Russian Power in the Caucasus Is Collapsing: How Azerbaijan Exposed Moscow's Declining Influence

When Azerbaijani authorities raided the Baku offices of Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik, paraded its executives before cameras, and broadcast over 100 stories in a single day comparing Russia to Nazi Germany, it marked something unprecedented in the post-Soviet space. A former Soviet republic was publicly humiliating Moscow — without any apparent fear of consequences. The dramatic escalation, triggered by the deaths of ethnic Azeri suspects in Russian police custody in Yekaterinburg, has pushed Azerbaijan-Russia relations to their lowest point since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But the episode is far more than a bilateral spat. It is a vivid illustration of how Russia’s war in Ukraine has eroded Moscow’s ability to project power and command deference across its former empire, with consequences that stretch from the Caucasus to Central Asia and beyond.

The Yekaterinburg Incident: A Spark That Lit a Powder Keg

On June 27th, police in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg detained a group of ethnic Azeri migrants accused of involvement in mob-style murders dating back two decades. While in custody, two of the men — Huseyn and Ziyaddin Safarov — died under circumstances that Russian authorities left conspicuously vague. Photographs of the other arrested men showed visible signs of beating and torture.

In Putin’s Russia, the brutalization of post-Soviet minorities in police custody is tragically unremarkable. What made this incident different was not what happened in Yekaterinburg, but what happened in Baku four days later. Azeri authorities raided the offices of Sputnik, the Russian state propaganda outlet operating in Azerbaijan’s capital.

The arrested Sputnik executives were deliberately paraded before cameras in what observers described as a mirror image of the Yekaterinburg detentions. The following day, eight more Russian citizens were arrested on drugs charges, with images suggesting they too had been beaten in custody. As the Center for European Policy Analysis wrote, the perp walk of Sputnik executives ‘marked something unprecedented: a former Soviet republic publicly humiliating Moscow without any apparent fear of consequences.‘

Baku Keeps Hitting the Escalation Switch

Had Azerbaijan stopped at the Sputnik raid, the incident would still have been historically significant. But the government of President Ilham Aliyev appeared determined to make a far broader point. On the same day the arrested Russians were reportedly beaten, Baku opened a formal investigation into the deaths of the Azeri suspects in Yekaterinburg.

Cultural events featuring Russian artists were cancelled. Azerbaijan’s media — which is closely intertwined with the government — broadcast over 100 stories in a single day criticizing Russian attitudes toward post-Soviet minorities. The state-run channel went so far as to compare Russia to Nazi Germany, a particularly pointed piece of trolling given the Kremlin’s long-standing insistence that its war in Ukraine is a war against Nazism.

The Jamestown Foundation assessed that the Yekaterinburg raids, combined with other accumulated grievances, had pushed Azerbaijan-Russia relations to their lowest point in the entire post-Soviet period. For anyone who recalled Russian media parroting Azeri narratives during Baku’s 2023 takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, the speed and severity of the deterioration was striking.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Mirage and the Christmas Day Disaster

The apparent coordination between Aliyev and Putin over the 2023 conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh was always more mirage than reality. Following the 2020 war, Russian peacekeepers had deployed to the region, and the Kremlin broadly intended to use them as leverage over both Azerbaijan and Armenia. But by 2023, Russia was so deeply bogged down in Ukraine that it could not have stopped Azerbaijan’s takeover even if it wanted to.

Five Russian peacekeepers were killed by Azeri forces during the operation, but Moscow chose to act as though the outcome was part of some grand plan — likely the least-worst option available, especially since Azerbaijan’s primary military backer was Turkey, a nation Putin was desperate to keep somewhat neutral in the Ukraine conflict. The event that truly shattered any remaining illusion of partnership came on Christmas Day 2024, when an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft was shot down over the city of Grozny by Russian air defenses that apparently mistook it for a Ukrainian drone. Thirty-eight of the 67 people on board were killed.

Although Putin eventually expressed condolences, he refused to accept responsibility. It appears Aliyev has never forgiven this. As Azerbaijani parliamentarian Tural Ganjali recently declared: ‘Azerbaijan has not forgotten the downed civilian aircraft, and Russia’s silence will not be tolerated.’

A Slow Burn of Escalation Before the Breaking Point

The tensions between Moscow and Baku had been quietly building for months before the Yekaterinburg incident brought them into the open. In February, Baku closed the local Russian cultural center, apparently in retaliation over the airline shootdown. Weeks later, a large cyberattack linked to Russia hit Azeri media outlets.

In response, Baku ordered the local branch of Sputnik to close. The propaganda outlet appears to have defiantly stayed open, likely on Moscow’s orders. Up to this point, the dynamics still seemed within the bounds of business as usual.

Russia was deploying its standard playbook for dealing with countries it had wronged: obfuscate, deny, refuse to apologize, and — if necessary — punish. The Kremlin had used similar tactics after it was revealed in 2021 that a deadly explosion at a Czech ammunition dump years earlier had been caused by Russian operatives. In that case, Moscow ramped up hybrid warfare against Prague and placed the Czech Republic on its official enemies list.

But while the Czechs expelled Russian diplomats, the Azeris went even further — and they did so without the protection of NATO that Prague enjoys.

Why Now? The Shifting Balance of Power

The question of what prompted Baku to escalate so dramatically has multiple answers, all of which illuminate the broader geostrategic picture. The most fundamental factor is the dramatic decline in Moscow’s perceived power. Five years ago, it would have been unthinkable for Azerbaijan to so openly stand up to its former colonizer.

It was Russia’s intervention that halted the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War short of a total Azeri victory. But today, Baku can see that its old overlord is bogged down in Ukraine and increasingly isolated on the world stage. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has cultivated a growing network of influential partners.

It is backed by Turkey, buys weapons from Israel, enjoys support from Pakistan and China, and sells gas to the European Union. International sanctions have also left Moscow reliant on Baku to connect it to markets like Iran and India. The balance of power has shifted, but the Kremlin refuses to recognize this — and there is nothing more aggravating than someone on an equal level treating you as an underling.

As Zaur Shiriyev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center told the New York Times: ‘Russia seems to want a relationship like it has with Belarus — dependence on Moscow, political loyalty and accepting Russia as the senior partner. But Azerbaijan doesn’t see itself that way. It wants equal, respectful relations.’

Post-Imperial Blindness and Ethnic Grievance

The Azerbaijan example fits into a broader pattern of post-imperial powers struggling to recalibrate their relationships with former colonies. France faces similar dynamics in West Africa, and Britain’s cavalier treatment of Irish concerns during the Brexit negotiations reflected a comparable blind spot. But the Azerbaijani case is particularly extreme.

This is a nation that has leveraged its post-independence oil wealth to become a formidable military player, one backed by the major regional power of Turkey, yet still feels looked down upon by its former master. Political analyst Emil Mustafayev, speaking to Al Jazeera, placed the killing of Azeris in Yekaterinburg police custody into a wider context of ethnic grievance: ‘The killing of Azeris is a link in the chain of tendentious politics where ethnic minorities are used as a lightning rod. This is not just a tragedy, this is a symptom of a deep sickness of the Russian society.’

The framing matters because it transforms a bilateral incident into a systemic indictment — one that resonates across the post-Soviet space wherever ethnic minorities have experienced similar treatment at Russian hands.

Calculated Strategy or Emotional Reaction? The Competing Theories

Not all analysts view Baku’s response as a purely emotional reaction to the Kremlin’s overreach. Some see a far more calculated ploy at work. Carnegie Politika ran a piece suggesting that Aliyev may simply be testing what concessions he can extract from Putin.

A separate commentary in Middle East Eye points out that Azerbaijan’s number one strategic goal at the moment is the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor across Armenia’s south — a narrow strip that would link the Azeri mainland with its exclave of Nakhchivan and, by extension, its ally Turkey. The original plan for the corridor, first proposed following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, envisioned Russian peacekeepers overseeing the route. It is possible that Aliyev’s goal is to force concessions that would cut Moscow out of the process entirely.

Alternatively, Aliyev’s confrontation with Russia could be primarily a public relations exercise — a calculated pose designed to boost his credibility both domestically and internationally. At home, Aliyev needs to burnish his strongman image as the protector of all Azeris. Abroad, Azerbaijan is currently trying to balance between Russia and the West without appearing too close to either.

A very public spat with Putin could endear Aliyev to the Europeans who are buying Azeri gas. The reality likely involves elements of all three motivations — genuine grievance, strategic calculation, and domestic political theater — operating simultaneously.

Why a Full Rupture Remains Unlikely

For all the dramatic escalation, a lasting split between Azerbaijan and Russia remains improbable, constrained by deep economic interdependence on both sides. Russia remains Azerbaijan’s biggest market for agricultural exports, while Baku imports massive amounts of raw materials from its northern neighbor. Azeris living in Russia send back significant remittances — according to Caucasus Watch, nearly half a billion dollars flowed from Russia to Azerbaijan last year.

On the Russian side, Putin knows he cannot afford to truly alienate Baku. Lashing out in any meaningful way would risk triggering a reaction from Turkey — a scenario Moscow is desperate to avoid while the Ukraine war continues. Even Aliyev’s recent telephone call with Ukrainian President Zelensky is probably best understood as a pointed reminder to the Kremlin that Baku has options, rather than a genuine leap into the Western camp.

The episode is therefore likely to eventually cool. But the fact that it happened at all — and that Moscow’s response has been limited to excuses rather than tanks — carries profound implications.

The Broader Erosion of Russian Influence Across the Post-Soviet Space

From the moment the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia went out of its way to ensure it remained the dominant power among post-Soviet states. In some places, like Moldova or Nagorno-Karabakh, that meant fomenting frozen conflicts. In others, like Estonia, it meant trying to destabilize governments with cyberattacks.

In Georgia and Ukraine, it meant outright invasion and occupation. In all cases, the unspoken premise was that Russia remained the Eurasian superpower — a nation so powerful that only a government intent on suicide would stand up to it without the backing of NATO. That premise no longer holds.

With the ‘three-day special military operation’ in Ukraine now well into its third year, it is clearer than ever that Russia is no longer the undefeatable hegemon it painted itself as. Dangerous and brutal, certainly. But a force before which all post-Soviet nations must prostrate themselves?

Not even close. As Azerbaijani parliamentarian Rasim Muzabekov told DW: ‘Baku no longer sees Moscow as an external power in a position to dictate the rules in the Caucasus.’ And Baku is far from alone.

Just over the border, Armenia — once one of Russia’s closest partners — is desperately trying to curry favor with the West. Moldova and Ukraine are pursuing EU membership. In Central Asia, China is emerging as a more attractive partner for nations from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan.

While some post-Soviet states are pulling closer to Moscow — namely Belarus and Georgia — the general trend is unmistakably one of waning Russian influence.

The Irony of Putin’s Gamble

In many ways, the current situation represents the precise opposite of what Putin intended when he sent troops streaming across Ukraine’s borders in February 2022. He bet the house on a quick victory that would cement Russia’s status as a superpower on a par with America or China. Instead, Russia today is dependent on China, unable to help allies like Iran during wartime, and — in the Kremlin’s eyes — disrespected by upstart former colonies like Azerbaijan.

All that remains is for Putin to try and burn the house down, killing Ukrainians on a vast scale, as if body count alone is what makes a nation respected. As the Center for European Policy Analysis wrote: ‘Power is as much about perception as reality. When Azerbaijan can arrest Russian state media leadership and parade them on television — when this generates not Russian tanks but Russian excuses — everyone watching understands the new reality.’

The Azerbaijan episode may blow over in the coming weeks. The economic ties are too deep and the strategic calculations too complex for either side to allow a permanent rupture. But the precedent has been set.

A former Soviet republic has publicly humiliated Moscow, and Moscow’s response has been impotent. Every other post-Soviet capital — from Yerevan to Astana to Tbilisi — is watching and drawing its own conclusions. If this flare-up in the Caucasus is anything to go by, the days of Russia as a danger to its neighbors may not be over.

But the days of Moscow as a respected, unchallenged power in its former empire almost certainly are.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What triggered the current crisis between Azerbaijan and Russia?

On June 27th, police in Yekaterinburg detained ethnic Azeri migrants accused of mob-style murders. Two men — Huseyn and Ziyaddin Safarov — died in custody under vague circumstances, with photos showing other detainees had been beaten and tortured. Four days later, Azerbaijan raided Russian state media offices in Baku, arrested Russian citizens in retaliation, and launched a sustained public escalation including over 100 critical news stories in a single day, cancellation of cultural events, and state media broadcasts comparing Russia to Nazi Germany.

What was the Christmas Day 2024 incident and why does it still matter?

On Christmas Day 2024, an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft was shot down over Grozny by Russian air defenses that apparently mistook it for a Ukrainian drone. Thirty-eight of the 67 people on board were killed. Putin expressed condolences but refused to accept responsibility. Azerbaijani parliamentarian Tural Ganjali declared: “Azerbaijan has not forgotten the downed civilian aircraft, and Russia’s silence will not be tolerated.”

The incident deepened a pattern of accumulated grievances that set the stage for the dramatic escalation that followed the Yekaterinburg deaths.

Why is Azerbaijan able to defy Russia so openly now?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has dramatically weakened Moscow’s perceived power and its ability to enforce compliance from former Soviet states. Azerbaijan has simultaneously cultivated a powerful network of partners — Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, China, and the EU — which buys its gas, supplies its weapons, and backs its diplomatic positions. International sanctions have left Russia reliant on Azerbaijan to connect it to markets like Iran and India, fundamentally shifting the balance of leverage between the two countries.

What is the Zangezur Corridor and how does it relate to the crisis?

The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed route across Armenia’s south that would link Azerbaijan’s mainland with its exclave of Nakhchivan and ally Turkey. Originally envisioned after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War with Russian peacekeepers overseeing the route, some analysts believe Aliyev may be using the current confrontation to force concessions that would cut Moscow out of the corridor arrangement entirely, adding strategic calculation to what might otherwise appear to be purely an emotional reaction to the Yekaterinburg killings.

What does the episode reveal about Russia’s standing across the post-Soviet space?

The Center for European Policy Analysis wrote that when Azerbaijan could arrest Russian state media leadership and parade them on television — and Moscow’s response was excuses rather than tanks — every post-Soviet capital drew its own conclusions. Armenia is now courting the West, Moldova and Ukraine are pursuing EU membership, and Central Asian nations from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan increasingly look to China as a more attractive partner. The Azerbaijan episode demonstrates that Russia’s ability to command automatic deference from former Soviet republics, even on its own doorstep, has collapsed.

Sources

• https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/02/world/europe/russia-azerbaijan-tensions-safarov.html
• https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-azerbaijan-russia-relations-are-breaking-point
• https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/07/azerbaijan-russia-arguments?lang=en
• https://www.dw.com/en/russia-is-moscow-losing-azerbaijan-as-an-ally/a-73147334
• https://www.gmfus.org/news/azerbaijan-and-russia-face-over-arrests-and-more
• https://jamestown.org/program/russia-azerbaijan-tensions-escalate-to-unprecedented-level/
• https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/1/why-are-ties-between-azerbaijan-and-russia-fraying
• https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/article/azerbaijan-arrests-russians-is-putin-losing-control-of-his-backyard-vc37kpx2b
• https://cepa.org/article/putins-perp-walk-in-the-caucasus/