Russia's Major Assault on Kharkiv: What You Need to Know

For those living in the region, it must have played out like a nightmare — one of those bad dreams where something awful is about to happen, but you remain powerless to stop it. For months, Western and Ukrainian intelligence had been warning about a massing of Russian forces near Ukraine’s northeast border, not far from the city of Kharkiv. As troop numbers swelled to around 35,000, President Vladimir Putin began talking about the need to create a “buffer region” along the border with Kharkiv Oblast.

Media speculated that an assault on Ukraine’s second city could come at any time in May or June. It was an attack foretold — a move in the Ukraine War’s bloody strategy game that just about everyone saw coming. Yet that did not make it any less horrific when it finally arrived.

The May 10th Offensive and Initial Russian Gains

On Friday, May 10th, the anticipated surge began. Reports started to filter in about fighting along the border. At first, it was unclear if these were just skirmishes or the start of something bigger.

Within forty-eight hours, though, those doubts had evaporated. The second Russian invasion of Kharkiv had begun. The attack exploded along two distinct lines — one in the Liptsi district to the city’s north, another towards the town of Vovchansk further east.

Although initial reports were mixed, by Sunday it was looking like Ukraine was in serious trouble. As multiple villages fell to Putin’s soldiers, overall commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, was quoted as saying “the situation is difficult.” Reports filtered in of territorial guard units abandoning prepared defensive lines.

Come Monday, the picture had gotten even worse. With about 100 square kilometers of territory lost, the head of military intelligence, General Kyrylo Budanov, told the New York Times: “The situation is on the edge. Every hour this situation moves toward critical.”

What made the nightmare so much worse was that the region had already experienced one Russian invasion before. Back in 2022, the initial Russian assault into Ukraine got close to Kharkiv’s limits. For months, artillery was able to pound this city of 1.4 million, before the surprise Ukrainian counteroffensive that fall drove the Kremlin’s forces back over the border.

The latest assault had yet another ingredient of a bad dream: repetition — the feeling of having to relive something already suffered through before.

Stabilization and the Limits of Russia’s Advance

Monday would prove to be the darkest moment of the renewed invasion, at least for now. Amid reports of massive Russian casualties, the rapid advances of the weekend seemed to peter out. While many villages remained in the Kremlin’s hands, things did at least seem to be moving towards stabilization.

By Tuesday, General Kyrylo Budanov was able to appear on television to note that the situation “is not catastrophic,” and that Russia’s troops had been “blocked on the frontiers they had reached.” US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel, meanwhile, announced that Washington “did not anticipate any major breakthroughs.” These assessments appear mostly correct — with the caveat that this is a fast-moving situation and things may yet change.

Current chatter is about the front lines stabilizing within days. While the Kremlin claimed on Tuesday to have also captured the town of Buhruvatka, Ukrainian Telegram channels are no longer in panic mode. Things seem to have somewhat calmed.

This appears to be backed up by the caution currently emanating from Russian milbloggers. The Financial Times quoted one major pro-war account telling its followers: “Russians should not expect a quick breakthrough.” As if to draw a line under the assault, Ukraine also dismissed the local commander who oversaw the initial response.

In some ways, it felt as if everyone was ready to move on. But only in some ways. Because, while no one has to fear headlines about the imminent fall of Kharkiv, the weekend assault has still left a brutal mark on Ukraine as a whole.

Small-Unit Tactics and the Question of Kremlin Strategy

The first and most obvious issue is that up to 160 square kilometers of territory fell to Russian forces. While operations are underway to push them back, it is not at all certain that land can be recaptured. Worse, these rapid gains — likely the fastest by either side since 2022 — were not achieved by the Kremlin massing an unstoppable force and punching its way through.

Of the 35,000 troops that gathered over the border, the New York Times reports that “only a few thousand” were committed to the fight. The analytical group Frontelligence Insight described it this way: “The Russian forces in the area did not form a cohesive mechanized force for a deep strike with concentrated strength. Instead, they employed multiple small-scale attacks at various border points using platoon-sized and even squad-sized units.”

This has raised questions about how prepared local commanders really were for the assault. No serious analyst thinks even the full force of 35,000 men could have hoped to take Kharkiv. The city is strongly fortified and absolutely massive.

Nor do the Russians even seem to have prioritized a deep drive into the oblast. The Institute for the Study of War’s assessment on May 13th noted that Russian forces “currently appear to be prioritizing the rapid establishment of a ‘buffer zone’ along the international border over setting conditions for deeper penetrations into northern Kharkiv Oblast.” Of course, war is not just about taking territory.

The Real Objective: Stretching Ukraine from Chasiv Yar to Sumy

Most observers assume that Moscow’s real aim is not to storm Ukraine’s second city, but to draw defenders away from a far more vulnerable settlement: Chasiv Yar. Located nearly 200 kilometers from Kharkiv, just to the west of Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar is one of the key strategic towns in the Donbas region — a former industrial heartland that has become Moscow’s main aim in the war’s current phase. Intense fighting at Chasiv Yar has been going on for weeks, with reports suggesting that Putin ordered it seized in time for the May 9th victory celebrations in Russia.

But with Ukrainian troops mounting an unexpectedly stiff resistance, the town — for now — remains in Kyiv’s hands. The assault toward Kharkiv could change all that. The AFU are currently low on manpower, due to a new law on mobilization being delayed thanks to political infighting.

That means that — in a stark change from the first year of fighting — Moscow now has a serious manpower advantage over Ukraine. By applying troop pressure in some areas, the Kremlin can force Kyiv to pull reserves from others, potentially creating openings. Analyst Rob Lee wrote on X that “Russia likely seeks to draw Ukrainian reserves and units away from the Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar fronts to set conditions for a deeper advance into Donetsk Oblast.

The problem remains that Ukraine does not have enough manpower/forces available. This operation likely seeks to stretch Ukraine’s forces further.” Austrian military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady likewise echoed this view, telling the Times that drawing Ukrainian forces away from Chasiv Yar was Russia’s main objective.

It is not certain at this point that the Kremlin succeeded in its goal. Reserves were poured into Kharkiv over the weekend, but they may not have been from Chasiv Yar. Regardless, the point was to force Ukraine into making uncomfortable choices — and it is a tactic the Kremlin is likely to repeat again in the near future, probably with a similar incursion towards the city of Sumy, some 145 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv.

Sooner or later, Russia is likely to succeed in its goal of making Kyiv stretch its forces too thin. Secondary goals may also be in play. A major one could plausibly be to bring Kharkiv within artillery range rather than enter the city itself.

Back in 2022, before the Ukrainian counteroffensive liberated most of the oblast, Kharkiv was in range of Russian guns, and Moscow’s forces bombed it relentlessly. Guardian journalist Luke Harding has described how “swathes of the north-east of the city were left in ruins — you can still see the ghostly tower blocks.” Per the Guardian, “if Russia secures positions in Vovchansk and Lyptsi, it will have a solid platform for artillery attacks on the city of Kharkiv.”

However, the Financial Times’s defense correspondent reports that Russia would have to penetrate much deeper into Ukraine’s main defensive lines to put the city at risk of shelling. Finally, one other reason Moscow may have launched this major assault is to protect the Russian city of Belgorod, situated just 70 kilometers from Kharkiv. Belgorod has been targeted by more cross-border attacks than any other Russian city.

If the Kremlin secures enough territory in Kharkiv Oblast, it will put the city out of reach of Ukraine’s weapons.

Why Defenses Failed Despite Months of Warning

The Kremlin could not have telegraphed its plans better if Putin had personally air-dropped leaflets into Kharkiv Oblast reading: “We are about to attack you.” Not only was the troop buildup visible, but the new North Group of Forces involved in the assault even set up their own Telegram channel to generate buzz. In the words of the BBC: “Ukraine appears to have been ill-prepared — despite official denials.”

Understanding why this was the case is vital because it could point towards broader issues that may affect the defense of other regions. The most damning critique is a lack of defensive lines. Commander of a Ukrainian Special Reconnaissance Unit, Denys Yaroslavskyi, told the BBC that in northern Kharkiv Oblast: “There was no first line of defense.

We saw it. The Russians just walked in. They just walked in, without any mined fields.”

He later added: “Either it was an act of negligence, or corruption. It wasn’t a failure. It was a betrayal.”

This is a serious accusation. Yet it may turn out to be the better outcome, since a corrupt local commander can be swiftly removed and put on trial. Far more concerning is the critique coming from other quarters, suggesting that defensive lines did exist but were misused or abandoned.

The founder of Frontelligence Insight, who posts on X under the name Tatarigami, wrote: “Some of these positions were abandoned, allowing Russian forces to occupy them. The issue here does not solely lie in fortifications, as the outcome in both the more fortified area near Hlyboke and the less fortified area near Vovchansk appears to be the same.” A former Ukrainian soldier posting under the pseudonym Constantine was even blunter: “In Kharkiv, the key problem was still the command that failed to prepare for a well-known Russian offensive.

The units were simply not prepared to fight. It’s not only a fortifications issue; it’s a lack of cohesiveness, poor communication, bad positioning, and poor training of the stationed units.” In the interests of fairness, the other side notes the Russian gains came mostly in gray zone areas that were not heavily guarded.

The New York Times describes these areas as “lightly defended and largely depopulated territory” that allows for faster advances. Still, when an assault everyone knew was coming manages to conquer over 100 square kilometers in a matter of days, not all problems can be waved away.

Western Equipment Delays and Restrictions on Weapons Use

Problems originating not in Kyiv or the AFU but in the collective West have compounded Ukraine’s difficulties. Perhaps the biggest of those problems is the lack of equipment and ammunition. While Congress finally passed the Ukraine supplemental some three weeks prior, it is taking a long time to get materiel to the front.

Journalist Luke Harding noted: “Not much has arrived so far in significant quantities. In the east last week, the mortars, the artillery, the F-16 jets were not there.” This missing equipment makes the job of pushing back Russian advances much harder.

Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) explains: “There is a direct correlation between the speed of supply from Ukraine’s international partners of artillery ammunition and air defense interceptors and the speed of deterioration at the front.” Air defense interceptors are especially important. Without them, Ukraine is unable to shoot down the Russian planes unleashing hyper-destructive glide bombs against frontline positions, as they did in Vovchansk.

Some of the promised equipment is already starting to show up on the front and should arrive in greater quantities in the coming weeks. However, it may not matter so long as Western restrictions on its usage remain in place. The ISW recently highlighted how “current US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons in the territory of Russia is severely compromising Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.”

Because Washington does not want to see a full-blown war between Russia and NATO, the Pentagon restricts the Ukrainians from using American weaponry on Russian soil. The ISW explains what this means in practice: “US policy has effectively created a vast sanctuary in which Russia has been able to amass its ground invasion force and from which it is launching glide bombs and other long-range strike systems.” The 35,000 troops near Belgorod did not mass in a single place where some well-aimed rockets could have decimated their ranks, but a green light to strike Russian rear supporting areas would certainly make Moscow’s job a lot harder.

The Manpower Crisis and Russia’s Summer Offensive Plan

The real, deeper issue at the heart of Ukraine’s problems in Kharkiv is one that analysts have been highlighting for months: manpower. Back in autumn of 2023, former top commander in Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, asked the government to mobilize half a million men to replenish the AFU’s ranks. Instead, the mobilization bill was delayed by political infighting that mirrored the dysfunction in the US House of Representatives over the Ukraine supplemental.

Kyiv only finally passed the new mobilization law at the end of April, and it only took effect in the week of the assault. This means that Ukraine now needs to mobilize and train hundreds of thousands of new troops — a process likely to take a minimum of three months, and possibly more. As a result, Ukrainian frontlines are now stretched thin and manned by exhausted soldiers without the reserves for proper rotation.

This is why most analysts agree that Moscow’s next move after Kharkiv will almost certainly be an assault towards the city of Sumy. In General Budanov’s words: “From the very beginning, the Russians were planning an operation in Sumy region. As of now, Tuesday, they are keeping small groups of forces in the border area — they have the town of Sudzha, and we have the Sumy area, but the situation has not allowed them to take active action and start implementing their plan.”

That plan is to stretch the AFU even thinner, until a gap opens up somewhere in the frontline that the Kremlin can exploit. Sabotage groups near Chernihiv ensure soldiers must be posted to the northern border. Attacks near Zaporizhzhia keep more pinned in the south.

According to RUSI: “The breadth of their attacks has fixed Ukrainian troops on the line of contact and forced the AFU to spread out its artillery, expending munitions to break up successive Russian attacks.” The think tank foresees this problem growing worse in the coming weeks. Along with the current actions around Kharkiv, assaults towards Sumy and possibly Zaporizhzhia are likely.

RUSI also thinks Ukraine will be able to blunt all of these attacks. But all that will do is leave Russia able to push towards its main goal: conquering the Donbas. RUSI’s analysts see Moscow’s summer offensive unfolding this way: “Once Ukraine commits its reserves in these directions, the main effort will see the expansion of the Russian push in Donbas.

This axis is already making slow but steady progress. The objective is clear: to cut Ukrainian supply lines connecting Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk.” Once those supply lines are cut, holding Donetsk Oblast will become much harder.

The likely scenario is a Ukrainian retreat, allowing Putin to reach the administrative borders and claim his biggest victory in two years — a victory that would make the Russian conquest of Bakhmut and Avdiivka seem trifling in comparison.

Can Kyiv and the West Prevent a Russian Summer Victory?

The situation in Ukraine right now is bleak, and wishful thinking will not change that. However, analysis of why things are happening in a certain way can begin to reveal the outlines of how Kyiv can turn this around. The most important point — after throwing everything it can at mobilization — is for Kyiv not to fall prey to optimism bias.

The former AFU soldier who posts on X as Constantine recently complained that “our highest military and political leadership doesn’t like negative reports, and units and commands that report problems are frowned upon. This leads to commanders unwilling to ask for help and report the real state of affairs, instead trying to blur away problems and hoping that they will never bubble up.” If that is indeed the case, then the Ukrainian leadership runs the risk of repeating the mistakes Russia made in 2022, when a culture of burying bad news led Moscow to wildly overestimate its chances of pulling off a quick conquest.

In the West, too, governments can take steps to ensure Ukraine survives this difficult moment with its forces mostly intact. RUSI’s assessment is clear: “If Ukraine’s allies engage now to replenish Ukrainian munitions stockpiles, help to establish a robust training pipeline, and make the industrial investments to sustain the effort, then Russia’s summer offensive can be blunted, and Ukraine will receive the breathing space it needs to regain the initiative.” A Russian victory is not inevitable at this point.

While they vastly outnumber Ukraine’s forces, the troops currently fighting on Moscow’s side are mostly low-quality. The majority of capable junior officers and elite units were decimated in the botched invasion at the start of 2022, and Russia’s theory of victory now relies on grinding slowly forward, using massive artillery barrages and glide bombs to destroy everything in its path. That may yet be enough to win the war — to make some big gains that cause Ukraine’s backers to throw in the towel and force Kyiv to negotiate an unfavorable peace.

But it is also a primitive method of fighting, one that could be neutralized by an AFU with sufficient fortifications, munitions, and manpower. Whether the governments in Kyiv and the West are able to resolve their issues quickly enough to make this a reality is debatable. What is not up for debate is that this moment represents their last, best shot to do so.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the real strategic objective behind Russia’s May 2024 assault on Kharkiv?

Most analysts assess that Moscow’s primary aim was not to capture Kharkiv — a heavily fortified city of 1.4 million — but to draw Ukrainian reserves away from Chasiv Yar and the Pokrovsk front in Donetsk Oblast. By forcing Kyiv to redirect troops to the northeast, Russia hoped to create openings for deeper advances in the Donbas, where it had been making slow but steady progress.

How much territory did Russia seize, and why was the advance so fast?

Russia seized up to 160 square kilometers in the opening days using only a few thousand of the 35,000 troops massed at the border. Rather than a concentrated mechanized push, it employed multiple small-unit attacks — platoon-sized and even squad-sized — at various border points. Commander Denys Yaroslavskyi of a Ukrainian Special Reconnaissance Unit accused local leadership of betrayal, stating there was no first line of defense and no mined fields, allowing Russian forces to walk in unopposed.

Why was Ukraine ill-prepared despite months of warning?

Western and Ukrainian intelligence had flagged the troop buildup for months, and Russia even set up a dedicated Telegram channel for its new North Group of Forces. Yet defenses were inadequate. Beyond suspected corruption or negligence in local command, analysts such as Frontelligence Insight’s Tatarigami noted that some prepared positions were simply abandoned, with poor communication, bad positioning, and undertrained units identified as systemic problems.

How did US restrictions on weapons use contribute to Ukraine’s difficulties?

The ISW highlighted that US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using American-supplied weapons on Russian territory effectively created a vast sanctuary where Russia could mass its ground invasion force and launch glide bombs without fear of counter-strike. The 35,000 troops near Belgorod assembled undisturbed, and Russian aircraft continued launching hyper-destructive glide bombs against frontline positions from within that protected space.

What does RUSI assess as Russia’s broader summer offensive plan?

Britain’s Royal United Services Institute assessed that Russia’s summer strategy was to fix Ukrainian forces with simultaneous assaults on Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia, exhausting the AFU’s limited reserves across multiple fronts. Once Ukraine had committed those reserves, the main effort would expand the push in Donbas with the objective of cutting supply lines between Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk — a breakthrough that would make holding Donetsk Oblast far harder for Kyiv.

Sources

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