Why Is China Firing Its Top Generals? Author: Wilfred M. Waimiri On Friday, the 17th of October, the Chinese Ministry of Defense put out a statement announcing that nine of the country’s top generals were expelled from the military and the Chinese Communist Party for, and we’ll quote them here, “serious violations of discipline and law”, which in China is usually code for corruption.
Key Developments
Among the ousted generals was He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that leads the Chinese Communist Party, and widely considered one of the most powerful men in China. His removal marks the first time that a sitting general is removed from the CMC since the cultural revolution, close to 50 years ago, underscoring just how significant a move this was. Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times, and we’ll quote him here, “The fact that Xi Jinping can purge a CMC vice-chair shows how serious he is about stamping out corruption in the military.
Xi wants to turn the PLA into an effective fighting force beyond China’s borders but also into a complete servant to his domestic agenda.” Beyond corruption, there are those who viewed the purge as a way for Xi to consolidate his power, and stave off a potential coup, rumours of which have persisted for a while now. The purge has also raised troubling questions about the state of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Key Takeaways
- The Chinese Ministry of Defense expelled nine top generals for “serious violations of discipline and law”—widely understood as code for corruption—in an October purge.
- He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was among those removed; it was the first time a sitting general had been removed from the CMC since the Cultural Revolution nearly 50 years ago.
- Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted successive factions: first the Shanghai clique under Jiang Zemin, then the Shaanxi Gang, and now members of the Fujian clique who had been the primary beneficiaries of Xi’s earlier purges.
- Analysts are divided on whether the purges primarily reflect Xi’s anti-corruption drive, his effort to consolidate power and deter coup attempts, or both motivations simultaneously.
- The purges raise serious questions about PLA combat effectiveness: if corruption was as widespread as the dismissals suggest, the military’s ability to project power abroad—particularly toward Taiwan and the South China Sea—may be significantly compromised.
If corruption was indeed as widespread as these dismissals seem to suggest, then what does it say about the military’s effectiveness?
Strategic Implications
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Can an army riddled with internal problems truly project power abroad, as China sought to do? And does this upheaval strengthen or weaken the PLA, at a time when tensions with the U.S. continue to escalate? [TITLE]: Factionalism And Coup Speculations As we mentioned in our introduction, nine generals were removed in the October purge.
We chose to focus on He Weidong for two reasons. One, how unprecedented his removal was given his rank and two, his close ties to Xi Jinping. To Xi, any short- to medium-term instability at the highest levels of the PLA command structure – and the reputational costs that incurs – is a price worth paying to achieve his goal.”
In the long term, the goal is simple, for China to resume pursuing its original geostrategic goals in places like Taiwan and the South China Sea, with a competent army free of the corruption scandals that have so far riddled the PLA.
Risk and Uncertainty
Dr. Zi Yang, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), wrote in the Diplomat, that the relationship between the two men goes back decades, to the time they served in Fujian province, a coastal region in southeastern China that sits directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan.
Yang further asserts that He’s rise to the top was primarily the result of Xi’s patronage. The mention of Fujian is important here because, according to Bloomberg, several of the other ousted officials, including Miao Hua, former director of the CMC’s political work department, and Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theater Command, also served in the province. These officials formed the Fujian clique, which, alongside the Shaanxi Gang, and the New Zhijiang Army formed the Xi Jinping faction, and they were the primary beneficiaries of Xi’s earlier anti-corruption purges.
Outlook
In his inaugural address when he first came to power in 2012, Xi specifically called out corruption as one of the most pressing challenges that the Chinese Communist Party had to address. Some of Xi’s earliest targets included Xu Caihou amd Guo Boxiong, two former CMC vice chairmen who were implicated in a cash for ranks scheme. By early May 2016, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign had reportedly resulted in the arrest of at least 60 military officers, although some analysts believe that the actual numbers could be higher.
Most of the ousted officials were thought to be members of a faction within the Chinese government called the Shanghai clique, which had risen to power during the rule of former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin. The fall of the Shanghai faction allowed Xi Jinping to appoint members of his faction to influential positions. However by 2023, Xi had begun turning on them, starting with the Shaanxi Gang, military leaders who shared connections to Xi through his family’s home province of, you guessed it, Shaanxi.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Who was He Weidong and why does his removal matter?
He Weidong served as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission—the body that leads the Chinese Communist Party—and was widely considered one of the most powerful men in China. His removal marked the first time a sitting general had been ejected from the CMC since the Cultural Revolution nearly 50 years ago, underscoring the extraordinary scale of Xi Jinping’s latest purge.
What is the Fujian clique and how does it connect to the purge?
Several of the ousted officials, including Miao Hua and Lin Xiangyang, previously served together in Fujian province, forming what analysts call the Fujian clique. This group, alongside the Shaanxi Gang and the New Zhijiang Army, had been part of Xi Jinping’s own faction and were the primary beneficiaries of his earlier anti-corruption drives against the Shanghai clique. By 2023, Xi had begun turning on them too, suggesting the purges are less about ideology and more about eliminating any faction capable of challenging his authority.
Is this purge primarily about corruption or about Xi consolidating power?
Analysts are divided. Xi has consistently framed anti-corruption work as central to his leadership since his inaugural address in 2012, and his campaign has resulted in the arrest of at least 60 military officers by early 2016. However, beyond corruption, observers note the purges help Xi stave off potential coup attempts and eliminate the patronage networks of rival factions—goals that run parallel to, rather than distinct from, his stated anti-corruption mission.
What do the purges suggest about the PLA’s combat effectiveness?
The scale of the dismissals raises troubling questions: if corruption was as pervasive as the removals imply, then the PLA’s ability to conduct complex military operations—especially power projection toward Taiwan or in the South China Sea—may be significantly undermined. As Neil Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute put it, Xi wants to turn the PLA into both an effective fighting force and a complete servant to his domestic agenda, but achieving both simultaneously is difficult when the command structure is being repeatedly disrupted.
What are Xi Jinping’s long-term goals for the PLA following the purges?
According to analysts cited in the article, Xi is willing to accept short- to medium-term instability and reputational costs at the highest levels of the PLA command structure in order to achieve his long-term objective: a military free of corruption scandals and capable of pursuing China’s original geostrategic goals, particularly in Taiwan and the South China Sea. The purges are therefore understood as painful but deliberate medicine intended to produce a more loyal and effective force over time.
Sources
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/purges-and-power-is-china-quietly-rebalancing-its-command-structure/
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/chinese-anti-corruption-crackdown-former-top-general
- https://jamestown.org/cronyism-and-failed-promotions-xis-pla-purge/
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/xi-jinpings-inner-circle-the-shaanxi-gang/
- https://orcasia.org/article/140/faction-politics-in-china-and-its-implications-for-the-20th-party-congress
- https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-future-of-factional-politics-in-china-under-xi-jinping/
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-powerful-factions-among-chinas-rulers/
- https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/he-weidong-general-who-tested-xi-jinpings-ultimate-taboo
- https://jamestown.org/the-four-main-groups-challenging-xi-jinping/
- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thoughts-on-the-political-demise-of-miao-hua/
- https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-coup-rumours-xi-jinping-s-decline-are-premature
- https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30/xi-purges-china-military-pla-ccp-power-control/
- https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/do-military-coup-plots-or-fears-explain-largest-ever-pla-purge/
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/12/world/asia/xi-trump-military-purges.html
- https://www.thecipherbrief.com/inside-xi-jinpings-military-purge-loyalty-power-and-taiwan
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-upgraded-lawfare-in-the-south-china-sea/
- https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/as-china-pushes-out-from-the-first-island-chain-us-allies-like-japan-and-the-philippines-surveil-from-nearby/
- https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/03/11/chinas-shipbuilding-dominance-a-national-security-risk-for-us-report/
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- https://www.reuters.com/world/china/veteran-military-leader-zhang-shengmin-promoted-chinas-number-two-general-2025-10-23/
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