Putin and North Korea: How Russia Is Becoming a Pariah State

Vladimir Putin is running out of friends. After eighteen months in command of Russia’s ongoing invasion of the sovereign nation of Ukraine, a man who was once regarded as a rather shrewd, albeit brash strongman, has been revealed for what he is: a sinister, ruthlessly authoritarian dictator, willing to waste tens of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian lives alike in exchange for a burned-out village here, or a patch of grass there. After adopting nigh-on-genocidal tactics like the forced adoption of Ukrainian children into the heart of Russia, after attempting to leverage Europe’s energy crisis into a forced capitulation, and after tacitly endorsing, or perhaps even ordering the widespread use of torture against Ukrainian civilians, much of the world is in lock-step about precisely what a dangerous figure Vladimir Putin really is.

The United States, the EU, and other Western nations stand firmly against him. China seems to view him as a tool, in order to bring a future Russia under a larger global hegemony. His many client states around the world have been forced to increasingly hold him at arm’s length, powerless to stop his worst impulses, but powerless to wean themselves off economic and energy dependence on his economy.

But ask North Korea, and Vladimir Putin appears to be looking like more and more of an ally.

Strange Bedfellows: The Geography and History Binding Moscow to Pyongyang

From a budding military partnership to clear political and diplomatic overtures, North Korea has been looking to draw Vladimir Putin closer for some time, and with few other options, Putin appears more and more willing to reciprocate. This is not a partnership based on love; like any good political marriage, it is one of mutual benefit and a shared hunger for power that simply cannot be satisfied alone. But with Russia’s list of friends growing shorter by the day, the names that do remain on that list become all the more important.

The Russian capital city of Moscow and the North Korean capital of Pyongyang are separated by some 6,400 kilometers as the crow flies. That is nearly a thousand kilometers further apart than London is from New York, further than a flight from Berlin to Mumbai, and further than the city of Caracas is from San Francisco. But Russia and North Korea are technically neighbors, sharing either side of a land border that runs just 17.3 kilometers long.

The two countries have been linked by the so-called Friendship Bridge since 1959, and North Korea enjoyed a long, very cozy relationship with the modern Russian state’s predecessor, the Soviet Union. It was the Soviets who were the first to recognize North Korea as an independent nation in 1948, and North Korea’s status as a communist nation, heavily influenced by Stalinism, made it a key partner of the Soviets before, during, and after the Korean War. But despite the historical closeness between the Soviet Union and North Korea, modern-day Russia has been hesitant to lean into any level of friendship.

A close alliance with North Korea is a liability for any nation that flirts with Pyongyang overtly enough to be noticed. Between North Korea’s nuclear program and the resulting economic blockade of the country, and its horrific treatment of its own people, North Korea is essentially a pariah state—a global outcast, and one that most of the world’s nations will happily reject in unison.

Russia’s Slide Toward Pariah Status: From Crimea to Full-Scale Invasion

The modern Russian Federation, especially under long-time President Vladimir Putin, has generally worked hard to be perceived as a level-headed, legitimate player in global affairs. To have a relationship with North Korea that goes beyond what the world can accept as being necessary in light of the shared history of two neighbor nations, Russia has long risked ostracization, or even being lumped into pariah status alongside the North Koreans. But ever since the mid-2010s, Putin’s Russia has appeared to move toward an endgame.

Previous offenses, like violence in Chechnya and other Russian minority enclaves and a brief, brutal war in the sovereign nation of Georgia, have been begrudgingly accepted by the rest of the world—certainly not as an ideal outcome, but as something everybody was willing to stomach in order to not make greater problems. But when that same cycle began repeating in the nation of Ukraine, something seemed to change. First with an annexation of Ukrainian-held Crimea, then by propping up a years-long, low-grade insurgency in Ukraine’s Donbas region, and finally with the full-scale invasion that began in 2022, Russia has been pushing the envelope further and further, and although Russian leaders certainly haven’t been happy about it, they’ve ultimately proven willing to suffer through the sanctions and loss of face that have come with such choices.

At this point, Russia, too, has become something of a pariah state, isolated from large parts of the Western world in response to its acts of overt aggression toward a smaller neighbor. But Russia’s situation is not quite so simple, because while the United States, the European Union, and much of the global West have rejected Putin’s expansionism out of hand, a number of other nations have been less willing to say goodbye to often-fruitful diplomatic and economic ties with the world’s largest nation. China has continued to provide Russia with mostly non-lethal support in its war effort, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made no bones about his willingness to form a more directly collaborative relationship with Russia in the future.

Russia’s Remaining Allies and North Korea’s Toxic Isolation

Major regional powerhouses like Brazil, India, and South Africa share ties with Russia under the BRICS affiliation, a group that Saudi Arabia, Iran, Argentina, and other nations agreed to join as recently as August 2023, a year and a half into a horrific war waged by one of BRICS’ major players. Russia maintains major ties with NATO member Turkey, and it has massive influence in the wealthy Gulf states, as well as a number of developing nations around the world. So, in a diplomatic sense, things are not looking great for Russia, but they are not looking awful.

China, India, and Brazil are all wealthier nations than Russia is, and Iran and Saudi Arabia are not far behind, suggesting that there could be quite a bit of benefit to Russia and its people if they can do the hard work of strengthening those ties. But much like walking into a dinner party holding a pile of feces is unlikely to make one very popular, so too do increasingly visible ties between Russia and North Korea risk alienating just about everyone else who has not already turned on Vladimir Putin. Compared to Russia, North Korea’s list of allies is very short.

China is the nation’s main economic benefactor, to the point that it props North Korea up on its own feet, but even that relationship has been badly strained in recent years. India has stepped up its economic ties with the Hermit Kingdom, but not to nearly the level that would be called friendly. Brazil is generally regarded as an opponent to the North Korean regime.

Turkey barely speaks to them. Even Russia’s neighboring Belarus, widely considered little more than an extension of Putin-controlled Russia, has only the bare minimum in formal relations. Even among nations who actively shy away from Europe and North America, North Korea remains the skunk at the garden party.

On paper, at least, one would think that Russia would be unwilling to risk the trade-offs that would come from shaking North Korea’s proverbial hand.

Why Russia Wants North Korean Arms: Soviet-Era Shells for a 21st-Century War

When examining which overtures Russia has decided to make toward North Korea, and just as conspicuously the dimensions of diplomacy they have chosen to leave out, it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out what Russia is after. The answer is war supplies—specifically, artillery shells, ammunition, and the other forms of lethal aid that China and other Russian partners have been unwilling to provide. Since much of North Korea’s inventory is Soviet-era weaponry, with which modern Russian forces share a good deal of interoperability, if they dig through some dusty weapons depots, North Korea could be a relief valve for a Russian military-industrial complex that is straining to keep up with demand.

According to US intelligence, North Korean weaponry has already made its way into Russia in decent quantities, although the partnership Putin and Kim may be considering would be a good bit more substantial. The Hermit Kingdom is desperately in need of any economic relief, no matter what form it comes in, and the ruling regime, opulent as ever, is more than happy to skim off the top of any trade deals or arms shipments that may result from a partnership. North Korea has repeatedly signaled that it takes no issue with how Russia has conducted itself in Ukraine; in 2022, North Korea joined only Russia and Syria in recognizing the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, two breakaway states in eastern Ukraine that are essentially Russian puppets.

They also voted against a UN resolution to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, joined only by Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, and Russia itself. North Korea has most likely been contributing munitions to Russia for some time now, and has offered Russia tens of thousands of manual laborers to assist with infrastructural projects. If North Korea were to receive the sorts of money that would come from a major arms sale, they would be able to funnel that money into their intercontinental ballistic missile program, which, at least in theory, is meant to deter aggression from the West and South Korea.

Vladimir Putin is, at the time of writing, believed to be entertaining the possibility of a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong Un in the next few weeks. This meeting would likely take place in the Russian city of Vladivostok, building on existing relationships between the North Koreans and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Putin and Kim have met in the past; they did their first awkward world-leader handshake in 2019.

But this time, it would be to coordinate not just an arms deal, but other grand signs of increasing cooperation, like a series of rumored joint naval exercises between Russia, North Korea, and their mutual neighbor, China. Shoigu and other top Russian officials have made visits to Pyongyang as recently as July of 2023, and Putin and Kim are believed to have begun personally exchanging letters, laying the groundwork for a series of agreements that could conceivably happen fast once the wheels are set in motion on both sides.

Russia’s Ammunition Crisis: The Numbers Behind the Desperation

As for what the Russian military actually needs, it is likely that arms transfers would come with preference to anti-tank rockets, artillery shells, and ammunition for small arms. Anti-tank rockets from prior generations work reasonably well on even the most advanced tanks of today, while the older, Soviet-era equipment that Russia has been forced to rely on for its artillery needs is the same equipment that North Korea has been reproducing at a large scale for decades. The country’s rifles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and warplanes are mostly obsolete, and those that would be useful in a 21st-century, full-scale war are going to take a lot more convincing to get from North Korea’s inventory than some artillery shells.

It is that ammunition that is really critical, in a war that has turned into more and more of a meat grinder every day. If it can be moved, it will likely be via rail links along that narrow strip of shared border, although if either Putin or Kim can move heaven and Earth to get China to cooperate, there is the outside possibility that a much larger amount of munitions could be transported across Eurasia in a relatively short span of time. Just how badly Russia seems to need these weapons shipments cannot be overstated.

It is a good general rule to assume that if Vladimir Putin himself is acknowledging publicly that something is wrong in Russia, then that something is in fact very wrong, and that rule becomes especially relevant when acknowledging that Putin has been publicly discussing Russia’s arms shortages all through the summer of 2023. According to Putin himself, Russia is running out of “high-precision ammunition, communications equipment, aircraft, drones, and so on,” and while North Korea does not have all those assets ready to ship, they have the basic weaponry that can really make a difference. Estimates prior to the start of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, made during a time when Russia was supposed to be conserving its ammunition, estimated that the nation’s military was still burning through some ten to fifteen thousand artillery shells per day, in addition to missiles and suicide drones.

That fire rate, plus a much higher rate in more intense moments in the conflict, has slowly been eating down a stockpile of an estimated 525,000 artillery shells in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian numbers that must be taken with a grain of salt. Russia is believed to have far more, about 16 million rounds with an unknown number of duds, but even assuming no duds and that conservative rate of fire, that would put Russia depleting its forward artillery stockpiles every fifty-two days, and running out of artillery completely after 1,600 back-to-back, relatively low-key days of fighting in Ukraine. Push that number to an average day of the conflict—call it 25,000 shells per day—and factor in every other shell being inoperable, based on reports that about half of the ones in storage are visibly rusty and in poor condition.

Under those circumstances, Russia runs out of shells in just under a year, and that is before accounting for Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammo dumps. Russia’s production rate is roughly 700 rounds per day across all of Russia. Forbes explains that this is enough to take one battery of six 152-mm guns and fire them for a fifteen-minute bombardment, in order to leave exactly zero shells behind for the entire rest of the Russian offensive.

Kim Jong Un in the Driver’s Seat: Who Really Holds the Leverage

With that dire of a situation for Russia, its status as the wealthier, better-armed nation may not matter much in practice. Russia can have all the food, critical equipment, and luxury goods in the world, but if North Korea does not need those trade items as badly as Russia needs weapons, then it is Kim Jong Un who is in the driver’s seat. Arms that might not have been worth much five years ago might suddenly get very expensive when they are offered up.

After all, North Korea knows all too well that Russia, like everyone else in the world, would not be coming to the negotiating table if they had any more palatable option, and if Russia’s position on the world stage does improve, they will probably leave North Korea behind. Better to take advantage of a desperate Russia when it is presented on a silver platter, knowing that Russia is more likely to keep coming back if these deals with North Korea further isolate them from everybody else. Russia should have all the leverage in the world over North Korea, but the reality of the situation could turn their bilateral order on its head, and fast.

There is also something to be said for simple imagery on the world stage. Kim Jong Un has vowed to “hold hands” with Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine since it began, but so far, he has been waiting with arms outstretched and made to hope that Putin might eventually come his way. Now that Putin is showing interest, it is not much of a leap to paint a picture of Russia’s dictator running into North Korea’s embrace.

Sergei Shoigu has already become the first Russian defense minister to make a visit to North Korea since the Soviet Union dissolved, and this amount of personal attention paid to Kim and his regime is atypical even for Vladimir Putin, let alone for the average world leader. This is not to say that North Korea does not also get serious benefit out of the deal. In addition to the cold, hard cash they would receive in return for their munitions, North Korea would nestle up against a second powerful benefactor, reducing its dependency on China and thus making it less beholden to the will of Beijing.

It would also align North Korea with another major nuclear-armed nation, at the same time as the United States is seeking to enshrine trilateral pacts with nearby Japan and neighboring South Korea, thus chopping up the Far East along lines of regional alliances that could remain baked in for decades to come. There is also the possibility—however unlikely—that the North Korean regime could use the money they make to feed their people, or provide some level of medical support for the millions of North Koreans who have spent their entire lives in a state of malnourishment. Russia could conceivably meet part or all of North Korea’s price demands via food shipments rather than simply fulfilling a financial request, thus reining in the degree of latitude Russia affords North Korea by agreeing to participate in a bilateral deal in the first place.

Russia the Pariah: The Long-Term Cost of Cozying Up to Pyongyang

As for who is getting the better end of the deal, the answer is obvious, and the answer is North Korea. Ultimately, any arms deal with Kim Jong Un would be an act of desperation from Russia and its Ministry of Defense, an acknowledgement that a combination of Western sanctions and Russian military-industrial unpreparedness have meant that Russia has bitten off more than it can chew in Ukraine. It would also, quite clearly, mean that Putin’s Russia has begun to compromise what dignity and global influence it had left, choosing to throw in with states like North Korea rather than face the music, concede that its invasion of Ukraine had been misguided, and work to re-establish connections with the global nations that could provide Russia with something more than simple explosives.

A long-running trade agreement with North Korea will almost certainly alienate countries like Brazil, India, and Turkey, who have been able to walk a tightrope and tacitly accept Russia’s plausible deniability on some things, but would be unable to do the same if it meant implicitly legitimizing North Korea. If this deal does go through, it is undoubtedly North Korea whose stock will rise, even if it is rising just a few inches from its incredibly dismal place on the world stage. And it is Russia whose stock will almost certainly take a massive hit—perhaps even one that cannot be reversed.

The prospect of a major military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang points to a wide range of implications for Russia, for North Korea, for Ukraine, and for the broader world order. The Russian war effort really is going that poorly, with Russia unable to come up with the kinds of munitions it believes it needs in order to decisively end the war in Ukraine. North Korea has an opportunity to become a relevant global player on some level, something it has not been in a very long time.

Ukraine’s stalwart defense is working, and as its counteroffensive continues to eat into Russian resources, with new tanks and fighter jets on the horizon, it is becoming more and more feasible that Russia might eventually be forced to capitulate. But there is also a much broader question: What happens if one of the world’s two most heavily nuclear-armed nations loses its last veneer of credibility before the international community, and really goes off on its own to become a pariah state? What does it look like if Russia decides to simply be out for itself, not just in wars of expansion, but in all things?

Russia has taken pains to nurture its cabal of rogue states for some time now. North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, Eritrea, and a few other nations are all under Russia’s political thrall to some degree or another. With those nations coming to understand that Russia might need them as much as they need Russia, more and more of them may begin hiking prices for the support they do provide—enriching themselves while doing their own small part to knock Russia down a peg.

The potential for Russia to begin forming dependencies beyond just munitions supply—diplomatically, and perhaps even economically—is real. Sign on the dotted line with North Korea, and for a little while, the immediate situation may improve. But what Russia pays, in this devil’s deal, is to accept the idea of a future in which North Korea could well be its only friend.

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