
33. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/
34. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/01/politics/michael-flynn-condemns-iran-actions/index.html
35. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/12/16447436/trump-iran-deal-decertify-inara
36. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom
37. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-by-iaea-director-general-yukiya-amano-13-october-2017
38. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n17/412/08/pdf/n1741208.pdf?token=CDXMkcdr9jGotUMnxJ&fe=true
39. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/12/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-waives-sanctions-but-sets-deadline-for-overhaul
40. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html
41. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/49155_en
42. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/mobile/previously-identified-irans-new-centrifuge-assembly-workshop#:~:text=June%206%2C%202018&text=On%20June%205%2C%202018%2C%20Iran’s,in%20the%20Natanz%20enrichment%20complex
43. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/08/iran-deal-trump-withdraw-us-latest-news-nuclear-agreement
44. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/11/5/what-swift-is-and-why-it-matters-in-the-us-iran-spat
45. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance-0/swift-and-sanctions#:~:text=In%20an%20isolated%20event%20in,assessment%20of%20the%20economic%20situation
46. https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/105708
47. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45729397
48. https://2017-2021.state.gov/irans-firing-of-space-launch-vehicle-defies-international-community/
49. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-new-mechanism-to-facilitate-trade-with-iran
50. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-targeted-human-rights-sanctions-series-irgc-terrorist-designations/
51. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/updated-highlights-of-survey-of-irans-advanced-centrifuges-March2023#:~:text=Overall%2C%20Iran%20has%2012%2C994%20centrifuges,and%207231%20IR%2D1%20centrifuges
52. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/31/us-to-renew-waivers-for-some-work-on-iran-nuclear-plants-report
53. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/iran-advances-nuclear-program-withdrawal-jcpoa/
54. https://apnews.com/article/e46d3bdff2bd48d9a6a87a6752e6be6f
55. https://english.khamenei.ir/news/6844/I-don-t-consider-Trump-worth-sending-a-message-to-we-won-t-negotiate
56. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48700965
57. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/govinf2019-8.pdf
58. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-49182562#:~:text=The%20US%20Department%20of%20the,in%20America%2C%20the%20department%20said
59. https://2017-2021.state.gov/new-sanctions-designations-on-irans-space-program/
60. https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-usa/uss-pompeo-says-irans-latest-nuclear-steps-raise-concern-idUSL2N27N0C8/
61. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51314171
62. https://spaceanddefense.io/irans-revolutionary-corps-launches-satellite-purpose-unknown/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20IRGC%20also%20runs,and%20its%20military%20in%20particular.%E2%80%9D
63. https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-the-u-s-resolution-extending-the-iran-arms-embargo/
64. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/29/iran-fires-underground-ballistic-missiles-for-first-time
65. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/open-source-defence-intelligence-case-studies/case-study/janes-assessment-of-iran-nuclear-programme#:~:text=In%20September%202020%20the%20Atomic,the%20facility%20from%20potential%20airstrikes
66. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/18/iran-hails-lifting-un-arms-embargo-momentous-day-sanctions-us-protests
67. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55128970
68. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-resumes-20-enrichment-fordow-amid-rising-tensions-with-us-2021-01-04/#:~:text=DUBAI%2C%20Jan%204%20
69. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/nuclear-watchdog-casts-doubt-on-iranian-claims-over-missing-footage
70. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/02/01/irans-new-space-rocket-could-double-as-a-weapon/
71. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/2/israel-sees-6-month-iran-nuclear-breakout
72. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/u-s-rescinds-trump-white-house-claim-that-all-u-n-sanctions-had-been-reimposed-o-idUSKBN2AI2Y8/
73. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-nuclear-chief-salehi-says-60-enrichment-has-started-natanz-site-2021-04-16/
74. https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_blinken-no-iran-funds-s-korea-nuclear-compliance/6203153.html
75. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html#:~:text=A%20power%20failure%20that%20appeared,been%20carried%20out%20by%20Israel
76. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/irans-next-president-ebrahim-raisi-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal/
77. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/iran-iaea-reach-monitoring-agreement
78. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-02/news/iran-accelerates-highly-enriched-uranium-production
79. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/6/iran-says-israel-attacked-its-karaj-site-to-thwart-nuclear
80. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-03/iran-told-u-s-to-unblock-10-billion-to-resume-nuclear-talks