Will the RSF Defections End the War in Sudan?

A war is raging across Sudan that has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and put millions more at risk of starvation and famine. It is a war defined by drones used to attack civilians indiscriminately, by cities besieged and then sacked, by populations massacred in what may be some of the worst war crimes seen this century. And unlike the conflicts in Iran, Ukraine, and Gaza, which receive wall-to-wall coverage, this war has drawn very little attention.

Ignited in 2023 when soldiers from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked the official military — the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) — the fighting has now lasted more than three years. In that time the country has nearly split in two: the RSF controls the western part around Darfur and parts of Kordofan, while the SAF holds much of the center and east, including the capital Khartoum, which it retook from the RSF in May of last year. Following the capital’s liberation, leading Sudan expert Alex De Waal described the conflict as a strategic stalemate, with neither side able to land a decisive blow.

That may be about to change. Several of the RSF’s senior commanders — including some considered founding fathers of the militia — have defected to the SAF in recent months, taking their men, vehicles, and weapons with them. These are men accused of hideous war crimes: men who oversaw the sacking of cities, the slaughter of civilians, and a persistent campaign of rape against Sudan’s women and girls. Yet embracing them may be the SAF’s only path to victory.

Key Takeaways

Sudan’s civil war, ongoing since April 2023, has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, yet receives a fraction of the coverage given to wars in Iran, Ukraine, and Gaza.
After the SAF retook Khartoum in May of last year, the conflict settled into what analyst Alex De Waal calls a strategic stalemate — which a wave of high-level RSF defections may now break.
The defectors are not low-level deserters but senior, often founding, RSF commanders implicated in mass atrocities, including the siege and fall of El-Fasher, where perhaps 60,000 people were slaughtered.
The SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is publicly welcoming these commanders as heroes — with amnesties, returned property, and unfrozen bank accounts — sending the message “join us and all will be forgiven.”
An RSF attack in February on the home territory of Mahariya paramount chief Musa Hilal helped trigger the defections, threatening to collapse the RSF’s alliance of mostly Arab tribes into internal civil war.
The defectors bring critical losses for the RSF: manpower, combat vehicles, and — most dangerously — intelligence on supply lines, air defenses, drone launch sites, and ammunition depots.
Despite the damage, the defections alone may not end the war: the RSF retains 200,000 to perhaps half a million fighters, a resilient horizontal command structure, long-range drones, and continued weapons supplies from the UAE.

The Defections Begin

Even by the lamentable standards of insurgent armies in the 2020s, the Rapid Support Forces are notorious for their brutality. They are responsible for massacres that may have killed tens of thousands, such as at El-Fasher last autumn. They set up detention centers during their rule over Khartoum, where countless civilians were tortured to death. They are responsible for what appears to be an ongoing genocide in Darfur.

And they are proud of it. Follow RSF commanders on social media and you will find videos of them killing people, burning villages, and smilingly admitting to war crimes. These are not men of conscience, nor the sort who seem to harbor second thoughts about the civilians they are slaughtering.

All of which makes the recent rash of defections to the Sudanese military stranger still. The first senior commander to leave was Abu Aqla Keikal, a former military intelligence officer who had become the militia’s top commander in El Gezira state. According to the SAF, Keikal defected in October 2024 because of the RSF’s destructive agenda — a neat little story of a commander having a change of heart. But that is not how wars work, least of all in Sudan.

Abu Aqla Keikal and the Price of Switching Sides

Keikal had originally served in the army before forming his own militia, the Sudan Shield Forces, in December 2022, recruiting fighters from the Butana region in central Sudan. When the war broke out in April 2023, he initially sided with the SAF. But in August 2023 he switched to the RSF, claiming he was doing so in support of the Sudanese revolution and to fight for the rights of marginalized people.

According to ACLED, a non-profit that monitors conflicts worldwide, the Sudan Shield Forces’ deep knowledge of central Sudan and ties to the communities of al-Butanah — an area spanning Khartoum, al-Jazirah, River Nile, and Gedaref states — made them extremely valuable to the RSF. Keikal was himself a skilled military leader, commanding RSF troops during their successful offensive in Gezira State and serving as a regional commander.

According to Ali Mahmoud Ali, a researcher at ACLED, the SAF allegedly orchestrated Keikal’s defection to weaken the RSF’s hold in eastern Gezira. Days before he switched sides, the SAF had launched a coordinated multi-pronged offensive into the state — one that would culminate in the seizure of the regional capital, Wad Madani, opening the road to a still-occupied Khartoum. To get Keikal across the lines, the SAF offered him amnesty, a recurring feature of the defections to come.

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The RSF’s response would put a lid on further defections for nearly a year. According to the BBC, the paramilitaries launched at least 69 reprisal attacks on towns and villages in Gezira state, targeting members of the Shukriya ethnic group, of which Keikal is a member. According to the UN, at least 120 people were killed — and given the UN’s tendency to wildly underestimate death tolls in Sudan’s war, that figure was likely a massive undercount. Such public bloodletting may be a major reason no more RSF commanders switched sides over the following year, even as the paramilitaries were expelled from Khartoum.

Al-Qubba and the 2026 Wave

Then came 2026, and what can only be described as a wave of defections. The first to jump ship was Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known by the nickname Al-Qubba. A founding member of the RSF, he was one of the militia’s highest-ranking field commanders, controlling Kutum locality in North Darfur and leading the siege of El-Fasher — a siege that culminated in the RSF overrunning the city and slaughtering perhaps sixty thousand people.

Al-Qubba may have overseen the 21st century’s largest single act of mass killing to date. Yet he has now been embraced by the SAF, with what appears to be a promise to scrub his crimes from the record.

Al-Qubba seems to have had reasons to defect beyond immunity. He was passed over for the military governorship of North Darfur in favor of Ibn Shouk after the fall of El-Fasher in October 2025. And according to Ali Rizqallah, another commander who would also defect, Al-Qubba had been neglected by RSF leadership for four months, forced to request basic supplies from junior officers related to the militia’s top command.

There are faint echoes here of the position Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin found himself in during the Battle of Bakhmut in 2023, reduced to berating his superiors and demanding more material for his siege. But where Prigozhin staged a mutiny, Al-Qubba instead took his men and 46 combat vehicles and joined the SAF. When he arrived in Dongola, the capital of Sudan’s Northern State, he was personally welcomed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Here we reach a key driver of these defections. As more RSF commanders cross the lines, the SAF has gone out of its way to embrace them, releasing videos on social media that show them treated as heroes. It is a clever move from al-Burhan, telling the paramilitaries, essentially: join us and all will be forgiven. The only problem is that some of these men have committed crimes any sane person would call unforgivable.

The big question becomes what it means for the SAF to so publicly embrace genocidal mass murderers.

Jumping Ship: A Cascade of Commanders

To paraphrase Oscar Wilde: to lose one senior commander may be regarded as misfortune; to lose several looks like carelessness. Several is exactly what the RSF have lost in recent months. After Al-Qubba came Brigadier General Khala Abdullah Shagab, an officer ranked fifth in the RSF’s hierarchy according to Drop Site News, who also defected with his men and equipment. And then there was Brigadier Ali Rizqallah, better known by his nom de guerre Al-Savannah, who defected following alleged supply shortages.

These were not small fry. Al-Savannah had built a name as a key recruiter and leader, with Al-Qubba telling local media that he was among the RSF’s most prominent field commanders. Even without such endorsements, the RSF’s reaction tells the story: as with Keikal, the paramilitaries went on a spree of killings, targeting the ethnic groups from which the defectors came. The pattern suggests the RSF is incapable of learning lessons — especially since it may have been the RSF’s increasingly genocidal targeting of other tribes that drove some of these defections in the first place.

The Fracture Within: Musa Hilal and the Mahariya

Brigadier General Amin Ismail, a crisis management expert at the Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, told the Sudan Tribune that the RSF’s attack on the Mustaraha pastoral area in North Darfur in February had played a large role in pushing some of these commanders to abandon the paramilitaries. The assault targeted the home territory of Musa Hilal, paramount chief of the Mahariya clan, from which many RSF commanders — including Al-Qubba and Al-Savannah — originate, and a longtime thorn in the side of RSF leader Hemedti.

Hilal was the leader of the Janjaweed militia, the precursor to the RSF, during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s. As Hemedti’s stature grew and he gained more supporters within the Janjaweed, a power struggle emerged between the two men. When the RSF was formalized in 2013, it cemented their feud, as Hemedti co-opted a large number of soldiers who had previously been loyal to Hilal.

For much of the war, Hilal has backed the SAF, declaring the RSF a foreign-backed militia — a not unfair characterization given the enormous quantity of weapons and supplies the UAE provides. Tensions escalated after Hilal was accused of involvement in the killing of a senior RSF official earlier this year, an accusation Hilal claimed was a smokescreen for the RSF dismantling the power of the Mahariya. This culminated in the February attack, seen by many as a direct assault on Hilal’s authority and the Mahariya clan more broadly.

Brigadier General Ismail told the Sudan Tribune that this attack was the straw that broke the camel’s back, threatening to collapse the RSF’s alliance of mostly Arab tribes into a civil war. Sudan analyst Mohieddin Mohamed Mohieddin put it bluntly to the Tribune: “The RSF has begun to crack from within.” Hence the wave of defections — defections the SAF is now trying to capitalize upon to break the stalemate. The question is whether it is worth it.

Crimes and Misdemeanours: The Cost of Amnesty

Anything that can help end this war is clearly worth weighing. Sudan’s civil war is likely the worst war happening anywhere in the world right now — hundreds of thousands dead, millions displaced, and millions more at risk of starvation, with the situation worsening by the day. And yet it is hard not to argue that the SAF’s decision to ally itself with these commanders sets a terrible precedent for post-war justice.

These are not ordinary soldiers who had a change of heart. Al-Qubba was accused of blocking food and medicine from reaching the people of El-Fasher during the siege, and when the city fell he was still on the RSF’s side — making him, at the very least, complicit in the genocide that followed. According to The Arab Weekly, during Abu Aqla Keikal’s time with the RSF, the militia’s attack on Gezira State featured systematic atrocities including mass rape and killings. According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Keikal oversaw the displacement of more than 500,000 people.

The SAF, it must be said, are not angels. A late-May 2026 newsletter from the Sudan War Monitor opened with the line: “Dozens of civilians were killed on Tuesday after a suspected Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) drone strike hit the local market in Gbeish town, West Kordofan State.” Beyond indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas, the SAF have been accused of revenge killings and of stopping food from reaching starving civilians in RSF-held areas.

Yet there is a difference between the war crimes committed by the SAF and the baroque, almost performative bloodletting and genocide undertaken by the RSF with undisguised glee. The defectors have been a key part of that. And here they are, given not just a hero’s welcome by al-Burhan but gifts, concessions, and in some cases amnesty. The Sudan Tribune reported that Al-Qubba got back a multi-story property in Khartoum’s upscale Kafouri district and had his bank accounts unfrozen as part of his defection deal; his record of slaughter, meanwhile, appears to have been scrubbed.

There is an enduring image from November of last year of al-Burhan embracing a displaced woman at the al-Afahd camp in the Northern State, which had become a refuge for people fleeing Al-Qubba’s violence. That in less than a year we have gone from that image to al-Burhan embracing Al-Qubba is one of the greatest tragedies of this war. We cannot fault the SAF for it — the civil war is one of national survival, and in such a conflict you do what you must to win, which is also why the SAF has allied with Islamist militias accused of atrocities.

But practicality does not erase moral objection. Al-Qubba oversaw a siege in which children starved to death, medicine ran out, and civilians ate grass and leaves to survive; his forces then overran the city and killed so many people, so quickly, that the director of Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab noted the fall of El-Fasher may have been the fastest bout of bloodletting since the Rwandan Genocide. In a just world, Al-Qubba and men like him would end this war shot dead in a ditch or standing trial at The Hague.

Instead, he may go off to a leisurely retirement, never having to repent.

The Impact on the RSF War Effort

The defections have hit the RSF hard. Retired Major General Ahmed Abdel Rahim Shukratullah, who played a significant role in the development of the Janjaweed, described Al-Qubba’s defection as a painful blow that would severely disrupt the paramilitaries’ morale and tactical balance. He is not wrong.

When a group like the RSF loses multiple high-ranking commanders — including a founding member — within months, regular soldiers begin asking the kinds of questions that destroy an army’s morale. If the commanders are leaving, why should the foot soldiers stay? Defections signal that the top brass has lost faith in the militia’s ability to win, and since the rank and file have nothing to gain and everything to lose in defeat, they too may begin to leave.

Beyond morale, there is the immediate loss of manpower and equipment. Al-Qubba alone defected with multiple fully equipped combat vehicles and hundreds of fighters. Keikal brought his entire Sudan Shield Forces, with their deep knowledge of central Sudan. These are not symbolic losses but ones that will badly affect the RSF’s ability to fight.

The biggest risk, however, is what these commanders know. According to Ayin News, Al-Qubba brings invaluable intelligence on RSF supply lines across the Chadian and Libyan borders, as well as the exact coordinates of RSF air defense vehicles, drone launch sites, and ammunition depots. That is the kind of information the SAF could use to hammer the RSF and turn the tide of the war.

Why the War May Not End Yet

Before celebrating the downfall of this genocidal militia, it is worth examining why these defections, by themselves, may not be enough to end the fighting. First, while the defected commanders are enormously consequential, they are still only four people. Even counting the soldiers who came with them, that is a drop in the bucket against the RSF’s operational strength.

The exact figure is unknown, but estimates suggest anywhere from 200,000 to perhaps half a million fighters once allied troops in groups like the SPLM-North are included. It would take a great many more defections before the paramilitaries became incapable of offensive operations.

Then there is the group’s structure. According to ACLED’s Ali Mahmoud Ali, the RSF’s horizontal structure has helped it absorb the impact of these defections, because it allows the militia to deploy troops where they are most needed rather than relying on a rigid hierarchical chain of command. The RSF also retains the weapons to make this a painful war for the SAF and the Sudanese people. Its arsenal of long-range drones has allowed it to strike as far as Port Sudan on the Red Sea — a formidable capability in itself.

Most importantly, the RSF still has the support of its main backer, the UAE. According to Middle East Eye, US intelligence agencies reported that as recently as October 2025 the UAE increased its supply of drones and other weapon systems — including small arms, heavy machine guns, and artillery — to the RSF. The date matters: October 2025 is the same month El-Fasher fell. If the genocide that followed was not enough to stop Abu Dhabi from supporting the militia, perhaps nothing is.

As long as the UAE keeps the weapons flowing, the RSF has the resources to sustain operations.

The Balance: A Crack the SAF Can Exploit

None of this is to downplay the significance of the defections to the SAF. The immediate boost in morale and manpower alone will go a long way toward convincing SAF soldiers that victory is, if not guaranteed, then perhaps close. The intelligence these commanders bring opens a whole new list of targets; according to ACLED, the SAF is expected to use the defections to launch offensives in North Darfur.

Most importantly, the defections give the SAF the best chance it has had to completely destroy the RSF. As Mohieddin Mohamed Mohieddin told the Tribune, the RSF is cracking from within, and if the SAF can exploit those fault lines, the militia could crumble, allowing the army to finally end the war. The only question is whether such a prize is worth the amnesties granted to these most awful of men.

Presented by

Simon Whistler

Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. WarFronts is his deep dive into military history and conflict analysis.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is Al-Qubba, and why is his defection so significant?

Al-Qubba — Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam — was a founding member of the RSF and one of its highest-ranking field commanders. He controlled Kutum locality in North Darfur and led the siege of El-Fasher, which culminated in the RSF overrunning the city and slaughtering perhaps sixty thousand people — a pace of killing the director of Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab compared to the Rwandan Genocide. He defected with his men and 46 combat vehicles and was personally welcomed in Dongola by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

What role did Musa Hilal and the Mahariya clan play in triggering the defections?

Hilal is the paramount chief of the Mahariya clan, from which many RSF commanders including Al-Qubba and Al-Savannah originate, and a longtime rival of RSF leader Hemedti dating back to their days in the Janjaweed. The RSF’s February attack on the Mustaraha pastoral area — Hilal’s home territory — was seen by crisis-management expert Amin Ismail as the straw that broke the camel’s back, threatening to collapse the RSF’s alliance of mostly Arab tribes and pushing several commanders to abandon the militia.

What is the SAF offering defectors, and what are the moral implications?

The SAF is publicly welcoming the commanders as heroes through social-media videos, alongside gifts, concessions, and in some cases amnesty. The Sudan Tribune reported that Al-Qubba had a multi-story property in Khartoum’s upscale Kafouri district returned to him and his bank accounts unfrozen, with his record of slaughter apparently scrubbed. Critics argue this sets a terrible precedent: Al-Qubba oversaw a siege where children starved and civilians ate grass, then was present when the city fell and tens of thousands were slaughtered.

What strategic intelligence do the defectors bring to the SAF?

According to Ayin News, Al-Qubba brings invaluable intelligence on RSF supply lines across the Chadian and Libyan borders, as well as the exact coordinates of RSF air defense vehicles, drone launch sites, and ammunition depots. Beyond that, the defectors represent an immediate loss of manpower and equipment for the RSF — Al-Qubba alone brought 46 combat vehicles and hundreds of fighters — and signal to rank-and-file RSF soldiers that top commanders have lost faith in the militia’s ability to win.

Why might the defections still not be enough to end the war?

The defectors are only four commanders; even counting the soldiers who came with them, that is a fraction of an RSF estimated at 200,000 to perhaps half a million fighters. The RSF’s horizontal command structure allows it to absorb such losses by deploying troops where most needed rather than relying on a rigid hierarchy. Its arsenal of long-range drones can strike as far as Port Sudan, and the UAE — which as recently as October 2025 increased its supply of drones, small arms, heavy machine guns, and artillery — continues to keep the militia armed and capable of sustaining operations.