On September 18th, at a press conference in the United Kingdom, President Donald Trump made a stunning announcement: the United States wanted to retake Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Delivered in his trademark off-the-cuff style, the remark nonetheless represents a seismic shift in American foreign policy. After more than four years since the chaotic withdrawal that saw U.S. forces slip out of Bagram in the middle of the night — leaving behind over $7 billion worth of military equipment and precipitating the collapse of the Afghan government — Washington is now signaling it wants back in.
The announcement is all the more remarkable because it was the first Trump administration that initiated America’s departure from Afghanistan by signing a peace deal with the Taliban. Now, with China rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal in western Xinjiang and America’s strategic options in Central Asia narrowing, the question of whether U.S. boots will once again touch Afghan soil has become one of the most consequential geopolitical debates of the moment.
Why Bagram and Why Now?
To understand why Trump is fixated on this specific patch of Afghan real estate, it is necessary to appreciate both Bagram’s geography and the broader strategic landscape that has shifted dramatically since the 2021 withdrawal.
Key Takeaways
- President Trump has publicly demanded the return of Bagram Air Base, threatening “bad things” if Afghanistan does not comply, citing China’s rapid nuclear expansion in western Xinjiang as the primary strategic driver.
- China is constructing approximately 250 ICBM silos in Xinjiang — more than ten times the number currently operational — making the region a critical concern for U.S. strategic planners.
- Alternative basing options in Central Asia are blocked: Kazakhstan and Tajikistan belong to Russia’s CSTO alliance, and Uzbekistan’s own defense doctrine explicitly prohibits foreign military bases on its soil.
- The Taliban have categorically rejected any U.S. return, calling Trump’s remarks an assault on national sovereignty, while their army chief denies that any negotiations are taking place.
- Most regional observers believe a full military return is unlikely; the most probable scenario involves a small intelligence presence focused on the common threat of ISIS-K, with the Taliban seeking sanctions relief and humanitarian aid in return.
The town of Bagram sits approximately 60 kilometers from Kabul — close enough to monitor the Afghan capital but far enough away to be easily defensible. This geographic sweet spot was exploited first by the Soviet Union, which originally built the air base, and later by the United States and its allies after arriving in 2001. American forces rebuilt the facility, repairing damage from years of factional fighting during the 1990s.
At its peak, Bagram housed more than 100,000 soldiers and featured two massive runways capable of handling heavy transport aircraft. Because Afghanistan is landlocked and surrounded by countries and militias that are not particularly friendly to the United States, the base became a critical node in America’s military supply chains, enabling the movement of troops and materiel without reliance on vulnerable road networks.
These logistical and geographic advantages remain relevant, but they are not the primary factor driving Trump’s push. In his own words, the main reason is China. During the UK press conference, Trump mentioned that Bagram is roughly an hour away from where China is building its nuclear weapons.
He was referring to western Xinjiang, the province where China borders Afghanistan and where, according to a policy brief by the non-profit think tank The Orion Policy Institute, Beijing is undertaking a rapid and unprecedented nuclear buildup. The brief details silo construction at Yumen and Hami in Xinjiang as constituting the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever undertaken. With 120 silos under construction at Yumen, another 110 at Hami, a dozen at Jilantai, and possibly more being added, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force appears to have approximately 250 silos under construction — more than ten times the number of intercontinental ballistic missile silos in operation today.
Beijing’s increased defense spending by 7.2% this year suggests the arsenal could grow even further.
America’s Shrinking Options in Central Asia
The explosive growth of China’s nuclear program explains the urgency with which the Trump administration is pursuing Bagram. For decades, Washington has relied on a network of overseas bases to rapidly respond to crises and reassure allies of its power-projection capabilities. That network stretches across Europe, the Middle East, and even Africa — but since leaving Afghanistan, it does not extend into Central Asia. China’s westward nuclear expansion is happening precisely as America’s window to regain a foothold in the region is closing.
Alternative locations have been considered and found wanting. According to the New York Times, after the 2021 withdrawal, the Pentagon explored placing troops in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. However, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s alternative to NATO.
While the alliance has been described as ‘lifeless’ by Dr. Thomas Ambrosio, a professor of political science at North Dakota State University, membership would still make it extremely difficult for America to establish bases in those countries. Uzbekistan, although not a CSTO member, and despite President Mirziyoyev’s recent meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UN summit, has its own constraints.
According to the Warsaw Institute, a Polish think tank, Uzbekistan’s 2012 foreign policy and 2018 defense doctrines explicitly prohibit foreign military bases from operating on its territory.
This process of elimination leaves Bagram as the most strategically obvious choice — not just because of its proximity, sitting about 2,400 kilometers from the silos in Hami, but because it is the least complicated option. The fact that a base in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan qualifies as the ‘least complicated’ underscores just how truly limited America’s options are.
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The Strategic Case: Surveillance, Taiwan, and Rare Earths
Former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz has been one of the most vocal proponents of retaining or regaining Bagram. In an op-ed for the Military Times, Waltz argued that abandoning the base meant the United States was walking away from the only air base in the world located in a country that physically borders China. Beyond the surveillance potential — the ability to monitor Chinese nuclear developments and military activity in Xinjiang — Waltz believes that having a base in Afghanistan would allow the U.S. to open a second front in a possible war over Taiwan, increasing the odds of victory.
Waltz also pointed to Afghanistan’s mineral wealth as another compelling reason for the U.S. not to have left. U.S. Geological Survey estimates peg the value of Kabul’s untapped rare earth deposits at around $1 trillion.
In Waltz’s view, access to these minerals would reduce American dependence on China, which controlled over 69% of rare earth mine production in 2024 and nearly half of the world’s reserves. However, it is worth noting that the U.S. previously spent nearly half a billion dollars attempting to develop Afghanistan’s mining industry, with corruption and a lack of infrastructure leaving virtually nothing to show for the astronomical investment.
Although Waltz is no longer National Security Advisor — having been reassigned to the UN after the Signalgate controversy — he remains a member of Trump’s inner circle. Regional observers such as Lisa Curtis, Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, believe his strategic thinking continues to shape the president’s foreign policy decisions. Speaking to DW, Curtis suggested that Waltz had planted the seed of the Bagram idea into Trump’s mind. That seed has now sprouted into a policy position with real consequences for Central Asian geopolitics.
The Taliban’s Response and the Question of Negotiations
Kabul’s response to Trump’s announcement was swift and unequivocal. Al-Emarah, one of the Taliban’s official publications, described Trump’s remarks as an assault on national sovereignty and an insult to the feelings of the Afghan people. Trump doubled down on Truth Social, writing: ‘If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back to those that built it, the United States of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!!’
Speaking with reporters on Saturday, Trump went further, stating: ‘We’re talking now to Afghanistan and we want it back and we want it back soon, right away. And if they don’t do it, if they don’t do it, you’re going to find out what I’m gonna do.’ This statement suggested two things: first, that his administration was negotiating directly with the Taliban about a possible return, and second, that Trump is willing to escalate if things don’t go his way.
The Taliban, however, are not just rejecting American boots on the ground — their army chief, Qari Fasihuddin, has denied that any negotiations are taking place at all. In geopolitics, when one side claims negotiations are underway and the other insists there is nothing to see, the truth often lies somewhere in the middle. It is possible that back-channel talks are happening, routed through intermediaries in Doha, but Kabul has every incentive to deny them. According to Shadi Khan Saif, a former Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent for Reuters, even the hint that the Taliban are willing to give up the base would be a humiliation, undermining the sovereignty they fought to reclaim.
If negotiations are indeed happening, the denials give the Taliban time to thread the needle between appearing uncompromising at home while extracting concessions from the Trump administration. For Trump, talking about the negotiations publicly gives him leverage and puts the Taliban on the back foot — part of his vaunted ‘Art of the Deal’ approach.
How Likely Is a Full U.S. Return?
Even if negotiations are happening and somehow going well, that does not mean they will come to anything. Deals between nations — even allies — can and often do fall through, weighed down by politics and shifting priorities. The challenge is exponentially greater between two nations whose worldviews could not be more diametrically opposed and who have killed thousands of each other’s soldiers.
Most regional observers believe a full return will not happen. The Taliban have consistently pointed to the Doha Agreement’s pledge that the U.S. would not threaten Afghanistan’s territorial integrity, using it as a shield against Trump’s demands. If diplomacy fails, Trump is unlikely to use military force to capture the airbase.
According to The Economist, seizing and holding Bagram would require thousands of troops and complex logistics, costing American taxpayers billions at a time when there is deep weariness over the cost of wars. It would also cost Trump political capital, as he would be contradicting his pledge to never start a new war.
Internationally, a military seizure would attract condemnation from other major powers. China has already accused the U.S. of stoking tensions and creating confrontations. Russia would seize on any American return as justification for its own actions, arguing that if the U.S. can disregard the Doha Agreement, Moscow can disregard any international treaties — giving Putin further justification for attempts to annex neighboring territories. Even among America’s allies who reluctantly supported the Afghan mission for two decades, there is little appetite for a return.
If a deal falls through, Trump will likely impose even harsher sanctions on the Taliban, allowing him to retain his image as a tough negotiator while avoiding the fallout of sending soldiers back. However, the effectiveness of additional sanctions is unclear given the sheer scale of sanctions already imposed on Afghanistan.
The Most Probable Scenario: A Limited Intelligence Presence
In the unlikely event that a deal does materialize, experts consulted by DW believe it will probably not involve a base handover or anything approaching the troop levels that once filled Bagram. The most probable scenario is that the Taliban allows a small number of intelligence officers into the country to help fight a common enemy: the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), a regional branch of ISIS.
Since taking power, the Taliban have clamped down on ISIS-K but have been unable to stamp it out completely, even with Russia’s assistance. A targeted U.S. presence focused on rooting out the insurgents would allow both sides to achieve some of their objectives without being seen to capitulate. Lisa Curtis cautions that even in this scenario, the Taliban would likely want to keep the arrangement out of the public eye because of the sovereignty implications.
In return, the Taliban could seek the lifting of some sanctions and normalization of their relationship with the United States. Kabul recently announced a prisoner exchange deal with the U.S. as part of normalization efforts, and any potential agreement, no matter how narrow in scope, would advance that goal. Kabul might also request humanitarian aid for citizens still reeling after a magnitude 6.0 earthquake struck the nation on August 31st, killing 2,200 people, destroying 5,000 homes, and worsening an already precarious economic situation.
The earthquake occurred amid threats from the Trump administration to freeze all aid to the nation, and UN reports indicate that humanitarian aid to Kabul has dropped by nearly 50%, impacting rescue and relief operations according to health workers and aid officials. If presented as an aid-for-access bargain, the Afghan people might not be as opposed to a limited American presence.
China’s Growing Influence and America’s Diminishing Leverage
America’s struggle to make a deal with the Taliban and find a foothold in Central Asia is emblematic of a world that is moving further away from the United States and embracing its main geopolitical adversary, China. Political commentator Ghaffar Hussain, in an interview with DW, put it bluntly: ‘I don’t think America has anything that the Taliban really wants right now. If they want loans, China can offer that. If they want aid, China can offer that.
China’s kind of muscled America out, if you like, so they don’t really need America for anything.’
Beijing’s growth as a rival capable of investing in infrastructure and industries like mining has reshaped power dynamics not just in Kabul but across the broader region. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to establish itself as a reliable security partner for Central Asian states, and both powers are actively blaming Washington for the region’s instability. Vassily Nebenzia, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, attributed the increasing threat of ISIS-K to the hasty withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2021, stating: ‘The growing activity of ISIL-Khorasan is no coincidence.
While hastily leaving Afghanistan, NATO troops abandoned vast quantities of weapons and equipment there, which then fell into the hands of ISIL inter alia.’ Those accusations carry weight in regional capitals, and Washington has not yet proven capable of countering them.
What Central Asian Nations Actually Want
According to Miras Zhiyenbayev, Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Studies Program at a Kazakhstan-based think tank, Washington needs a competent, clearly articulated strategy that is consistently implemented at the ground level. He believes the region’s leaders are pragmatists who prioritize economic growth, security, and sovereignty, and who resist being forced to choose sides. They will work comfortably with China on roads, with Russia on security, while courting the EU for trade and the Gulf for capital.
Kazakhstan offers a telling example of this multi-vector approach. Despite being a CSTO member and hosting special trainings for the group, the country has recently begun cozying up to both China and the West to guard against a potential Russian invasion of its northern territories — areas with a large ethnically Russian population that could become the Kremlin’s next target in a post-Ukraine war world.
Washington needs to exist in this new reality, where its offers are seen not as inherently better than the competition’s but rather as part of a broader regional tapestry. The United States can no longer command the economic or political leverage that once justified its presence; it must compete on terms that Central Asian capitals actually value.
The Risks of American Absence
No one expects Central Asia to be the administration’s immediate focus given everything happening in Ukraine and the Middle East. However, the United States cannot afford to completely cede the region to other powers. If Washington continues to pull back, it risks reinforcing the image of a country looking inward while rivals carve out bigger roles. It will communicate that America is comfortable watching from the sidelines while Beijing and Moscow shape the region’s future.
Once that perception takes hold, it becomes difficult to shake off, because both allies and adversaries will begin planning around an absent America. The longer this is allowed to persist, the harder it becomes for the United States to regain credibility. Whether through a deal on Bagram, a limited intelligence-sharing arrangement, or a broader diplomatic and economic engagement strategy, Washington must find a way to remain relevant in Central Asia — or accept the consequences of a region that has moved on without it.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Why does Trump want Bagram Air Base back and what is the strategic rationale?
Trump’s primary stated reason is China’s rapid nuclear buildup in western Xinjiang, which borders Afghanistan. According to the Orion Policy Institute, China is constructing approximately 250 ICBM silos — 120 at Yumen and 110 at Hami — more than ten times the number currently operational. Bagram sits roughly 2,400 kilometers from the silos at Hami, giving the U.S. surveillance capability and a strategic foothold in a region where it currently has no military presence.
Why can’t the U.S. establish military bases elsewhere in Central Asia instead?
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are members of Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization, making U.S. basing arrangements there politically untenable. Uzbekistan, while not a CSTO member, has foreign policy and defense doctrines from 2012 and 2018 that explicitly prohibit foreign military bases on its territory. This process of elimination leaves Bagram as what one analysis calls the “least complicated” option — a striking description given that it is controlled by the Taliban.
Are the U.S. and Taliban actually negotiating about Bagram?
Trump has publicly stated “we’re talking now to Afghanistan” and wants the base back “right away.” However, Taliban army chief Qari Fasihuddin has categorically denied that any negotiations are taking place. The most likely reality, according to regional observers, is that back-channel talks are occurring through intermediaries in Doha, but the Taliban have every incentive to publicly deny them to avoid appearing to compromise the sovereignty they fought to reclaim.
What is the most likely outcome if any agreement is reached?
Experts consulted by DW believe a full base handover or large troop presence is very unlikely. The most probable scenario is that the Taliban allows a small number of U.S. intelligence officers into the country to help fight their common enemy, ISIS-K, which the Taliban has been unable to fully suppress despite Russian assistance. Such an arrangement would let both sides achieve limited objectives without either side appearing to have capitulated.
Why is a full U.S. military return to Afghanistan considered so unlikely?
Seizing and holding Bagram would require thousands of troops and complex logistics at enormous financial cost, at a time of deep public weariness over war spending. It would also cost Trump political capital, directly contradicting his pledge never to start a new war. Internationally, it would draw condemnation from China, Russia, and U.S. allies. The Taliban cite the Doha Agreement’s pledge that the U.S. would not threaten Afghanistan’s territorial integrity as a legal shield against Trump’s demands.
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