Yemen's Decade of Crisis: Proxy War, Humanitarian Collapse, and Global Shipping

Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemeni government, the Houthis, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda all share a common objective: trying to influence the same place. Today, Yemen represents a tangled spiderweb of competing forces all vying for power, wrapped up in what is widely recognized as the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet. The ongoing crises exacerbate some of the most wide-scale suffering in the modern world.

Understanding how Yemen reached the point of total collapse and state failure requires untangling this complex web to identify the actors involved, their allegiances, and their military actions. This includes examining the Houthis’ direct impact on international shipping routes. Yemen is a nation that has spent the last decade fighting a brutal civil war shaped by deep historical and ideological divisions.

The Historical Context of a Divided Nation

To understand the complex history of this arid country, it is necessary to examine the modern remnants of what would become Yemen. While civilizations have lived in the land now known as Yemen for three millennia, the modern political boundaries were heavily influenced by imperial powers. Yemen has been an Islamic land for a long time, and it was under the control of both the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire in 1917.

Ottoman influence was patchy, while the British seized the port of Aden to use as a refueling station on the way to India. The British Empire is partially responsible for the territorial reality of the modern nation today. The Ottoman Empire finally succumbed to its decline in 1918 as World War One ravaged the dying empire.

As the Ottoman Empire fell away, its ashes gave rise to several new nations, one of which was North Yemen. The country now known as Yemen was originally two distinct countries. South Yemen remained a British Protectorate at this time and would not gain its independence until 1967.

Geographically and geopolitically, the two territories are East and West, however, the North and South monikers came during the Cold War to represent their differing ideologies as nations. North Yemen was known at the time as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen until 1962, run by a monarchy of Zaidi imams. The Zaidi are a longstanding Shia Muslim religious minority in Yemen.

In 1962, a revolution deposed the royal Zaidi family, and the territory became the Yemen Arab Republic. As a traditionally conservative regime, it was an authoritarian Islamic nation that maintained close ties with many of the Gulf states and was heavily influenced by tribal politics. South Yemen, after gaining independence from Britain in 1967, took a radically different path.

It became a Marxist-Leninist state, adopting a communist ideology with direct support from the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations. It was the only Marxist state in the Arab world, governed by the National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, later called the Yemeni Socialist Party. This socialist system involved state control of the economy, land reforms, and efforts to secularize and modernize society.

These two states existing simultaneously provide a stark example of how the Cold War shaped modern geopolitics in the Middle East.

Reunification, Rebellion, and the Saada Wars

These two nations, existing at one of the most globally polarizing times in history, could not have been more ideologically distinct from one another. One was a hyper-traditional, conservative Islamic authoritarian regime, and the other was a secular Marxist-Leninist republic. Having two nations with a common ancestry deeply divided by ideology laid the groundwork for future instability.

During the Cold War, North Yemen saw its longest-standing dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, come to power in 1978 following the assassination of President Ahmad al-Ghashmi by a bomb. Saleh had climbed high up the military and security ladder in North Yemen and took hold of the country at just 36 years old. He proved to be a crafty dictator, holding onto power for decades by filling the military with soldiers fiercely loyal to him.

In 1990, the Soviet Union began to break apart, ending the Cold War and halting support for the South Yemen regime. Both Yemeni nations sought unification in 1990; Saleh sought to stabilize the country and solidify his legacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for a stable Yemen as international shipping grew, and the possibility of the nation prospering more when unified, reunification seemed pragmatic.

In reality, despite their shared heritage and cultural ties, the nations were significantly different and had spent the latter half of the 20th century on completely different ends of the political spectrum. Tensions were bound to rise, and they did, until 1994 when the first Yemeni civil war broke out. The North dominated the political and military institutions of the nation, making the South feel marginalized.

In 1993, the Vice President and former president of South Yemen, Ali Salim al-Beidh, resigned from the government and retreated to the Southern capital of Aden. Northern forces quickly advanced and won the ensuing struggle by capturing Aden, ending the secessionist movement. Yemen remained united, but the North continued to dominate the South while resolving none of its grievances.

Saleh continued to rule throughout the 1990s and 2000s with increasing authoritarianism, corruption, and economic difficulties. Tensions rose again, driven by a group few expected. The Houthis, a Shia rebel group also known as Ansar Allah, are Zaidis—the same group that ruled North Yemen when it was the Mutawakkilite Kingdom.

What began as a cultural and religious revivalist movement for the Zaidis in the 1990s grew into a full-on guerrilla insurgency by 2004. The Houthis wanted more autonomy for Saada, the area of Yemen they originate from, sparking the Saada wars. The Shia Zaidi Houthis, led by the movement’s founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, felt marginalized by the central government.

Under al-Houthi, the Zaidis increasingly took up anti-government stances, eventually leading to the total denouncement of the government. They garnered genuine grassroots support from local tribal communities and those marginalized in the North. In 2004, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was killed by government forces, but rather than collapsing, the group rallied.

His brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, took over the movement and remains in charge today. During the Saada wars, which lasted until peace negotiations were brokered by Qatar in 2010, the Houthis became battle-hardened and expanded their military infrastructure, alongside growing support from Tehran. The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests that started in December 2010 in Tunisia, reached Yemen in 2011.

Widespread demonstrations protested Saleh’s continued authoritarian rule. Pressure mounted internationally from the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Saleh narrowly survived an assassination attempt in June 2011 when a bomb exploded in a mosque. Eventually, in February 2012, after 33 years of rule, Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down, handing power over to his second in command, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, through a Saudi-backed plan for transition.

However, this power exchange appeared more cosmetic than substantive.

State Collapse and the Outbreak of Civil War

Hadi’s government was unable to implement the reforms promised by the transition government, further fueling tension in the country. Yemen was going through a severe economic crisis in 2013. The Saleh regime had left behind high unemployment, rampant corruption, fuel shortages, and crumbling infrastructure.

The state’s security apparatus was starting to break down because Saleh had taken his loyalist forces with him when he resigned. Consequently, groups like the Houthis, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda were able to establish areas of control within Yemen. Hadi attempted to purge the government forces of Saleh loyalists, but the effort backfired into open mutiny.

In 2014, the Houthis and former President Saleh formed an alliance, massively strengthening the Houthis with Saleh’s highly trained loyalist forces. Their joint forces were greater than that of the official Yemeni government. The Houthis used their extensive experience of fighting the Saleh regime to now fight alongside him, quickly surrounding the capital city of Sana’a.

They arrested President Hadi and forced him to resign before he later escaped to Aden and renounced his resignation. This led to a massive political crisis where the Houthis declared themselves the rulers of all of Yemen, while Hadi’s government also claimed legitimacy, creating a dangerous power vacuum. By 2015, President Hadi had fled to Saudi Arabia as a full-blown civil war broke out in the nation for the second time in three decades.

Hadi’s government had international support but possessed no domestic power because Saleh’s forces and the Houthis were overwhelmingly strong. Hadi appealed to the international community for help. In 2015, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and including Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, and Qatar—began military operations in Yemen to reinstate the Hadi government.

Dislodging Saleh and the Houthis proved to be no easy task, especially given the nation’s mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda’s influence continued to grow throughout the country. Simultaneously in 2015, the Yemeni government announced a total blockade on all commercial and humanitarian shipping, only allowing items into the country after intense inspections.

Since the Hadi government had no naval force, this role fell to the coalition, which was concerned that Iran was sending supplies disguised as aid to the Houthis. Political allegiances across the nation often switch and swap rapidly. In 2017, it was revealed that Saleh was secretly talking to the Saudis to secure guarantees in return for the defection of his forces to the coalition, a move designed to crush the Houthis.

The alliance between the Houthis and Saleh officially ended. After a long life of scheming and holding absolute power, Ali Abdullah Saleh was assassinated by Houthi forces as he tried to leave Sana’a. In a moment of poetic justice, the very insurgency he helped create, fought against, and then fought alongside proved to be his ultimate downfall.

The Houthis were quick to consolidate as much territory, manpower, and equipment as they could from Saleh’s forces. While some defected to the coalition, the Houthis emerged as a wholly independent fighting force, effectively operating as a state within a state.

The Strategic Chokepoint and International Interventions

Operating as a de facto state, the Houthis established control over much of North Yemen, including the capital. They held key logistical supply lines, military bases, and weapons depots. As their insurgency advanced, they acquired sophisticated drone and missile technology, mostly originating from Iran.

This allowed the Houthis to fire over the border at Saudi oil facilities and eventually provided the capability to start pestering international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea beginning in 2023. Specifically, the Bab al-Mandab Strait—a critical chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and Houthi-controlled Yemen—presents an ideal location to attack cargo ships. The strait leads up to the Suez Canal and is vital for oil and gas exports.

The US Department of Energy estimates that 12% of all seaborne oil trade travels through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In April 2022, a six-month ceasefire in Yemen briefly provided hope for peace. Originally supposed to last for two months, it was extended numerous times, allowing for negotiations between the Houthis and the coalition and permitting more humanitarian aid to enter the region.

However, violations of the ceasefire and an inability to find common ground led to the collapse of negotiations and a return to fighting. This fragile semi-truce and low-intensity conflict continues to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, keeping the almost total aid blockade in place and worsening the suffering for civilians. The internationally recognized Yemeni government, comprised of a presidential leadership council, is backed by a coalition primarily led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi intervened in Yemen because the Houthis represented a threat to international security, especially when aligned with regional rival Iran. Both nations want to maintain regional security, preserve order, keep trade routes open, and prevent a failed state on the Saudi border that could trigger a massive refugee crisis. The Saudi-led coalition is also backed by much of the Western world through extensive arms sales.

However, international backing has drawn intense scrutiny. An internal report from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found serious gaps in US government oversight regarding how arms sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE were being utilized. In September 2023, the Washington Post reported that the US Army’s Security Assistance Command had been training Saudi border guards for the past eight years.

According to Human Rights Watch, those same border guards allegedly shot and killed hundreds of Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers trying to cross the Saudi-Yemen border between 2022 and 2023. Critics have accused the United States of selling weapons to Saudi Arabia that eventually fall into the hands of both Al-Qaeda and the Houthis, though former US President Donald Trump vetoed several bills designed to halt arms sales to the coalition.

Competing Militias, Terror Groups, and Factional Agendas

The Houthis, holding much of the north of the country, enforce a brutal authoritarian Islamist regime led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. They oppose foreign intervention and Sunni Islam, positioning themselves against both the coalition and the Yemeni government. While backed partially by Iran and Hezbollah, the Houthis are not simply a proxy force.

According to The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Iran’s military support for the Houthis since at least 2011 has largely been limited to training, media support channeled through Lebanese Hezbollah, and select weapons exports. Intelligence officials reported that Iranian representatives actually discouraged the group from taking the Yemeni capital of Sana’a in 2014. The Houthis are a highly independent force with significant resources, fighting to protect their territory against an internationally backed coalition with heavy fire superiority.

Beyond the primary warring parties, several smaller groups actively seek to take advantage of the chaos. The Islah Party, a political entity with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, commands militias that have fought various factions but operates largely as an anti-Houthi force. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a separatist group in Southern Yemen seeking the partition of the nation back to its pre-unification borders.

Primarily supported by the UAE, the STC has occasionally fought the Hadi government despite both nominally fighting under the coalition’s banner. In 2020, the STC made an agreement with the government for a mutual power-sharing arrangement in postwar Yemen. Terrorist organizations have also entrenched themselves.

Al-Qaeda gained a foothold in the South and East of the nation, boasting an estimated 7,000 supporters. The group has been heavily targeted by the United States, which conducted nearly 400 airstrikes in Yemen during the Obama and Trump administrations. While these strikes eliminated high-profile Al-Qaeda operatives, the Council on Foreign Relations notes they also resulted in over 100 civilian deaths.

Similarly, ISIS marked its 2015 entrance into Yemen with suicide attacks on two Zaidi mosques in Sana’a, killing nearly 140 worshippers, and later claimed responsibility for assassinating Aden’s governor. Though ISIS has fewer supporters than Al-Qaeda, both groups actively attack coalition forces and the Houthis. The Houthis utilize attacks on international shipping as a display of military capability and a means to garner support from extremist groups.

More significantly, it serves as an act of strategic leverage against the ongoing blockade. By threatening vital energy exports and arms shipments, the Houthis pressure the coalition to end the blockade. On August 30, 2024, the Houthis released footage showing a burning oil tanker carrying a million barrels of oil.

Securing consistent access to energy exports would exponentially grow the insurgency’s wealth and combat capabilities. Ground forces fighting for the coalition—primarily newly trained Yemeni troops and government loyalists—struggle against these battle-hardened militants entrenched in mountainous terrain. The conflict escalated further in January 2024, when the UK and USA launched direct airstrikes against Houthi positions in response to the continued threat to international shipping lanes.

The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis

The presence of multiple heavily armed actors, all pursuing their own visions for Yemen and actively fighting each other, has created a black hole of death, destruction, and human rights violations. The European Union deemed Yemen the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet in 2018. A closer look at the data surrounding basic necessities reveals the perfect storm of violence and suffering facing the Yemeni people.

UNICEF reports that 2.2 million children in Yemen are suffering from acute malnutrition, including over 500,000 suffering from severe acute malnutrition—a condition that is fatal if left untreated. The International Rescue Committee notes that food prices have skyrocketed since the conflict began, more than doubling since 2015. The war has entirely decimated the local economy, causing the Yemeni Rial to plummet in value.

Oxfam reports that 80% of Yemeni people now live below the poverty line. In a nation that historically imported a large portion of its food, this economic collapse combined with the ongoing blockade creates a highly dangerous environment. Floods and droughts over the past several years have only exacerbated the agricultural collapse.

Mwatana, a Yemeni human rights charity, has reported that warring factions have actively targeted food and water infrastructure, including farms, irrigation works, and fishing boats. This direct violation of international law has deliberately worsened the food crisis. The UN reports that a staggering 14 million people—half the nation’s population—face a clear and present danger of imminent famine, representing the world’s largest food security emergency.

Children suffer profoundly, not just from food insecurity but from the sheer danger of the combat zones. The UN verified that more than 11,000 children were killed or seriously injured in the conflict between 2015 and 2022. Furthermore, UNICEF reports that over 4,000 children have been actively recruited as child soldiers by the warring parties.

Civilian infrastructure is routinely decimated. The Yemeni Archive reports 900 cases of attacks on and military use of education and health facilities. Airstrikes on medical facilities are common, with Saudi-led coalition forces allegedly responsible for 72 attacks and Houthi forces responsible for 52.

Al-Thawrah hospital in Sana’a alone has been attacked nine times. The Norwegian Refugee Council reported that 14% of Yemen’s population, around 4.5 million people, have been displaced by the conflict, with many displaced multiple times. The sheer scale of unexploded ordnance presents an ongoing lethal threat.

According to Human Rights Watch, landmines and explosive remnants killed 121 civilians in the first quarter of 2023 alone. Houthi forces heavily utilize landmines in areas critical for survival, including farmland and water sources.

The Information Black Hole and Yemen’s Uncertain Future

Human Rights Watch has documented that all parties to the conflict—including Houthi forces, the Yemeni government, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and various coalition-backed armed groups—have arbitrarily arrested, forcibly disappeared, tortured, and ill-treated detainees. Hundreds of Yemenis remain held at official and unofficial detention centers across the country, despite a substantial prisoner swap in April 2024. Additionally, warring parties impose unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions on humanitarian organizations, causing severe delays for citizens requiring aid.

In Taizz, a city held by the Houthis, all major roads have been closed off since 2015, making it nearly impossible for aid to reach the isolated population. Owing to overlapping crises, lack of resources, and the chaos of war, not all atrocities are successfully recorded, leading to a profound crisis of information within Yemen. The Washington Post reports that parts of Yemen operate as a “black hole” for information, where attacks and killings routinely go unreported.

For years, 10,000 was the commonly recognized number for the civilian death count, but this figure stems from an outdated 2016 UN report. The true number of civilian dead is unknown, as the Yemeni government ceased reporting statistics years ago. While the number directly killed by airstrikes and fighting is estimated between 15,000 and 25,000, the UN reported in 2020 that indirect deaths from famine and disease reached 233,000.

Today, high-end estimates suggest the total death toll could be as high as 377,000. Journalists are systematically targeted by all sides of this conflict, directly contributing to the lack of verifiable information. The coalition, particularly Saudi Arabia, maintains a highly criticized track record with the press, heavily scrutinized following the 2018 murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

This event prompted Western powers to temporarily limit some weapons sales and the refueling of coalition aircraft. Neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis tolerate independent journalists; the Houthis actively promote their own media to fit the narrative of their de facto rule in North Yemen. The Yemeni Archive has documented at least 182 armed conflict incidents targeting media and journalistic infrastructure since 2014.

One local radio station worker noted, “I leave my home and I don’t expect to come back because of the work I do in the media, yet our duty is to continue.” Yemen is no longer a state on the brink of collapse; it has already failed. The streets of the capital are occupied by Houthi forces, the internationally recognized government operates in exile, militancy runs rampant, and humanitarian organizations are stretched far beyond their limits.

The scale of the problem is growing too fast to be managed without a comprehensive peace agreement. If peace is eventually achieved, the country will face the monumental task of rebuilding its institutions brick by brick. Only by learning from a decade of devastating missteps can the Yemeni people ensure that this level of catastrophe is never repeated.

Frequently Asked Questions

How did the Houthis go from a local revivalist movement to controlling Yemen’s capital?

What began in the 1990s as a Zaidi cultural and religious revival movement grew into a guerrilla insurgency after the Houthis launched armed conflict against the Yemeni government in 2004 under Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. After al-Houthi was killed and his brother Abdul-Malik took command, the movement expanded through the Saada wars until 2010 and then exploited the chaos of the Arab Spring. In 2014, the Houthis formed an alliance with former president Saleh and his loyalist forces, combining to a strength that exceeded the official Yemeni military and allowed them to surround and seize the capital Sana’a.

Why did Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervene in Yemen in 2015?

President Hadi’s internationally recognized government had collapsed under Houthi pressure, and Hadi had fled to Saudi Arabia by 2015. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi intervened to reinstate the Hadi government and prevent a failed state on Saudi Arabia’s border that they feared would trigger a refugee crisis. Both nations were also alarmed by the Houthis’ deepening links to Iran, which they viewed as a regional rival attempting to extend its influence via the Houthi movement, and they sought to keep trade routes and oil export infrastructure secure.

What makes the Bab al-Mandab Strait strategically important and how do the Houthis exploit it?

The Bab al-Mandab Strait is the critical chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and Houthi-controlled Yemen leading up to the Suez Canal. The US Department of Energy estimates that 12 percent of all seaborne oil trade passes through it. The Houthis have used drone and missile technology — mostly sourced from Iran — to conduct targeted attacks on cargo ships transiting the strait and the Red Sea beginning in 2023, using this leverage to pressure the Saudi-led coalition to end the blockade on Yemen and to display their military reach, including releasing footage of a burning oil tanker carrying a million barrels of oil in August 2024.

How severe is Yemen’s humanitarian crisis?

The EU declared Yemen the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in 2018, and the situation has deteriorated since. UNICEF reports 2.2 million children suffering from acute malnutrition, including over 500,000 cases of severe acute malnutrition. Oxfam estimates 80 percent of Yemenis now live below the poverty line. The UN reports 14 million people — half the population — face imminent famine.

Warring factions have deliberately targeted farms, irrigation works, and fishing boats in violation of international law, while 4.5 million people have been internally displaced. High-end estimates put the total death toll, including indirect deaths from famine and disease, as high as 377,000.

Why is it so difficult to get accurate information about the conflict in Yemen?

The Washington Post describes parts of Yemen as a “black hole” for information where attacks and killings routinely go unreported. The Yemeni government stopped publishing casualty statistics years ago, and the commonly cited figure of 10,000 civilian deaths came from an outdated 2016 UN report. Journalists are systematically targeted by all sides — neither Al-Qaeda nor the Houthis tolerate independent press, and Saudi Arabia’s track record with the media came under intense scrutiny after the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Yemeni Archive has documented at least 182 incidents targeting media and journalistic infrastructure since 2014.

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