Avdiivka Has Fallen — Can Ukraine Still Win the War?

When the end finally came, it did so with remarkable swiftness. Prior to mid-February, the Donbas town of Avdiivka had been holding out against Russian forces for nearly a decade. Surrounded on three sides since 2014, it acted as a key Ukrainian fortress, allowing Kyiv’s troops to disrupt Moscow’s supply lines and shell the occupied city of Donetsk.

As recently as December, it was still holding firm against Russian attacks — a heavily fortified symbol of Ukrainian resistance. But then Moscow’s forces managed to breach the first line of defenses, and the rest quickly crumbled. As Ukraine’s new commander, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky, was appointed on February 8th, the situation was beginning to look critical.

By February 16th, social media was alive with reports that Russia was about to encircle Avdiivka’s defenders. Then, on February 17th, Syrsky announced he had given the order to withdraw. After holding out for nearly ten years, Avdiivka at last had fallen.

Russia’s Biggest Victory Since Bakhmut and Its Strategic Consequences

In the days since, a lot has been said about this latest setback for Ukraine’s forces — about how Avdiivka’s conquest marks Russia’s biggest victory since taking Bakhmut in May of 2023, and about how its loss is far more consequential to Ukraine than Bakhmut ever was. As the New York Times put it: “Avdiivka was a stronghold of Ukrainian defenses in the Donetsk region, protecting several key Ukrainian military positions farther west.” Among those positions is the strategic city of Pokrovsk — a place vital for Ukrainian logistics, and one Russia will likely now turn its attention to.

The silver lining to this cloud of disappointment was that things initially appeared to be much worse. The social media chatter about encircled Ukrainian troops? With a few days’ hindsight it looks like this came perilously close to happening.

That Kyiv’s forces instead managed to retreat in good order should make everyone breathe a sigh of relief. Analyst John Helin noted on X: “Encircled Ukrainians and mass POWs would’ve been catastrophic for Ukraine politically and militarily.” That this did not happen is due to good choices made by commanding officers — not least the choice to sacrifice the city to save lives.

As the Economist noted, they could have instead opted to stage a last stand at the sprawling, defensible coke plant on the edge of town in a rerun of what happened at Mariupol’s iron and steel works. That they did not has preserved crucial manpower. Also in the silver linings category was the sheer number of casualties the Kremlin’s forces took.

Since the main assault on Avdiivka began in October, Ukraine estimates 17,000 Russians were killed and 30,000 wounded. Russian Telegram channels, meanwhile, claim the true figure was more like 16,000 killed and wounded. Regardless of who is closer to the real figures, that is still a staggering amount.

At the higher end, it would mean more Russians died taking one Donbas town this winter than officially died in the entire ten-year Soviet-Afghan War.

Shell Hunger and the Collapse of Artillery Parity

Still, the fall of Avdiivka marks a bleak moment for Ukraine — one in which, for perhaps the first time since spring of 2022, it looks like Kyiv might really lose the war. How did this happen, and what comes next? The first question is complicated, involving both local and international factors.

From a purely military standpoint, a whole lot of blame can be heaped on the shortages Ukraine is currently experiencing. Where artillery is concerned, those shortages have become dangerous. After briefly achieving near-parity at some sections of the front over summer, Kyiv has since seen its ability to match Russian shelling dwindle.

Earlier in the winter, Ukraine managed to hold Avdiivka even as Moscow’s forces gained a five-to-one artillery advantage. By the time the city fell, that advantage had grown to ten-to-one. Among Ukrainian lines, shell rationing had become acute.

The Wall Street Journal reported that “soldiers sometimes hold fire even when Russian soldiers are in their sights in order to preserve ammunition.” If artillery shortages had become acute, then air defense missile shortages were critical. The last days before Avdiivka’s fall were characterized by Russian airstrikes at an intensity not yet seen in the conflict.

The Institute for the Study of War reports that on February 14 alone, Russia conducted 73 airstrikes in the area. Glide bombs, too, played their part. With around 60 deployed a day from great distances, they annihilated Ukrainian positions.

Overall, it is thought that between January 1 and February 17, Russian forces dropped something in the region of 450,000 kg of bombs on an area about one tenth the size of Washington, D.C. That this was possible was due to extremely overstretched Ukrainian air defenses being unable to cover the whole front. With adequate defenses missing around Avdiivka, the ISW claims Russian forces “temporarily established limited and localized air superiority and were able to provide ground troops with close air support.”

Providing ground troops with close air support is exactly what a half-decent military is meant to do. Prior to the fall of Avdiivka, Ukrainian air defenses were too strong to allow Moscow this luxury. With clear gaps now emerging in those defenses, there is a decent chance that such relentless bombing campaigns could become a feature of the war.

The ISW estimates that if shortages continue, then Russia may be able to establish temporary, localized air superiority along more parts of the front. If the shortages get worse, the Russians may begin massive air campaigns that unleash levels of destruction similar to the Kremlin’s air war in Syria. This is not a hypothetical possibility, but a real one.

Speaking anonymously to the New York Times, American officials have indicated that without further donations from the West, Ukraine’s air defense missile stocks will run dry in March of 2024.

Western Failures: European Inertia and American Gridlock

Thankfully, the situation has not yet reached that point. In the aftermath of the retreat from Avdiivka, Kyiv’s forces managed to shoot down four Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers and two Sukhoi Su-35s — a clear signal that Russia does not yet control the skies. But the growing shortages of artillery shells and air defense missiles do point to another factor behind the fall of Avdiivka: the failure of the West to get its collective act together.

The failure flows from both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, a pledge made in 2023 to supply Ukraine with one million shells by March instead resulted in a mere 524,000 shells being delivered. In America, meanwhile, a vital aid package has been stalled in Congress since autumn.

In Europe’s case, the failure is due to an unwillingness to move the continent’s defense industries onto a war footing. As soon as it became clear that his initial plan of conquest had failed, Putin began mobilizing Russia for a long war. Most of Europe, by contrast, failed to act with any sense of urgency.

When the million shells announcement was made in early 2023, the EU — bowing to French pressure — insisted those shells must be locally made. But without any earlier efforts to boost European production, the homegrown clause simply meant the bloc failed to meet its target. The good news is that investments made over the last year suggest Europe will be producing well over a million shells in 2025.

The bad news is that 2025 is a hell of a long way away when Ukraine desperately needs shells now. If the story in Europe is one of idleness and poorly managed industrial policy, the story in the US is one of endless partisan gridlock. Although a $60 billion aid package for Ukraine was put forward back in autumn, wrangling over new restrictions on the southern US border delayed a vote until this year — when Senate leadership at last split the aid off from immigration reform.

While Ukraine aid, along with aid to Israel and Taiwan, cleared the Senate by 70 votes to 29, it is now languishing in the House, where Speaker Mike Johnson is said to have privately told Republicans there is “no rush” to address the issue. At the time of writing, the House is on a two-week recess. There nonetheless seems to be a majority in the House for passing the aid package in a bipartisan vote.

Pew research published in February shows 74% of Americans describe the war in Ukraine as important to the national interest — a figure that includes 69% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Unfortunately, that figure does not include the small number of hard-right House members who would kick Mike Johnson out of the speaker’s chair if he sent so much as another penny to Kyiv.

Ukraine’s Mobilization Dilemma and Manpower Crisis

While Ukraine’s backers in the West have to take some blame for the fall of Avdiivka, Kyiv itself is not wholly innocent. While Ukraine cannot solve the air defense or shell hunger problem by itself, it could solve the crucial manpower one. On Telegram, serving soldiers have been open about the shortage of troops, the lack of rotation on the frontline, and the fact that many of those fighting fall into the 40–45 age bracket — an age at which the sheer physical strain of fighting takes a serious toll.

The military believes such pressures could be alleviated by mobilizing an additional half-a-million troops. The trouble is that authorizing a mass mobilization like this would be so unpopular that none of Ukraine’s politicians are willing to do it. To be fair to them, there are good reasons.

Plucking another 500,000 men out of the workforce would further damage an economy that is badly contracting. Suggestions that younger men should be mobilized also run into the problem of Ukraine’s unusual demographics — in which those in the fighting age cohort of 18–25 are in shortest supply. A result of people foregoing children during the deep economic depression of the 1990s, this relative lack of young people also means Ukraine cannot afford to lose too many without sacrificing its own future.

The flipside, of course, is that there will not be any future if Russia wins this war. But with the mobilization debate so polarizing, politicians have not yet pressed ahead with legislation. Taken together, these European, American, and Ukrainian failures explain why the outlook for the next few months is so bleak.

Spring Forecast: From Incremental Losses to Potential Catastrophe

The answer appears to be anything from a bad spring to a really bad one. At the worse end of the spectrum, analyst Rob Lee notes that the meager gains Ukraine made in its counteroffensive last summer are hard to defend and likely to come under threat. Already, Russia is attacking around Robotyne, and it could be that Ukrainian forces will be rolled back from there.

Similarly, analyst John Helin thinks Avdiivka could be just the start of a tsunami of bad news. In his words: “Avdiivka is likely going to be a sign of things to come for this spring. Russia will attempt to push its advantage while Ukrainian troops are battered, exhausted, and lacking firepower.”

At the less-bad end of the spectrum, analysts note that while things are not great, they could also be a lot worse. Given the scale of Russian losses around Avdiivka, the more optimistic have been suggesting that Moscow’s troops may not be ready to fully exploit Ukraine’s weaknesses. Reporting from the Munich Security Conference, the Economist’s Shashank Joshi wrote on X: “Most officials I spoke to in Munich agreed Russia did not have capacity to achieve a major breakthrough, though they expected more incremental gains.”

The British Ministry of Defense put out its own assessment saying that “it is likely that Russian forces lack the combat effectiveness to immediately exploit the capture of Avdiivka and will require a period of rest and refit.” Indeed, the widespread assumption seems to be that Ukraine will likely lose more territory in the coming months, but that the losses will be localized — like at Avdiivka — rather than sweeping. Bad as the situation is, even the more pessimistic John Helin suggested the Ukrainians could at least try to “weather the spring storm and attrit the Russians the best they can.”

The unspoken assumption, of course, is that the West will eventually get its act together and come to Ukraine’s aid, and that Ukraine will also pass its mobilization bill and get fresh troops on the frontlines by summer. While both of these things are likely to happen, they are not certain. If they do not come to pass, then that spring storm is going to grow into a category five hurricane — one that will scatter and destroy all possible hopes of Ukrainian victory.

Concrete Steps to Regain the Initiative

The first major step is for Europe to give up its insistence on shipping homegrown shells to Ukraine and start looking beyond its borders for supplies. This is eminently doable. On the same day Avdiivka fell, Czech President Petr Pavel revealed that Prague’s agents had identified 800,000 artillery shells in various foreign nations that could be bought and shipped to Ukraine within weeks.

Although reporting has been hazy on exactly where these shells are, the assumption seems to be they are spread across nations like South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa. They comprise about half a million 155 mm shells and over 300,000 122 mm shells. Being a small country, the Czech Republic alone cannot buy and ship all this ammunition to Ukraine.

But if a richer nation like the US, UK, or Norway is willing to step up, then the shell hunger problem could be solved by Easter. Other European countries are also thinking outside the box. On February 19th, Denmark announced that it would donate all of its artillery to Ukraine.

Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen tried to cajole other states into following suit, saying: “This is not only a question about production because we have weapons, we have ammunition, we have our defenses that we don’t have to use at the moment, that we should deliver to Ukraine. We have to do more.” At the time of writing, no other country has followed Denmark’s lead.

But the gesture shows there are artillery shells out there in the world that can still be delivered to help Kyiv withstand the onslaught. A second thing Europe could do is boost its funding for Ukraine. In terms of non-military financial aid, the EU is by far the largest donor to Ukraine, outstripping the US by tens of billions of dollars.

As the Economist notes: “Europe is a rich place” — a rich place that claims Ukraine losing the war on its doorstep would represent an existential threat. Estonia’s Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, has suggested each country in NATO donate 0.25% of their GDP to Ukraine this year. Most European countries already spend three times that much on overseas development aid.

Diverting just a third of that aid money would create a fund for Ukraine of around $150 billion — far larger than the support package stuck in the US Congress. At that level, Ukraine could not only keep its battered economy ticking over, it could also outright buy the air defense missiles it needs from America. Alternatively, the EU could do what it did during the pandemic and issue joint bonds to quickly raise cash.

Kaja Kallas estimates over 100 billion euros could be freed up in this way.

The US Aid Bill and Ukraine’s Mobilization: Two Political Tests

The third major step would be to finally get the US aid bill through the House of Representatives. With the two parties so bitterly divided, this might seem impossible. But a world can be imagined in which Mike Johnson is at least persuaded to bring it to a vote.

Maybe Biden calls him in and makes significant concessions on the border issue. Maybe the murder of Alexei Navalny convinces the speaker that the time for delays is at last over. Alternatively, maybe there is a discharge petition — a procedure that allows the House to force a floor vote on an issue against the speaker’s wishes.

The catch is that it requires the signatures of 218 representatives. That would mean all Democrats agreeing and several Republicans joining them — a potentially tricky thing to ask when multiple Democrats have said they would vote against the bill over the $14.1 billion of aid it earmarks for Israel. But tricky is not a synonym for impossible.

And if Democrats really believe their president when he says Putin “must be stopped,” then this is the time to step up. The final step is for Ukraine to at last pass its mobilization bill. This will be hugely unpopular in Ukraine, as mobilizations always are.

It will wrench fathers away from children, husbands from wives, sons from their parents. It will result in thousands of young men who would otherwise live ordinary lives dying in trenches in their country’s east. Sadly, though, it will be a necessary evil.

Some sectors of the front have seen no troop rotations since the war began. Ukraine’s defenders are exhausted and in need of rest. Even if the bill is passed today, it will take at least two months before the fresh troops reach the front.

And time, sadly, is a luxury Ukraine does not have. The notion that Ukraine is doomed only makes sense if the West sits back and does nothing — if America drifts into isolationism and Europe descends into bickering and paralysis. Combined, the GDP of NATO countries dwarfs that of Russia.

The population of Europe alone far exceeds the manpower at Putin’s disposal. In technology and expertise, too, the West is far ahead. While the Kremlin has the head start in building industrial capacity, it is not an insurmountable lead.

With decisive action, the collective nations of the West could not just catch up with but go breezing past Russia. Maybe not in time to make 2024 any easier. But in time to make sure that 2025 becomes a nightmare for Moscow.

Whether Ukraine wins or loses this war is a choice. The only question is whether Western leaders have the resolve to make it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Ukraine withdraw from Avdiivka rather than stage a last stand?

Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky ordered the retreat on February 17, 2024, to preserve crucial manpower rather than fight to the last. Analysts noted that a besieged final stand at the sprawling coke plant on the edge of town — similar to what happened at Mariupol’s steel works — would likely have resulted in mass prisoners of war, which analyst John Helin described as catastrophic politically and militarily. The decision to sacrifice the city saved lives.

How severe were Russia’s artillery and air advantages over Ukraine at Avdiivka?

By the time Avdiivka fell, Russia held a ten-to-one artillery advantage; earlier in the winter Ukraine had managed to hold on against a five-to-one disadvantage. Between January 1 and February 17, Russian forces dropped roughly 450,000 kg of bombs on an area about one-tenth the size of Washington, D.C. The Institute for the Study of War recorded 73 Russian airstrikes in the area on February 14 alone, enabled by overstretched Ukrainian air defenses that could not cover the whole front.

What went wrong with the West’s pledges of ammunition to Ukraine?

Europe had promised to deliver one million artillery shells to Ukraine by March 2024 but delivered only 524,000, partly because the EU insisted the shells be locally manufactured before European production capacity was ramped up. In the US, a $60 billion aid package cleared the Senate 70–29 but stalled in the House, where Speaker Mike Johnson told Republicans there was “no rush.” American officials warned the New York Times that without further donations Ukraine’s air defense missile stocks would run dry in March 2024.

What concrete options existed to solve Ukraine’s shell shortage quickly?

Czech President Petr Pavel announced on the day Avdiivka fell that Prague had identified 800,000 artillery shells — roughly 500,000 of the NATO-standard 155 mm type and 300,000 of the 122 mm type — held by various foreign nations and available for purchase and delivery within weeks. Denmark also announced it would donate its entire artillery stockpile to Ukraine, with Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen calling on other countries to follow suit. Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas proposed each NATO nation donate 0.25% of GDP to Ukraine.

Why is Ukraine’s mobilization dilemma so politically difficult to resolve?

The military believes mobilizing an additional half-million troops would relieve critical frontline pressure, but no Ukrainian politician has been willing to authorize it. Pulling 500,000 more men out of the workforce would deepen an already contracting economy, and mobilizing the 18–25 age cohort is especially problematic because that generation is the smallest in Ukraine’s population — a legacy of people forgoing children during the severe economic depression of the 1990s. Losing too many young men risks sacrificing the country’s demographic future even if it survives the war.

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