The Chinese Navy: A New Goliath

This analysis examines The Chinese Navy: A New Goliath in historical and strategic context. It traces how the core developments unfolded, which institutions and actors shaped outcomes, and what those decisions changed on the ground. Rather than repeating headline-level claims, it focuses on concrete mechanisms, constraints, and tradeoffs that explain the trajectory of events.

The discussion moves from Key Developments through Strategic Implications to Risk and Uncertainty, then evaluates wider consequences. The goal is to clarify not only what happened, but why these developments still matter for current planning, risk assessment, and policy decisions.

Key Developments

And in its military, one branch above all others seems to have an uncanny knack for exemplifying China’s ever more revolutionary rise to global pre-eminence… it’s navy; it is the branch that grabs all of the headlines, with its aircraft carriers, its nuclear submarines, and ever more regular and grand military drills off of China’s coast… But how did it get that way? What are the key moments in its history? And above all else, what are its capabilities today?

Those questions and more we shall answer in the next twenty minutes or so, as we present to you a primer stuffed with all the information you need to know to have a decent understanding of the Chinese Navy… Let’s begin! Chapter 1, Modest Beginnings The People’s Liberation Army Navy, or Chinese Navy as we will call it herein to keep things simple, was established on the 23rd of April 1949, right on the tail end of the Chinese Civil War. Its formation unified all of Communist China’s scattered and disorganised naval forces under a single, unified command structure under the command of the Joint Staff Department, then based in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province.

Its formation unified all of Communist China’s scattered and disorganised naval forces under a single, unified command structure under the command of the Joint Staff Department, then based in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province. It’s ships at that time were, to be blunt, just a bit rubbish, both in terms of quantity and quality. The People’s Liberation Army, Communist China’s army, from which the Chinese Navy emerged, was first and foremost a land fighting force – it had been founded all the way back in 1927 as a militia of peasants and intellectuals waaaaaaaay deep in China’s interior, and so, it had neither the funds nor the territory necessary to make a naval force a pressing concern.

It stayed this way all up until the closing acts of the Civil War; Warlords, the Japanese, and the Nationalists – these were all enemies that could be, and in many cases, HAD to be fought on land, once again not making the establishment of a navy a pressing matter, even if they had been flush with cash.

Strategic Implications

It’s ships at that time were, to be blunt, just a bit rubbish, both in terms of quantity and quality. The People’s Liberation Army, Communist China’s army, from which the Chinese Navy emerged, was first and foremost a land fighting force – it had been founded all the way back in 1927 as a militia of peasants and intellectuals waaaaaaaay deep in China’s interior, and so, it had neither the funds nor the territory necessary to make a naval force a pressing concern. It stayed this way all up until the closing acts of the Civil War; Warlords, the Japanese, and the Nationalists – these were all enemies that could be, and in many cases, HAD to be fought on land, once again not making the establishment of a navy a pressing matter, even if they had been flush with cash.

That all changed however when the tide of the Civil War started turning in the Communists favour – partly this was because as the Communists slowly assumed the mantle of control over China, they suddenly found themselves with a coastline to defend, but mostly, it was a matter of inheritance, because as the Nationalists high tailed it across the East China Sea to make their last, VERY long lived stand on Taiwan, they left behind A LOT of ships; ships for which they lacked either the sailors, the time, or the fuel needed to take them with them, and the Communists were hardly going to let perfectly good ships go to waist were they? Quids in – they now had a navy. But as we have already said, the ships they got their hands on were just a bit crap; Nationalist China was hardly a power that sat on the apex of military technology, and it showed in their ships.

That all worked a treat, and thanks to the Soviet assistance, China had a modern navy on the go in no time and was fielding advanced designs such as the Type 01 Chengdu class destroyer and Type 07 Anshan class frigate, which were Chinese adaptations of the Soviet Riga class and Gnevny class respectively. Come 1960 however, Chinese and Soviet relations completely fell apart due to ideological differences, with the Soviet Union under Khruschev wanting to pursue a more ‘liberal’ Communism, and China under Mao wishing to carry on with a more hardline and doctrinal variant of Communism. This collapse in relations, which would later become known as the Sino-Soviet Split, saw the complete termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and naturally, that also meant that China was getting no more Soviet help with their navy.

Further to this, the other advanced naval powers of the day weren’t exactly lining up to help China out either, with the US, UK, France, etc, not EXACTLY being on friendly terms. China was on its own from there on in then. Fortunately, it had managed to rebuild its naval infrastructure sufficiently, and built up a wealth of indigenous expertise great enough that it didn’t REALLY need the help by that point anyway – they just had to roll with it and keep the momentum going.

Risk and Uncertainty

A few alright ones were mixed in there admittedly, like the ROCS Chongqing, an originally British Arethusa-class light cruiser that defected to the Communists in February 1949, and the ROCS Ji’an, an originally Japanese Type C escort ship that defected to the Communists in April 1949, but ships of this quality were very much in the minority, and the bulk of the ship was made up of either ANCIENT foreign ships that had somehow survived the last 20 years without being sent to the seabed, or civilian pattern junks that were jury-rigged with whatever firepower was lying around. Naturally, the Chinese Navy was none too chuffed about that state of affairs, so it immediately turned its attention to getting its hands on more ships. These would have to come from foreign powers for now, as China in the late 40s resembled a 10 million km² bomb site, and it would be a fair old while until domestic industry was up to the task of building a new navy.

They did manage to get their hands on some good stuff however, including the Wuchang & Xi’an, both Soviet Uragan-class corvettes, and the British Flower-class corvettes Kai Feng and Fu Po – ships like them did the job, for then at least, but there was still a way to go. SERIOUS efforts to get an indigenous Chinese navy into the water began in the early 1950s, and like most Chinese military modernisation efforts of that period, this one would be done with the help of their dear and ideologically aligned friend to the North… the Soviet Union, who happily sent naval attaches, shipyard machinery, technical documents, and even whole ships to China to aid them in their maritime endeavours. Most of the details of this technological slash military slash industrial aid is unknown, so we can’t say too much about it beyond the odd fact here and there that has snuck out, such as the fact that at the height of co-operation in 1958, just shy of 3,000 Soviet naval attaches were in China doing their thing.

Outlook

That all worked a treat, and thanks to the Soviet assistance, China had a modern navy on the go in no time and was fielding advanced designs such as the Type 01 Chengdu class destroyer and Type 07 Anshan class frigate, which were Chinese adaptations of the Soviet Riga class and Gnevny class respectively. Come 1960 however, Chinese and Soviet relations completely fell apart due to ideological differences, with the Soviet Union under Khruschev wanting to pursue a more ‘liberal’ Communism, and China under Mao wishing to carry on with a more hardline and doctrinal variant of Communism. This collapse in relations, which would later become known as the Sino-Soviet Split, saw the complete termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and naturally, that also meant that China was getting no more Soviet help with their navy.

Further to this, the other advanced naval powers of the day weren’t exactly lining up to help China out either, with the US, UK, France, etc, not EXACTLY being on friendly terms. China was on its own from there on in then. Fortunately, it had managed to rebuild its naval infrastructure sufficiently, and built up a wealth of indigenous expertise great enough that it didn’t REALLY need the help by that point anyway – they just had to roll with it and keep the momentum going.

That all changed however when the tide of the Civil War started turning in the Communists favour – partly this was because as the Communists slowly assumed the mantle of control over China, they suddenly found themselves with a coastline to defend, but mostly, it was a matter of inheritance, because as the Nationalists high tailed it across the East China Sea to make their last, VERY long lived stand on Taiwan, they left behind A LOT of ships; ships for which they lacked either the sailors, the time, or the fuel needed to take them with them, and the Communists were hardly going to let perfectly good ships go to waist were they? Quids in – they now had a navy. But as we have already said, the ships they got their hands on were just a bit crap; Nationalist China was hardly a power that sat on the apex of military technology, and it showed in their ships.

Historical Context: China’s Naval Ascent

A few alright ones were mixed in there admittedly, like the ROCS Chongqing, an originally British Arethusa-class light cruiser that defected to the Communists in February 1949, and the ROCS Ji’an, an originally Japanese Type C escort ship that defected to the Communists in April 1949, but ships of this quality were very much in the minority, and the bulk of the ship was made up of either ANCIENT foreign ships that had somehow survived the last 20 years without being sent to the seabed, or civilian pattern junks that were jury-rigged with whatever firepower was lying around. Naturally, the Chinese Navy was none too chuffed about that state of affairs, so it immediately turned its attention to getting its hands on more ships. These would have to come from foreign powers for now, as China in the late 40s resembled a 10 million km² bomb site, and it would be a fair old while until domestic industry was up to the task of building a new navy.

They did manage to get their hands on some good stuff however, including the Wuchang & Xi’an, both Soviet Uragan-class corvettes, and the British Flower-class corvettes Kai Feng and Fu Po – ships like them did the job, for then at least, but there was still a way to go. SERIOUS efforts to get an indigenous Chinese navy into the water began in the early 1950s, and like most Chinese military modernisation efforts of that period, this one would be done with the help of their dear and ideologically aligned friend to the North… the Soviet Union, who happily sent naval attaches, shipyard machinery, technical documents, and even whole ships to China to aid them in their maritime endeavours. Most of the details of this technological slash military slash industrial aid is unknown, so we can’t say too much about it beyond the odd fact here and there that has snuck out, such as the fact that at the height of co-operation in 1958, just shy of 3,000 Soviet naval attaches were in China doing their thing.