The Libyan Civil Wars: Quagmire in a Quagmire

The brutal execution of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 marked the end of one chapter in Libya’s tumultuous history but opened the door to a decade of chaos. The North African nation became a proxy battleground for global powers, with NATO, the Transitional National Council, and the Qatari military playing pivotal roles. Libya’s civil wars have left deep scars, with regional stability and global security hanging in the balance. As the world watches, the stakes are high: can Libya find a path to reconciliation, or will it descend into another quagmire?

Historical Context: The Arab Spring and Libyan Uprising

Historical Context: The Arab Spring and Libyan Uprising centers on The events leading up to the Libyan Civil Wars, including the Arab Spring, Muammar Gaddafi’s rule, and the initial uprising against his regime.. A group of survivors runs away from the convoy on foot; among them is Muammar Gaddafi, who until very recently had been Libya’s mad dictator. The execution of Muammar Gaddafi was the culmination of a civil war that had raged within Libya for the better part of a year, one of a number of Middle Eastern and North African nations that had revolted against their dictators during 2011’s Arab Spring.

But even as Gaddafi’s death ushered one Libyan civil war to its end, it created a tenuous peace that would hold for less than three years. Libya has endured two separate, but tightly interrelated civil wars in the space of a decade, civil wars that now, in retrospect, seem much less about the liberation of the Libyan people. The two successful movements set off a wave in other nations, in what would later be dubbed the Arab Spring.

We’ve already mentioned Libya’s dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, and how he met his end, but to give some context, Gaddafi had spent over four decades ruling Libya with an iron fist. His involvement with the bombing of a civilian airliner, his commitment to a Libyan WMD program, and his tendency to finance revolutionary movements around the world had turned Libya into a pariah state, and invited sanctions that hurt the Libyan people far more than they seemed to hurt Gaddafi himself. When the early days of the Arab Spring showed that the regimes of Tunisia and Egypt could be brought down, this provided all the proof-of-concept the Libyan public needed.

Rallies in the city of Benghazi called for Gaddafi to step down in mid-February, and when Libyan security forces responded with force to put down the protests, public discontent spread to more of Libya’s cities, including the capitol, Tripoli. Many of Gaddafi’s own cabinet and diplomatic staff resigned, and Libyan embassies around the world rebelled, flying a version of the Libyan flag that predated Gaddafi’s rule.

The First Libyan Civil War: NATO Intervention and Gaddafi’s Downfall

By late February 2011, the Libyan uprising had gained significant momentum. Much of eastern Libya had been liberated, and western city administrations began to capitulate. The tightly sealed borders and internet blackouts imposed by Muammar Gaddafi’s regime had previously hindered the flow of information, but rebel forces opened the Libyan border with Egypt, allowing journalists to enter and report on the unfolding events.

By the end of February, Gaddafi and his military supporters retained control over Tripoli, but the rest of the country had either joined the rebels or was on the verge of doing so. The international community, particularly the Western world, largely supported the rebels, but military intervention was initially slow due to concerns about the safety of foreign nationals in Tripoli and the potential for a geopolitical backlash. Sanctions and asset freezing were the primary tools used to isolate Gaddafi and his regime globally.

Although few nations were willing to supply arms to the rebels, Qatar stepped in to provide invaluable support, helping to organize a more cohesive resistance. During this period, the rebels consolidated their forces and established the Transitional National Council (TNC). The TNC not only oversaw military planning and leadership but also focused on restoring critical infrastructure and services in rebel-held areas, laying the groundwork for a transitional government.

This effort had a profound impact, both domestically and internationally, as the TNC’s actions demonstrated a commitment to the people of Libya that Gaddafi had long neglected. However, the TNC’s capabilities were limited, and the crisis led to significant displacement of both Libyans and migrant workers. The civil war entered a stalemate as both sides realized their limitations in terms of firepower.

Libya’s vast, sparsely populated terrain made it easier to hold territory than to capture it, given the relatively small number of fighters involved. The regime’s holdouts in Tripoli and along the coast were well-supplied and maintained a military advantage, while rebel forces leveraged the country’s resources and industry to move freely across the deserts. This tactical environment favored defensive strategies, making sustained offensive operations challenging.

The international community was divided on the next steps, with the African Union and the United States opposing military intervention, while France, the UK, and the Arab League supported a no-fly zone. The situation reached a critical juncture in mid-March when Gaddafi launched a major counterattack toward Benghazi and Tobruk. The UN Security Council approved a no-fly zone, and Gaddafi declared a cease-fire, but his actions quickly revealed it to be a mere attempt at appeasement.

On March 19, coalition warplanes and missiles struck Libya, effectively neutralizing the regime’s air capabilities. This intervention turned the tide of the war, emboldening rebel forces to advance as regime strongholds and advance camps were systematically targeted from the air. NATO took over the coalition operations at the end of March, and despite efforts by the African Union to broker a peace, fighting continued through April.

Several European nations sent advisors to assist the rebel forces, and by June, many of Gaddafi’s inner circle had either defected or been killed. Tripoli remained Gaddafi’s final stronghold, and fierce fighting persisted through the hot Libyan summer. However, in August, rebel forces converged on Tripoli, capturing strategic holdings in the outskirts.

On August 23, the rebels breached Gaddafi’s compound amidst intense urban combat. Despite capturing the compound, Gaddafi himself was not found in the city. With Tripoli under rebel control, the regime’s forces were on the defensive.

Gaddafi attempted to maintain support through occasional audio messages, but the remaining cities began to fall to the TNC. On September 15, the UN recognized the TNC as the voice of the Libyan people, and many cities and towns surrendered peacefully. By October, only Sirte and Bani Walid remained under regime control.

The final showdown occurred in Sirte, where Gaddafi was discovered and killed by rebel forces on October 20, 2011. His death marked the end of Libya’s first civil war, with the TNC achieving total victory. The international community, which had initially provided military support, shifted its focus to aiding in the rebuilding of the war-torn nation.

The TNC’s success in restoring services and gaining international recognition was a significant achievement, but the challenges of establishing a functioning transitional government and maintaining control over disparate militias would soon become apparent.

Aftermath and Escalation: Power Vacuum and Militia Rule

The fall of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 marked the official end of the First Libyan Civil War, but it left behind a power vacuum that quickly filled with various militias and armed groups. The Transitional National Council (TNC), which had led the rebellion against Gaddafi, struggled to establish a functional government. The TNC’s ineffectiveness allowed militias to consolidate power, particularly in the capital, Tripoli, and other major cities.

These militias, many of which had fought against Gaddafi, now turned their attention to competing for influence and resources within Libya. The Libyan military, weakened by years of underinvestment and internal purges under Gaddafi, was ill-equipped to challenge these militias. NATO, which had played a crucial role in the military intervention, began to withdraw its forces, leaving the fledgling government to deal with the aftermath of the conflict.

The Western world governments, eager to avoid another prolonged military engagement, provided limited support and focused on diplomatic efforts to stabilize the country. One of the most significant figures to emerge during this period was General Khalifa Haftar. Initially a militia commander in the eastern provinces around Benghazi, Haftar had a complex history, having been one of Gaddafi’s early supporters and a member of the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969.

After living in exile in the United States for two decades, Haftar returned to Libya and played a key role in the First Libyan Civil War. In May 2014, Haftar launched Operation Dignity, ostensibly to combat Islamist militants, particularly Ansar al-Sharia, which had gained control of Benghazi. This operation marked the beginning of the Second Libyan Civil War.

Haftar’s forces, later known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), received support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which conducted airstrikes against Islamist militias in Tripoli. These airstrikes, though officially denied, underscored the regional dimensions of the conflict. The political landscape in Libya became increasingly fragmented.

In June 2014, parliamentary elections were held, resulting in a new parliament known as the House of Representatives (HoR). However, Islamist militias, angered by Haftar’s offensive, took control of Tripoli and established their own government, the General National Congress (GNC). The HoR was forced to relocate to the city of Tobruk, where it aligned with Haftar’s LNA.

This division led to a protracted conflict between the two governments, each backed by different militias and external powers. The GNC, supported by militias from Misrata and other western cities, controlled Tripoli and much of western Libya. The HoR, with the backing of the LNA and its international allies, controlled eastern Libya.

The power vacuum and militia rule had dire consequences for Libya’s stability and security. The country became a hotbed for extremist groups, including the Islamic State (ISIS), which established a presence in Sirte in 2015. The Battle of Sirte, which lasted from May to December 2016, saw Libyan forces, backed by the U.S. and Qatari military, fighting to reclaim the city from ISIS.

The battle highlighted the ongoing chaos and the need for a unified government to address Libya’s security challenges. The international community, including the United Nations, attempted to mediate a peace agreement, but efforts were hampered by the deep-seated divisions and the interests of external actors. The Second Libyan Civil War, characterized by shifting alliances and protracted fighting, has left Libya in a state of perpetual conflict, with no clear path to resolution.

The rise of militias and the failure of the new Libyan government to establish control have created a quagmire that continues to plague the country and the broader Middle East and North Africa regions.

The Second Libyan Civil War: Islamist Rise and Regional Divisions

The Second Libyan Civil War: Islamist Rise and Regional Divisions centers on The events that led to the outbreak of the second civil war, including the rise of Islamist groups, regional divisions, and the involvement of external actors like Qatar.. At this moment, we’d like to reassure our viewers that if things have started to seem a bit confusing, that’s okay, and you’re certainly not alone. But this is the moment where the situation in Libya shifts from being complex, to being borderline unintelligible from the perspective of a casual observer, so we’d like to take a moment and outline some of the major players who will be most important as we move forward.

We’ll start with the two major opposing sides: the General National Congress, GNC, made from the remnants of the parliament elected in 2012, and the Libyan National Army, LNA, joined by the House of Representatives elected to parliament in 2014. The GNC was the major Islamist faction within Libya, based in Tripoli and exercising strong control over the coastal cities and the Nafusa mountains in the south. Their major military component was the Libya Dawn, a conglomeration of militias that seized control of significant military hardware, including planes, from major bases across the country.

The Libya Dawn received major support from a second militia conglomerate, Libya Shield, as well as a wide network of other Islamist militias who preferred to operate independently. The LNA gained the support of a large portion of the Libyan military, as well as significant amounts of hardware. However, the Second Civil War was by no means a bilateral conflict, with jihadist forces comprising a third element that was often just as happy to war with other jihadists, as they were to war against the GNC and the LNA.

Not only that, but nations who were generally opposed to the spread of Islamist rule had strong incentives to support Haftar, while nations interested in either supporting Islamist movements or accessing the natural resources on GNC territory, would support the GNC. This concordant military, political, and economic opposition to the Islamist government in Tripoli was the final point of no return, from which the Second Libyan Civil War became inevitable.

International Intervention and Attempts at Peace: The Role of the UN and Foreign Powers

The international community’s efforts to mediate peace in Libya have been marked by a series of diplomatic initiatives, military interventions, and shifting alliances. The United Nations played a pivotal role in these efforts, notably through the brokerage of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015. This agreement aimed to integrate the rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk into a unified political structure, with shared leadership from prominent figures on both sides.

The GNA, established in Tripoli in 2016, initially saw voluntary participation from Islamist factions and gained recognition from the United States and many other nations as Libya’s legitimate government. This recognition was a significant blow to Khalifa Haftar and his allies in Tobruk, who saw the GNA as an extension of the General National Congress (GNC) rather than a genuine path to peace. The GNA’s consolidation of support from various militias allowed it to push back against the Islamic State, which had seized control of strategic cities like Sirte.

The United States provided crucial support through coordinated airstrikes, helping the GNA launch Operation Impenetrable Wall against Sirte. This operation received unofficial backing from Haftar’s forces, which were simultaneously targeting Islamic State-held Derna. This brief alliance between Tripoli and Tobruk resulted in the expulsion of the Islamic State from both cities, confining them to smaller pockets of territory for the remainder of the conflict.

However, the peace process faced significant challenges. In late November 2016, Haftar sought direct support from Russia, appealing to Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov oversaw the collaboration, viewing Haftar as an ideal client to establish a Russian influence in Libya.

This move complicated the international dynamics, as Russia’s involvement added another layer of geopolitical tension. Meanwhile, Tripoli descended into violence, with clashes between rival Islamist militias and the presence of a self-declared government that challenged the GNA’s authority. The GNA’s control over Tripoli remained tenuous, dependent on the militias’ willingness to recognize its legitimacy.

Despite these setbacks, diplomatic efforts persisted. In May 2017, France brokered a ceasefire between the GNA and Haftar’s forces, calling for elections in early 2018. However, these plans faltered when Haftar declared the GNA illegitimate and announced his candidacy for the upcoming elections.

The stalemate led to the cancellation of the spring 2018 elections, further delaying the peace process. In April 2018, Haftar’s health crisis temporarily disrupted the conflict, but he quickly resumed military operations, launching offensives against Derna and participating in international peace talks in Paris. The Paris meeting resulted in a consensus among major Libyan leaders to hold parliamentary and presidential elections by the end of the year, although independent actors continued to resist the peace process.

The latter half of 2018 saw mixed progress. Major oil terminals reopened, and Tripoli’s airport resumed operations, allowing displaced Libyans to return home. The Palermo Conference in Italy further solidified the commitment to elections, scheduled for the following spring.

However, violence persisted, with attacks on Tripoli, prisons, and key infrastructure like the National Oil Company and the Foreign Ministry. In response, Haftar and the Tobruk forces targeted rebel factions in the south, regaining control of captured oil fields and launching assaults on cities like Murzuq. Despite these conflicts, both the GNA and Haftar’s forces maintained their formal commitment to peace until April 2019, when Haftar launched a surprise assault on GNA-controlled Tripoli, just weeks before the scheduled National Conference.

This offensive marked a significant escalation and a major setback for the international efforts to broker a lasting peace in Libya.

Implications and Lasting Impact: Regional Stability, Global Security, and Lessons Learned

The Libyan Civil Wars have had profound implications for regional stability and global security. The conflicts have destabilized North Africa, creating a power vacuum that has attracted a myriad of external actors and fueled ongoing violence. Libya’s borders have become porous, allowing for the proliferation of weapons and the movement of extremist groups.

The Second District, once a relatively stable region, has seen a surge in violence and lawlessness, with militias and criminal organizations exploiting the chaos to expand their influence. The spillover effects have been particularly acute in neighboring Egypt, which has had to contend with increased terrorist activity and refugee flows. Cairo’s intervention, including airstrikes and the deployment of ground troops, underscores the direct threat Libya’s instability poses to Egypt’s national security.

The involvement of international actors has further complicated the situation. NATO’s intervention in 2011, aimed at protecting civilians, ultimately contributed to the power vacuum that followed Gaddafi’s fall. The subsequent support from countries like Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey has turned Libya into a proxy battleground for regional and global powers.

The UAE’s backing of Khalifa Haftar, despite UN arms embargoes, and Turkey’s support for the Government of National Accord (GNA) have prolonged the conflict and deepened the divisions. The Qatari military’s role, particularly in arming and training militias, has also been significant, though less overt than its Gulf counterparts. These external interventions have not only hindered peace efforts but also set dangerous precedents for future conflicts.

The humanitarian toll of the Libyan Civil Wars has been immense. According to the United Nations, tens of thousands of people have been killed, and millions more have been displaced. The destruction of infrastructure, including hospitals and schools, has left many communities in dire need of aid.

The Battle of Sirte, which saw intense fighting and heavy civilian casualties, exemplifies the brutal nature of the conflict. The indiscriminate airstrikes by Haftar’s forces, targeting civilian areas and essential services, have been widely condemned by international human rights organizations. The use of mercenaries, such as those from the Russian Wagner Group and the former Blackwater CEO’s paramilitary forces, has added another layer of complexity and brutality to the fighting.

The lessons learned from the Libyan Civil Wars are crucial for future international interventions and national elites. The failure of the Transitional National Council (TNC) to establish a functional government highlights the importance of post-conflict planning and institution-building. The international community must ensure that interventions are followed by sustained efforts to support political reconciliation and economic development.

The experiences of countries like South Korea and Japan, which rebuilt after devastating conflicts with significant international aid, offer valuable insights. Moreover, the Libyan case underscores the need for a more coordinated and principled approach to arms embargoes and the prevention of external meddling. The Western world governments must be willing to hold their allies accountable for violations and ensure that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

For Libyan national elites, the conflicts serve as a stark reminder of the dangers of divisive politics and the importance of inclusive governance. The rise of Islamist groups and the fragmentation of the Libyan military have shown the need for a unified national identity and a strong, centralized authority. The experiences of other post-conflict societies, such as Rwanda and Bosnia, demonstrate the potential for reconciliation and reconstruction, but only with a commitment to dialogue and compromise.

The ongoing efforts to implement the UN-brokered peace agreement and the formation of a unified government are steps in the right direction, but they require sustained support and engagement from both domestic and international actors. In conclusion, the Libyan Civil Wars have had far-reaching implications for regional stability and global security. The conflicts have highlighted the dangers of external intervention, the importance of post-conflict planning, and the need for inclusive governance.

As Libya continues to grapple with the aftermath of these wars, the international community must learn from these experiences to better support future peacebuilding efforts and prevent similar crises from occurring. The lessons of Libya are clear: unchecked violence and external meddling can turn a local conflict into a regional quagmire with global repercussions.

The Path Forward: Reconciliation Efforts and Prospects for Peace

The path to reconciliation and peace in Libya remains fraught with challenges, despite recent diplomatic efforts and the announcement of a new roadmap for elections. The December 2015 UN-brokered agreement established the Government of National Accord (GNA), aiming to unify the rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. This accord included key terms such as the resettlement of displaced Libyans, amnesty for participating factions, and the demobilization of militias.

However, the implementation of these terms has been slow and fraught with obstacles. The planned presidential and parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for December 24, 2021, have yet to materialize due to disagreements over the electoral process, candidate lists, and the distribution of political powers. This impasse has led to growing frustration and a lack of trust among the Libyan populace and international backers.

The uncertainty has also emboldened militias, leading to renewed violence in Tripoli and other parts of the country. In August 2022, a skirmish in Tripoli resulted in over thirty deaths, highlighting the fragile nature of the current peace. The incident was reportedly backed by the Tripoli and Tobruk governments, underscoring the deep-seated divisions that persist.

Despite these setbacks, there are glimmers of hope. On January 5, 2023, delegates from Tripoli and Tobruk announced plans to present a new roadmap for free and fair elections. This development, if successfully implemented, could pave the way for a more sustainable peace.

However, the roadmap’s success is not guaranteed, given the history of failed agreements and the complex web of interests involved. The international community, including the UN, has been forced to make desperate deals to keep the peace process afloat, but many Libyans remain skeptical. The ongoing conflict has left Libya in a state of economic and social decay, with infant mortality rates soaring, education and healthcare systems in ruins, and local economies struggling to recover.

The prolonged war has also created a power vacuum that has attracted external actors, including Russia, which has expanded its influence in the region. The situation in Libya serves as a stark reminder of the challenges and pitfalls of international intervention and the need for a more nuanced and coordinated approach to conflict resolution. The lessons from Libya underscore the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict, fostering inclusive dialogue, and ensuring that peace agreements are implemented in a timely and transparent manner.

As Libya stands at a crossroads, the international community must remain committed to supporting the Libyan people in their quest for peace and stability. The new roadmap for elections offers a ray of hope, but its success will depend on the willingness of all parties to compromise and work towards a common goal. The people of Libya deserve a future free from the shadows of war, and it is incumbent upon the international community to support them in achieving this vision.

Frequently Asked Questions

What triggered the First Libyan Civil War and how did NATO become involved?

The Arab Spring provided the spark: after protests in Benghazi were met with force, public discontent spread across Libya and a rebel Transitional National Council formed to challenge Gaddafi. A critical juncture came in mid-March 2011 when Gaddafi launched a major counterattack toward Benghazi, prompting the UN Security Council to approve a no-fly zone. Coalition warplanes and missiles struck Libya on March 19, neutralizing the regime’s air capabilities, and NATO took over operations at the end of March, with the intervention proving decisive in turning the tide against Gaddafi’s forces.

What created the power vacuum that led to the Second Libyan Civil War?

The fall of Gaddafi in October 2011 left behind a country where the Transitional National Council struggled to establish a functional government, allowing militias that had fought in the civil war to consolidate power instead. General Khalifa Haftar’s launch of Operation Dignity in May 2014 — ostensibly to combat Islamist militants — marked the beginning of the Second Civil War, as Islamist militias responded by seizing control of Tripoli and establishing a rival government. This created two competing parliaments backed by different militias and external powers, fragmenting the country into east and west.

Who were the main external powers backing each side in the Second Civil War?

Haftar’s Libyan National Army received support from Egypt and the UAE, which conducted airstrikes against Islamist militias, while Turkey and Qatar backed the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Russia also entered the equation when Haftar sought direct support from Moscow in late 2016, viewing it as a vehicle for establishing Russian influence in the Mediterranean. These competing external interventions prolonged the conflict and deepened Libya’s divisions rather than resolving them.

What role did the Islamic State play, and how was it driven out of Sirte?

The Islamic State exploited the chaos of the Second Civil War to establish a presence in the city of Sirte in 2015. The Battle of Sirte, which lasted from May to December 2016, saw Libyan forces backed by US airstrikes and Qatari military support fighting to reclaim the city, and resulted in ISIS being expelled and confined to smaller pockets of territory. The battle was one of the few moments of cooperation between the rival Tripoli and Tobruk factions, and highlighted the ongoing security vacuum created by the absence of a unified Libyan government.

What obstacles have prevented Libya from holding elections and reaching a stable peace?

The UN-brokered Government of National Accord, established in 2016, never gained full acceptance from Haftar’s faction, and Haftar’s April 2019 assault on Tripoli derailed the latest attempt at elections scheduled for that spring. Presidential and parliamentary elections initially planned for December 2021 have yet to materialize due to disputes over candidate eligibility, electoral rules, and the distribution of political power between east and west. Renewed militia clashes in Tripoli in August 2022 underscored the fragility of any ceasefire, and the deep-seated distrust between factions — compounded by continued external meddling — has left the peace process in a persistent stalemate.

Sources

1. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/16/death-dictator/bloody-vengeance-sirte
2. https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring
3. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi
4. https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011
5. https://www.britannica.com/event/2012-Benghazi-attacks
6. https://greydynamics.com/libyan-civil-war-qatar-involvement/
7. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ten-years-ago-libyans-staged-a-revolution-heres-why-it-has-failed/
8. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt16f8d7x.20?seq=8#metadata_info_tab_contents
9. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/clashes-libyas-benghazi-kill-26208479
10. https://www.news24.com/News24/photos-chaos-in-libyan-capital-tripoli-20161202
11. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/libyan-islamist-group-ansar-al-sharia-says-it-is-dissolving-idUSKBN18N0YR
12. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1436956/middle-east
13. https://ghostarchive.org/archive/EyBDn
14. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-libyas-election-has-collapsed-what-comes-next-2021-12-22/
15. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131817
16. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eastern-libyan-commander-announces-final-opportunity-hold-elections-tv-2022-12-24/
17. https://www.libyaherald.com/2020/10/immediate-and-permanent-ceasefire-agreement-throughout-libya-signed-in-geneva/
18. https://www.brookings.edu/research/two-years-on-from-the-ceasefire-agreement-libya-still-matters/
19. https://ecfr.eu/article/infinity-war-libyas-reoccurring-conflict/
20. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/28/23-killed-in-tripoli-clashes-fears-grow-of-wider-libya-war
21. https://libyaobserver.ly/news/nova-haftar-making-secret-contact-dbeibah-abandons-bashaghas-government
22. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230105-libya-leaders-hold-talks-in-egypt-affirm-to-announce-peace-road-map-soon/
23. https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2020/07/13/Libya-crisis-timeline-The-battle-for-Tripoli-Sirte-and-oil
24. https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/where-does-china-stand-on-the-libya-conflict/
25. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/9/libyas-war-who-is-supporting-whom
26. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/libyas-islamists-who-they-are-and-what-they-want
27. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war
28. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354
29. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya
30. https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/a-dysfunctional-peace-how-libyas-fault-lines-were-redrawn/
31. https://time.com/5779348/war-libya-global-conflict/
32. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/libyas-civil-war-haftar-the-strongman/
33. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/exploiting-chaos-russia-libya
34. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/21/libyan-civil-war-france-uae-khalifa-haftar/
35. https://hir.harvard.edu/the-real-face-of-the-libyan-civil-war-and-the-underlying-humanitarian-crisis/
36. https://africacenter.org/publication/geostrategic-dimensions-libya-civil-war/
37. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445
38. https://www.usip.org/libya-timeline-qaddafis-ouster
39. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libyas-festering-crisis-risks-slide-back-war-2022-11-17/
40. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next
41. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19744533