On Friday, April 11th, the Associated Press posed a question that Horn of Africa observers have been dreading: Is Ethiopia at war again? This wasn’t a reference to the increasing acrimony between Ethiopia and its northern neighbour, Eritrea. Rather, the AP was highlighting a conflict that has been simmering quietly out of sight in Ethiopia’s Amhara region.
The Fano insurgency, named after the ethno-nationalist Amhara militia fighting the Ethiopian government, has been raging since 2023 with very little media attention because Addis Ababa has done everything in its power to keep it that way. Since the fighting broke out, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government has imposed sweeping restrictions on the information flowing out of Amhara region, blocking internet access and arresting reporters covering the conflict.
Key Takeaways
- The Fano insurgency in Ethiopia’s Amhara region has been raging since 2023, with the Ethiopian government imposing sweeping information restrictions including internet blocks and journalist arrests to keep it out of international headlines.
- In May, four major Fano forces merged to form the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF), creating a unified command structure that launched Operation Arbegna Adem Ali in September, representing one of the most significant offensives since the conflict began.
- The Amhara insurgency stems from three key factors: loss of political influence after Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018, feelings of betrayal after being excluded from the 2022 Tigray peace deal, and opposition to government plans to dismantle regional special forces.
- Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister accused Eritrea and a hardline TPLF faction of funding and directing armed groups in Amhara, raising fears of coordinated destabilization despite these actors being enemies during the Tigray War.
- Ethiopia faces potential multi-front warfare as it simultaneously fights insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, monitors tensions in Tigray, prepares for possible conflict with Eritrea, maintains peacekeepers in Somalia, and manages spillover from Sudan’s war.
- Neither military victory nor peace negotiations appear viable: a government counter-offensive would fuel ethno-nationalist sentiments, while the Fano lack political cohesion, and any peace deal acceptable to Amharas would likely trigger Tigrayan military action over disputed territories.
The Hidden War in Amhara
Despite reports continuing to emerge from foreign news outlets, human rights organizations, and conflict monitors like the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the Ethiopian government has successfully kept much of the Fano insurgency out of international headlines. These reports paint a grim picture of an ever-growing humanitarian crisis that has been largely invisible to the outside world.
After a period where, according to the available data, the intensity of the violence seemed to dip, the situation has turned increasingly violent. On September 24th, the insurgents launched Operation Arbegna Adem Ali, aimed at capturing strategically important towns and military positions within North and South Wollo, two zones within the Amhara region.
According to local outlet Borkena, Fano forces claimed they had killed over 470 government troops and captured 175 in just two days of the operation. The X account Amhara War Updates posted a video that allegedly showed the captured soldiers, though these claims and the reported numbers have not been independently verified. Still, even accounting for likely exaggeration, the operation represents one of the most significant Fano offensives since the conflict began, raising urgent questions about what caused this spike in violence, whether it will spread to other parts of the country, and whether there exists any viable path to peace in Amhara.
What Caused The Spike in Violence?
Understanding what caused this spike in violence requires examining three critical contextual factors that have shaped the Amhara insurgency. First, the Amhara are one of Ethiopia’s largest ethnolinguistic groups and for much of the country’s modern history, they have wielded significant political influence. Some observers view the Amhara insurgency as an attempt to regain that power.
For nearly three decades, the Amhara were part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four ethnically-based political parties that governed the country. The parties represented the Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and the communities in the country’s south. Of these, the Tigray were the most influential, having produced the longest serving Prime Minister in Ethiopia’s history, Meles Zenawi.
The Amhara’s political influence began to wane after Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo leader, rose to power in 2018. To secure Abiy’s rise, the Oromo and Amhara factions of the EPRDF collaborated to oust the Tigrayans from their dominant position within the coalition. The alliance would not last long, as Prime Minister Ahmed merged the coalition into a single party, the Prosperity Party, with the Oromo forming the party’s core. The Tigrayans refused to join the new party, while Amharan leaders who criticized the Oromo’s new-found dominance were either arrested or fled to other countries to seek political asylum.
The Tigray War and Amhara Betrayal
The second critical factor involves the Tigray War and its aftermath. Despite the political tensions with Abiy Ahmed’s government, when the Tigray War erupted in 2020—partly because of the power struggle outlined above—Amhara militiamen fought on the government’s side. They saw the war as an opportunity to reclaim disputed territories and assert their political relevance.
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However, Amharan representatives were excluded when the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Force (TPLF) eventually signed a peace deal in 2022. According to the International Crisis Group, many Amharans felt betrayed by this and accused Addis Ababa of plotting to hand back to Tigray disputed lands that the Amhara seized during the war.
The tensions between the government and the Amhara grew even more pronounced after Addis Ababa announced plans to dismantle the special forces present in each of Ethiopia’s 11 ethnically based regions and integrate them into the federal structure. From the government’s perspective, this was simply aimed at fostering ethnic unity and preventing regional forces from being drawn into conflict as had happened in Tigray.
However, the Amhara saw it as an attempt to weaken them, leaving them defenseless against the Tigrayans and the federal government. During the war, the TPLF had invaded Amhara Region, where they conducted massacres, burned villages, and were implicated in war crimes. While the Amhara were also accused of war crimes in Tigray Region, this didn’t mean locals felt any less vulnerable. Instead of integrating, most of the militiamen deserted and joined the Fano.
The Formation of the Amhara Fano National Force
The third and most consequential factor is the recent transformation of the Fano themselves. Until quite recently, the Fano were best understood not as a single unit but rather as a collection of loosely allied militia that were united by a joint distrust of Addis Ababa. That changed in May, when four of the major Fano forces announced that they would be merging to form the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF), a unified command structure aimed at consolidating the fragmented insurgency and coordinating operations across the region.
This unification is the primary reason for the spike in violence. It is the AFNF that launched and is coordinating Operation Arbegna Adem Ali, and the significance of this development cannot be overstated. For two years, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces fought a war of whack-a-mole. They would deal with one Fano group in North Wollo, only to have another pop up in South Gondar almost 200 kilometres away.
Victories effectively meant little because each time the government moved on to deal with the next militia, they would give the one they just defeated time to rearm, restrategize and attack again.
This fragmentation made the Fano nearly impossible to eliminate, but it also limited the effectiveness of their attacks. Unlike the mass mobilization and large-scale fighting that took place in Tigray, Addis Ababa was able to fight the Fano with smaller forces, giving the government space to pursue other military objectives, like preparing for a potential war with Eritrea over access to the coast.
Now, however, this is all in danger of unravelling. While unified under the AFNF, the Fano lose some of the unpredictability that comes with fighting as completely independent groups. However, they gain the ability to plan and execute more complex operations than anything they could before. For the government, this represents a nightmare scenario.
They not only have to deal with the AFNF, they also have to deal with the other Fano militia taking advantage of the cover created by the larger group to launch their own attacks.
Recent Fano Military Gains
So far, the new unified structure appears to be working in the Fano’s favor. Borkena reports that on October 7th, after an hours-long siege, the Fano captured Gashena, a town that was the site of one of the fiercest battles during the Tigray war. Apart from its symbolic significance, Gashena’s location, connecting routes between Lalibela, Woldiya, and Debre Tabor, make it a critical military and logistics hub according to regional security observers who spoke to local outlet The Habesha.
The insurgents then turned their attention to Woldiya, capital of the North Wollo zone, and have reportedly encircled it. On X, the Amhara War Updates account claimed that at least nine soldiers have defected from the Ethiopian army, citing their opposition to what they call the regime’s genocidal campaign against Amhara civilians.
It must be stressed that this information has not been verified by third parties. It should also be emphasized that Borkena is known to publish accounts that can charitably be called exaggerated. Still, such stories do offer a glimpse into how the Fano’s new military unification is shifting the momentum on the ground.
The Ethiopian government, however, believes there may be another dimension to this spike in violence, one that extends beyond the Fano’s newfound unity and organizational capacity.
Regional Dynamics and External Involvement
In a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Eritrea and a hardline faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front of actively working together to destabilize Ethiopia. According to the minister, these external actors are “funding, mobilizing and directing armed groups” in the Amhara region. These allegations come at a time when there are increased fears that the Ethiopian government will launch a military incursion into Eritrea to seize ports along the Red Sea.
What makes this allegation particularly alarming is the fact that Eritrea and the TPLF were on opposite sides during the Tigray War. To this day, Eritrean forces occupy Tigrayan land in the border regions, while the crimes Asmara committed against civilians were among the most stomach-churning of an already hideous war. Any current alliance between them would be a dramatic reversal from positions they held barely four years ago, and it only makes sense when viewed through the lens of the chaotic world of Tigrayan internal politics.
The hardline TPLF faction in question is led by Debretsion Gebremichael, who, following a coup against a Tigrayan leader aligned with Addis Ababa, currently controls the local government in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. This faction has refused to accept the 2022 peace deal, claiming—not unreasonably—that Addis Ababa has failed to fully implement its terms.
While the TPLF has not launched a new offensive, the combination of unresolved grievances, shifting regional alliances, and escalating rhetoric has fueled growing fears that another devastating Tigray war may be imminent. The independent outlet, The New Humanitarian, perfectly captured those fears in an article by an anonymous Tigrayan who fought in the first war titled “I don’t want to fight again in another Tigray war.”
Quoting from the piece: “These days everything reminds me of 2020, of the days and weeks leading up to the last war: The elders and religious leaders going back and forth between Addis Ababa and Mekelle (capital of the Tigray region) for negotiations; the tension, insecurity, and confusion; the military preparations.”
The Risk of Multi-Front War
If these tensions erupt into another Tigray war, then there’s a significant risk that Ethiopia’s multiple conflicts will converge into a single, devastating multi-front war. After all, the Ethiopian government is already stretched dangerously thin.
Beyond Amhara, the government is trying to stamp out an ongoing insurgency in Oromia, the country’s most populous region, that has been raging in its current form since 2018. Although it hasn’t received as much attention as the fighting in Amhara and Tigray, with local magazine The Reporter calling it a silent conflict, it nonetheless continues to drain military resources and destabilize large swaths of territory.
To keep track, this means that the Ethiopian government is fighting in two theaters—Amhara and Oromia—monitoring an increasingly tense situation in Tigray, and possibly getting ready to invade Eritrea. All this while also keeping a contingent of peacekeepers in neighboring Somalia, and dealing with the potential overspill effects of the devastating war in Sudan. Saying the government is stretched thin therefore feels like an understatement.
If the allegations in Foreign Minister Gedion’s letter are accurate, then the nature of Ethiopia’s security crisis could soon fundamentally change. What were previously separate insurgencies could become coordinated fronts in a wider conflict designed to overwhelm the federal government’s capacity to respond. The danger of increased coordination has already been demonstrated by the AFNF’s recent attacks.
There’s also the risk that other insurgent groups take advantage of this multi-front war to ratchet up their attacks. While this represents the worst-case scenario and there are no guarantees that it will happen, in a country like Ethiopia, where fighting has raged for decades in some places, it’s best to be prepared in case the worst-case scenario happens, instead of being caught off guard.
A Path To Peace
Since this catastrophic outcome is not inevitable, the question becomes: is there a viable path to peace in Amhara, and by extension, can Ethiopia avoid sliding into a catastrophic multi-front war? The answer, unfortunately, is neither simple nor straightforward.
Experts believe that achieving peace in Amhara will require concrete commitments from both the government and the Fano, not just rhetoric. Unfortunately neither side appears ready to make the necessary concessions, with both believing that a military victory in the conflict is possible. According to analysts at Critical Threats, this isn’t likely to happen.
In their view, if the government pursued a heavy-handed counter-offensive, it would only exacerbate the ethno-nationalist and anti-government sentiments driving the insurgency. It would prove the Fano’s point that the government does not care for the Amharan people, and they are the only ones who can defend them. This is a massive concern in a country where Amharans form one of the biggest ethnic groups of all.
For the Fano, despite the recent partnership, they are likely to struggle because of long-standing divisions. Even in the AFNF, they do not have a single leader, rather a council led by 13 fighters. This paints a picture of a group united only by a common enemy, and if that common enemy were to be removed, the glue holding the group together would melt away rapidly. Additionally, the Fano have been unable to translate military gains into political success during past offensives.
The Negotiating Table: Ethiopia’s Best Bet
The negotiating table represents Ethiopia’s best bet for peace. Both the insurgents and the government should recognize that neither can achieve a decisive military victory and that continued fighting will only deepen the humanitarian crisis engulfing the region—a humanitarian crisis that, according to the UN, led to the death of more than 2,000 civilians in 2024 alone, and has displaced hundreds of thousands.
Yet, such negotiations may be impossible. One of the key Amharan fears is that the government will hand back some of the lands they annexed during the Tigray War, as implied in the 2022 peace deal with the TPLF. That fear is especially applicable to the zone they call Welqait and the Tigrayans call Western Tigray—a place Amharans fought and died to secure.
Unfortunately, if Addis Ababa agreed to Amharan demands on this land, that would be unacceptable to the Tigrayans, hundreds of thousands of whom still remain under arms. By cutting a peace deal acceptable to the Amhara, Addis Ababa might all but guarantee that the TPLF would try to retake Western Tigray by force.
Regardless, time is running out. Every day these conflicts continue, more civilians are displaced, killed, or pushed deeper into poverty. The longer fighting persists, the harder reconciliation becomes and the more likely the worst case scenario is to occur. The region’s future may well be decided by whether the leaders can choose dialogue over devastation. Sadly, there is little reason for optimism.
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Simon Whistler
Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.
Frequently Asked Questions
What caused the Amhara insurgency against the Ethiopian government?
Three critical factors drove the Amhara to armed rebellion. First, the Amhara lost political influence after Oromo leader Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 and merged the ruling coalition into the Prosperity Party with the Oromo at its core, sidelining Amharan leaders. Second, Amharans felt deeply betrayed when they were excluded from the 2022 Tigray peace deal, despite having fought on the government’s side, and feared Addis Ababa would hand back disputed territories the Amhara had seized during that war. Third, they fiercely opposed government plans to dismantle regional special forces, viewing it as an attempt to leave them defenseless against both Tigrayans and the federal government.
What is the Amhara Fano National Force and why does its formation matter?
The AFNF was created in May when four major Fano militia groups merged into a single unified command structure. Previously the Fano operated as loosely allied independent units, which made them difficult to eliminate but also limited the scale and complexity of their attacks. The merger allowed the AFNF to plan and execute large coordinated operations, including the September launch of Operation Arbegna Adem Ali targeting North and South Wollo — a development the article calls the primary reason for the spike in violence.
What are the risks of Ethiopia sliding into a multi-front war?
The Ethiopian government is already fighting insurgencies in both Amhara and Oromia, monitoring escalating tensions in Tigray, possibly preparing a military incursion into Eritrea for Red Sea access, maintaining peacekeepers in Somalia, and managing spillover from Sudan’s war. If Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister’s allegations are accurate that Eritrea and a hardline TPLF faction are coordinating to fund and direct armed groups in Amhara, previously separate insurgencies could converge into coordinated fronts designed to overwhelm the government’s capacity to respond simultaneously.
Why is a negotiated peace between the government and the Fano so difficult?
Analysts believe neither side currently sees negotiation as necessary because both believe military victory is possible. A heavy-handed government counter-offensive would fuel ethno-nationalist sentiment and validate the Fano’s claim that only they can defend the Amhara people. For their part, the Fano are held together by a common enemy rather than a unified political vision, and are led by a council of 13 fighters rather than a single leader, limiting their ability to make binding political commitments.
What makes the disputed territory of Welqait such an obstacle to any peace deal?
Welqait — which Amharans call Welqait and Tigrayans call Western Tigray — is land the Amhara fought and died to secure during the Tigray War. Many Amharans fear the 2022 peace deal implicitly requires Addis Ababa to return it to Tigray. If the government agreed to Amharan demands to keep the territory, that outcome would be unacceptable to the Tigrayans, hundreds of thousands of whom remain under arms, making a renewed Tigray offensive highly likely and placing Ethiopia in an impossible diplomatic position.
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