Russian Military Failures: Aerial, Logistics, and Comms

The Russian military has long been considered one of the most formidable in the world. Having well and truly recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia invested heavily in its armed forces, fielding some of the most advanced equipment globally. This includes T-14 tanks designed to outperform American M1 Abrams and British Challenger IIs, SU-57 fighters capable of engaging American F-22s, and advanced AN-94 rifles that ostensibly make standard NATO weaponry obsolete.

Paired with Russia’s famous inexhaustible supply of manpower, a war with the nation was widely viewed as a terrifying prospect. This rhetoric was touted by the vast majority of the military commentary community prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, after the failed advance on Kyiv and the continued slow progress of Russia’s campaign in the east, all illusions of Russia as an advanced military power have been absolutely shattered.

Analyzing why a military that appeared so fearsome failed so badly requires focusing on the major tactical and operational breakdowns in aerial operations, communications, and frontline logistics during the opening stages of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The Challenge of Propaganda and Objective Analysis

When researching any conflict, there is often little consensus between analysts, resulting in an inescapable element of subjectivity. For example, some analysts, such as Stanimir Dobrev, have stated that at the beginning of the war, the Russian Air Force acted quite successfully because the positions of the enemy were known to it. A conflicting perspective asserts that the Russian Air Force at the outbreak of the war bordered on flatly incompetent.

Analysts will naturally disagree when discussing a conflict, relying on different sources and inherent biases that impact their interpretation. Consequently, reaching differing conclusions is a natural part of military analysis, requiring observers to consider claims within the context of the sources presented and use them as a springboard for further investigation. Propaganda, defined as information of a biased or misleading nature used to promote a political cause or point of view, is nothing new in warfare.

While the modern word entered public consciousness during the First World War, the manipulation of information to dictate public attitudes is as old as war itself. In Ancient Greece, public assemblies were harnessed for propagandising. In the modern information age, globally connected populations are bombarded with algorithmically personalised propaganda designed to dictate opinions.

Getting a clear and concise understanding of unfolding world events, especially contentious ones like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, remains unfathomably difficult. Both Russia and Ukraine have engaged in the curation of information for propaganda purposes. Russia has published exaggerated stories and dubious claims through news agencies such as South Front, a purportedly Kremlin-backed outlet.

Examples include false claims of Moroccan mercenaries in Ukrainian service and unverifiable reports regarding the results of Ukrainian shelling. Conversely, the Ukrainian government shared a fabricated video on March 4, 2022, titled “Russia launches battle with Ukraine,” which appeared to show a ZSU-23-4 Shilka engaging a Russian aircraft but was actually footage from the video game Arma 3. The video received over 2.5 million views before being debunked.

This issue of video game footage being passed off as authentic combat footage proved so pervasive that retired American four-star general Barry R. McCaffrey shared an Arma 3 clip of a Russian MiG-29 being shot down on May 16, 2022, believing it to be real. The most prominent example of propaganda efforts in the Russo-Ukrainian War is the “Ghost of Kyiv,” a mythic fighter ace who supposedly shot down over 40 Russian planes during the opening stages of the conflict.

This story, although undoubtedly well-intentioned, was a complete fabrication shared by the Ukrainian government and many legacy media outlets. The Ukrainian Air Force eventually admitted the fabrication on April 30, 2022, stating that the Ghost of Kyiv was a superhero-legend created by Ukrainians to embody the collective spirit of their highly qualified pilots. Because propaganda is a natural part of warfare, finding accurate information requires relying on primary sources and analysts with a track record for impartial reporting.

The Botched Aerial War and the Missing Supremacy

From its humble beginnings in the First World War, air power has become exponentially more important with every passing conflict. Control of the skies, or air supremacy, allows increased bombing efforts, tactical air support for ground forces, paratroop assaults, airdrops, and cargo plane transfers, while preventing the enemy from doing the same. Air power has become so vital that modern conventional warfare is practically decided by the war in the sky.

Doctrines written and tested in air-dominated conflicts like the Yugoslav and Gulf Wars demonstrate that if Russia had followed established examples, victory in Ukraine would likely have been assured and quick. Instead, Russian aerial operations were an absolute disaster, directly contributing to the wider failure of the Russian military in the opening stages of the war. To fully appreciate the scale of Russian failures in the air, one must look at coalition aerial operations during the Gulf War.

Coalition leadership during the invasion of Iraq demanded air superiority on day one, meaning the ability to carry out aerial operations without prohibitive interference. An enormous weeks-long aerial campaign targeted surface-to-air missile sites, anti-aircraft batteries, and airfields. A deception campaign involved launching massive sorties of aircraft circling the Saudi-Iraqi border, making Iraqi air defense operators complacent.

When the invasion launched, coalition forces achieved air supremacy on day one. Priority then shifted to destroying communication hubs, power stations, and strategic bunkers. AH-64 Apaches made precise hits, F-117 Nighthawk stealth aircraft provided radar jamming, and F-15 and F/A-18 aircraft delivered overwhelming force.

Within hours of the Gulf War invasion beginning, the Iraqi military found itself decapitated. It could not communicate, its chain of command was devastated, and personnel began to desert. Operation Desert Storm provided a template for how to quickly and expediently neutralize a nation’s military capabilities.

Russia simply had to follow that example, but it did not. Despite the dramatic appearance of Russia’s opening salvo on Ukraine, it was an abject failure. In the opening stages, the Russian military failed to eliminate multitudes of key targets and did little to neuter the ability of the Ukrainian military to mount an effective counter-offensive.

This failure significantly contributed to the inability to take Kyiv, a city not even 100 miles from the border. The opening Russian salvo targeted air bases poorly. Countless bombs and missiles landed off target, with many striking civilian areas and farmland rather than military installations.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) operations were largely unsuccessful. Rather than obliterating Ukrainian air defenses, the Russian attacks merely inconvenienced them. SEAD operations were carried out with unsuitable, older SU-25 aircraft flown by pilots who possessed little flight time and lacked dedicated SEAD training.

Consequently, by the end of day one, Ukraine was still able to communicate domestically and internationally undisturbed, and successfully mobilized its military largely unimpeded.

Quantitative Failures and Catastrophic Drone Losses

Russian air failures extended beyond qualitative shortcomings to massive quantitative deficits. During Operation Desert Storm, coalition air forces flew over 100,000 sorties and dropped 88,500 tons of bombs over five weeks. They destroyed 254 aircraft on the ground, 36 in air-to-air combat, and dismantled the vast majority of the Iraqi air defense network.

In stark contrast, Russian aerial forces did not drop even one percent of that yield before ground operations began on day one in Ukraine. The skies above Ukraine remained unsecured and highly hostile. This suggests the Russian military either vastly underestimated Ukrainian air defenses, overestimated its own aerial capabilities, or planned to invade without securing air superiority in hopes of forcing a quick capitulation.

The approximately 300 combat aircraft that the Russian Air Force moved within rapid deployment range of Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders were notably absent from the initial conflict. Instead of engaging, these aircraft largely remained on the tarmac. Consequently, the Ukrainian Air Force, supported by its surviving air defense network, continued low-level defensive counter-air sorties against the few Russian jets that entered Ukrainian airspace.

Ukrainian forces also executed ground attack and close air support missions to aid the militia and reserve units harrying the initial Russian invaders. The majority of Russian aircraft that did take to the sky remained within friendly airspace, attacking targets with stand-off weapons of dubious accuracy. The lack of Russian air superiority resulted in severe tactical failures, clearly visible during the Battle of Antonov Airport.

On February 24, 2022, Russian paratroopers attempted to secure the strategically vital Antonov Airport on the outskirts of Kyiv to use as a staging point for troops and supplies. While initially successful, the paratroopers required aerial reinforcement. Because Russian SEAD operations had failed, transport planes, including an AN-26 carrying troops and supplies, were shot down en route to the airport.

The loss of these aircraft proved to be a critical turning point. Throughout the entire Kyiv Offensive, Russian forces took confirmed aerial logistical losses of at least nine Mi-8 transport helicopters and an AN-26, with credible reports of additional losses including two IL-76 strategic airlifters. The greatest consequence of the failed Russian SEAD operations was the decimation of Russian ground forces by Ukrainian aerial assets.

Convoys packed tightly along thin, predictable routes became rich targets for drones and planes that would not have been operational had SEAD been successful. Confirmed Russian losses to the Bayraktar TB2 drone alone during the opening stages included: eight Ural-4320 trucks, five KamAZ 6x6 trucks, five KamAZ-6350 8x8 artillery tractors, five 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers, four 9A317 TELAR Buk SAM systems, three unidentified armored fighting vehicles, two Mi-8 transport helicopters, two KA-52 Alligator attack helicopters, two unidentified logistics trains, two BMD-2s, two KamAZ-5350s with EOV-3523 excavators, two 23mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, two unidentified trucks, one MT-LB with a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, one BTR-D, one communications vehicle, one 220mm BM-27 Uragan, one 9A310M1-2 TELAR Buk SAM system, one 9A39M1-2 TELAR Buk SAM system, one 9A331 TELAR Buk SAM system, and one Pantir S-1 SAM system. These confirmed kills by a single aerial asset underscore the catastrophic impact of failing to secure air superiority.

The Smart Munitions Shortage and Coordination Breakdown

An often-cited reason for the Russian Air Force’s lack of activity is a severe shortage of smart munitions, making commanders reluctant to commit aerial forces in the face of potentially disappointing returns. This shortage appears endemic to the Russian military. During Russia’s intervention in Syria from 2015, only the SU-34s regularly utilized smart munitions, and even these hyper-modern strike aircraft frequently fell back on unguided dumb bombs and rockets.

Deliveries of smart munitions to the Russian Expeditionary Force were sparse, clearly demonstrating a long-term deficit. This shortage meant Russian combat pilots, who already average a maximum of 125 to 150 flight hours a year compared to 180 to 250 for British Royal Air Force pilots, were incredibly unfamiliar with advanced targeting systems. However, the lack of smart munitions and qualified pilots does not fully explain the Russian Air Force’s hesitance early in the war.

Russia still had around 300 aircraft stationed within operational distance of Ukrainian airspace, representing a formidable force. Approximately 80 of these were modern SU-35S multi-role fighters, and around 60 were modernized SU-25SMs. Aircraft with such inbuilt sensors should have been capable of dropping dumb ordnance with reasonable accuracy.

The prevailing explanation for this reluctance is that the Russian Air Force lacked confidence in its ability to discriminate between Russian and Ukrainian aircraft on its surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Forced to choose between protecting their own airspace or attacking Ukraine’s, they chose the former. Managing joint engagement zones, where aircraft and SAM systems engage enemy forces without hitting friendly assets, requires perfect communication and incredible inter-service coordination.

Russian Armed Forces coordination during the opening stages of the war was disastrous. Cargo aircraft failed to turn off transponders, allowing Ukrainian SAM operators to track them on flight radar and shoot them down. Ground forces repeatedly assaulted Kyiv at a single point rather than laying a traditional siege, and convoys were sent down the exact same roads where previous convoys had just been destroyed.

Coordination across all Russian forces, let alone the Air Force, was severely lacking. Facing an inability to coordinate complex aerial operations, Russia chose to limit its own flights to prevent friendly fire incidents, effectively opting to protect its own skies while leaving Ukrainian airspace contested. Senior Russian military leadership was well aware they commanded a force incapable of complex operations due to a lack of supplies, insufficient training, and blatant incompetence.

By playing it safe, their aerial operations totally failed. Consequently, the regular Ukrainian military could fall back and regroup, move assets in and around Kyiv unimpeded, bring supplies into the capital, and execute counter-attacks without severe aerial interference. This strategic failure majorly contributed to the early collapse of the Russian advance.

Logistical Collapse and the Railway Reliance Doctrine

Logistics remains the single most important aspect of modern warfare. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, declared, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

This assertion proved profoundly accurate during the Russo-Ukrainian War. The unmitigated failure of the Russian military to adequately supply its troops with provisions and ammunition prevented a quick, decisive, or strategically meaningful victory. Instead of securing the country rapidly and negotiating peace in the ruins of Kyiv, Russia was forced into a long, slow grind in the eastern separatist regions.

The primary logistical problem the Russian military faced was a fundamental failure of their logistical doctrine. This doctrine proved incapable of supporting a fast-moving war beyond the nation’s borders due to an over-reliance on railways. No other European military uses railroads to the extent that the Russian army does.

Because Russia spans over 6,000 miles, utilizing railways is an efficient and cost-effective method for domestic transport of men and material. However, mistaking this solid domestic rail network for a capable expeditionary logistics network led to the severe neglect of trucks and road-based supply chains. This rail-based approach struggles significantly during foreign operations due to the difficulty of establishing forward railhead positions.

Establishing forward railhead operations is a highly complex process. Dedicated areas must be created for receiving, sorting, repackaging, loading, and storing cargo. Because military trains carry dangerous materials, cargo must be dispersed across protective locations.

Estimates place the time needed for the Russian military to establish a fully functional forward railway operation at three to five days, an incredibly long time in modern warfare. This delay was fatal during the VDV paratroopers’ assault on Hostomel Airport on the first day of the invasion. Dependent on Il-76 cargo aircraft that were being shot down, the invaders found themselves cut off from rail and road logistics, ran low on ammunition, and were promptly wiped out or forced to surrender.

A road-based logistic network would have provided a much better chance of supporting initial gains. Furthermore, forward railheads are less flexible and more vulnerable than truck convoys. Trains are limited to predetermined paths, shackled by civilian infrastructure constraints.

Russian logistical planners opted for caution, establishing forward railhead operations far from the frontlines. This kept the railheads safe but placed an insurmountable strain on the Russian military’s limited and badly organized supply of trucks. By late March 2022, the advance on Kyiv stalled completely as Russian forces ran critically low on supplies, halting their offensive at roughly the range of a single supply truck’s fuel tank.

The Critical Truck Shortage and Unsecured Supply Lines

The Russian military’s failure to sustain the Kyiv offensive was directly tied to a massive shortage of trucks. Prioritizing rail logistics over road transport, combined with systemic corruption, prevented the manufacture and maintenance of sufficient utility vehicles. At the start of the war, Russia simply lacked the truck inventory required to sustain a complex logistical network within occupied Ukraine.

Russia possesses ten Material Technical Support Brigades, split between logistics and automotive units. At full strength, each brigade holds around 400 trucks. Including trucks distributed among motorized units, estimates placed the Russian military’s total pre-invasion operational truck supply at no more than 5,000 vehicles.

To put this shortage into perspective, the United States Military, which has roughly the same number of personnel as the Russian Armed Forces, operates over ten times the number of trucks. Complex logistical operations form a pyramid as they extend forward: the truck delivering supplies to frontline soldiers requires another truck behind it to carry its fuel, creating a gradually thickening chain back to the forward railheads. Without enough trucks, such a network is impossible, rendering deep territorial gains entirely unsustainable.

Furthermore, establishing this network requires ample drivers, forward operating base personnel, and troops to defend supply lines. In modern militaries, support troops vastly outnumber combat soldiers; the U.S. military deploys roughly 12 support personnel per combat soldier, whereas Russia relies on less than half that ratio. The dire logistical situation was exponentially worsened by the significant number of trucks destroyed, captured, or abandoned during the opening weeks of the conflict.

Accurately tracking material losses is difficult due to the fog of war and commanders downplaying losses to superiors. However, the prevalence of smartphones in Ukraine, coupled with Russia’s failure to dismantle Ukrainian communication networks, allowed a steady flow of verified, geolocated photographs of destroyed Russian equipment. Independent analysis of confirmed utility vehicle losses by June 29, 2022, stood at staggering numbers.

Losses included 12 GAZ 66s, 3 KrAZ 255Bs, 1 KrAZ 25BB tanker truck, 8 ZiL 131s, 18 9T452 low loaders, 2 9T217 transloaders, 2 9T244 transloaders, 5 GAZ-3308s, 2 GAZ Sobols, 2 Ural 375Ds, 256 Ural 4320s, 72 Ural 4320 tankers, 46 Ural 43206s, 13 Ural Federals, 3 Ural 5323s, 4 Ural 63704s, 1 MAZ TZ 500 tanker, 7 KamAZ 4x4s, 292 KamAZ 6x6s, 51 KamAZ 6x6 tankers, 9 KamAZ 8x8s, 14 KamAZ Avtozaks, 6 KamAZ Avtozaks with up-armored cabins, 5 KamAZ 6350 8x8 artillery tractors, 3 civilian KamAZ 6x6s converted for military use, 5 UAZ 469 jeeps, 8 UAZ 452 vans, 2 UAZ Patriot jeeps, 3 UAZ 23632 pickup trucks, 2 UAZ 23632 148 64 technicals, 1 Toyota Hilux pickup truck, 280 unidentified trucks, and 57 unidentified utility vehicles. The staggering scale of these losses crippled an already emaciated logistical network. Photographic evidence revealed that early in the conflict, the Russian military was forced to requisition civilian trucks, including KamAZ commercial vehicles and unarmored civilian transport, to replenish frontline losses.

The impact on the Kyiv offensive was definitive. Had a robust, well-defended, and adequately supplied logistical network been established, Russian forces could have consolidated initial gains and properly besieged the capital. Instead, undersupplied units repeatedly charged down Highway P-02, driving into the same ambushes as their predecessors, ultimately leading to the total collapse of the northern offensive.

The Complete Collapse of Battlefield Communications

We have no communication. We have no walkie-talkies. Nothing.

These words, spoken by an exhausted Russian soldier in a March 2022 interrogation video released by the Ukrainian military, highlighted a fundamental failing. While individual testimonies during wartime must be treated with skepticism, this specific claim was indicative of a wider, systemic trend within the Russian military: the complete and abject failure of tactical and operational communications. From the moment the invasion began, visual evidence accumulated showing Russian troops utilizing cheap, off-the-shelf commercial walkie-talkies, relaying orders via runners with pen and paper, and broadcasting over unsecured frequencies easily intercepted by Ukrainian civilians using basic amateur radio equipment.

The communication failure was not limited to the platoon or regimental level. Command structures across all branches of the Russian military experienced systemic blackouts and interception vulnerabilities. Unsecured communications reportedly led to devastating targeted strikes against senior leadership.

Ukrainian sources claimed that the interception of an unencrypted phone call broadcasted the exact location of Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, leading directly to a fatal strike, though Russian media subsequently contested the report of his death. Regardless of individual casualties, the primary cause of these vulnerabilities was the Russian use of a wide range of incompatible, mixed-vintage communication systems. The Russian military operates a hodgepodge of pre- and post-Soviet hardware.

While operating mixed-generation armor is manageable, employing mismatched communication systems proved disastrous. Field officers were forced to choose between establishing secure, encrypted communications with a tiny fraction of their troops, or establishing unencrypted, unsecured communications with their entire unit. This dilemma devastated Combined Arms Warfare.

For example, the Russian 90th Guards Tank Division comprised multiple tank regiments, motorized rifles, and artillery units, operating everything from the legacy 1979 T-72A to the modernized 2013 T-72B3. While the T-72B3 possessed advanced digital encrypted communication systems, the older T-72A models did not. Because the older tanks lacked secure channels, the entire division was forced to communicate using the lowest common denominator—antique, unencrypted Soviet radio systems that were easily intercepted by Ukrainian signals intelligence.

This vulnerability extended to air-ground coordination. If a unit required Close Air Support, only a fraction of Russia’s SU-25 fleet, specifically the modernized SU-25SM, possessed the advanced encrypted systems needed to communicate securely with modern ground units. The vast majority of the fleet relied on unencrypted Soviet-era radios.

Consequently, tactical requests for air support were broadcast openly, allowing Ukrainian forces to anticipate strikes, jam frequencies, and prepare surface-to-air missile defenses.

Corruption, the Azart Radio System, and the Cost of Failure

These communication issues were not new to the Russian Armed Forces. Poor communications had plagued Russian operations in every conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union, notably during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Despite being a rapid victory for Russia, the 2008 conflict exposed massive structural flaws.

Russian field commanders were forced to use civilian mobile phones as military radios failed. Communication between the Army and Air Force was practically nonexistent, resulting in an inability to provide dynamic Close Air Support. As noted in analyses of the Georgia conflict, the lack of inter-service communications equipment meant the operation was joint only in the most superficial sense, with air force commanders allegedly directing jets via mobile phone from their offices.

The Russian government was well aware of these operational deficits. In 2009, under pressure from then-President Dimitri Medvedev, the Russian General Staff announced plans to bring a radio set to every serviceman and combat vehicle by 2011. The initial plan focused on the older but reliable Akveduk family of radios.

However, the Defense Ministry soon overrode this practical approach, instead funding the development of a next-generation encrypted communications system dubbed Azart. The project promised uncrackable communications for all Russian troops. Development was awarded to Angstrem, a Moscow-based electronics manufacturer whose owner was a personal friend and advisor to President Medvedev.

Subsequently, the financial ledgers at Angstrem failed to align with the massive government investment, indicating severe corruption within Russian military procurement. The corruption remained hidden beneath Kremlin propaganda. In 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin proudly showcased the Azart handsets, which analysts viewed as evidence of a modernizing military.

Later leaks revealed that the few boxes of radios shown to the press constituted the entire Russian stockpile, and the units failed to function as promised. By the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War a decade later, only an estimated 60,000 Azart units had entered service, woefully insufficient for an invasion force of up to 200,000 soldiers. The Kremlin had allocated 18 billion rubles (approximately 294 million USD) to the project, resulting in a per-unit cost roughly estimated at $4,900 USD, raising further questions about the hardware’s quality.

The limited supply of Azart radios forced the army to default to lowest-common-denominator unencrypted systems. Furthermore, Russian troops expressed intense dissatisfaction with the Azart units they did receive. Online communities documented scathing reviews regarding poor broadcast range, lack of clarity, overly complex encryption protocols, and terrible battery life.

The operational impact of this failure was twofold: it allowed Ukrainian forces and civilians to easily jam Russian frequencies with dead noise or abusive language, and it provided Ukrainian Intelligence Services with a treasure trove of intercepted communications. By tapping into open channels, Ukraine could precisely map Russian troop movements, assess logistics, monitor deteriorating morale, and repeatedly ambush Russian columns, definitively collapsing the Russian offensive on Kyiv.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Russia fail to achieve air supremacy on the first day of the invasion?

Russia did not follow the template set by coalition forces during the Gulf War, which demanded air superiority before any ground advance. Russian SEAD operations used unsuitable, older SU-25 aircraft flown by pilots with little flight time and no dedicated SEAD training, so Ukrainian air defenses were barely inconvenienced rather than destroyed. By the end of day one, Ukraine could still communicate domestically and internationally and mobilize its military largely unimpeded, while approximately 300 Russian combat aircraft mostly remained on the tarmac.

What role did smart munitions shortages play in Russian aerial failures?

Russia entered the war with a severe shortage of precision-guided munitions, a problem evident since its Syria intervention starting in 2015, when even modern SU-34s frequently fell back on unguided dumb bombs. Russian combat pilots also averaged only 125 to 150 flight hours a year — far below British RAF pilots’ 180 to 250 — leaving them unfamiliar with advanced targeting systems. Compounding this, commanders were reluctant to commit aircraft without the munitions needed to justify the risk of losses to Ukrainian air defenses that had survived the failed SEAD campaign.

How did Russia’s over-reliance on railways cause the Kyiv offensive to stall?

Russian logistical doctrine depends on railways to a degree no other European military matches, a system suited to domestic transport across Russia’s vast territory but poorly adapted to fast-moving foreign operations. Establishing a functional forward railhead requires three to five days, and forward railheads are fixed on predetermined paths rather than flexible like truck convoys. With only an estimated 5,000 trucks — roughly one-tenth the ratio the US military maintains — Russian forces ran critically low on supplies by late March 2022, halting their advance at roughly the range of a single supply truck’s fuel tank.

How did Ukraine exploit Russia’s communication failures?

Russian forces relied on a hodgepodge of incompatible, mixed-vintage radio systems ranging from legacy Soviet hardware to modern digital encrypted sets. Units like the 90th Guards Tank Division were forced to use unencrypted Soviet-era radios so that older vehicles such as the T-72A could communicate with the rest of the division, making all transmissions easily intercepted by Ukrainian signals intelligence and even civilian amateur radio operators. This allowed Ukraine to map Russian troop movements, monitor deteriorating morale, and repeatedly ambush convoys.

What happened to the Azart encrypted radio program, and why did it matter?

Following communication failures exposed in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia funded the Azart next-generation encrypted radio system through Angstrem, a company whose owner was a personal friend of President Medvedev. Corruption within military procurement meant that by the start of the 2022 invasion, only an estimated 60,000 Azart units had entered service for an invasion force of up to 200,000 soldiers. The units that did reach the field received scathing reviews for poor range, unclear audio, overly complex encryption, and bad battery life, forcing the army to default to unencrypted legacy systems that Ukraine could easily intercept and jam.