Rearmament: How Japan Plans to Become a Military Superpower

The geopolitics of Asia Pacific are undergoing a spectacular change. One that won’t be felt properly for years, but which has the power to transform the entire region. It is not China’s increasing assertiveness, nor the fate of Taiwan — although that certainly factors into it. It is Japan’s momentous decision to rearm.

To become the planet’s third largest spender on defense and — so the government hopes — undertake the nation’s biggest buildup of its armed forces since 1945. Announced by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the end of 2022, the plans represent the biggest overhaul of Japan’s defense posture in decades. From purely-defensive weapons, the government now intends to procure missiles capable of striking mainland China, boost its maritime and air forces, and reinforce its island territories against attack.

Kishida’s December 2022 Security Overhaul: Three Documents That Changed Everything

On December 16, 2022, the government of Fumio Kishida released new versions of Japan’s three key security documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Program. The first key updates since 2013, the documents were notable for the bluntness with which they described the situation facing Tokyo, calling it “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII” and declaring a need for “fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s capabilities.” It was not just the unusual language that caught analysts’ eyes, but the response the documents proposed.

A defense spending spree unmatched in recent Japanese history. A sharp shift away from a security budget equivalent to one percent of GDP, and towards something closer to the NATO two percent standard. In other words, a call for Japan to undergo its largest rearmament since the end of the Second World War.

What was particularly surprising was the leader fronting the plans. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is known internationally for his commitment to nuclear disarmament, and was assumed to come from his party’s more dovish wing. Now here he was, overseeing a security strategy that would — if implemented — catapult Japan from ninth place in overall defense spending to third place, behind only the US and China.

China, Russia, and North Korea: The Threats Driving Japan’s Shift

The answer to what changed lies with three of Japan’s nearest neighbors: China, Russia, and North Korea. Of these, China is the nation that spooks Tokyo most. The national security strategy named Beijing “the greatest strategic challenge ever to securing the peace and stability of Japan.”

Polls show 90 percent of Japanese distrust China. Yet while the rise of China and Beijing’s increased aggressiveness are Tokyo’s number one security concern, it was another nation that helped propel this dramatic shift — the Russian Federation. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was not just a wake-up call to Europeans.

Over 8,000 km away, the sight of Russian missiles crashing into Kyiv sent shockwaves through Tokyo. As Foreign Policy wrote: “That a major power armed with nuclear weapons could invade a neighbor with impunity, seeking to unilaterally change borders by force, shook Japan to the core.” Suddenly, all the old certainties about the world order melted away — reduced to insubstantial nothings by the fires burning in Ukraine’s cities.

Kishida even claimed that “Ukraine is the future of Asia.” By that, he did not mean Putin would try to conquer Japan. Although Tokyo and Moscow have an active dispute over islands seized at the end of WWII, no one really thinks the Kremlin wants to hoist its flag over Japan.

Rather, the PM seems to have realized that what could happen in Europe could also happen in Asia — that if one nuclear-armed state were willing to attack a non-nuclear neighbor, then others might do so, too. Japan has two nuclear-armed adversaries right on its doorstep. China is suspected of wanting to retake Taiwan by force in the next few years — a conflict that would undoubtedly pull in Japan.

According to the Japan Times, this is the major parallel Kishida keeps highlighting: a potential Asian version of the Ukraine crisis unfolding right on Japan’s doorstep, a doorstep that just happens to comprise disputed islands that China claims as its own. Beijing was not the only threat the new security documents highlighted. In recent years, North Korea’s saber rattling has become an anxiety-inducing fact of life in Japan.

The Hermit Kingdom routinely tests missiles through Japanese airspace without warning, and Kim’s rhetoric towards Tokyo has been pure bellicosity. In Fumio Kishida’s words: “Unfortunately, in the vicinity of our country, there are countries carrying out activities such as enhancement of nuclear capability, a rapid military build-up and unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force.”

A $321 Billion Defense Budget: Japan’s Unprecedented Spending Surge

The year that Kishida’s government unveiled its new strategy — 2022 — the Japanese defense budget was 5.4 trillion yen, or around $40 billion. That was enough to make Tokyo the ninth largest military spender in the world. But it was only because Japan’s economy is so large that a spending cap of one percent of GDP still works out at a significant amount.

Lift that cap, and Japan becomes one of the biggest defense spenders on Earth. That is exactly what the current plan envisages. From 2023 to 2027, inclusive, the defense budget should be a combined $321 billion.

That means Japan will end the period spending 8.9 trillion yen — or $66 billion — in 2027 alone. The Brookings Institute notes that this is a 65 percent spending increase. Nor is it only the defense budget proper that is getting a boost.

Other security-related fields are getting their own increases, from the Coast Guard to science and technology sectors working with military technology. While the actual defense budget will not reach two percent of GDP, related and adjacent spending will bring the overall total up to NATO standard — despite Japan not being part of the alliance. Already, these increases are becoming visible.

The 2023 budget is 26 percent higher than the prior year: the biggest year-on-year defense budget increase in modern Japanese history. Since WWII, the country has been constitutionally pacifist, and keeping defense spending low was seen as a way to ensure Japan could not wage war. Key to this was the “sword and shield” policy, and America’s role in it.

At its most basic, the policy saw the US as the “sword” — meaning American bases on islands like Okinawa would handle a return strike on any nation that attacked Japan. Tokyo itself was the “shield” — the part charged with protection. To this end, the Self-Defense Forces were founded in 1954, on the strict understanding that they would only be used to protect the homeland.

As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has put it: “Japan has capped military spending at 1 per cent of GDP and limited its military capabilities to what is needed to repel an armed attack on its territory.” Under Shinzo Abe, Tokyo changed its rules to authorize troops deployed abroad on UN missions to use force. It was also Abe who, in 2017, announced that the one percent spending rule would no longer be followed.

In 2020, the defense budget finally breached that ceiling for the first time since 1960. Admittedly, these were baby steps, hampered by a public firmly against increased military spending. In 2018, just 19 percent of Japanese wanted a larger defense budget, against 58 percent who wanted it to stay the same.

What is happening now is of a different order of magnitude, not so much building on Abe’s work as eclipsing it. Kishida is being helped by a public that has swung behind him. A poll conducted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine showed 55 percent of Japanese wanted more defense spending.

He is also helped by a USA that is looking to shift the cost of its own defense burden. Feeling the strain of trying to contain nuclear rivals in both Europe and Asia Pacific, Washington is more than happy to start sharing the “sword” role with Tokyo.

Counterstrike Capabilities: Tomahawks, Hypersonic Missiles, and Domestic Production

Of all the ways Tokyo is looking to up its game, perhaps none is as important as the ability to conduct counterstrikes — the ability to hit back any enemy who hits you. The main reason for having counterstrike capability is to ensure adversaries are aware of the potential pain, and never attack in the first place. Japan does not currently have this capability.

For years, the country instead relied on layered air and missile defense systems. Today, however, China and North Korea simply have too many ballistic and cruise missiles — enough to overwhelm Japan’s defense systems and leave vital targets vulnerable. Japan’s coastal defense missiles are limited to a range of just 200 km.

Even the air-to-air missiles it recently purchased from Norway can travel only 480 km. This will not be the case for much longer. A key part of the new defense strategy is to procure missiles with a range of over 1,600 km — far enough to strike Beijing or Pyongyang.

The opening phase is an agreed purchase of 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the USA. But there will be a focus on domestic production, too. The Japanese MoD recently signed a contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for an upgraded version of their Type 12 anti-ship missiles, in variants that can be launched from the ground, from the air, or from other ships.

The new upgrades will both wildly increase the Type 12’s range and make it more stealthy. A separate contract will design and build a new generation of long-range anti-ship missiles launchable from submarines. Add to this recent orders for F-35A-carried Joint Strike Missiles, as well as Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off Missiles for F-15s, and Tokyo is on a missile-buying bonanza.

In the development category comes a proposed new hypersonic glide missile intended for delivery in 2026. Envisaged as a weapon that can be ground launched by units stationed on Japan’s remote islands, it will be designed and produced domestically to help break Tokyo’s reliance on outside suppliers. This concept — of building local production capacity — goes right to one of the core goals of the new defense strategy.

SIPRI estimates the US provides 80 percent of Japan’s needs in airpower and counterstrike areas. Setting up a new industrial base is a difficult, lengthy process, but the government wants to spend the money to make it happen. New contracts should also boost pre-existing industries.

Of the 37 major new ships called for, all will be built domestically in Japan. This includes the two new Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) designed for ballistic missile defense — a pair of multi-billion-dollar destroyers that will be able to take out even hypersonic glide weapons. Japan will also team up with the UK and Italy to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

While Tokyo waits for that to be ready, it is spending on foreign kit to plug the gaps. In 2020, the US gave the greenlight to Japan purchasing 105 F-35s for $22 billion, including eight F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters and eight F-35B Lightning multirole fighter aircraft bought in the current cycle. Other priorities include developing integrated operational planning with a new joint command, investing in force resilience, and making civilian airfields and ports accessible to the SDF.

At the other end, plans include turning the southwestern islands into micro-fortresses — beefing them up with so many anti-ship and air defenses that Chinese navy vessels will not be able to come near them.

The Manpower Crisis: Demographics Threaten Japan’s Military Ambitions

When assessing Japan’s prospects for rearmament, plenty of experts have sounded warnings. There is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which commits the nation to only ever utilize its forces for self-defense. While Kishida’s government has a line about only ever striking first if an attack was imminent and unavoidable, there is a whole section of Japanese society that instinctively recoils at any hint of militarization.

But such concerns could be the least of Tokyo’s worries. The Diplomat magazine recently ran an article that dug deep into the current obstacles facing Kishida. Their conclusion: the manpower problems already suffered by the Self Defense Forces make rearming Japan a near-impossibility.

The core issue is that the SDF is desperately lacking professional soldiers and sailors. Out of the 247,000 service members the force should have, a full 16,000 positions are currently unfilled. The magazine highlighted the specific impact on the Maritime Self Defense Forces, where a lack of capable sailors means those present are forced to take on extra duties to the point of exhaustion.

The MSDF is still capable of performing its duties — working ships are not being left in dock for lack of crew. The Diplomat’s point, though, is that barely being able to keep Japan’s current forces functioning does not bode well for the massive scaling-up in all domains that Kishida envisages. This is compounded by Japan’s well-documented population crisis.

Japan’s fertility rate has not reached the replacement threshold since the 1970s. Over the last few years, the overall population has begun to decline. From a high of 128 million in 2017, Japan’s total population is projected to slump to 53 million by 2100.

The current effects are less visible as a full-on population collapse and more as a rapidly aging society. According to the BBC, 28 percent of Japan’s population are 65 or over — the second highest rate in the world, after only Monaco. Meanwhile, the proportion of young people is shrinking.

In 1994, there were nearly 17.5 million young adults aged 18–26 in Japan. By 2020, that had fallen to 9 million. This is a huge problem for any country wanting to boost its military capabilities.

Armies require young, able-bodied people for the physical demands older personnel cannot meet. They also want to bring career soldiers in young, and train them up for a lifetime of service. The private sector offers perks and salaries that the Self Defense Forces cannot compete with.

As The Diplomat writes: “While Japanese politicians are more willing than ever to contemplate an assertive defense policy, pacifism and an aversion to military service remain deeply entrenched in postwar Japanese society.” The JSDF has tried creative workarounds, including a proposal to end the ban on people with tattoos serving — originally put in place due to an association between body art and the Yakuza, the ban has stopped many ordinary young people from considering the JSDF as a career choice.

Fiscal Barriers and the Investment Gap: Can Japan Afford Superpower Status?

As the world’s third largest economy, the idea that Japan cannot finance whatever it feels like might sound ridiculous. Far smaller economies — like Israel — spend way more than two percent of their GDP on defense without suffering financial collapse. The issue is that these smaller economies usually have a society that accepts the need for some pain in return for defense gains.

In Japan, that simply is not the case — especially when it comes to taxes. Tax hikes in Japan have a history of being political cyanide. Public polling shows consistent, large majorities against any tax increases to fund defense spending.

While Kishida recently got his defense spending bill through the Japanese Diet, it notably delayed any tax increases until 2027. Instead, the government is desperately trying to find sources of nontax revenue, partly in the form of reallocating surplus funds from the foreign exchange special account. But by moving money from other budgets, Japan is having to refocus its priorities just at a moment when social spending to care for the elderly population is skyrocketing and public debt is running at 250 percent of GDP.

The Brookings Institute wrote of the defense spending plans: “Generating and sustaining this massive amount of new funding over the next several years — and beyond — may not be easy.” Even assuming the spending bill proves to be less an obstacle and more a minor speed bump, the JSDF still needs to worry about the investment gap. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a piece arguing that decades of underinvestment meant the road to great military power status will be far longer than Kishida and his government realize.

The basic premise is that, due to the one percent spending cap, Japan’s existing military capabilities are far ropier than they at first appear. To quote: “Decades of low spending have left Japan’s defense force with aging physical infrastructure, low munitions stockpiles, old and insufficient air- and sealift and refueling capabilities.” To even think of turning the JSDF into a world-class fighting force, the government will need to heavily invest to upgrade all these neglected areas.

But current plans have not put aside enough money for that. According to the Carnegie Endowment: “To fill this gap in the next five years, Japan would need to invest an additional 2 percent of GDP on top of planned increases just to offset one decade of underspending.” That means Kishida would have to aim to spend a whopping four percent of GDP on defense.

While not unheard of — Israel, Kuwait, Algeria, Oman, and Qatar all spend more — doing that in Japan would mean implementing steep tax rises or painful spending cuts, two things that are politically impossible. As a result, the journey to military superpower status is likely to be a long slog. The Carnegie Endowment estimates that the JSDF will likely “still be dependent on the United States in many ways and limited in their ability to contribute to any regional crises well into the 2030s.”

With the clock ticking on a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the 2030s may well be too late.

A Rearmed Japan and the Future Balance of Power in Asia

Whatever problems may lie ahead for Tokyo, there is no doubt that the new focus on defense represents one of Japan’s biggest shifts in decades. If all goes to plan, it is a shift that will have profound implications not just for the Japanese, but for the whole of East Asia — maybe for the world. For the first time in nearly eight decades, Japan will once again stand near the pinnacle of global military powers: a huge regional counterweight to China, and a major force in its own right.

The circumstances that have led to this change are not ideal. The return of geopolitics to an era red in tooth and claw. The rise on Tokyo’s doorstep of an assertive nuclear superpower, as well as the ever-more erratic behavior of rogue states like North Korea and Russia.

But that is the era the world now lives in. Countries can either bury their heads in the sand, or try and keep up with these rapidly changing times. With their defense spending plans, Fumio Kishida and his government have made their choice.

Only the future will tell if it was indeed the right one for Japan’s citizens.

Frequently Asked Questions

What triggered Japan’s decision to rearm in 2022?

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida released three updated security documents on December 16, 2022, citing what he called “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII.” The combination of China’s increasing assertiveness, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—which shook Japan into recognizing that a nuclear-armed state could attack a neighbor with impunity—and North Korea’s routine missile tests through Japanese airspace drove the shift.

How large is Japan’s planned defense spending increase?

Japan’s combined defense budget from 2023 to 2027 is planned at $321 billion. By 2027 alone, spending is projected to reach 8.9 trillion yen ($66 billion)—a 65 percent increase according to the Brookings Institute—moving Japan from ninth to third place in global defense spending, behind only the US and China.

What new offensive weapons is Japan acquiring?

Japan will purchase 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States and has contracted Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to build upgraded Type 12 anti-ship missiles launchable from ground, air, or ships with significantly extended range. Japan is also developing a domestically produced hypersonic glide missile for delivery in 2026, with a range exceeding 1,600 km—far enough to strike Beijing or Pyongyang.

What is Japan’s manpower problem, and why does it matter for rearmament?

The Self Defense Forces are already 16,000 personnel short of their 247,000-member target, and Japan’s demographic crisis makes recruitment harder every year. The 18-to-26 population shrank from 17.5 million in 1994 to 9 million by 2020. The Diplomat concluded that barely keeping current forces functioning does not bode well for the massive scaling-up Kishida envisions, and the private sector offers perks and salaries the JSDF cannot match.

Can Japan actually afford to become a military superpower?

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimates Japan would need to spend an additional 2 percent of GDP on top of planned increases just to offset one decade of underinvestment in aging infrastructure and depleted munitions stockpiles—implying a total of around four percent of GDP. Public opposition to tax increases is consistently large, and with public debt at 250 percent of GDP and social spending rising for an aging population, the Carnegie Endowment concludes the JSDF will likely still depend on the United States in many ways well into the 2030s.

Sources

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