Mogadishu Rising: Somalia's New Alliances and the Proxy War Taking Shape

Say what you will about the nation of Somalia, but it is one of those rare parts of the world that is never boring. Over the last several months, Somalia has been an ignored but critical factor in a much larger regional realignment, as the Middle East and North Africa enter a new era of conflict and competition. After many years teetering on the brink of absolute failed-statehood, the Somali federal government seems to have found some real momentum, building its power through new alliances and using those alliances to assert dominance on the home front.

But Mogadishu’s control over Somalia is far from a settled issue. As the Somali federal government tries to step up, a wide range of hostile forces are preparing to take a stand. For the many millions who live there, Somalia’s coming power struggle will decide the nation’s fate for years or even decades to come. For the wealthier nations of the Islamic world, and even the mightiest nations on the planet, Somalia is the site of a fast-growing proxy conflict.

When Mogadishu gains in strength, it all but guarantees that the proxy conflict is about to start heating up.

A Breakaway State, and a Surprise

Turn back the clock to 17 March 2026, and it seemed as if the Somali national government was about to suffer another devastating setback. On that day, a Somali regional governor, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed of the country’s South West State, declared that his state was suspending all relations with the Mogadishu government, effectively granting itself autonomous status and perhaps clearing the way for a declaration of independence.

At a press conference, Mohamed laid out his case. Mogadishu had armed militias to try to control South West State and had tried to unseat Mohamed himself, including through a series of constitutional changes that he and other officials had staunchly opposed. In a rejection of Mogadishu’s authority, Mohamed claimed re-election in a statewide vote that the capital had condemned as illegal, and he vowed to act on the mandate of his people.

If Mohamed and his allies succeeded, South West State would become the fourth Somali region to make itself functionally independent of Mogadishu, after the separatist state of Somaliland in the north, and the two autonomous states of Puntland, on Somalia’s eastern tip, and Jubaland, in the country’s southern bread basket. If history was any indication, South West State would succeed, and prove yet again that Somalia is simply incapable of keeping control over its wayward provinces.

Mogadishu Strikes Back

Except this time, that is not what happened. Somalia’s national military took a few days to organize itself, then embarked on a steady southward march toward South West State’s largest city, Baidoa. Home to large international peacekeeping forces as well as key humanitarian agencies, Baidoa is a major strategic asset for whichever force controls it. At first, it seemed as if South West State might be prepared for a showdown: aid agencies suspended operations, and thousands of people fled the city.

In reality, though, South West State’s resistance crumbled with stunning speed. Over the course of a single day, Somali federal forces took control of the entire city. Mohamed resigned his regional presidency just hours later and fled across the border, with his former finance minister appointed to oversee a transition back into Mogadishu’s orbit.

The victory was an unusual but undeniable show of force for the Somali federal government, and it sent shockwaves across the rest of Somalia’s autonomous governments. In southern Jubaland, regional leaders condemned Mogadishu’s actions against South West State’s right to manage its own affairs. In northeastern Puntland, regional leader Saeed Abdullahi Deni placed his forces on high alert, warning that Mogadishu’s actions could be replicated against Puntland in the near future. As of writing, Mogadishu has not attempted any similar action toward Puntland or Jubaland, but as close observers of Somali affairs have noted, those fears are not exactly unjustified.

Mogadishu’s Powerful New Friends

The growing nervousness around Mogadishu’s intentions is underscored by the fact that the capital has recently made some very powerful new friends. One of them put its power on full display during the offensive against South West State, when Turkey used strike drones to provide aerial overwatch for advancing federal troops.

Turkey has been militarily active in Somalia for years, but its operational tempo has recently increased quite dramatically, and so has the size of its troop presence. Once reliant on a small detachment of about 400, Turkey recently authorized the deployment of up to 2,500 soldiers onto Somali soil, along with attack helicopters and several F-16s that recently deployed to Mogadishu. Over the last couple of months, Turkey has used those F-16s to carry out airstrikes against al-Shabaab, deployed main battle tanks, and taken on increasingly serious training responsibilities with Somali forces.

But Turkey’s growing ties with Somalia go much deeper than military cooperation. In mid-April, a Turkish deep-sea oil exploration vessel arrived off the Somali coast, ready to start one of the world’s deepest offshore operations across three zones away from shore. When drilling begins, this will be Somalia’s first-ever offshore oil operation, a move expected to send major revenues toward Mogadishu.

For decades, Somalia’s untapped oil reserves were something of a tragedy for global energy magnates, located in a part of the world too chronically unstable to attempt extraction. Now it is Turkish ships and companies handling extraction, while Turkish forces keep control on the mainland.

Oil, Shadow Fleets, and a Bag of Cash

Also in April, Somalia restarted its long-dormant trade ship registry after several decades. But it set up that registry in a way that suggests Somalia’s primary goal is to protect vessels belonging to a global shadow fleet of illicit maritime trade, masking travel to Russian and occupied Ukrainian waters by showing that its ships are making calls to Turkish ports.

The personal dimension of the relationship is just as striking. After a recent visit to the Turkish capital, Somalia’s president even hitched a ride on a private jet with links to Turkish intelligence, reportedly carrying some 25 million dollars in cash to help ease Mogadishu’s troubles in the months ahead.

And although Turkey might be Somalia’s best friend across the last several months, it is far from Somalia’s only friend. In February, Egypt chose to deepen its ties with Mogadishu, deploying nearly 1,100 troops to the capital in Egypt’s first such deployment across several decades of cooperation. Days before Egypt deployed its troops, Saudi Arabia signed its own military cooperation deal with the Somali government, promising increased defense collaboration across a wide range of strategic priorities.

Both agreements came on the heels of another arrangement, this one between Somalia and Qatar, where in January Qatari officials promised military training support, technical exchanges, stabilization assistance, and other joint cooperation. Finally, in April, Somalia finalized a deal worth 900 million dollars to acquire 24 sophisticated JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan, aircraft that will take Somalia’s air force from one of the most antique on the African continent to one of the most advanced south of the Sahara.

HSM’s Consolidation of Power

As Somalia builds its growing list of dependable international partners, its president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, known as HSM, is in the midst of a rapid consolidation of domestic power. Over the last few months, HSM has led a sweeping legal campaign to centralize authority in Mogadishu, after decades of national policy designed to balance the power of Somalia’s highly influential clans.

In April, HSM’s federal government passed constitutional amendments that will essentially end Somalia’s old, clan-based voting system and institute a one-person, one-vote electoral model. He has turned the prime minister’s post into a directly appointed position, with no need for parliamentary approval. Even more controversial, he has set up a system where, despite the push for one-person, one-vote, Somalia’s president will be elected by parliamentarians instead of voters, a change that many in Somalia have taken as a political double-cross.

In many ways, Mogadishu’s position is stronger than it has been in decades. A range of regional allies are prepared to provide real, meaningful military and economic support, and for once, Somalia’s autonomous and breakaway regions are feeling the pressure instead of pressuring the capital. But even though HSM and his allies are gathering their power, that is not the whole story. In reality, the battle for Somalia’s future is just getting started.

Why One-Person, One-Vote Is So Explosive

We begin with the situation at home, where HSM’s rapid consolidation of power has kicked off a nationwide political crisis. The move toward a one-person, one-vote system would have been controversial even in the best of circumstances. Somalia is a place where clan loyalties are exceptionally important, and where the nation’s political system, despite its flaws, was designed to ensure that larger clans could not simply seize power for themselves.

That is hardly an abstract concern. Prior clan rivalries have descended into full-scale campaigns of ethnic cleansing, including the little-known genocide against the Isaaq people in the late 1980s, sometimes called the Hargeisa Holocaust. While estimates of the death toll range from 50,000 to 200,000, the genocide is known to have resulted in the near-complete destruction of the cities of Hargeisa and Burao, the two largest cities of modern-day Somaliland, where the Isaaq clan forms a local majority.

In modern Somalia, where not just Somalilanders but the people of Puntland and Jubaland each manage their own affairs, and where other Somali clans do not have the population required to secure their own representation, a shift to one-person, one-vote is not seen as a move toward proportional, representative government. It is seen as a way to place executive power, and the instruments and weaponry of the state, in the hands of the most powerful clans. HSM’s other moves, including the subordination of the prime minister’s office and the decision to ensure that Somali voters cannot directly elect their president, are seen as further indication of his true motives.

A Constitutional Cliff and the Call for “National Salvation”

That is bad enough on its own, but it is made worse by the fact that Somalia is barreling toward an imminent political crisis. HSM’s presidential term expires in less than a month, on 15 May, yet Somalia does not have any upcoming elections scheduled, and there do not appear to be any preparations underway to make a vote happen. Even worse, Somalia’s Federal Parliament has already expired, as of 14 April, meaning that during Mohamud’s final few weeks of legitimacy, he faces far fewer checks on his power than usual. Parliamentary leaders have claimed they will extend their mandate for another year, but that has kicked off a wave of high-profile resignations from parliamentarians who accuse HSM and his allies of violating the Somali constitution.

The growing crisis has intensified demand for Somalia’s political opposition to step in, and right now it appears the opposition intends to take action. On 20 April, Somali opposition leaders and prominent clan elders announced plans for a “national salvation,” with the support of the vast majority of Somalia’s prominent opposition figures and the former director of National Intelligence, who was once a close ally of HSM.

While the phrase “national salvation” might sound rather innocuous from the outside, it is a well-known euphemism in Somali politics, widely understood to reference an armed uprising against Mogadishu. During their summit, the opposition called upon the public to participate in actions that would oppose the spread of chaos and authoritarianism. They also welcomed several defectors from the HSM government, while in Kenya, the now-exiled former leader of South West State organized a gathering in Nairobi for Somali opposition figures abroad.

Two Coalitions, One Battleground

While Mogadishu’s domestic rivals gather strength, international affairs are just as important, especially now that a showdown between HSM and the opposition seems like a real possibility. The drama playing out in Somalia today is part of a much larger, rapidly evolving regional dynamic, one that has drawn in most of the powerful nations across the Middle East and North Africa.

All the nations building ties with Mogadishu, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan, are slowly but steadily forming into a loose geo-strategic coalition that is also wielding influence in Libya, Yemen, and other unstable nations across the region. They are opposed by another loose but increasingly coherent coalition, which includes Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Morocco, and others.

The dynamics here could fill a book. The two coalitions include an entire spiderweb of pre-existing and emerging rivalries: Israel versus Turkey, Ethiopia versus Egypt, Saudi Arabia versus the Emirates, and so on. The important thing to understand is that all of these nations are too rich, too ambitious, and simultaneously too risk-averse to go to war directly anytime soon.

Instead, they are seeking out indirect conflicts in every conceivable area: economic competition, battles over energy resources, scientific and technological innovation, alliance-building with foreign partners, and good old-fashioned proxy wars. Notably, despite the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict centered on Iran, this is a dynamic where Iran is not a direct participant. Both sides seem to be pursuing visions in which Iran is no longer a relevant force, although a post-Iran Middle East is not guaranteed to become reality.

Superpowers Enter the Fray

Somalia is a key part of that growing proxy conflict. Turkey, Egypt, and the other nations of their informal faction have chosen to back Mogadishu. Israel, the Emirates, and their allies have gone the opposite route, supporting Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, as well as friendly elements of the national Somali political opposition.

Mogadishu is keenly aware of what is happening. In December 2025, after Israel became the first country to recognize breakaway Somaliland as a sovereign nation, Somalia led the African Union, the Arab League, and its key allies in a sweeping condemnation of Israel and its conduct. In January, Somalia canceled all agreements with the Emirates, alleging that the UAE violated Somali sovereignty, interfered in its internal affairs, and gave direct support to Somaliland and Puntland. Those tensions came to a head again in mid-April, when Israel appointed a diplomatic envoy to Somaliland, prompting intense backlash from Mogadishu and all of its allies.

Even the world’s two rival superpowers are getting in on the action. China does not just see Somalia as an emerging partner, linked through close mutual friends like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It views Somalia’s problems with Somaliland as a direct parallel to its own issues around Taiwan. In mid-April, China pledged to step up its military support for Somalia and signed a satellite cooperation agreement with Mogadishu to expand a range of Somali national capabilities and services.

America, meanwhile, aligns much more closely with Israel’s objectives. While Washington and Mogadishu maintain direct relations, the US military has worked closely with the forces of the Puntland region in a joint campaign against the Islamic State in Somalia. In early March, the commander of US AFRICOM visited Jubaland for a series of meetings intended to strengthen America’s strategic partnerships and counterterrorism cooperation with the region. Even more troubling for Mogadishu was an offer Somaliland made to the United States in late February: access to Somaliland’s mineral resources, as well as permission to create military bases on its soil, in exchange for recognition.

The Bab al-Mandeb Factor and a Jihadist Powder Keg

As if the world needed even more reason to turn Somalia into a key geopolitical flashpoint, the Iran war has done precisely that. Somalia, and particularly the territory claimed by Somaliland, sits very close to the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the southern access point to the Red Sea. On the other side of the strait is a part of Yemen controlled by the Houthi rebels, a key proxy ally of Iran, and in the middle of the strait is roughly 12 to 15 percent of all maritime trade, including more than 30 percent of global tanker traffic.

The Houthis had already demonstrated their ability to impact Red Sea trade, in a solidarity campaign meant to support Hamas during Israel’s war in Gaza. After Iran instituted an effective blockade of the Persian Gulf, world nations are more interested than ever in making sure the Red Sea cannot be shut down unilaterally. But according to reports from illicit-finance researchers in Mogadishu, the Houthi rebels are building their own alliance with Somalia’s al-Shabaab insurgency. While that alliance has been quietly coming together for months, Somali researchers indicate the relationship has recently become, in their words, “more systematic, more strategic, and it has every sign that it should be a huge concern for anyone concerned about regional security.”

So let us review the situation. Somalia is barreling toward a political crisis, in which an increasingly authoritarian federal government has demonstrated its ability to recapture a breakaway state. Somalia’s opposition is making a thinly veiled call for nationwide armed opposition, and right now there is not even an election scheduled where the situation could be resolved peacefully.

Somalia’s government is supported, economically and militarily, by a loose coalition of nations quietly backed by China, and the nations of that coalition absolutely detest the rival coalition backing the Somali opposition and its breakaway states. Control over Somali territory is more important than ever because of the war in Iran, and no outside powers have demonstrated any clear interest in mediating. Two exceptionally violent jihadist insurgencies, al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia, are each still present in different parts of the country, and an al-Shabaab alliance with the Houthis seems to be growing deeper by the day.

If all of that sounds like a powder keg, that is because it is a powder keg.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happened when South West State declared independence from Mogadishu in March 2026?

On 17 March 2026, regional governor Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed declared that South West State was severing all relations with Mogadishu and effectively claiming autonomous status. Rather than accepting the secession as in previous cases, Somalia’s national military marched on the state’s largest city, Baidoa, and captured it in a single day. Mohamed resigned hours later and fled across the border, with his former finance minister appointed to oversee a transition back under federal control.

How has Turkey deepened its involvement in Somalia?

Turkey used strike drones to provide aerial overwatch during the federal offensive against South West State and has since authorized the deployment of up to 2,500 soldiers, along with F-16s, attack helicopters, and main battle tanks. Turkish forces have conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab and taken on major training responsibilities with Somali forces. In mid-April a Turkish deep-sea oil exploration vessel arrived off the coast to begin Somalia’s first-ever offshore oil operation, with revenues expected to flow to Mogadishu.

What constitutional changes has President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made, and why are they controversial?

HSM passed amendments ending the clan-based voting system in favor of a one-person, one-vote model, turned the prime minister’s post into a directly appointed position requiring no parliamentary approval, and arranged for the president to be elected by parliamentarians rather than by voters. Critics argue these changes are not genuine democratic reforms but a mechanism to concentrate executive power and state weaponry in the hands of Somalia’s most powerful clans, particularly given Somalia’s history of clan-driven ethnic violence including the genocide against the Isaaq people in the late 1980s.

What are the two rival regional coalitions competing for influence in Somalia?

One coalition — Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan, quietly backed by China — supports the Mogadishu federal government. The opposing coalition — Israel, the UAE, Ethiopia, and Morocco — backs Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland. These groupings reflect a broader regional competition playing out across Libya, Yemen, and other unstable nations, with each side too risk-averse for direct war but aggressively pursuing proxy influence and alliance-building.

Why does Somalia’s location make it strategically critical in the current regional environment?

Somalia and the territory claimed by Somaliland sit close to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea, which carries roughly 12 to 15 percent of all maritime trade and over 30 percent of global tanker traffic. The Houthis, a key Iranian proxy, control the opposite shore of the strait. Reports indicate al-Shabaab and the Houthis are building an increasingly systematic alliance, meaning control of Somali territory has become a direct concern for anyone seeking to keep Red Sea shipping lanes open.

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