Iran's Hidden Power Struggle: Who Really Runs Tehran After the War

On the 21st of April, with only a few hours left before the ceasefire between the United States and Iran expired, American President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that he was extending it to allow discussions to continue. For anyone in the conflict business, this counted as genuinely good news: a resumption of fighting would have inflicted even more global economic fallout. Yet the good news was not the main story. Far from it.

The main story was the reason Trump gave for extending the ceasefire. The Iranian regime, he said, was so fractured that it was unable to present a single unified proposal for Washington to consider. In some ways, a fractured Iranian regime is to be expected. The US and Israel had just killed nearly everyone in any position of real power, and some upheaval was inevitable. Still, very few observers would have predicted how acrimonious the relationships between Tehran’s competing factions would become.

Consider one episode that captures the chaos: the Iranian navy publicly branding the nation’s top negotiator an idiot in front of the entire world. These splits are more than disagreements. They represent a growing power struggle inside the regime, one that could ultimately decide the shape of the Middle East for decades to come.

Key Takeaways

The US and Israel killed nearly Iran’s entire senior leadership during the war, with the number of senior officials killed possibly as high as fifty, creating a leadership vacuum that cannot be filled on any reasonable timescale.
New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, gravely wounded in the strike that killed his father, now governs from hiding via handwritten messages carried by couriers, running the country “like the director of a board” with IRGC generals as the board members.
The IRGC, led by hardliner Ahmad Vahidi, has accumulated so much power that analysts say it now eclipses the Supreme Leader, who is described as subservient to the Guards because he owes them his position.
Iran’s negotiators function as glorified messengers rather than empowered diplomats; the IRGC recalled the delegation from talks in Islamabad after Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi showed flexibility on proxy support.
The worst-case outcome is a hyper-militarized Iran where moderates have even less power to restrain the hardliners, a regime that views the mass killings of January as a template for crushing dissent.

The thesis is stark: with most of Iran’s senior leadership dead, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has captured the state, and the version of Iran that emerges from this war may be more hardline and more dangerous than the one that entered it.

Who Is Actually Running Iran?

The campaign of assassinations that hollowed out Iran’s leadership was extraordinarily thorough. Beyond former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the dead include Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; Major General Mohammad Pakpour, commander-in-chief of the IRGC; and Aziz Nasirzadeh, the minister of defence. All told, the number of senior Iranian officials killed in the war could be as high as fifty.

The point is not to eulogize the dead but to underscore the scale of the vacuum in Tehran. Replacing even a single one of these figures would be a recruitment nightmare. Replacing all of them is simply not possible, at least not on any reasonable timescale. That reality forces an uncomfortable question: who, really, is running Iran?

The conventional answer points to Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the former Supreme Leader, chosen to succeed his father in the chaotic days after the latter’s death. But unlike his father, his power is severely constrained by a number of factors that go to the heart of why the regime is now so dysfunctional.

A Supreme Leader in Hiding

According to The New York Times, Mojtaba Khamenei was gravely wounded in the same attack that killed his father at the start of the war. One of his legs was so badly injured that it has been operated on three times, and he is awaiting a prosthetic. His face and lips were severely burned, making it difficult for him to speak, and an Iranian official told the Times he will eventually need plastic surgery.

These injuries explain why the younger Khamenei has not recorded a video or audio message. He instead issues written statements posted online and read on state television, unwilling to appear weak in his first public address. Despite the trauma, the Times reported he remained mentally sharp and engaged.

The second constraint is location. The new Supreme Leader is in hiding, and government officials do not visit him for fear that Israel might trace them to his location and kill him. Rather than holding meetings, he receives handwritten messages delivered by couriers who travel highways and back roads, by car and motorcycle, until they reach his hideout. His responses return the same way.

Even in calm times this would be a crippling way to govern, like running a country entirely through Slack. In the middle of an existential war, it is far worse.

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The Board and Its Directors

Abdolreza Davari, an adviser to former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, told the Times that Mojtaba is now running the country like the director of a board. “He relies heavily on the advice and guidance of the board members,” Davari said, “and they collectively make all the decisions. The generals of the IRGC are the board members.”

The most powerful of these generals is Ahmad Vahidi, the current commander-in-chief of the IRGC. Vahidi joined the Guard in 1979, rose through its intelligence arm in the early 1980s, and by 1988 had become the first commander of the Quds Force, the unit responsible for Iran’s external operations and proxy relationships across the Middle East. He is such a well-known hardliner that Mohammad Ali Shabani, editor-in-chief of the Middle East outlet Amwaj, wrote on X that his predecessors looked like schoolteachers by comparison.

Another IRGC figure wielding considerable power is Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the current secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. According to Iran International, Zolghadr was installed in that post, one of the most powerful in the country, because the Guards pressured President Masoud Pezeshkian into appointing him. That the IRGC was willing to lean on the nation’s elected president is a measure of both its strength and its determination to impose its will across the regime. Rounding out the inner circle is General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a former IRGC head who has served as top military adviser to both the father and son supreme leaders.

The Civilian Centers of Power

Guided by these three men and others with smaller public footprints, the IRGC has grown so dominant that, by some analysts’ reckoning, it now eclipses the Supreme Leader himself. Ali Vaez, the Iran director at the International Crisis Group, told the Times that Mojtaba is now subservient to the Guards because he owes them his position and the survival of the entire system.

Still, the IRGC is not the only center of power in Tehran. President Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist elected on a platform of diplomatic engagement and economic recovery, remains the country’s highest elected official. Iran International reported that he clashed with Vahidi over the economic and social fallout of the war, criticizing the IRGC’s strategy of escalating regional tensions and striking neighboring countries, and warning of the long-term damage to Iran’s economy.

Pezeshkian also demanded that executive decisions about the war be made by the government rather than the IRGC, a demand Vahidi predictably refused. Among hardliners, Pezeshkian is seen as weak, particularly after he apologized to neighboring states hit by Iranian munitions.

Two other figures matter. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is a career diplomat who helped negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal and has since built a reputation for working across factional lines. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament, has ties to the IRGC but a reputation as a pragmatist. Despite their differing politics, all three men share an interest in striking a deal to end the war, and all three have been repeatedly frustrated by the IRGC.

Negotiations as Theater

The first round of US-Iran talks in Islamabad lasted 21 hours. Despite that marathon, the two sides parted without an agreement. Most analysts blame the diametrically opposed demands of Tehran and Washington, but according to Iran International, fractures within the Iranian negotiating team were also to blame.

Sources familiar with the meeting told the outlet that Araghchi showed signs of flexibility, particularly on reducing or halting financial and military support for Iran’s proxy network, including Hezbollah. That flexibility drew a sharp reaction from Zolghadr, who submitted a report to the IRGC accusing Araghchi of deviating from the delegation’s mandate and engaging in discussions beyond the leadership’s directives. The IRGC then ordered the delegation to return to Tehran immediately.

The episode reveals that the Iranian negotiators never really had the authority to negotiate. At most they are glorified messengers, shuttling positions between American counterparts and the IRGC, which makes the final decisions. What happened next confirmed it.

The Strait of Hormuz Power Move

In the introduction we noted that the Iranian navy called the country’s top negotiator an idiot. The reason traces back to the Strait of Hormuz. On Friday, the 17th of April, Araghchi wrote on X that the strait was completely open for the remainder of the ceasefire and that ships could travel the routes announced by the Iranian maritime authority. President Trump confirmed as much on his own channels, though he stressed the US naval blockade of Iran would remain in full force until Iran reached a deal to end the war.

The strait did not stay open for long. Within hours, the Iranian navy broadcast the now-infamous message branding Araghchi an idiot, declaring the strait closed, and insisting it would only reopen on the order of new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Then came the public dressing-down. The IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency called Araghchi’s post a “bad and incomplete tweet,” while a second IRGC-linked outlet, Fars News, accused him of plunging Iranian society into “an atmosphere of confusion.”

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the IRGC used its control over the strait as a tool for Vahidi to slap down his rivals, including Ghalibaf and Araghchi. Every time the Guards contradict a civilian official on Hormuz, they are not only messaging Washington. They are reminding domestic rivals who has the final word and where real power lies.

The Talks Collapse Inward

That same infighting, Iran International reported, was the main reason Iranian negotiators skipped the second round of talks in Islamabad. As the delegation prepared to depart for Pakistan, a message arrived from Khamenei’s inner circle ruling out any discussion of nuclear issues and reprimanding the foreign ministry team over the earlier negotiations. Araghchi warned that attending under such constraints would serve no purpose and would effectively amount to a death sentence for the negotiations.

Eventually, according to Dror Balazada, a reporter for Israel’s Channel 14, the IRGC allowed Araghchi and Ghalibaf to resume talks, but without any power to commit to or guarantee anything, once again reducing them to messengers. Israel’s Channel 12 news, meanwhile, reported that Ghalibaf found the situation so frustrating that he resigned as a negotiator. That resignation has not been confirmed, but if true, it raises serious doubts about the prospects for any peace deal.

It also poses an uncomfortable problem: who could replace Ghalibaf? The job demands someone with experience cutting international deals, someone Washington will respect, and someone pragmatic enough to negotiate rather than simply restate maximalist positions. That rules out an IRGC hardliner, who has historically proven too inflexible. With much of Iran’s senior leadership destroyed, Tehran has few options left.

If the Negotiators Walk Away

An even more troubling question is what happens if Araghchi also quits the negotiating team. He has been publicly humiliated by IRGC-affiliated media, threatened with impeachment by a sitting lawmaker, and overruled on what should have been a routine announcement about the Strait of Hormuz. Yet as constrained as Araghchi and Ghalibaf are, having them in the room is better than seating a hardliner who would only issue maximalist demands and talk past whoever Washington sends. Without the two of them at the table, the negotiations would likely collapse entirely.

Publicly, Trump has projected patience, telling the press he is in no rush to reach a deal. Privately, according to multiple media reports, he appears bored with the war and eager to move on. If he concludes the negotiations are going nowhere, the alternative could be an even longer bombing campaign designed to eliminate what remains of the regime and its military capabilities. In short, the infighting and the IRGC’s repeated displays of strength could end up being the regime’s undoing.

What Comes Next

Set aside the prospect of failed talks and renewed war for a moment, and consider the other path: the regime stops infighting long enough to strike a deal with Washington that guarantees its survival. Even that scenario is grim. The version of Iran that emerges would be one where the IRGC holds more power than at any point in the history of the Islamic Republic, run by some of the most hardline figures the organization has ever produced. Hardline, that is, even by the standards of the Iranian regime.

Iran was already one of the most repressive nations on the planet before the war. In January, facing the largest protests since the 1979 revolution, the regime unleashed hell on demonstrators. The death toll is contested, with some sources putting it as high as 30,000 and the government claiming only 3,000 died, but it is generally agreed that thousands lost their lives. Crucially, that crackdown happened under a regime that still had a functioning supreme leader, senior clerics with independent institutional weight, and reformist figures who at least nominally pushed back.

That regime is gone. In its place is one led by figures so brutal they make the perpetrators of January’s killings look like schoolteachers.

Vahidi’s Iron Fist

Vahidi is wanted by Interpol for his alleged role in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people, and he spent more than a decade building the Quds Force into the instrument of regional destabilization it became. He is now surrounded by people who will not meaningfully check his power.

Beyond the IRGC itself, Vahidi can call on the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia with tens of thousands of members. Before the war, the Basij were spread across the country, with 32 provincial command units and between 40,000 and 54,000 resistance bases embedded in mosques, schools, universities, and factories. The war has made them even more decentralized. The Economist notes they have been broken into tens of thousands of small, mobile cells, ideal for rapidly crushing protests.

According to Dr. Meir Javedanfar, an Iran scholar at Reichman University, they are already attacking civilians, taking revenge against those believed to have supported the war.

Internationally, a more hardline Iran would likely do more to support its proxies, viewing them, if not as effective deterrence, then as a way to make any future conflict more painful for the region. A hyper-militarized Iran where moderates have even less power to restrain the hardliners is the worst-case scenario, and not only for the Iranian people. Countries from the Gulf to Turkey will have to live knowing that the people who authorized firing missiles at their nations to take revenge on America are consolidating power on their doorstep. Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, would live under a regime that treats January’s mass killings as a model for handling dissent.

An Expensive Exercise in Replacement

The bitterest possibility is that such a transition would render the entire war an expensive exercise in swapping one regime for an even worse, more extreme version of itself, like replacing Lenin with Stalin. Yet that now appears to be the most likely outcome of the ongoing power struggle.

None of this is guaranteed. Should the war resume, the combined forces could kill the new IRGC leadership. Or some negotiated settlement could yet emerge that props up the regime’s more moderate elements. But both outcomes seem unlikely. The world therefore needs to start thinking seriously about how it will deal with a post-war Iran under IRGC rule, because the IRGC has already envisioned what comes next, and for the rest of the region it is unlikely to be good news.

Presented by

Simon Whistler

Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Trump extend the US-Iran ceasefire on the 21st of April?

Trump said he extended the ceasefire because the Iranian regime was so fractured that it could not present a single unified proposal for Washington to consider, leaving no coherent counterpart to negotiate with.

Who is running Iran, and why is Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s power so constrained?

Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the former Supreme Leader, took power after his father’s death but governs from hiding, communicating only through couriers carrying handwritten messages. He was gravely wounded in the same attack that killed his father, is unable to appear publicly, and owes his position entirely to the IRGC. According to the International Crisis Group, he is now effectively subservient to the Guards, running the country like the director of a board with IRGC generals as its members.

How did the Strait of Hormuz episode expose the IRGC’s dominance over civilian officials?

After Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly announced the strait was open for the rest of the ceasefire, the Iranian navy contradicted him within hours, called him an idiot, and declared the strait closed, insisting it would reopen only on the Supreme Leader’s order. The Institute for the Study of War assessed this as a deliberate power move by IRGC chief Vahidi to humiliate his civilian rivals and signal to domestic audiences where real authority lies.

Why are Iran’s negotiators described as glorified messengers who cannot actually negotiate?

When Araghchi showed flexibility on proxy support during the Islamabad talks, IRGC-aligned official Zolghadr reported him for exceeding his mandate and the IRGC recalled the delegation. The Guards later permitted Araghchi and Ghalibaf to return to talks but stripped them of any authority to commit to or guarantee anything, reducing them to carrying positions between Washington and Tehran’s hardliners.

What does a post-war Iran under IRGC dominance look like, and why does it alarm observers?

If the regime survives, it would emerge with the IRGC holding more power than at any point in the Islamic Republic’s history, led by hardliners such as Vahidi, who is wanted by Interpol for his alleged role in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. The Basij militia has been broken into tens of thousands of small cells ideal for crushing protests, and the reformist and clerical checks that existed before the war are gone, leaving a regime that treats January’s mass killings as a model for handling dissent.