Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy: Why America's Allies Are Terrified

On Thursday, December 4, 2025, without much fanfare, preamble, or even as much as a Truth Social post, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy. In theory, the 33-page document will guide the foreign policy of the second Trump administration—shaping how parts of the government allocate budgets and set policy priorities for years to come.

Presidents generally publish a National Security Strategy once per term, and these documents rarely cause a stir. Despite the ideological differences between most U.S. presidents, their stated foreign policy goals tend to follow a familiar formula: strengthen Washington’s relationships with allies across the globe, project American power to deter adversaries, and promote American values and economic interests while maintaining global stability. When former President Biden published his strategy in 2022, the biggest controversy was a consensus among security experts that the plan was too ambitious.

This time was different. Despite the muted rollout, the document set off alarm bells from Toronto to Brussels—and even calling it a “stir” feels like a gross understatement. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote on X that “it’s language that one otherwise only finds coming out of some bizarre minds of the Kremlin.” That is not exactly a ringing endorsement.

This is the story of a strategy document that reads less like a routine bureaucratic exercise and more like a blueprint for reordering America’s relationships with its closest friends—and why, from Canada to France to Latin America, the people who once counted themselves Washington’s allies are now afraid of what comes next.

What’s Actually In It

“To ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come, our country needs a coherent, focused strategy for how we interact with the world.” That is how the document opens—by reinforcing the idea Donald Trump has lived by since he first ventured into elective politics: America First.

The strategy criticizes the National Security Strategies of administrations since the Cold War as insufficient to protect American interests, accusing them of offering vague platitudes and misjudging what the American people actually want. “After the end of the Cold War,” it reads, “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests. Our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens (…) They allowed allies to offload the cost of their defense onto the American people.”

That sentence captures the through line that runs across the entire document. Under the Trump administration, Washington will focus on its own interests first and prioritize other countries only when their interests intersect with America’s.

So what are America’s interests, exactly? According to the document, they begin at home: protecting the country from military attacks and hostile foreign actions, exercising full control of the border and of who enters the country, and developing resilient national infrastructure that can withstand both natural disasters and hostile attacks. The strategy also emphasizes a strong army, the world’s most credible nuclear deterrent, and the world’s strongest economy.

America’s Demands of the Wider World

From the rest of the world, Washington wants several specific things. It wants to prevent a hostile power from dominating the Middle East’s oil and gas supplies and the strategic routes through which they pass. It wants to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open and to maintain secure, reliable supply chains and access to critical materials. And it wants to support America’s allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe—while, in the document’s own framing, “restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.”

Closer to home, the administration wants the Western Hemisphere stable enough to prevent mass migration to the United States, and it wants regional governments to cooperate against drug cartels and other transnational criminal organizations. In a modern reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, Washington wants to ensure that hostile foreign powers do not own key assets in the Western Hemisphere and that the U.S. retains access to critical locations throughout the region. This is what the document calls the Trump Corollary.

For those not well-versed in nineteenth-century foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine is the principle established by President James Monroe in 1823 that warned European powers against further colonization or interference in the Americas. Over the years, various presidents—most famously Theodore Roosevelt—added their own interpretations, known as corollaries, which extend or modify the original doctrine to fit new circumstances or justify specific actions. Washington insists the Trump Corollary is a common-sense addition that restores America’s priorities in a manner consistent with the country’s security interests. It is widely seen as a message to China, which has invested heavily in ports, infrastructure, and strategic assets across Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades.

China, Taiwan, and the South China Sea

The document calls out the trade imbalance between Beijing and Washington, positioning it as a major national threat. Going forward, it says, Washington will prioritize reciprocity and fairness to restore America’s economic independence and technological lead. As part of this strategy, the United States will focus on deterring a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan—not only because of the island’s importance in the semiconductor supply chain, but because of its strategic location.

“Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters,” the document states. “Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy.” That sea is of particular concern.

The strategy outlines a fear that if a nation hostile to the United States were to take it over, it might impose tolls or close the vital shipping lane at will—a major challenge to American economic interests. To prevent that, the document insists on building up the American navy as well as the navies of regional allies like India and Japan.

From this framing, it might seem as if Washington is taking a particularly hard line on China. Yet, as Jonathan Cheng, the Wall Street Journal’s China Bureau Chief, observes, the strategy is actually much softer on China than past documents. That does not mean Beijing will love all of it.

Emily Harding, vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that China will love only two parts and hate everything else: “Beijing will love the explicit declaration that the U.S. preference is noninterference in other nations’ affairs and the clear statement about respecting states’ sovereignty. (…) They will hate the calls for them to get out of Latin America and the robust approach to deterrence, both necessary and excellent policy positions.”

If that were all the document contained, it would be a slightly controversial but unremarkable strategy—the kind that generates a few headlines without fundamentally alarming allies or reshaping the global order. But for nations across Europe, the Americas, and Asia, the document’s arrival has been nothing short of terrifying. So what has U.S. allies spooked?

Controversies in the Americas

The best place to start in measuring allied discontent is with what was once the closest ally of them all: Canada. There was a lot in this document to spook Ottawa.

According to Alan Woods, a reporter at the Toronto Star, there is a fear that if Canada does not become the 51st state, Trump will happily make it an economically dependent vassal state. “American domination is the clearly stated intention of the NSS,” Woods wrote. “He wants to make his country strong by keeping other nations in his sphere of influence—the western hemisphere—weak and reliant.”

In Woods’s view, if Washington decides that Canadian policies conflict with American interests—whether on Chinese investment, defense procurement, or trade decisions—the administration has now laid out a framework for economic coercion. He believes this may be an effective way to bend people to Washington’s will, but it is the wrong approach if the United States wants to make friends and guarantee lasting security.

If Canada feels threatened, Latin America faces something arguably worse. The document treats the region not as a collection of sovereign partners but as what Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, called “a region of risks first, and one of opportunities second.” According to Macarena Vidal Liy, a correspondent at the Spanish-language outlet El País, Washington is now declaring that Latin America is no longer simply its backyard but its front yard—and that it will exercise all the influence that distinction implies.

Coercion, Carrots, and Sticks in Latin America

Beyond the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—which seeks to limit which nations Latin American countries can do business with—the strategy emphasizes that Washington will use economic leverage to bend the region to its will. Countries that cooperate on migration control and fighting drug cartels will receive preferential treatment. Those that do not will face tariffs, aid cuts, and diplomatic isolation.

This has already played out multiple times in 2025. Colombia, which has worked closely with Washington for decades on counter-narcotics, found itself in Trump’s crosshairs: President Gustavo Petro was labeled an illegal drug leader, had sanctions imposed on him, and saw Bogotá accused of failing to meet its drug control obligations. In Venezuela, Trump went further still, authorizing a gigantic military buildup in the region that looked ominously like a prelude to regime change. With the publication of the strategy, regional observers like Vidal Liy expect the administration to ramp up its pressure campaigns against what it considers recalcitrant regimes.

The document also expects Latin American countries to give American companies preferential treatment in business deals. “The terms of our agreements, especially with those countries that depend on us most and therefore over which we have the most leverage, must be sole-source contracts for our companies,” it reads. “At the same time, we should make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.”

While this has raised obvious questions of sovereignty, not every regional expert sees it as wholly negative. Jason Marczak, vice president of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, told the council that “the priorities laid out in the NSS dovetail with many of the interests of countries across the Western Hemisphere, such as security and economic growth (…) There’s also a regional yearning for greater US investment, especially in infrastructure (…) The NSS provides a blueprint for the broader US government to elevate its role in these critical sectors, and it underscores the need for a whole-of-government approach.” If that view holds, America’s approach—controversial as it is in some quarters—might find supporters in the places one would least expect.

Countries facing genuine security crises or desperate for infrastructure investment may be willing to accept Washington’s terms, at least in the short term. Whether the strategy ultimately endears Washington to the Latin American people over the long run is anyone’s guess.

Europe and the Politics of Burden-Shifting

Away from the Americas, the insistence on burden-sharing and burden-shifting has proven particularly controversial in Europe. “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” the document declares. “The United States will stand ready to help (…) those countries that willingly take more responsibility for security in their neighborhoods and align their export controls with ours.” The implication is simple and stark: the United States might not come to the defense of countries that do not pay what Washington considers their fair share—even if those countries are close allies.

This is not the first time the administration has pressured America’s allies to spend more on defense. During the first Trump term, the president insisted all NATO members hit the 2% spending target; that figure was ramped up to 5% during the second administration, which NATO members agreed to in June 2025. Yet as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted at the time, the 5% pledge is likely more a political statement designed to appeal to Donald Trump than a concrete spending plan. Most NATO members carry high debt loads that make it fiscally unsustainable to increase defense spending by vast sums within a short period.

SIPRI also warned against conflating military spending with output: “Military spending as a share of GDP is easy to communicate but must not be mistaken for a direct indicator of military capabilities. Moreover, it does not speak to whether funds are being used efficiently, whether the spending addresses real capability gaps, or how resources are balanced across categories such as personnel, major equipment, and operations and maintenance.” None of this is an argument that Europe should spend less on defense—WarFronts has produced endless analyses urging European leaders to stop treating defense spending as an optional extra.

But, as Rick Landgraf wrote for War On The Rocks, the language in the strategy goes further than encouraging Europe to stand on its own two feet; it amounts to arm-twisting with major implications for NATO’s cohesion. “It treats compliance as a condition for political favor,” Landgraf wrote. “If enforced, it would trigger severe budgetary and political shocks across Europe and beyond."

"Civilizational Erasure” and the Great Replacement Echo

Beyond defense spending, the document takes a hard line against what the administration views as Europe’s failings. It asserts that the EU and other international bodies are undermining political liberty and sovereignty, that migration policies are transforming the continent and creating strife, and that Europe is censoring free speech and political opposition. It claims the continent is not only growing weaker economically—its share of global GDP, the document notes, fell from 25% in 1990 to 14% today—but is also facing the risk of “civilization erasure.”

According to the Financial Times, in criticizing Europe so harshly the strategy echoed language used by Vice President JD Vance in his February 2025 speech to the Munich Security Forum, which stunned European allies with its adversarial tone and its claim that the continent faced a greater threat from its own democratic failings than from Russian aggression. “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less,” the document states. “As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.”

It also references falling birth rates and the loss of national identities, declaring that America wants Europe to “remain European.” Because of these trends, it argues, certain NATO members may within a few decades cease to be majority European—leaving open the question of whether such nations will still view a relationship with the United States as desirable.

The irony, as international policy commentator Janan Ganesh noted in the Financial Times, is that the share of foreign-born people in the United States is about the same as in Britain and higher than in Italy. According to U.S. Census data, non-Hispanic white people are projected to become a minority around 2045.

Yet the document paints Europe as a wild outlier—despite other U.S. allies, like Australia, being far more racially diverse. According to Tim Ross, POLITICO’s Chief Political Correspondent in Europe and the UK, by emphasizing declining birth rates and insisting that Europe “remain European,” the administration introduced a racial dimension that is difficult to ignore, echoing the great replacement theory—a debunked white nationalist conspiracy claiming that white populations are being deliberately replaced by immigrants from majority-nonwhite nations, particularly from Africa.

Ross is not alone. Experts who spoke to NBC News made the same observation. Rod Dacombe, a politics expert at King’s College London, told NBC: “The phrase ‘civilizational erasure’ does indeed sound aligned to Great Replacement Theory, and this shouldn’t be a surprise—it has been a feature of populist right rhetoric for some years now.” The White House has denied any link between the strategy and the great replacement theory; spokesperson Anna Kelly called the comparisons total nonsense.

Still, it is striking that so many experts independently drew the connection.

Ukraine, Russia, and the “Patriotic Parties”

Returning to the document’s broader critique of Europe, it castigates the continent’s external dependencies—pointing specifically to Germany, where chemical companies are building some of the world’s largest processing plants in China, powered by Russian gas they cannot obtain at home. It calls European officials’ expectations regarding the war in Ukraine unrealistic, yet insists that it is a core interest of Washington to negotiate peace in Ukraine in order to prevent the war from escalating and to reestablish strategic stability with Russia.

Perhaps most controversially, the strategy celebrates what it terms “patriotic European parties,” which observers interpreted as extreme right-wing outfits such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), calling for the United States to cultivate resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations. Tim Ross believes this implicit endorsement amounts to a call for regime change that poses an existential threat to sitting centrist leaders—Emmanuel Macron in Paris, Keir Starmer in London, and Germany’s Friedrich Merz. Ross points to high-stakes elections in parts of Britain and Germany where centrists could lose the most ground to parties aligned with Trump’s vision: the AfD in Germany and Reform in the UK.

This tracks with the president’s broader pattern, not only in Europe but across the Americas, of seeking to influence elections in favor of right-wing parties. Thomas Carothers, director of the democracy, conflict, and governance program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told AFP: “I cannot think of a time when a US president was willing to just openly state his preferences in foreign elections in this way, at least in modern history.” Will Freeman agreed, telling AFP it was “a consistent attempt to influence the politics, to reinforce what I think they see as already a shift towards the right that’s gaining force across the region.” On the irony of Washington backing parties like the AfD that have long been defined by their anti-American rhetoric, the document has nothing to say.

How Europe Is Taking It

The reaction depends on which side of Europe you look at: the side composed of traditional American allies, or the side composed of Russia. In France, former ambassador to the U.S. Gérard Araud wrote on X that the section devoted to Europe read like a far-right pamphlet and largely confirmed perceptions that Trump is an enemy of Europe. In Germany, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul noted that the United States would remain Berlin’s most important ally, but that his country did not need any outside advice.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk appealed directly to the American people, writing on X: “Dear American friends, Europe is your closest ally, not your problem. And we have common enemies. At least that’s how it has been in the last 80 years. We need to stick to this, this is the only reasonable strategy of our common security.

Unless something has changed.”

In Russia, by contrast, the Kremlin heaped praise on the strategy, calling it an encouraging change of policy that largely aligned with Russia’s thinking. The key reason for Moscow’s celebration—apart from how harshly Washington criticized Europe—is that Russia is hardly mentioned at all. The document contains no criticism of what Russia is doing in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe, including its recent dispatch of a spy ship into British waters and drones into NATO airspace.

That omission may be doing more harm than good. According to Dr. Torrey Taussig, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative, by failing to criticize Russia the administration is undermining its own security objectives: “By underplaying—and refraining from even referencing—the conventional threat Russia poses to transatlantic security, the NSS does not empower those nations that are working to take on greater defense responsibilities (…) In this regard, the NSS is an own goal that undermines the administration’s stated objectives for what it seeks to achieve with European allies.”

What emerges from all these statements is that, on a fundamental level, Europe feels it cannot trust Washington as long as Trump is in the White House—and not just at the leadership level. According to a nine-country survey carried out for the European affairs debate platform Le Grand Continent, 48% of Europeans see Trump as an enemy of the continent, echoing Ambassador Araud’s words. The figure peaks in Belgium, where 62% consider him an enemy, and is lowest in Poland, at 19%. Even in Poland, though, that does not translate into broad affection: 48% said he was neither friend nor foe, and only 24% considered him a friend of the continent.

The Regions Left Off the Page: The Middle East and Africa

Before assessing what the strategy means for the world, there is an elephant in the room. So far the discussion has covered the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Europe—with no mention of Africa or the Middle East. That silence reflects exactly how the document treats those regions: the section addressing both occupies only about two and a half pages, with Africa taking up just half a page. The strategy openly acknowledges something rarely said in geopolitics—that the United States cannot afford to be equally attentive to every region and every problem in the world.

For the Middle East, the document declares that the era of the region dominating American foreign policy, in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution, is over. The reasoning: the Middle East is no longer the source of imminent danger it once was. Conflict remains, but the document argues it is much less of an issue than the headlines suggest.

Iran, which it characterizes as the region’s chief destabilizing force, has been greatly weakened by both Israel and Washington. And while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists, the document claims there is progress toward a permanent peace thanks to the ceasefire Trump negotiated. As American oil production ramps up, Washington’s traditional reason to focus on the region recedes; in its place, the Middle East becomes a source of and destination for international investment across industries including AI, nuclear energy, and defense technologies.

And as Middle Eastern partners—particularly the Gulf monarchies—demonstrate their commitment to fighting radicalism, Washington will stop insisting that they abandon their traditional forms of leadership.

In Africa, the document criticizes the former American policy of spreading liberal ideology. Instead, it calls for the United States to partner with select countries to ameliorate conflict, foster mutually beneficial trade, and transform Africa from a continent dependent on foreign aid into a thriving region capable of harnessing its vast natural resources. It highlights several conflicts—the Sudan war, the Congo conflict, and Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions—as possible opportunities for engagement.

According to Rama Yade, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, while the Africa section is razor-thin, the administration is committed to ending the continent’s conflicts as a means of advancing American economic interests. Yade points to the Congo conflict, where the landmark peace agreement between Rwanda and the DRC offers a platform to enrich American business. The Financial Times reported that after the deal, the DRC agreed to give American buyers preferential treatment for minerals sold by its state-owned mining companies; Washington and the Swiss trader Mercuria each announced up to $1 billion in fresh funding for minerals ventures in the DR Congo, the world’s biggest producer of cobalt and second-biggest producer of copper.

What’s Next for the World

So what does America’s National Security Strategy mean for the world? According to George Riekeles, associate director of the European Policy Centre, and Varg Folkman, a policy analyst at the same institute, it means Europe is on its own. In their view, this should surprise no one who followed Vance’s critical Munich speech or who understands how Trump officials such as Elbridge Colby view the continent. Nathalie Tocci, director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, supports this reading.

Writing in Foreign Policy, she argued the administration has a clear vision for Europe—to divide and conquer it. “It is long past time for Europe to realize that, when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine war and the continent’s security, it is, at best, alone,” Tocci wrote. “At worst, it now faces two adversaries: Russia in the east and Trump’s United States in the west.”

For Latin America, things look even worse. Unless a country happens to be completely aligned with Trump’s thinking—El Salvador being the obvious example—the document heavily implies a level of political interference and economic coercion by Washington not seen in the region since the 1970s. For other regions the situation is less dire, but the implications remain troubling. In the words of Rick Landgraf, writing for War On The Rocks, America is moving away from the post-Cold War liberal order it helped usher in toward an era of leadership and power defined by coercive leverage, bilateralism, and transactional alignment.

This is an America that is not necessarily retreating from the world stage but consolidating its power through bullying and dealmaking—an America that, if push came to shove, may choose to abandon its friends and the alliances that have kept much of the world safe for decades, in order to make common cause with the very adversaries that threaten its allies’ security. That is a scary thought, and it is the thought the rest of the world is now forced to sit with.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, and why does it alarm Latin America?

The Trump Corollary is the document’s modern reinterpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which warned European powers against interfering in the Americas. The corollary seeks to ensure hostile foreign powers do not own key regional assets, that the US retains access to critical locations, and that American companies receive sole-source contracts while foreign firms are pushed out. It is widely read as a message directed at China’s heavy investment in Latin American ports, infrastructure, and strategic assets. For Latin American nations, it represents a declaration that Washington treats the hemisphere not as a collection of sovereign partners but, as one analyst put it, as its “front yard” — subject to economic coercion if governments do not align with US priorities on migration, drug cartels, and business deals.

Why are European leaders alarmed by the document?

The strategy ties American security commitments to political compliance and defense spending, threatening to reduce support for allies who do not pay what Washington considers their fair share — even as SIPRI noted that the 5% NATO spending pledge is likely more a political statement than a realistic plan. It also criticizes Europe’s migration and free-speech policies, warns of “civilizational erasure,” and praises “patriotic European parties” that observers interpreted as the far right including Germany’s AfD. Former Swedish PM Carl Bildt called the language the kind “one otherwise only finds coming out of some bizarre minds of the Kremlin,” and former French ambassador Gérard Araud said the Europe section read like a far-right pamphlet.

What does the strategy say about China and Taiwan?

The document identifies the US-China trade imbalance as a major national threat and emphasizes deterring conflict over Taiwan, citing the island’s role in the semiconductor supply chain and its strategic location splitting Northeast and Southeast Asia. It calls for building up the US Navy and the navies of regional allies like India and Japan. The Wall Street Journal’s China Bureau Chief Jonathan Cheng assessed the language as actually softer on China than past documents, even as it calls for Beijing to withdraw from Latin America. Beijing, according to CSIS vice president Emily Harding, will welcome the non-interference language but strongly oppose the calls to exit Latin America.

Why did Russia praise the strategy, and why do analysts call that a problem?

The Kremlin praised the document because it contains no criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine or anywhere else in Europe — including a spy ship entering British waters and drones entering NATO airspace — while heavily criticizing European allies. Dr. Torrey Taussig, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative, argues this is an own goal: by refusing to even reference the conventional threat Russia poses, the strategy fails to empower the very European nations Washington is demanding take on greater defense responsibilities, undermining the administration’s own stated security objectives.

What do analysts conclude the strategy means for the global order?

Analysts describe a decisive shift away from the post-Cold War liberal order Washington helped build toward an era defined by coercive leverage, bilateralism, and transactional alignment. Nathalie Tocci of the Istituto Affari Internazionali argued that Europe now faces two adversaries — Russia in the east and Trump’s United States in the west. Rick Landgraf, writing for War On The Rocks, characterized the document as an America that consolidates power through bullying and dealmaking rather than retreating from the world stage — one that may choose to abandon longtime allies to make common cause with the adversaries that threaten them.

Sources

1. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
2. https://www.csis.org/analysis/national-security-strategy-good-not-so-great-and-alarm-bells
3. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/5/five-key-takeaways-from-trumps-national-security
4. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/unpacking-trump-twist-national-security-strategy
5. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/05/trump-reveals-national-security-strategy-western-hemisphere-europe-00678265
6. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-trumps-national-security-strategy-means-for-us-foreign-policy/
7. https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/12/new-trump-national-security-strategy-recasts-americas-under-revived-monroe-doctrine/
8. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/12/06/us-national-security-strategy-targets-europe-and-spares-its-adversaries_6748213_4.html
9. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/12/national-security-strategy-incoherent-babble/685166/
10. https://www.dw.com/en/us-releases-national-security-strategy/video-75041435
11. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/12/07/europe-united-states-national-security/
12. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/ten-jolting-takeaways-from-trumps-new-national-security-strategy/
13. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trumps-national-security-strategy-softens-language-on-china-f121ddb3
14. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-unveils-strategy-prevent-china-conflict-over-taiwan-2025-12-05/
15. https://x.com/gerardaraud/status/1996837676625154423