The Six Day War: The Conflict That Shaped the Modern Middle East

The summer of 1967 brought a war that changed the dynamics of world politics for decades to come. The Six Day War pitted the fledgling nation of Israel against an alliance of surrounding Arab nations, constituting nearly all the countries Israel shared a border with. But this mismatched fight did not go the way anyone expected. Israel shocked the Arab alliance, and the world, and in the course of six days, tripled the land under its control.

This war was no one-off occurrence. It played an influential part of a larger geopolitical tempest still spinning today, known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Six Day War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War, would pit Israel against its Arab neighbors for the third time since its birth, just two decades before.

Roots of the Conflict: From the British Mandate to Repeated Wars

Since its formation in 1948, the nation of Israel has traded blows with the Arab nations surrounding it. Jewish refugees in the 1940s, many escaping the horrors of the Holocaust, settled in a little strip of land on the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea. In doing so, they displaced many Arab populations living there at the time.

Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations divided the former Ottoman land up into mandates, a stepping stone to the formation of nation-states. Great Britain controlled the Palestinian mandate and the Arab population that lived there. After World War II, Great Britain opened up the Palestinian mandate to the growing numbers of Jewish refugees streaming out of Europe.

Despite strong Arab pushback and subsequent British policies to limit the number of settlers, the Jewish population there instituted networks of immigration, ensuring the continuing stream of refugees to the area. The Jewish refugees saw the land that is now Israel as their ancestral homeland, attested to by their scriptures. Arab populations saw the land as the place their families had lived and cultivated for generations.

Great Britain’s hands were tied, having made similar but conflicting promises of autonomy to both the Palestinian and Jewish populations in the region. The United Nations formally accepted the Partition Plan, an attempt to reconcile Britain’s conflicting promises, dividing the land of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. This ended the British mandate and led to Israel declaring independence in 1948.

The establishment of Israel drove away large populations of Arab Palestinians, a majority of which are still exiled from their homes today. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War (or the First Arab-Israeli War) and the 1956 Suez Crisis (or Second Arab-Israeli War) showed Israel that their nation was right in the middle of a geopolitical minefield set to explode.

Water Disputes, Blockades, and the Road to War

In the 1960s, Israel, once again, found itself in hot water. Israel drew much of its water from the Sea of Galilee in the North. However, the sea drew its water from streams originating in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights.

In 1964, Syria protested an Israeli project diverting the Sea of Galilee waters to the Negev Desert in the country’s south. In response, Syria started a canal project that threatened to divert the streams that filled the Sea of Galilee, effectively cutting off Israel’s biggest water supply. Several years later, Egypt endangered another Israeli water source.

Israel’s southern neighbor threatened to cut off access to the Straits of Tiran. In effect, this would restrict Israel’s access to the Red Sea and shipping lanes that brought them Iranian oil. Though the Straits of Tiran technically fell in Egyptian-controlled waters, they are an international passageway.

Restricting a country’s access to international shipping lanes is legally an act of war. Towards the end of May 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser blocked those straits to Israeli shipping. The precarious situation was not helped by a geopolitical arena rife with discontent.

Palestinian guerilla groups had been attacking Israeli cities and settlements across the Jordanian border. Israel had been butting heads with Syria in air skirmishes, verbal sparring was picking up in intensity, and inaccurate Soviet intelligence claimed Israel was massing forces along the Syrian border. Egyptian President Nasser used these reports as an impetus to display Pan-Arab strength in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Suez Precedent and the Expulsion of UN Forces

To understand the situation in the Sinai, it is necessary to return to the Second Arab-Israeli War, just over ten years before. In 1956, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, wresting control of the waterway from French and British companies. In response, Britain and France convinced Israel to help them in attacking Egypt and retaking control of the Suez.

Though Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula — the triangular patch of land between Israel and Egypt — and Britain and France regained control of the Suez Canal — the narrow stretch of water linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and the only thing separating the Sinai Peninsula from the rest of Egypt — the victory was short-lived. Egypt had sunk ships in the shallow waters, rendering it useless. In addition, international pressure, primarily from the U.S. and Soviet Union, forced Britain and France to withdraw from the Suez region and Israel to return control of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

The UN deployed forces in the region to provide a buffer between the two unfriendly states. The United Nations Emergency Force, or UNEF, had remained in the Sinai until the buildup to the Six Day War, giving Nasser a decade’s worth of free defense against Israel. When the clouds of war were gathering in 1967, though, Nasser felt pressure from his Arab allies to kick the UN forces out.

Each Arab country wanted to make clear their intentions for war. President Nasser said on Cairo Radio, “This is our chance, Arabs, to deal Israel a mortal blow of annihilation, to blot out its entire presence in our holy land.” After King Hussein signed a defense pact with Egypt, he announced, “All of the Arab armies now surround Israel.”

And the Syrian Defense Minister proclaimed, “Syria’s forces are ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland.” But while Syria and Jordan were involved in prewar border skirmishes with Israel, they saw the UN buffer between Egypt and Israel as unfair. Why should they suffer losses while their ally, Egypt, who talked a good game about Pan-Arabism and fighting Israel, sits back and enjoys this free defense?

Syria and Jordan leaned into President Nasser to replace the UNEF with his own forces. Doing so would give Israel another border to worry about defending and draw more Israeli Defense Force, or IDF, soldiers away from the Syrian and Jordanian borders. President Nasser, trapped by his bombastic rhetoric and not wanting to give the appearance of deserting his allies, requested that the UN withdraw their troops.

Perhaps he thought the UN would refuse and he could claim to have done his best and go back to enjoying his free buffer from Israel. But the UN, perhaps to Nasser’s surprise, granted his request and removed all their troops. Nasser, with no other option, moved his army into the Sinai and began massing along the Israeli border.

Operation Focus: Israel Seizes Air Superiority

By the end of May 1967, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq had signed defense treaties and coordinated troop buildup, signifying to Israel their readiness for war — a war that represented the Arab countries’ desire to eradicate Israel. Israel opened the month of June responding to the building threat. They formed a national unity government — uniting all parties in the legislature — and decided to go to war by the 4th.

The odds Israel faced were unfavorable. The conflict pitted one nation, Israel, against an Arab alliance of four. Israeli forces numbered just over a quarter million compared to the Arab forces of nearly half a million.

Israel had only 300 combat aircraft compared to the Arab Alliance’s 1,000. And Israeli tanks paled in comparison to Arab tanks, at 800 versus 2,500. But Israel took the lesson of surrounding danger to heart.

They had planned for this eventuality for years, down to the number of planes they could have in the sky. And this preparation would make all the difference. The fighting started on the morning of June 5th with Operation Focus, an Israeli air strike against Egyptian targets.

Extensive training allowed Israeli pilots and ground crews to increase the speed of plane refitting and refueling. This led to Israeli planes spending only eight minutes on the ground before taking off for another bombing run. This quick turnaround could be done eight times per day, giving Israel a massive advantage in the air.

Deploying all but 12 of their aircraft, the Israeli Air Force took its adversaries by surprise and crippled their air capabilities. Israel destroyed an estimated 300 Egyptian, 20 Jordanian, and 50 Syrian aircraft, as well as airfields in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, giving Israel decisive air control on just the first day of the conflict. Although Operation Focus was a major success for Israel and paved the way for its victory, there was still fighting left to be done on the ground.

Israel faced a three-front war that spanned a vast majority of its border.

The Egyptian Front: Sinai Conquest and Chaotic Retreat

Concurrent with the airstrike on Egypt, Israeli land forces advanced into the Sinai. Both sides had massed troops along the border in anticipation of invading the opposing side. Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula numbered close to 100,000 soldiers, just under 1,000 tanks, and 1,000 each of armored vehicles and artillery pieces.

Israeli forces rang in at around 70,000 soldiers and 700 tanks. Israeli planning and strategy, though, beat out the opposition — a trend that would become common during this brief war. Israel’s strategy depended on surprise.

The night before their advance into Egypt, Israeli forces stayed camouflaged and radio silent until receiving orders to advance. The advance itself further used the element of surprise threefold: by progressing at the same time as the airstrikes of Operation Focus, by using different routes than the ones they used in the previous 1956 war, and by using a flanking approach rather than a direct assault. Israeli divisions along the northern route moved into the Sinai, and they met light resistance at first.

Perhaps it was the element of surprise or perhaps it was faulty Egyptian intelligence claiming the advance was a diversionary tactic. Whatever the case, Israeli forces were well on their way through Egyptian lines before resistance picked up. Israel advanced despite heavy fighting and losses and soon attacked the city of Sheikh Zuweid.

Egyptian forces were embedded deep in the town. It was not until their commander and many of his staff were killed that Egyptian forces abandoned their positions and the IDF took control of the city. On the first day, Israeli forces had taken the cities of Khan Yunis, Sheikh Zuweid, Arish, and Rafah.

On June 6th, Israeli forces faced the daunting task of taking the heavily fortified city of Um-Katef. After maneuvering, paratrooper missions, and one of the most concentrated artillery barrages in Israel’s history, the IDF took the city, clearing it of Egyptian forces. At the beginning of the war, the IDF had avoided entering the Gaza Strip, save the cities of Rafah and Khan Yunis, because of strict orders from Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

However, Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlements spurred Yitzhak Rabin, the IDF chief of staff, to override Dayan’s orders. The IDF entered the Gaza Strip and, after fierce fighting against both Palestinian and Egyptian forces, took the entire Strip by the end of the war’s second day. Faced with Israel’s grueling but eventual advance into the Sinai Peninsula, the most Egyptian leadership could do was sit and watch their defenses fall one after the other.

However, the fall of Abu-Ageila, a strategically important dam and road junction close to Um-Katef, was the straw that broke the camel’s back. When Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and President Nasser learned of their army’s defeat at Abu-Ageila, they ordered a hasty retreat. But this was no fall-back-and-regroup retreat.

The two leaders ordered all Egyptian forces to vacate the entire Sinai Peninsula posthaste. And that was about the extent of the details. Lack of clarification on the manner and order of retreat led to a chaotic Egyptian abandonment of the region.

Israeli artillery fired on retreating forces. Aircraft dropped napalm bombs on columns of retreating soldiers. The confusion was such that, at one point, Egyptian artillery even fired on its own army.

Over the course of the following three days — June 6th, 7th, and 8th — Israeli forces advanced, capturing further towns, strongholds, and strategic points all along the Sinai Peninsula. By the end of the day on June 8th, Israeli forces had expelled Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula entirely and solidified their control of the region. After just four days of fighting, Egypt was ready to sign a ceasefire.

The Jordanian Front: Nasser’s Deception and the Fall of Jerusalem

The countries of the Arab Alliance had signed various agreements and pacts with each other to formalize their alliance against Israel. The defense pact between President Nasser of Egypt and the young King Hussein of Jordan gave Egypt control of Jordanian forces. President Nasser stationed General Riad of Egypt in Amman, Jordan, to assume command of the regiments stationed there.

On June 5th, even though Operation Focus turned out to be devastating for Egypt, the all-but-defeated country gave off the exact opposite impression. To keep King Hussein and Jordanian forces in the war, President Nasser blatantly lied to his ally. As Egypt’s planes and airfields were being demolished by Israeli planes, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer sent a cable to General Riad in Amman, claiming Egyptian forces had repelled the Israeli air attack and significantly weakened its Air Force.

The cable ordered General Riad to attack Israeli forces in the West Bank. The initial IDF strategy was to stay on the defensive against Jordan in order to focus on the Egyptian front and protect civilians and holy sites in Jerusalem. However, Egypt’s control of the Jordanian military and their claim of victory in the Sinai turned these well-laid plans on their head.

Even as Jordanian forces opened machine gun fire and artillery barrages on Israeli positions in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel responded only with small arms fire. Still hoping to contain fighting to the Egyptian front, the Israeli government reached out to King Hussein through UN channels. Israel’s last attempt at peace stated the IDF would “not initiate any actions against Jordan.

However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the king will have to bear the full responsibility of the consequences.” King Hussein’s response, coming from a position of perceived power bolstered by Egypt’s claim to early victory, was one of “too little, too late.” Jordanian shelling and aerial bombing continued.

Iraqi planes even joined in on some runs, causing material damage to buildings and inflicting casualties. Israeli leadership decided on their own air strike retaliation. Israeli planes bombed Jordan’s two airfields, destroying many of their aircraft, including all of their fighter jets.

The Israeli bombing run extended to the H-3 Airbase in western Iraq. These runs, happening at the same time as Operation Focus, further solidified Israel’s iron hold on air power. On the ground, fighting between Israeli and Jordanian forces flared.

Despite fierce protest from UN personnel, Jordanian forces dug in on the perimeter of Government House, a building acting as the headquarters of UN observers. Israeli forces eventually broke through Jordanian defenses, forcing them to retreat to Bethlehem. Many in the Israeli government saw Jordan’s provocation as the perfect opportunity to capture the Old City of Jerusalem.

They had long coveted this territory for its religious significance. On June 5, Israel launched an offensive to do just that. The IDF encircled the entire city of Jerusalem and waged a hard battle against Jordanian, Egyptian, and Iraqi forces.

By the end of June 6, just the second day of the war, Israel had captured the Old City. It would take just one more day for Israel to expand upon its success in Jerusalem and gain all but complete control of the West Bank. IDF forces advanced westward towards the Jordan River, driving Arab forces back and capturing city after city.

After conquering Jerusalem, Israel took the cities of Judea, Hebron, Nablus, and Bethlehem. By the end of June 7, the war’s third day, Israel had issued orders setting up the military government that still controls the West Bank today. Jordan had withdrawn its troops from the West Bank to avoid a complete annihilation of its army.

The Syrian Front: The Battle for the Golan Heights

For much of the start of the war, both Syria and Israel did not engage in battle. Israel wanted to contain the fighting to just the Egyptian front as much as possible. Syria, despite its defense pacts with Jordan and Egypt, strove to avoid fighting Israeli forces.

Having received Egypt’s claim of victory over Israel in the Sinai, Syrian military leadership grew scared and confused at the contrast between the reports they received and the damage they witnessed Israeli troops inflict on any opposing force. For the first four days of the conflict, June 5th to 8th, Syria focused on building up defenses in the rough terrain of the Golan Heights. The most Syria committed to was sporadic shelling of northern Israel, some bombing runs over Israeli settlements in the Galilee region, and a failed offensive on the water plants in the city of Tel Dan.

This offensive proved fruitless for Syria because of its tanks being too wide to traverse bridges, poor radio communication between units, and a refusal of low-morale troops to advance. When the Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian airfields in retaliation, destroying nearly two-thirds of the latter’s air capabilities, Syria realized that the claimed Egyptian victory in the Sinai could not be true. Syrian leadership ordered the aircraft that survived the Israeli bombing to retreat to bases far from the front.

They were to take no further part in the fighting against Israel. As the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts were clearing up, Israeli leadership debated the prospects of launching an attack against Syria. Many wanted to see Syria punished for their role in the buildup to the war and the minor skirmishes they started.

Others feared heavy losses from a daunting uphill battle against a heavily fortified and entrenched enemy in the Golan Heights. On the morning of June 9, Syria announced their acceptance of the UN-proposed ceasefire. Despite Syria’s intention to avoid conflict, Israel launched an offensive that same day.

As expected, Israeli forces ran into fierce resistance from a Syrian force well dug in and heavily armed in the Golan Heights. The Syrian defenses were such that Israeli air raids proved ineffective compared to the other two fronts. However, Israeli forces slugged their way uphill, fought grueling battles, and eventually broke through Syrian lines.

By the end of June 9, the IDF had reached the plateaus and ordered in reinforcements to take on the second line of Syrian defenses. On the second day of the offensive, Israeli troops found Syrian positions largely abandoned. Syrian troops, low on morale and not keen to undergo another day of bloody combat, had hurriedly retreated, blowing up bunkers, burning documents, and leaving behind equipment in perfect working condition.

The last remaining Syrian troops holed up in the city of Quneitra found themselves the object of an unfortunate broadcast. To pressure the UN into mandating a ceasefire, Syrian authorities had announced the fall of Quneitra. However, Syrian troops in the city were still fighting.

Their morale damaged by the report, troops in the city surrendered to Israeli forces just three hours later. By June 10th, Israel had added the Golan Heights to its ever-growing list of captured territories. The following day, all sides signed a ceasefire, bringing the Six Day War to an end.

Aftermath: A Reshaped Middle East and Lasting Consequences

Israeli success in this short conflict caught nearly every participant and onlooker by surprise. A tiny upstart nation, in the course of six days, summarily destroyed the fighting capabilities of three of its neighbors allied against it; captured the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights; and asserted itself as a regional powerhouse. The war saw around 20,000 Arab casualties — with some sources claiming more — compared to only an estimated 1,000 Israeli casualties.

When the dust had settled, around one million Arabs now found themselves under Israeli control in the newly captured territories. Historians attribute Israel’s swift victory to more efficient military leadership, better troop prep, and more accurate intelligence. In comparison, Arab efforts often looked haphazard, at best.

Of the captured territories, Israel only returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt thanks to the Camp David Accords. This happened over ten years after the war’s end. Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and maintained a military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The war fundamentally shifted the dynamic of Arab-Israeli relations. During the buildup to the war, leadership of Arab nations, especially President Nasser, proclaimed graphic intentions for their campaign against Israel. Even going so far as to state the goal was to wipe Israel off the map, Arab leadership made it clear that they questioned the legitimacy of Israel to exist as a state.

Though in meetings after the war, Arab states proclaimed there would be “no peace, no recognition and no negotiation” with Israel, leaders of Arab countries changed their rhetoric from one of destroying Israel to one of regaining land and establishing borders. The next stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict would reflect this change when, in 1973, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War to reclaim lost territories.

Frequently Asked Questions

What caused the Six Day War, and why did Israel strike first?

Several converging pressures drove Israel to launch a pre-emptive strike. Egypt’s President Nasser had blocked the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping in late May 1967 — legally an act of war — cutting off Israeli access to the Red Sea and Iranian oil. Syria had threatened to divert the streams feeding the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s main water source, and Palestinian guerrilla groups had been attacking Israeli settlements across the Jordanian border. Faced with an Arab alliance that had publicly declared its intent to destroy Israel, Israeli leaders concluded that waiting for the first blow would be fatal.

How did Operation Focus achieve air supremacy on the first day?

On June 5th, Israel deployed nearly all its aircraft in a coordinated strike against Egyptian airfields, destroying an estimated 370 Arab aircraft — roughly 300 Egyptian, 20 Jordanian, and 50 Syrian — along with runways in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The key advantage was Israeli pilots’ rapid turnaround: extensive training cut ground time to just eight minutes per sortie, allowing each plane to fly up to eight missions a day. Catching Egypt’s air force largely on the ground, Israel secured decisive air control before a single large ground battle had been fought.

How did Egypt’s Field Marshal Amer deceive Jordan, and what were the consequences?

As Egyptian airfields were being demolished by Israeli planes, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer sent a cable to Egyptian General Riad in Amman claiming Egypt had repelled Israel’s air attack and inflicted heavy losses. Acting on this false report, King Hussein opened machine-gun, artillery, and aerial assaults on Israeli positions in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Israel had initially sought to avoid a Jordanian front to focus on Egypt, but Jordanian shelling forced a full response. The deception ultimately cost Jordan the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and all of its fighter jets by the end of the war’s second day.

Why did Syria largely avoid fighting until the last day of the war?

Syria’s military leadership, after receiving Egypt’s false claim of victory, grew alarmed by the stark contrast between those reports and the damage they witnessed Israel inflicting on Arab forces. For the first four days, Syria confined itself to sporadic shelling, limited bombing runs, and a failed offensive at Tel Dan — a push that collapsed because its tanks were too wide for bridges, radio communication failed, and low-morale troops refused to advance. Only on June 9th, after the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts were already settled, did Israel launch an offensive into the Golan Heights.

What territory did Israel capture, and what happened to it afterward?

In six days, Israel seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, roughly tripling the land under its control. About one million Arabs came under Israeli rule in the newly captured territories. Of those areas, only the Sinai was eventually returned — to Egypt through the Camp David Accords more than a decade after the war.

Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and maintained a military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The war’s aftermath shifted Arab rhetoric from destroying Israel to recovering lost territory, setting the stage for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

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