Who Could Lead Europe to War? The Continent's Missing Defense Leader

Europe has a defense problem. In truth, it has a great many of them, but one stands above the rest. In a world reordering itself at speed, Europe is attempting to drag itself into a military and strategic renaissance: rebuilding armies, regaining power, and trying to remember what it feels like to throw a bit of weight around again. The ambition is real. What is missing is a hand on the tiller.

Europe needs a leader. And with the United States increasingly scoffing at its trans-Atlantic allies, it has become clear that Uncle Sam will not take the job. Europe’s defense alliance needs the strength to stand on its own and the vision to decide what it wants to be and what it is prepared to fight for. Someone, somewhere across the continent, has to rise to the occasion. The future of Europe hangs in the balance, and there is no time left to waste.

So consider a small exercise. Pause, and work out which country you believe is best equipped to lead Europe into the future. Whatever your answer, the rest of the continent will inform you that you chose wrong. Every European nation except the one you picked believes that your candidate simply is not up to the task, and they will convene a committee to say so in a strongly worded statement.

The deeper problem is this: at the precise moment Europe most needs a leader, its inability to agree on one runs further than almost anyone imagines.

A recurring theme runs through everything that follows: if a nation cannot get its own military together, it is probably not a great option for everyone else to follow. That single test, more than any abstract debate about leadership qualities, does most of the work in eliminating candidate after candidate. The other recurring theme is trust, the quiet, decisive currency of any alliance, and the one commodity that no European nation has accumulated enough of to command the rest.

This is a tour of every nation that could conceivably lead the continent, and every reason Europe will not accept any of them. The candidates exist. The consensus does not, and that absence is the real danger.

The Bodge Job: Why This Is About Countries, Not Leaders

Before touring the bad options, one clarification matters. Several of Europe’s current leaders are genuinely making waves on defense, whether nation by nation or through the European Union and NATO. A few will come up by name. But where individual leaders go unmentioned, it is usually because the constraint is the broader political situation that prevents them from being effective, not the person.

The focus here is on countries rather than individuals, and deliberately so. In the world of defense, national policies and decades-long initiatives matter far more than any single government leader. European capitals are a revolving door, and it would be foolish to assume any particular leader will still be relevant in a couple of years. National posture, industrial base, demography, and strategic culture endure. Cabinets do not.

That framing carries through the entire analysis. A candidate’s fitness to lead is judged by what its nation can sustain across decades, not by the energy of whoever happens to occupy the top office this season. With that established, the first nation can be pulled from the pile.

The United Kingdom: Elite, But Out the Door

Begin with the United Kingdom, a nation with a historical reputation for serious military might and one of the continent’s better win-loss records in modern war. Today’s British military is renowned for its training, discipline, and technological sophistication. It has been among the most proactive modernizers, and it accumulated global experience across the 21st century under the War on Terror and beyond. Britain fields a blue-water navy, a highly capable air force, and its own nuclear arsenal.

Its strategic minds are among the world’s best, and its special operators draw constant praise from international peers. It sits inside Five Eyes, was a founding member of NATO, and remains the closest global ally of the United States.

And yet Britain is highly unlikely to win the trust of its European allies as a continental leader, not least because it spent the past decade telling Europe it did not want to be part of Europe. The rest of the continent does not blame Britain’s current leaders for Brexit or the turbulence around it, but Europe still registers that Britain holds it at arm’s length. London’s long-term commitment remains in question, and influential European voices regularly ask what Britain actually wants, both as part of the continent and as a sovereign state.

Britain has money and expertise in abundance. What it lacks is a clear strategic vision, and without one, Europe cannot trust that Britain will not turn its back when it matters.

The structural problems run deeper. If a nation cannot get its own military in order, it is a poor model for everyone else to follow, and Britain is a striking example. The British Armed Forces are not large: roughly 137,000 active-duty personnel and about 32,000 reservists. Recruitment is failing, and the army in particular has more than halved since the end of the Cold War.

The public has grown disillusioned with both the institutions and the mission, with a broken recruitment process and chronic quality-of-life issues driving recruits away. Just 11 percent of British Gen-Z adults said they would fight for their country, per a February 2025 poll.

The Royal Navy, once the stuff of legend, is badly atrophied. Up to two-thirds of the fleet needs maintenance at any given moment, it is steadily losing personnel, and it is not clear it could even protect the English Channel in wartime. Politically, Britain is in no condition to lead any international body. Its two main parties are each in a state of progressive collapse, while the rising alternatives have yet to establish a real foothold, especially on the world stage.

And although the military has militarized in a conventional sense, its leadership has adapted poorly to changing times. Europe needs a leader that understands how fast warfare is changing. Britain may have learned that lesson academically, but it has not put it into practice.

France: The Best Option, Which Is Not the Same as a Good One

From Britain, turn to Europe’s other nuclear power. On paper, France has a stronger mandate to lead than the UK. Unlike Britain, it is a member of the European Union, and it fields the continent’s second-largest peacetime military, having recently been overtaken by Poland.

It commands one of the world’s largest economies, and its nuclear deterrent has both air and sea components, where Britain relies entirely on submarines. The French military is the most technologically sophisticated in the EU, with the genuine hallmarks of a great power: its own aircraft carrier and blue-water navy, indigenously produced advanced fighters, main battle tanks, mobile howitzers, and a defense-industrial base that exceeds most of its European peers. France is experienced abroad, and unlike Britain it has mounted its own foreign expeditions very recently.

In the round, Europe clearly trusts France on diplomacy, defense, and foreign policy in a way it does not trust Britain.

But being the better option does not make France a good one, and its biggest problems are political, economic, and diplomatic. Paris is staring down the barrel of a major debt crisis. Over the past year it has become obvious that France is in dire financial straits, with the international community now contemplating stopgap measures up to and including an IMF bailout, something that should be unthinkable for a country of France’s standing.

The reason it is not unthinkable is that the money trouble travels with a political crisis, with France rotating through governments at a dizzying rate. Those crises alone might be immediately prohibitive, because France’s peers recognize that a country in that condition is not fit to lead.

Compounding this, President Emmanuel Macron has barely more than a year left in office. The one near-certainty in French politics is that his chosen successor will not be warmly received by the electorate, and Jordan Bardella of the hard-right National Rally appears on track to win. France could therefore start moving in a very different direction on defense and much else.

Then come the problems specific to the French military, because a strong military is not automatically a trustworthy one. France carries heavy baggage from its recent expeditions. In Africa’s Sahel, it left such a poor impression that several regional governments looked at Russia’s Wagner Group, judged it the better partner, and ushered in a worsening security crisis that better French conduct could have avoided.

Put France in charge of a European alliance and that reputation generalizes onto its partners. France also has a long record of treating “European defense” as a thinly veiled pretext for pursuing its own interests and then demanding European endorsement. Across the continent it is no secret that, in French eyes, French interests come first, and signing up to a French-led order looks to many like consigning the rest of Europe to permanent second fiddle.

Finally there is the paradox that sounds like a strength. France, more than any other nation, is openly making the case that it deserves to lead Europe through the battles ahead. Rather than inspiring confidence, that campaign has drawn skepticism and mistrust. The reaction is less “thanks for stepping up” and more “it’s weird how much you want this.”

Germany: Industrial Heft, Heavy History

From France comes the idea that Germany could lead all of Europe to war, and the obvious objection arrives immediately. But the affirmative case deserves a hearing first. Berlin manages the world’s third-largest economy, behind only the United States and China, and for decades it has been treated as one of the rightful stewards of the European project.

Germany has guided EU politics and economics for years, and while its inflexibility, its instinct for hesitation, and its outsized influence draw criticism, European leaders generally regard it as an asset rather than a liability. Its manufacturing sector is among Europe’s strongest, positioning it to become the continent’s defense-industrial base after a few years of reform. Like France, Germany produces a wide range of indigenous equipment, especially for its land forces, and it sits at the geographic center, able to weigh in on both Western Europe’s concerns and the eastern flank against Russia.

Its newest leaders have shown real interest in defense and remilitarization, pushing a pragmatic rethink of Germany’s strategic place, including as a staging area for a future continental war against Russia.

On the other hand, this is Germany, and the 20th-century record speaks for itself. This is the nation that twice tried to conquer Europe within a thirty-year span, failed both times, perpetrated the Holocaust, and was a driving force behind the two largest wars in human history, with a combined death toll somewhere around 100 to 120 million. No European nation will forget that legacy, and many, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, still feel it deeply.

So does the German public, where the work of learning that history’s lessons continues today. Modern Germany is a very different place. But in nations already wary of German military intentions, it is easy enough to look at the remilitarization push, the rise of the hard-right AfD, and the erosion of the rules-based order, and to wonder whether arming Germany with a continent’s worth of weapons would be a decision Europe regrets.

This is not only how others see Germany. A large share of the German public shares the unease, and modern Germany has spent generations trying to swear off militarization wherever possible. If France is overly eager to take charge, Germany has the opposite affliction. It is not clear that German leaders, or the German people, would be comfortable in the role even if it were handed to them.

Legacy is the elephant in the room, but not the only problem. Germany is the first nation on this list without a nuclear arsenal, and, like every nation discussed from here forward, that gap makes it a less than ideal leader for a continent with two nuclear powers. If Germany leads on defense, it changes the strategic dynamic within which Britain and France must operate.

At worst, a German leader, or any non-nuclear leader, could drag Britain and France toward considering the use of their arsenals against their will. On the domestic front, Berlin has allotted enormous sums to remilitarization, but the spending has been slow and the decisions tangled in red tape and political squabbling. Its defense-minded leaders are temporary, and nothing guarantees that a future government would not stall or reverse the momentum.

And while the German military is large and technologically sophisticated, it lacks modern fighting experience and lags badly on readiness.

Poland: All the Will, Still Catching Up

Across Germany’s eastern border sits a nation whose strengths counter some of Germany’s greatest weaknesses. After generations under Soviet overlords, German overlords before that, and a long catalog of others across history, Poland is in the middle of a major military reformation. Warsaw recently surpassed Paris to field the European Union’s largest military, and it has no intention of stopping. Poland will spend up to 5 percent of GDP on defense this year, it is targeting a peacetime force of over 300,000 troops, and it is rapidly overhauling its army, air force, and defense-industrial base.

More than any other European nation, Poland has clearly absorbed the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it is absolutely committed to never again being swallowed by an expansionist adversary. Poland genuinely cares about continental defense, and it is clear-eyed about its limitations and the capabilities it still needs to build. It is convinced that one day it will form the bulwark of a continental defense and that it may have to hold the line largely alone, even if its allies pitch in. It is more willing to change and grow than Britain, not weirdly passionate about being in charge like France, and more realistic about the urgency of remilitarization than Germany.

But passion alone cannot make a continental leader, and Poland knows it. Warsaw is not pushing hard because it has spare money or an unusually martial society. This is a painful process, worth doing but costly.

Poland is not trying to surpass established high-tech militaries like France or Germany; it is trying to catch up, and it is moving so fast precisely because of the size of the gap it must close before it can face Russia. It spent decades under Soviet authority, and even a few years ago it had a military to match: reliant on outdated Soviet kit the rest of NATO could not or would not use, with leadership steeped in Soviet warfighting doctrine. Its defense-industrial sector had potential but was badly underperforming and needed huge injections of capital and outside hardware to have even a basic shot at remilitarization.

Poland threaded that needle, but this is still a military relearning fundamentals and unlearning bad habits. It simply does not yet have the knowledge or experience to wield a leadership role effectively, and its own leaders understand that.

Strategically, Poland’s focus diverges sharply from most of its allies. It is building to be a front line against a single, clear threat on its eastern flank, and it is not remotely concerned with the other roles a continental leader must fill: power projection, continental mobilization, or even the basics of naval warfare, a skill set Poland sensibly declines to spend its limited time learning. Its military is growing, but it is still working through post-Soviet integration with the rest of Europe, strategically and tactically.

It lacks an indigenous defense-industrial base, leaning on the US military for many of its most advanced capabilities, which leaves it beholden to Washington in a way a European defense leader should not be, and overly reliant on South Korea for the rest. And even where European capitals understand and perhaps envy Poland’s urgency, there remains a nagging voice in the back of their minds. Poland is remilitarizing very quickly on a continent that has prized peace and cooperation for decades.

Europe trusts Poland enough to call it a partner. It does not trust Warsaw enough to call it a leader.

Italy and Spain: Baggage and No Appetite

From Poland comes Italy, and while its historical reputation as the “least of the great powers” is a poor start, it does have points in its favor. Like Britain and France, the Italian economy is among Europe’s largest, and its military is fairly large, fairly experienced, and quite advanced. The Italian Navy, while not what it once was, is a formidable force in the Mediterranean, and the country’s defense-industrial complex is among Europe’s better options, with military shipbuilding capacity, a key role in the F-35 program, and several major firms producing Italian-designed kit. It handles non-combat logistics well, and though it lags peers on modernization, it is working to catch up on a relatively ambitious timeline.

Unfortunately, Italy carries much of the same historical baggage as Germany. It is less intense, but still a factor, and Italy’s current far-right nationalist government has generated real skepticism among European counterparts. Politically, Italy is notorious for high turnover and ministerial scandals, and it has a reputation as a chronic defense under-spender.

Its population is old and aging, recruitment is a longstanding problem, and the will to fight is among the lowest in Europe: just 16 percent of fighting-age people, per a 2025 poll, against nearly 40 percent who would declare themselves conscientious objectors and over a quarter who would endorse hiring mercenaries instead. Strategically, critics can credibly argue that Italy is a poor fit, oriented toward Mediterranean threats and maritime security at a moment when Europe is gearing up for a land war against Russia.

Spain can be ruled out far more quickly. European defense experts argue endlessly about which leadership qualities matter most, but they agree on one point: a nation that simply will not invest in defense is the obvious wrong choice to lead it. That problem was laid bare in 2025, when Spain sat on its hands during NATO talks on raising spending expectations until it secured a carveout exempting it from spending as much as everyone else.

Spain is on track to reach NATO’s original 2 percent of GDP threshold by 2029, and it will not attempt the 5 percent threshold the alliance recently set, despite threats from US President Donald Trump to expel it. One could catalog Spain’s other defense problems, political fragmentation at home, no meaningful power projection, a location among the EU nations furthest from Russia, personnel shortages, poor pay, thin experience, weak modernization, internal mismanagement. But none of that is necessary, because Spain simply does not want the job.

The Nordics and the Netherlands: Quality Without Critical Mass

Turning to the high north, the Nordic nations collectively offer real military promise. Along the eastern flank, Finland is among the larger and more capable forces at Europe’s disposal and one of the few with concrete plans to reorient into an all-out, society-wide defense against Russia. Finnish artillery and Arctic fighting skills are the stuff of legend, and its population is among the most willing to fight in all of Europe.

Sweden brings a robust domestic defense industry anchored by Saab and strong Arctic and naval capabilities. Norway is a high-tech, highly integrated military with a special aptitude for special-operations warfare. Denmark can project power to protect Greenland and is among the NATO nations focused on rapid response and surveillance, an area where many European militaries have grown weak.

The argument collapses the moment one notes that the Nordics are several nations, not one. Even together they are among Europe’s smaller population centers, and while their aggregate capabilities impress, most would not be in contention if evaluated individually. The clear exception is Finland, with its distinctive defense model and a blend of technical skill and social unity the rest of Europe could learn from. But Finland also holds a very long front line with Russia, and while it could conceivably defend itself, doing so would consume so much energy that none would be left for anyone else.

Trust is a further obstacle, and for varying reasons. Sweden and Finland only just joined NATO. Norway is not in the European Union. Denmark sat at the epicenter of the biggest US-Europe blowout in NATO’s history, over Greenland.

Nation by nation, Denmark has been accused of chronic underinvestment in Greenland and has weathered embarrassing scandals among its top brass. Norway has struggled to adapt to Russian hybrid warfare, and its armed forces face a significant collective mental-health crisis. Sweden lacks specialized personnel and is struggling to balance domestic security needs against export demands. And Finland’s own defense leaders know that even with their best effort, it will be a miracle to hold ground and aerial control across their massive front line.

The Netherlands deserves a place in this conversation too: a relatively small military of just 35,000 troops that punches well above its weight in certain areas. The country has a sizable economy, larger than Poland’s or any Nordic nation’s, and is working hard to double its military by 2030. It has built a highly capable air force and navy, its special operators rank among the world’s best, and its intelligence services are real contributors to European defense.

But the Dutch carry plenty of problems: political instability, an inexperienced and small force, drastic cuts across recent decades, and some acute concerns on top. Recruitment is not delivering the numbers needed to double the force as planned, and the shortfall is worst among the highly specialized personnel who take longest to train and replace. Modernization has been hit or miss, missing the land forces in particular.

Worst of all, the Dutch carry a problematic and recent military reputation. It was Dutch ground troops, serving as UN peacekeepers, who failed to prevent the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, an affair so catastrophic it led the entire Dutch government to resign in 2002. A robust, experienced, well-sized force with successes since might have rebuilt European trust.

That is not the case here.

Dishonorable Mentions, and the Ukrainian Asterisk

A few more nations simply would not fit. Belgium, home to NATO and EU headquarters, might seem an obvious mention, but hosting important business on European defense does not make Belgium an important player in it. In essence, Belgium is a host and nothing more, widely regarded as a military free rider, spending as little as 1.2 percent on defense in some years and wholly reliant on neighboring allies for security against any real threat. Its own officers describe its forces as “not deployable,” and it has done only a fraction of the modernization its partners have managed.

Then there is Turkey, a NATO ally with one of the alliance’s most powerful militaries, and really not a nation Europe would want to entrust with its fighting future. Turkey is a geopolitical black sheep within NATO, known for military adventures in the Middle East and repressive campaigns at home that its European allies want no part of. It has a recent record of advocating Russian interests inside the alliance, sometimes threatening its veto to do so, and it spent much of the 2020s opposing Swedish and Finnish accession on the grounds that they supported Turkey’s Kurdish rivals.

Turkey is rearming, but it is intent on preserving and building its geostrategic autonomy and explicitly does not want to tie itself to regional alliances beyond NATO’s nuclear umbrella. It is using its position as sole arbiter of the Black Sea to accumulate as much geopolitical leverage as possible, and European nations rightly suspect that leverage could be turned against them as easily as against Russia.

Across the rest of Europe the eliminations come quickly. The Baltic nations field minuscule militaries and are exceptionally vulnerable to Russian invasion. Romania, Bulgaria, and much of Central Europe are variously underequipped, underfunded, underpowered, undertrained, and undermotivated. The Balkans cannot be trusted not to spontaneously combust at a moment’s notice.

Switzerland is as neutral as ever. Greece is only recently out of a horrific financial crisis and more focused on its eastern Mediterranean rivals than on the rest of Europe. As for Portugal, the kind thing is simply not to discuss its military at all.

Last, and far from least, there is Ukraine, which actually does have a strong case as both a fighting partner and a strategic leader. More than any nation on the continent, Ukraine understands precisely what it takes to stand against Russia. It has a massive wartime military, a commitment to the eastern front across at least the next generation, and a defense-industrial complex better suited to modern warfare than any in Europe today.

It is urgently warning European leaders to prepare for war and insisting the continent will need Ukraine in the battles to come. But for now Ukraine remains firmly outside the great European club. A post-war Ukraine may eventually be welcomed in, but it faces many years of reconstruction before it can turn its focus outward.

The Underwhelming Answer

So who can lead Europe to war? After this exhaustive list, the answer is deflating. Plenty of nations could do it. France could. Germany could. Poland could, and so on. But every one of them would have to fight substantial headwinds to manage it, and many are so consumed by their own problems that they are unlikely even to try.

The pattern across every candidate is consistent. Britain has the expertise but not the commitment, and a force that is shrinking faster than it can recruit. France has the capabilities but is consumed by debt and political churn and weighed down by the suspicion that its idea of European defense is really French defense by another name. Germany has the industrial base and the central geography but cannot escape its own history or its own hesitation.

Poland has the will and the urgency but is still racing to close a gap rather than standing ready to lead. Italy, Spain, the Nordics, and the Netherlands each fall short on capability, appetite, scale, or trust, and the dishonorable mentions barely warrant a hearing. Even Ukraine, which understands the fight against Russia better than anyone, sits outside the club for now.

Europe is more than halfway through the 2020s, and it is genuinely working to rearm and to learn the lessons this decade has delivered. The will to change is no longer in doubt. What remains absent is a continental leader, and on that question Europe is still sorely lacking. There may be no single, obviously correct candidate who ought to step up. The real danger is that nobody will.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does Europe need a defense leader now rather than relying on the United States?

Because the United States is increasingly scoffing at its trans-Atlantic allies, and it has become clear that Washington will not do the job. Europe’s defense alliance needs the strength to stand on its own and the vision to decide what it wants to be and what it will fight for, which requires a leader to make those decisions.

Why is the United Kingdom not a viable leader despite its elite military?

Britain spent the last decade telling Europe it did not want to be part of Europe, so its long-term commitment is in question. Beyond trust, its forces are small at roughly 137,000 active personnel, its army has more than halved since the Cold War, recruitment is failing, just 11 percent of British Gen-Z adults would fight, and up to two-thirds of its navy needs maintenance at any time.

What makes France the strongest candidate, and what disqualifies it?

France fields the EU’s most technologically sophisticated military, with its own aircraft carrier, blue-water navy, indigenous fighters and tanks, and a nuclear deterrent with both air and sea legs. But it is facing a major debt crisis that could require an IMF bailout, it rotates through governments rapidly, it carries reputational baggage from the Sahel, it treats “European defense” as a vehicle for its own interests, and its peers find its eagerness to lead off-putting.

Why is Germany’s history such an obstacle to it leading European defense?

Germany twice tried to conquer Europe within a thirty-year span, perpetrated the Holocaust, and helped drive the two largest wars in history, with a combined death toll of roughly 100 to 120 million. No European nation will forget that, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, and much of the German public shares the unease about remilitarization, making both Germany and its neighbors reluctant.

How has Poland become the EU’s largest military, and why is that still not enough?

Poland recently surpassed France to field the EU’s largest military, plans to spend up to 5 percent of GDP on defense, and is targeting over 300,000 troops, driven by the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But it is racing to catch up rather than to lead, still shedding Soviet-era kit and doctrine, lacks an indigenous defense-industrial base, and depends on the US and South Korea for hardware, so Europe trusts it as a partner but not as a leader.

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