America vs. Iran's Proxies: The Tower 22 Strike and the Widening Middle East War

In the early days of February 2024, the United States found itself doing exactly what it had spent months trying to avoid. A fatal drone attack on a small American outpost in Jordan had killed three US soldiers, and Washington answered with a wave of retaliatory airstrikes that left a wide stretch of the Middle East reeling. What followed was not a single act of reprisal but a cascade: promised follow-on strikes, a parallel air campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and at least one subsequent militant strike back against American positions. Week by week, the world’s most powerful military was being drawn deeper into a regional conflict it had publicly insisted it wanted no part of.

The most defining moment came on the night of Friday, the second of February, when an American air assault rained bombs down on a network of facilities tied to Iran-backed militias across Iraq and Syria. It was a deliberate, telegraphed escalation, built to deter — yet the strikes also handed Iran and its proxies precisely the kind of dynamic they have long sought to engineer: an America that is engaged, exposed, and bogged down in the unpopular work of bombing Middle Eastern targets.

This analysis traces three interlocking developments from that period. The first and largest is the spiraling confrontation between the United States and Iran’s regional proxies, from the Tower 22 attack through the retaliatory campaign and into the joint US–British strikes on the Houthis. The second is a quieter but revealing episode in the Caucasus, where Georgia intercepted a clandestine shipment of explosives it believes was bound for Russia from Ukraine. The third is a cyberattack on the Philippines attributed to hackers in China — and the unusually restrained diplomacy it produced.

Taken together, these stories sketch the central question hanging over American strategy in early 2024: whether a campaign of measured, overwhelming force can deter Iran’s network of proxies, or whether each strike pulls Washington one step further into the very war it has worked so hard to escape.

The Strike That Answered Tower 22

By far the most consequential event of early February was the American air assault that began at about midnight local time heading into Saturday, 3 February. A package of A-10C Thunderbolt II attack planes and F-15E Strike Eagles escorted two B-1B Lancer bombers across a stretch of Iraq and Syria where Iranian-backed militias are known to operate. The bombers had been deployed from an airbase in Texas and refueled in flight — a deliberate choice so that partner nations in the Middle East would not be liable for having allowed US warplanes to attack Arab targets from bases on their soil.

The aircraft struck seven facilities in all: three in Iraq and four in Syria, using a total of 125 precision-guided missiles. Across those seven sites, 85 individual targets were identified and struck directly, and at least 80 have since been confirmed as either completely destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable. The targeting list read like a deliberate dismantling of a war machine: command-and-control centers, intelligence structures, munitions stockpiles holding missiles, rockets, and drones, logistical supply depots, and more.

This was not a symbolic, one-off reprisal. It was a calculated effort to degrade the operational capacity of every adversarial force in the area at once — Iraqi, Syrian, or Iranian alike.

Who Was Hit, and How Many Died

Pinning down a precise death toll proved difficult, but at least 45 militants are believed to have been killed across Iraq and Syria, including at least 29 in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Satellite imagery later confirmed the devastation of multiple targeted facilities, and area residents attested to widespread destruction — while also noting that some bands of militants had already cleared out before the bombs fell.

The full list of organizations struck remains incomplete, but at least three were identified. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces took a direct hit on their headquarters, killing sixteen; that body coordinates a network of roughly 67 smaller militias comprising well over 200,000 fighters, and is regarded as one of Iran’s most powerful allies inside Iraq, with unusually close ties to the Iraqi government. The splinter organization Kata’ib Hezbollah — a powerful paramilitary group seeking regime change in Iraq and the expulsion of American forces, and a major recipient of IRGC support — was also targeted. Finally, Liwa Fatemiyoun, a primarily Afghan militia based in Syria and one of the most experienced fighting units left in that country, was struck as well.

Whether any of the dead belonged to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or specifically its Quds Force special-operations element, remains unclear. Many of the struck sites are believed to have been used jointly by the Quds Force and the local militias that depend on it.

Cyber Operations, Sanctions, and the Shape of the Response

The airstrikes did not stand alone. US officials indicated that Washington conducted unspecified cyber-operations against Iran on the same day, though concrete information on those operations was scarce in the week that followed. Washington also levied fresh sanctions against companies believed to be tied to Iran’s missile and drone programs — an effort to choke the supply chain feeding the very capabilities the strikes had just bombed.

As National Security Council spokesman John Kirby framed it, the airstrikes were meant to degrade the ability of all adversarial forces in the region — Syrian, Iraqi, or Iranian — to launch attacks against American targets. The emphasis, in other words, was infrastructure damage, not a body count tied to any particular nationality. President Joe Biden left no ambiguity about whether the mission was finished: “Our response began today. It will continue at times and places of our choosing,” he said, adding, “Let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond.”

Administration officials reinforced that message, signaling that additional strikes were coming and would more directly target the IRGC alongside Iraqi and Syrian militias. They stressed that targets had been chosen from specific intelligence showing direct involvement in attacks on Americans, with care taken to minimize civilian casualties.

Tower 22: The Attack That Started It

The retaliation answered the killing of three US soldiers in a drone strike on an outpost called Tower 22. Though technically on Jordanian territory, the base sits at the fringes of Jordan’s outlying border regions, well within range of militants in both Iraq and Syria. It was not the first attempted strike against US troops in the region, nor even the first to wound Americans — but it was the first to cause American front-line deaths since the militant groups’ current campaign began. As the B-1B Lancers flew toward their targets on Friday the second, Biden was at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, attending the transfer of the three soldiers’ bodies.

In the days before the response, it was genuinely unclear whom — or what — the United States would target. Responsibility was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, but that name does not denote a single militia. It is an umbrella organization representing a wide range of pro-Iran militant groups in Iraq, many of which also operate in Syria. It is also relatively new, emerging only in 2020 and becoming a meaningful entity after the current wave of Middle Eastern hostilities began in October 2023.

That ambiguity created a strategic puzzle. The claim of responsibility did not reveal which group actually launched the drone, nor whether the decision to hit Tower 22 was made by the umbrella organization’s leaders, a single militia’s commanders, or decision-makers in Iran itself. It left Washington weighing whether to identify the specific culprit, strike militia targets broadly regardless of affiliation, or take the fight directly to Iran as the patron empowering them all.

The Politics of the Response: Criticism at Home and Abroad

The strikes represented a major and intentional escalation, aimed squarely at deterring future attacks on the several thousand US troops positioned across Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. By hitting a high number of valuable targets — and hinting at more to come — Washington sought to send a blunt message: that attacking American bases simply isn’t worth the devastation that follows.

That message landed to mixed reviews. At home, Biden drew Republican fire from several directions. Senator Roger Wicker, a senior Republican voice on defense, charged that “Iran and its proxies have tried to kill American soldiers and sink our warships 165 times while the Biden administration congratulates itself for doing the bare minimum. Instead of giving the Ayatollah the bloody nose that he deserves, we continue to give him a slap on the wrist.”

Others zeroed in on the delay between the Tower 22 attack and the response, arguing it let Iranian personnel escape. Senator Lindsey Graham put it bluntly: “The only Iranian we killed in Syria, Iraq is some dumbass that doesn’t know how to get out of the way. We gave them a week’s notice.” House Speaker Mike Johnson echoed the complaint that the administration “telegraphed to the world, including to Iran, the nature of our response.”

Abroad, Iraq objected on two grounds — that it had not been warned in advance, and that, warned or not, it regarded the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty. Syria condemned the attack in similar terms while accusing the US of making it harder for Syrian forces to address the militants themselves. Condemnation came not only from expected quarters like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad but also from the normally neutral nation of Oman, while Russia and China each accused Washington of deliberately inflaming regional tensions.

A Target-Rich Environment and the First Signs of Deterrence

The promised next rounds of American strikes would have no shortage of targets. In Iraq’s Anbar Province and Syria’s Deir ez-Zor governorate — where the 2 February strikes occurred — a long list of additional militia-linked facilities remains. Nearby, in Syria’s largest cities of Damascus and Aleppo, sit facilities known to be controlled and operated directly by Iran.

Iraq hosts comparable targets, though Washington has historically been more hesitant to strike there in hopes of preserving a collaborative diplomatic relationship. What the United States chose to hit next would be telling, both for the signals it could send by prioritizing certain targets and for the possibility of striking IRGC assets directly.

Despite the political outcry, there was early evidence that the threat of American air power was already changing behavior on the ground. In the days before the strikes, Kata’ib Hezbollah announced “the suspension of military and security operations against the occupation forces in order to prevent embarrassment to the Iraqi government.” That announcement did not spare the group from being targeted — but it spoke to the deterrent effect, and suggested that outside actors, likely including the governments of Iraq or even Iran, had pressured the group to stand down.

Not every militia followed suit; the Harakat al-Nujaba movement vowed to keep fighting. Iran, for its part, insisted it did not want direct conflict with the United States, and Washington reciprocated. The decision to strike Quds Force facilities while sparing its leadership was, by US accounts, a deliberate signal that both sides should draw down.

Retaliation and Counter-Retaliation: The Cycle Tightens

Even the best intentions on both sides proved insufficient to stop the cycle. As has been noted in prior coverage, militias that receive weapons, funding, and strategic direction from Iran are not necessarily under Iran’s complete control — and whether or not Tehran quietly signed off, several groups launched their own retaliatory attacks. In the immediate aftermath of the 2 February strikes, two rockets targeted a US outpost in northeastern Syria, and two days later an explosive drone was fired at another outpost in the same area. Neither caused damage or injury.

The next attack did. On the night of Sunday, 4 February, a base in eastern Syria housing both American troops and their Kurdish allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces was struck. A drone hit a training ground where SDF commando units were drilling, killing at least six Kurdish fighters and wounding at least eighteen more; no American casualties were reported.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility — which, given its nature as an umbrella body with little offensive capability of its own, simply signaled that one of its affiliate militias had carried out the strike. The SDF had initially blamed “Syrian regime-backed mercenaries” before pivoting after the umbrella organization’s admission.

Further militant strikes drew further American ones. On Wednesday, 7 February, the US Department of Defense announced that an American drone had raided a neighborhood in Baghdad, killing a senior Kata’ib Hezbollah commander — Abu Baqir al-Saadi — whom the US accused of “directly planning and participating in attacks” against Americans. He was killed alongside up to two other suspected militants while driving along a main road in Mashtal, and Iraqi leaders were not notified beforehand.

BBC reporters at the scene described a large and hostile public reaction, with social-media posts reportedly urging mass assaults on the US embassy in Baghdad’s Green Zone. The strike quickly drew comparisons to former President Donald Trump’s drone assassination of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani — an act that initially appeared to set Iran back but is now widely seen as a precipitating factor in the current violence.

The Red Sea Front: Striking the Houthis

The fourth of February was significant for another reason. On the same day, US forces and their British counterparts launched the latest round of airstrikes against the Houthi rebel organization in Yemen. The Iran-backed Houthis have spent months attacking commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea with missiles and drones, effectively blockading one of the world’s busiest shipping routes and forcing a large military response to safeguard global trade.

Reluctant to commit ground forces, the US and its partners have instead pursued a sustained air campaign to erode the Houthis’ ability to launch attacks. The Houthis claim they are targeting Red Sea shipping to pressure the world into a Gaza ceasefire.

In this round, the US and Britain struck 36 Houthi targets, hours after a smaller preliminary strike destroyed a handful of anti-ship missiles. The larger second strike combined US warships firing ship-to-land missiles, US F/A-18 jets flown from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and British Typhoon fighters attacking targets directly.

The strikes hit 13 distinct locations — possibly including sites near Yemen’s presidential compound, according to sources on the ground. A joint US–British statement listed weapons-storage facilities, missile launchers, air-defense systems, and radar systems among the targets. While Washington did not say whether this counted as part of its Tower 22 retaliation, the scale and variety of the operation more closely resembled the Iraq and Syria strikes than most prior joint actions against the Houthis.

In a follow-up minor strike on Monday the fifth, the US destroyed two autonomous, explosive-laden drone boats, though their intended target was unknown.

Defiance at Sea and the Long-Term Cost to Global Trade

The Houthis answered with defiance. Spokesman Mohammed al-Bukhaiti vowed that “military operations against Israel will continue until the crimes of genocide in Gaza are stopped and the siege on its residents is lifted, no matter the sacrifices it costs us,” adding that “American-British aggression against Yemen will not go unanswered, and we will meet escalation with escalation.” True to that pledge, the group launched ballistic-missile attacks on two ships in and around the Red Sea.

On Tuesday the sixth, the Barbados-flagged, UK-owned cargo ship Morning Tide sustained minor damage after three ballistic missiles encroached on its position. The same day, the Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier Star Nasia was attacked in identical fashion; the American destroyer USS Laboon shot down one of the three missiles, and the ship reported minor damage but no injuries.

Even though those particular attacks were largely thwarted, months of continuous threats have forced lasting adjustments. Many companies have diverted shipping around the Cape of Good Hope, sending vessels all the way around Africa rather than through the Red Sea — incurring longer transit times, higher costs, and steep increases in insurance prices for any ship that braves the route. Disruptions lasting days or weeks might have been absorbed; disruptions stretching across months are a different matter, and firms that have not yet felt the pain broadly understand that they soon will.

One stark indicator came from Egypt’s Suez Canal, where revenues fell by nearly 50 percent in January compared with prior months — not a crippling financial blow to Egypt, but a flashing warning that a vast share of Red Sea traffic has abandoned its normal routes. That strain, the Houthis hope, will push the world’s nations to press harder for a Gaza ceasefire.

The Shahed 136 and the Hole in Tower 22’s Defenses

New details also emerged about the attack that set off the surge in violence. Two revelations stood out: confirmation of the weapon used, and insight into how it reached the base. The drone was an Iranian-made Shahed 136 — a 200-kilogram, three-and-a-half-meter pusher-prop aircraft that Iran has been spreading around the world in massive numbers.

Capable of flying low and slow at roughly 185 kilometers per hour, or 115 miles per hour, the Shahed has seen use in Yemen, Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq. That an Iranian-made drone ended up in the hands of an Iranian-backed proxy is no surprise; what made Tower 22 notable is that it marked the first time American personnel were killed by a Shahed 136, a weapon analysts expect to feature heavily in future hostilities.

Harder for the US to stomach were revelations about the base’s air defenses — or the lack of them. According to military sources who served at Tower 22, the outpost was not equipped with proper anti-drone protection. As one Air Force airman told The Intercept anonymously, “The air defenses were minimal, if any.

We relied heavily on aircraft from MSAB to stop any targets. We had a radar system called TPS-75 that was broken 80 percent of the time I was there.” MSAB refers to a nearby Jordanian airbase hosting US troops.

Another service member said, “They have outposts surrounding the base, but that does little to nothing when faced with attacking aircraft.” Others reported that the base lacked proper alert systems, leaving troops to warn each other by phone or by knocking on doors. Some accounts, including from the Associated Press, alluded to basic counter-drone systems, but those remained unconfirmed; others suggested only electronic jamming meant to disrupt a drone’s flight path — which plainly failed, if it existed at all.

Without a working radar, a functioning anti-drone system, or other ready defenses, the Shahed evaded detection until it was already at the base.

A Vulnerability the Enemy Can Read Too

The more somber implication is that vulnerabilities now known to news organizations will soon be known to the militias themselves. Kata’ib Hezbollah may lack the strength to fight the US in an outright war, but it has an internet connection — and it is only a matter of time before reporting on these gaps reaches groups that wish America harm. The question becomes whether smaller outposts can streamline their existing defenses or get new equipment on site before Iraqi and Syrian militias can exploit the opening — a race in which the militias enjoy a substantial head start even after the first wave of US airstrikes. The Defense Department says new systems are already earmarked for deployment; whether they arrive and are set up before the next attack is another matter entirely.

That uncertainty feeds the broader strategic anxiety. The decision by Iran’s proxies to attack the United States is neither arbitrary nor merely an expression of anger. Iran and its proxies want the US actively engaged — bogged down across the Middle East, doing the deeply unpopular work of bombing regional targets, expanding its military footprint, and tying itself to the actions of nations like Israel, which Iran regards as its primary adversary. Both Iran and its proxies maintain that their ultimate aim in this round of violence is to force a Gaza ceasefire, offering Washington an off-ramp while warning that, absent one, the militias will keep fighting even at great cost to themselves.

Drawn Into a War It Says It Doesn’t Want

With a fresh round of American airstrikes in the rearview mirror, the harder question lingers: Is the United States being slowly pulled into a conflict it has insisted it wants no part of? Iran does not want a direct war with the United States — far from it. But much as Hamas has continued to draw Israel into Gaza despite enormous personnel losses, Iran has shown little concern for how many of its supporters in Iraq and Syria the United States kills.

Just as Israel now draws horrified condemnation from much of the world for its conduct in Gaza, Iran seeks to lure Washington into a position where it, too, is perceived as a destructive force amid broader Middle Eastern carnage. Whether America’s recent airstrikes deter Iran from that objective or play directly into its hands is a question only history can answer — and that history has not yet been written.

Georgia’s Unexpected Parcel

Far from the Middle East, a smaller but telling episode unfolded in Georgia, the nation wedged between Russia and Turkey on the Black Sea coast. On Monday, 5 February, Georgia’s primary domestic security body — the State Security Service, or SSSG — revealed it had seized a clandestine shipment of explosives following an improbably long route from the Ukrainian port of Odesa toward the southwestern Russian city of Voronezh. This is not cargo that would ordinarily pass through Georgia.

One can drive from Voronezh to the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv in roughly five hours, and to Odesa in about fifteen — or could, were Ukraine and Russia not at war. Instead, the package is believed to have traveled a far longer overland path out of Ukraine, through the NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, then up through Georgia, with another 18 hours of road travel still ahead before reaching Voronezh.

The explosives were concealed in a Ukrainian-owned minivan, disguised within cargo made to look like car batteries. According to the SSSG: “It has been determined that the explosive devices contain military-grade C-4 plastic explosives, which can be activated with an electric detonator and a special timer. The total weight of the explosives is 14 kilograms.” Six devices were identified in total — three left in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and three taken toward an attempted border crossing in an operation that the service said involved seven Georgians, three Ukrainians, and two Armenians.

Echoes of the Kerch Bridge

Whatever purpose the couriers offered Georgian authorities has not been made public, but international observers harbored few illusions. Moscow has alleged that a similar overland route was Ukraine’s method of choice for the truck bomb that exploded on the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022. Traveling roughly the circumference of the Black Sea, that truck bomb allegedly drove onto the bridge — which Russia inaugurated in 2018 to link Russia with the annexed Crimean isthmus — before detonating and collapsing a section of the span. The bridge has been targeted in multiple attacks since, though none with the effectiveness of that first blast.

Ukraine stayed largely silent on the minivan, and there is no direct evidence it was bound for the Kerch Bridge. Kyiv has struck a wide range of Russian targets in recent months, including with explosives, as it works to broaden its counteroffensive and bring the war home to Russian citizens. Ukraine’s only substantive comment came through its embassy in Georgia, which said it was looking into the allegations and urged the Georgian government not to politicize the matter. Regardless of the intended target, the purpose seemed clear: an attempt to infiltrate Russia, intercepted at the final leg of a multinational journey.

A Nervous Georgia and a Long List of Russian Targets

The timing was awkward for Georgia. Former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili had just stepped down and named a successor, Prime-Minister-Designate Irakli Kobakhidze. Both belong to the Georgian Dream party, which has been reluctant to condemn Russia’s invasion and which many Georgians see as an extension of Russian influence.

In 2022, several Georgian Dream members split off to form a new faction, People’s Power, accusing the European Union and the United States of trying to turn Georgia into a second front against Russia. That sentiment surfaced again as the new Prime-Minister-Designate responded to the seized explosives in his first week: “This once again confirms what, in principle, the high-ranking officials of the Ukrainian government openly said that they wanted and probably still want: A second front in our country.” Having already fought and decisively lost a quick war against modern Russia, Georgia’s leaders and people alike are wary of any signal that might tie them to Ukraine’s resistance — which may explain the strength of the condemnations.

Had the minivan reached Voronezh, several meaningful targets awaited. The airbase Voronezh Malshevo, just outside the city, is believed to host two squadrons of Sukhoi Su-34 fighters. The Buturlinovka airbase, about two and a half hours away but still in Voronezh Oblast, is also thought to station fighter aircraft.

A bolder operation might have aimed at the Voronezh-45 nuclear base, a three-hour drive from the city, which also hosts a major aircraft production plant, an electronic-warfare equipment developer, and a mechanical plant producing missile parts and aircraft engines — alongside more basic targets like oil depots and chemical facilities. Ukraine has struck Voronezh before with drones and explosives. The interception of a single minivan will not shift Eastern Europe’s geopolitical balance, but it underscores two realities: Ukraine is still working hard to carry out retaliatory attacks inside Russia despite flagging support and a hardening stalemate, and Georgia’s leadership is taking pains not to appear complicit in moving munitions that could be used against Russia.

China Hacks the Philippines

The final development moved the lens to Southeast Asia, where the Philippines weathered a large-scale cyberattack attributed to hackers operating out of China. The episode arrived against the backdrop of a long campaign of maritime harassment, in which China has used its own Coast Guard vessels and a fleet of purported fishing boats — widely understood to belong to its maritime militia — to pressure the Philippines at sea. The cyberattack was one of many Manila attributes to forces inside China, but it came at a delicate moment: the two countries had recently agreed to draw down tensions, and each was watching to see whether the other would honor that commitment.

The attack hit Manila during January but was reported on 5 February. It was a wide-ranging effort to break through various Philippine websites and email systems. Among the targets were the personal website of President Ferdinand Marcos, the website of the Philippine Coast Guard, and the inboxes of the Department of Information and Communications Technology. The hackers used Chinese state-owned software and managed to penetrate a first layer of defense that the Philippines has worked hard to build around its digital infrastructure.

Crucially, though, the attack ultimately failed.

An Unusual Restraint From Beijing and Manila

The story matters less for the failed hack itself than for the diplomacy around it. Failed intrusions happen worldwide and rarely warrant attention. Nor is the point that China broke its word to ease tensions — the attacks occurred in January, while the two governments were still hammering out an agreement. What stands out is the unusual restraint China showed, given its long record of both conducting large-scale cyber-espionage and declining to rein in private hackers operating on Chinese soil or infrastructure.

Rather than the outrage or thinly veiled malice that often colors Beijing’s responses, China declined to deny a connection. As the Chinese embassy in Manila put it: “The Chinese government all along firmly opposes and cracks down on all forms of cyber attack in accordance with law, allows no country or individual to engage in cyber attack and other illegal activities on Chinese soil or using Chinese infrastructure.” There is plenty to question in that statement, but it amounted to a full-throated condemnation at a moment when an annoyed denial would have sufficed.

The restraint ran both ways. Filipino government spokesman Renato Paraiso said: “We are not attributing this to any state. But using the internet protocol addresses, we pinpointed it to China.

We are appealing to the Chinese government to help us prevent further attacks.” That is not a condemnation; it leaves room for cooperation — a notably softer posture than Manila’s usual stance toward suspected Chinese antagonism.

It is rare to find good news in this corner of geopolitics. After several contentious months between China and the Philippines, here was at least one dispute where both sides outwardly appeared interested in de-escalation rather than confrontation. It is a single minor incident, and worth no more than that — but when two nations with this kind of relationship choose to let even one slight be forgiven, it can be a quiet sign that, somewhere, a conflict may be turning in the right direction.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was Tower 22, and what happened there?

Tower 22 was a small US outpost on Jordanian territory, near the country’s outlying borders and within range of militants in both Iraq and Syria. An Iranian-made Shahed 136 drone struck the base, killing three American soldiers — the first US front-line deaths since the militant groups’ current campaign began — and triggering the American retaliation that followed.

How large was the US retaliatory strike on 2 February 2024?

American A-10C Thunderbolt IIs and F-15E Strike Eagles escorted two B-1B Lancer bombers, flown from Texas and refueled in flight, to strike seven facilities — three in Iraq and four in Syria — using 125 precision-guided missiles. Of 85 targets identified and struck, at least 80 were confirmed destroyed or inoperable, and at least 45 militants are believed to have been killed.

Which militant groups did the United States hit?

At least three were confirmed: the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, which coordinates roughly 67 militias and over 200,000 fighters; the splinter group Kata’ib Hezbollah, which seeks regime change in Iraq and the expulsion of US forces; and Liwa Fatemiyoun, a primarily Afghan militia based in Syria. All receive support from Iran’s IRGC.

Why did Tower 22’s defenses fail to stop the drone?

According to service members who were stationed there, the base lacked proper anti-drone defenses and relied on a TPS-75 radar that was reportedly broken about 80 percent of the time. With no functioning radar, alert system, or effective counter-drone weapon, the slow, low-flying Shahed 136 evaded detection until it was already at the base.

What did the strikes on the Houthis target?

On 4 February, US and British forces struck 36 Houthi targets across 13 locations in Yemen using US ship-launched missiles, US F/A-18 jets from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and British Typhoon fighters. The strikes hit weapons-storage facilities, missile launchers, air-defense systems, and radar systems, with the aim of degrading the group’s ability to attack Red Sea shipping.

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