The Indonesian Air Force: A Masterclass in Procurement

For most nations on Earth, developing and building an air force is a matter of deadly seriousness. The United States has spent decades cultivating its strategic edge with the best aircraft on the planet: the F-22 Raptor, the B-2 Spirit, and the upcoming B-21 Raider. China is pouring resources into its military aviation research and development at an unparalleled scale, ensuring that the reveal of secretive, highly advanced fighter aircraft and absolutely massive drones are practically a weekly occurrence.

Europe and Japan pursue sixth-generation fighter aircraft at a breakneck pace. Turkey and South Korea have bent over backwards to design cutting-edge aircraft under their own control. Russia is attempting to maintain its status in the aerospace sector despite ongoing systemic challenges.

But across the entire world, there is one global air force that lives by the rule of cool—and somehow manages to pull it off. Right now, the nation of Indonesia is building an absolute fever dream of an air force, a chaotic mishmash of flying technology from nearly every continent on Earth. By the time Indonesia has filled its hangars with aircraft already confirmed to be on the way, it will fly American dogfighters alongside Russian interceptors, sophisticated French delta-wings alongside Brazilian prop fighters, and the flying pride of Ankara alongside the newest masterpiece from Seoul.

Where most nations look at the menu of global fighter aircraft and selectively pick out their favorites, Jakarta looked at that menu and decided to order one of everything.

The Current Fleet and the Pending Arsenal

Travel to Indonesia right now, secure permission from the nation’s government to enter its airbases, and the Indonesian Air Force witnessed during the stay really is not much to look at. Right now, on paper, the nation possesses 110 combat aircraft, with their most impressive assets being twenty-three copies of the not-that-old, relatively sophisticated, American-made F-16C and D models. But look under the hood, and the reality for Indonesia today is far less encouraging.

Of its 110 fighter aircraft, only about sixty-two are currently acknowledged as operational. Its Russian-made Su-30s and Su-27s languish without spare parts, the older F-16s in its arsenal are at risk of becoming museum pieces, and the other aircraft it relies on are far from the platforms one would want to be flying in a head-to-head contest against a rival global air force. All of that would be entirely discouraging if it was not for the cavalry that is about to arrive.

Right now, Indonesia is waiting on no fewer than 144 top-of-the-line aircraft from several nations at once, and it is merely a couple of strokes of the pen away from bringing that number to about two hundred. Over the past several years, Indonesia has been on a spending spree, wining and dining with some of the most ambitious aerospace companies on the globe. The nations that Indonesia is entertaining are industry competitors, geopolitical rivals, and, at times, outright adversaries.

For Jakarta, that is all part of the overarching procurement strategy. Indonesia has money to burn, it wants as many high-end combat aircraft as it can possibly procure, and if capitals like Washington, Beijing, and Paris want to trip over each other in their haste to get Indonesia to sign a contract, then that is an acceptable outcome. As one evaluates the aircraft inbound to Indonesia’s arsenal, there is one key caveat to explain: Indonesia may have already bought this air force, but it does not yet possess this air force.

For lots of reasons, Indonesia is coming at this with a strategy to sign contracts now and deal with the logistics later. It is all but guaranteed that Indonesia will eventually receive all these aircraft, but some of them are not even in full production yet, meaning that it will take at least a few more years for Indonesia to truly reach its potential. The deals are signed, the aircraft are inbound eventually, and the shape of this highly chaotic but potent Indonesian air force is already coming into focus.

Fifth-Generation Ambitions with the Kaan and Boramae

At the heart of Indonesia’s future combat air fleet will be the first fifth-generation stealth fighter ever to enter Indonesia’s arsenal, which also happens to be the first stealth fighter ever developed outside the big three nations of the modern aerospace world: the United States, China, and Russia. The aircraft is known as the Kaan. After it took its first flight in February of 2024, the platform became the pride and joy of the nation of Turkey.

Expected to enter full-scale production by or before 2030, the Kaan is a twin-engine, single-seater fighter aircraft that is designed to be just as hard to detect on radar, according to Turkish officials, as the American F-22 and F-35. Capable of flying at Mach 1.8 and carrying up to eight missiles or bombs concealed in an internal weapons bay, as well as another six on the wings, the Kaan is meant to serve as a direct competitor to the best fifth-generation aircraft on offer from the United States or China. Crucially, it comes with none of the onerous export restrictions or geopolitical debts that those two larger nations are known for.

The Kaan is expected to feature a highly advanced avionics suite, including top-of-the-line radar and data fusion capabilities, and it is built to fly alongside a supersonic unmanned drone, a loyal wingman aircraft known in Turkey as the Anka-3. Indonesia signed for forty-eight copies of the Kaan in 2025 at a price of about ten billion United States dollars. While Indonesia will have to compete with other prospective buyers like Egypt, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan, Jakarta has been promised its aircraft within about ten years.

Flying alongside the Turkish Kaan will be the South Korean Boramae. First flown in 2022, already in limited production, and set to start flying with South Korea as early as next year, the Boramae in its current form is a highly advanced fourth-generation jet. This means that it is about as close to being a cutting-edge stealth fighter as possible without being able to check all the boxes to meet that specific fifth-generation threshold.

Starting after 2027, however, the Boramae will be built and sold in a modified version as a fully stealthy fifth-generation fighter. Indonesia has been part of the Boramae project since 2010. Although Indonesia’s role in the initiative has been the source of considerable drama between Jakarta and Seoul, Indonesia still expects to acquire forty-eight copies of the jet as soon as possible.

Like the Kaan, the Boramae hits a top speed of about Mach 1.8, featuring a respectable combat range, ten onboard hardpoints, and an advanced avionics suite that puts it on par with just about anything on offer from the United States, China, or Europe. In essence, early versions of the Boramae—including those that Indonesia is expected to receive—are only excluded from the fifth-generation category because they do not conceal their weapons in internal weapons bays or use sophisticated stealth coatings. Thus, the jet will show a larger radar return than a comparable aircraft that can hide its munitions.

But even that early version of the Boramae is better than just about every non-fifth-generation aircraft on Earth. When South Korea integrates new avionics upgrades onto its later models, it is highly likely that Indonesia will be able to reap the technological benefits.

Heavy Hitters from the United States, China, and France

Beyond just Turkey and South Korea, Indonesia is pursuing a contract with the United States for twenty-four copies of what might be the most impressive, most blatantly un-stealthy fighter on the planet. It is known as the F-15EX, and looking at it from the outside, it looks the same as any other F-15 that the United States has flown since the jet’s first flight in 1972. Under the hood, however, the F-15EX is a far more dangerous beast than its predecessors.

Built to thunder through the sky at Mach 2.5, with an impressive range and the ability to climb fifteen kilometers within a minute, the F-15EX is built less as a traditional fighter aircraft and more as a flying arsenal. Depending on the configuration, a single EX-model can carry up to twelve air-to-air missiles, up to twenty-three bombs and missiles of varying configurations plus a pair of drop tanks, or very heavy weapons that are far too large for a jet like the Kaan or the Boramae to lug around. The F-15EX is big, loud, and the absolute opposite of a stealth aircraft, but it is equipped with highly advanced avionics that are built to be continually upgraded as new technology becomes available.

Indonesia has not yet closed the deal for the EX, but it is expected to sign on the dotted line as soon as it can, possibly once it completely disengages from a deal that appears to be dead in the water to buy Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35s. Just in case there was any doubt about whether nearby China would accept so many advanced F-15s on its doorstep, Indonesia has gone the extra mile to ensure that Beijing knows it has not been forgotten. Indonesia made global headlines in 2025 by indicating that it was looking to buy forty-two copies of China’s J-10C, a relatively low-cost but impressive fourth-generation aircraft that had drawn acclaim just a couple of months prior.

Before Indonesia went public with its interest, the nation of Pakistan used the J-10C to shoot down several copies of the internationally respected Rafale, made by France’s Dassault corporation. Although it is just an upgrade on prior copies of the J-10, the J-10C represents an overhaul of a similar scale to the F-15EX, integrating lots of advanced avionics, new weapons, vastly improved engines, and other features that put it into the same echelon as the most advanced non-stealth aircraft across the globe. A delta-wing design with a respectable combat range and a top speed of Mach 1.8, the J-10C leverages eleven hardpoints to get the job done and can work with the best air-to-air missiles in China’s arsenal, including the now combat-proven missile that Pakistan used against India, the PL-15.

Speaking of the French Rafale that the J-10C shot down, France has been a major contributor to Indonesia’s fighter bonanza. Notably, Indonesia is working to procure the F4 version of the jet, a step above the planes that were in India’s arsenal when they got shot down. The F4 integrates long-range sensing and data-networking tools that probably would have come in handy for India, based on the information available regarding how those Rafales were targeted.

Despite that stain on its record, and a couple of other minor black eyes, the Rafale is widely regarded as a high-caliber, capable combat aircraft, with a similar top speed and combat range to the J-10C and most of the other jets in this procurement wave. It is a powerful delta-wing design with some serious payload capacity, leveraging fourteen hardpoints to fire all sorts of NATO-standard equipment, and it can add up to five external drop tanks to dramatically extend its range. Like the other aircraft slated for Jakarta, it is equipped with a modern avionics suite.

In French service, it is built to launch nuclear weapons, although it would be a real surprise if Indonesia ended up utilizing that feature. All told, that makes five advanced combat aircraft that Jakarta is looking to procure: the Turkish Kaan, the South Korean Boramae, the American F-15EX, the Chinese J-10C, and the French Rafale. Yet even that robust list is not the full story of Indonesia’s combat air wing.

The nation still flies a couple of dozen American F-16s, as well as a handful of Russian Su-27s and nearly a dozen Su-30s, which are multirole aircraft known for their high speed and long range. The nation also flies thirteen copies of the South Korean-made light fighter, the F/A-50 Golden Eagle, a cheap, nimble, and easy-to-fly aircraft that Indonesia ultimately wants nineteen copies of in total. Furthermore, it flies thirteen copies of Brazil’s prop-powered Super Tucano, an aircraft that at first glance looks as if it belongs in World War II.

However, the Super Tucano combines a long-range, long-endurance, highly rugged design with modern avionics to create one of the more interesting and effective close-air-support aircraft in the world. Indonesia also flies a handful of copies of Britain’s Hawk 200, a training model that was redesigned as a dedicated combat aircraft, although those are scheduled to be phased out very soon. And, technically speaking, there is still a slim chance that Indonesia could procure a couple of dozen Russian-made Su-35s, even if it currently seems that this particular deal is doomed to failure.

By the time its many orders have been filled, Indonesia will fly some two hundred of the most sophisticated combat aircraft on the market today, in what will be, by far, the most international air force in the world.

Historical Context and the Strategy of Diversification

It is natural to question why Indonesia is undertaking such a complex procurement strategy. Observers might wonder what Indonesia hopes to achieve by picking up all five of these new, advanced fighter models that it could not accomplish by leaning on just one or two reliable platforms. Anyone with a deep knowledge of military aviation is well aware that many of these aircraft fill identical strategic roles.

While each of them will have their respective strengths and weaknesses, those minor capability trade-offs are not usually enough to justify building an air force in such a fragmented manner. Therefore, either Indonesia’s leaders are making these decisions based exclusively on the rule of cool—trying to impress the rest of the world in the way that other wealthy nations do with massive vanity projects—or there has to be a deeper geopolitical rationale to justify this approach. Fortunately for both the Indonesian military and the Indonesian taxpayer, the nation is motivated by far more than the mere desire to put on the most impressive airshows in the Indo-Pacific.

The strategy begins with Indonesia’s intense desire to make up for lost time. All through the 1990s and the early 2000s, Indonesia was a nation facing intense international sanctions. These penalties were largely due to its conduct toward civilians in what is now the nation of East Timor, as well as its military intervention and practices of near-total war against the secession movement there.

As a result of those actions, Indonesia was strictly barred from receiving new weapons systems from the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere. It was only in 2006 that the last of the international sanctions finally cleared. Prior to that era, Indonesia had suffered through a similarly restrictive experience with the Soviet Union.

On the one hand, that history meant that Indonesia had gone through an extended period of time when it simply had not been able to purchase the military kit that it wanted. Instead, it was forced to take a drip-feed of whatever excess hardware that other nations could spare, whenever they were intermittently open to working with Jakarta. But on the other hand, and much more important to its current doctrine, it meant that Indonesia had learned a valuable and exceedingly difficult lesson: If a military makes its arsenal entirely dependent on a small number of foreign partners, then those foreign partners can easily choose to cut off the supply chain, leaving the dependent nation completely paralyzed.

Now that Indonesia has had enough time to build up its financial savings, the nation has decisively chosen to pursue a path of strategic diversification. It is determined to get its military kit from as many sources as possible, even if that means suffering through more administrative headaches and managing smaller individual contracts. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the nation never again gets entirely dependent on any single supplier.

If Indonesia does something to drastically anger China, causing Beijing to stop sending replacement parts or software upgrades for its J-10Cs, Indonesia knows it can easily fall back on four other nations to help make up the strategic gap. In that worst-case scenario, the air force would only lose about a fifth of its best aircraft. Better yet, by prioritizing contracts with countries that would openly consider each other rivals, Indonesia actively makes it more costly for its supplier nations to even consider cutting it off.

Geopolitical Implications and Navigating Regional Threats

Consider a hypothetical scenario where the United States finds a reason to be outraged with Indonesia and attempts to cut off the sustainment chain for its American-made fighters. America can certainly attempt that embargo, but policymakers must consider that by doing so, they will instantly hand China a golden opportunity to provide the operational support and diplomatic partnership that America refuses to offer. Similarly, Turkey and South Korea are both trying very hard to become major global arms exporters and sell their advanced aircraft.

Each of them could try and leverage that supplier relationship with Indonesia to their own benefit. However, if either of them turns their back on Indonesia or causes a diplomatic offense, their direct export rival is right there, waiting to jump in and prove the superiority of their platform. From Indonesia’s perspective, a highly diverse air force makes it much harder for supplier nations to justify allowing friction into their relationships with Jakarta, while simultaneously ensuring that if any of those nations do sour on Indonesia, the nation’s military readiness will not have to suffer catastrophic declines.

The benefits of this strategic diversification apply at a far greater geopolitical scale. Military supply deals are not like standard international trade deals, especially for complex systems like advanced fighter aircraft. They represent a decades-long relationship that includes far more than the initial round of hardware deliveries.

Nations locked in these relationships will require spare parts, software updates, training support, and other technical resources for as long as a given aircraft remains in their arsenal. Meanwhile, nations that export their aircraft enjoy the long-term economic benefit of multi-billion-dollar deals that both sides have firmly committed to maintaining. Nations that sell or purchase arms from other nations generally tend to maintain friendly diplomatic relations, and in Indonesia’s case, that means it can more easily sustain critical friendships with all of these major powers at once.

The United States and South Korea enjoy Indonesia’s patronage, China enjoys Indonesia’s patronage, and France and Turkey enjoy it as well. From Indonesia’s strategic perspective, all of that diplomatic leverage is exceptionally meaningful because it is a massive country with no direct regional rivals. Indonesia and Malaysia are not likely to ever go to war.

Nations like Singapore, Brunei, or the Philippines are not actively trying to provoke a conflict with Jakarta, and it would be very out of character for modern Australia to opt into a military confrontation of any kind unless absolutely necessary. Indonesia does deal with an ongoing insurgency on its own soil, specifically on the island of Papua, but it hardly needs any highly sophisticated fifth-generation air power in order to maintain a tactical advantage in that low-intensity conflict. If Indonesia faces any truly existential military threat, it would likely be as part of a much wider war in the Indo-Pacific.

In such a scenario, grand coalitions led by China on one side, and the United States on the other, would risk either labeling Indonesia as an enemy or seeing its sovereign territory caught in the crossfire. That is particularly problematic because Indonesia, along with Malaysia and Singapore, presides directly over the Malacca Strait. This critical seaway would almost certainly come under severe blockade or direct attack in the event of an all-out war.

China is heavily dependent on that specific trade corridor, and it is not hard to see how either Beijing or Washington could justify heavy fighting around that zone to secure their interests. Therefore, Indonesia’s diversified air force, and its overarching policy of strategic diversification, affords it two distinct advantages. First, if either global superpower did attempt to secure the strait by force, Indonesia would have a large fleet of advanced warplanes at its disposal to try and deter the aggression or defend its territory.

Better yet, Indonesia could lock down the strait directly—perhaps with the coordinated aid of Malaysia and Singapore—and then strategically choose which side of the conflict it would ultimately align with. More importantly, Jakarta can make sure that both Beijing and Washington treat it with the respect owed to a highly prized export partner, rather than viewing it merely as a bunch of islands to be overrun in a geopolitical game of Risk. Because the United States, China, and all these other nations have vital geo-strategic interests tied up with Indonesia, they are far less likely to risk disrupting that relationship if it is not absolutely necessary.

The Repository of Combat Data and the Logistical Nightmare

Indonesia’s wide arsenal of international combat aircraft, advanced weapons, sensor technology, simulators, and more, offers it a unique chance to export something that no other nation could possibly match. Once it formally secures the vast range of aircraft that it currently desires, Indonesia will be able to offer granular information on exactly how those aircraft compare to each other directly in simulated combat environments. Indonesia will have the unprecedented option to comb through each design for hidden defects and technical shortcomings.

It can pit them against each other in whatever complex ways Indonesia sees fit, and then, if the government decides to do so, it can offer that vital information to any and all international entities it chooses. To get a sense of how important this data truly is, one needs only to look back at the aerial engagement between Indian Rafale jets and Pakistani J-10Cs during their border confrontation in 2025. Since that specific encounter took place, militaries around the world have been working hard to figure out exactly what happened, how the two aircraft measured up, and why each of their specific capabilities succeeded or failed.

According to French sources, China has even used unverified rumors around the engagement to try and offer the J-10C over the Rafale to nations that are currently looking to make a purchase between the two platforms. Notably, Indonesia only publicly signaled its firm interest in the J-10C after that exact exchange took place, heavily suggesting that Jakarta might have been convinced by the combat results. With so many advanced aircraft actively in its possession, Indonesia has the rare opportunity to engage in a rigorous process of study and data collection that no other air force could match for these specific platforms.

Nor is it as simple as just trying to figure out which fighter is the absolute best in a head-to-head dogfight. Each of these aircraft comes with distinct weapons, specialized engines, unique onboard digital architecture, and a wide range of other capabilities. The international community will be desperate to see these systems measured against each other through a reliable, neutral partner that is able to crunch the actual numbers.

Indonesia could easily use that information to level the global playing field, providing openly accessible data on which of these platforms are truly capable in a modern fight. Alternatively, it could sell exclusive access to that information, agreeing to share data or collect specific testing results for a premium price. By pursuing such a highly diversified, advanced air force, Indonesia has successfully made itself significantly more important in Indo-Pacific affairs.

The nation is actively looking for positive relations with everyone, it can handle the temporary pain of a supply setback with anyone, and it has ensured that all these powerful countries remain more interested in keeping Indonesia happy than in winning petty diplomatic squabbles over the next few decades. Indonesia’s concrete ability to defend itself, and its strategically critical territory, will only grow with time. Soon, it will be able to act as a central repository of combat information that powerful countries will be very interested in acquiring.

However, Indonesia’s ambitious strategy comes with a handful of lingering problems that are simply too big to overlook. Indonesia is not the only world nation capable of pursuing this strategy, but it is unequivocally the only nation that has taken strategic diversification to such an extreme limit. Other countries simply do not want to accept the operational risks that Indonesia has taken on.

The most obvious problem in all of this is that attempting to maintain an air force this diverse, with this varied quality of hardware, is a logistical nightmare of unparalleled proportions. Even if one only accounts for the five advanced aircraft that Indonesia seems on track to be flying, the training, supply, and support load for the military is going to be massive. These five aircraft are each fairly different and certainly not directly interoperable.

In essence, Indonesia will need to establish and fund five entirely different training tracks for both its combat pilots and its ground maintenance teams. That does not even account for the distinct difficulty of teaching other pilots to fly the light-attack jets or propeller planes, which are an entirely different category and are not necessarily easier to fly just because they are less technologically sophisticated. The nation will need to sustain several different, highly specialized supply chains to several different base locations.

It is committing to the risky idea that it can comfortably fund those distinct sustainment initiatives for decades, all at once, in a nation where consistent defense funding has historically been an enduring challenge. It will have to find a miraculous way to either make its aircraft interoperable or arm, maintain, and repair each of them completely separately, utilizing a limited number of trained personnel on a limited number of airbases, while sharing a limited pool of national funds. If Indonesia is both a partner of questionable political loyalty and the owner of a logistical paper tiger, Washington and Beijing could decide that acting unilaterally against Indonesian territory makes the most strategic sense.

For all the immense risk that Indonesia is accepting, Jakarta deserves credit for attempting an exercise in unconventional strategic thinking that is on track to build one of the most uniquely capable air forces in living memory.

Sources

1. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-01/us-lifts-indonesia-arms-embargo?utm_source=chatgpt.com
2. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep46128?utm_source=chatgpt.com&seq=1
3. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/in-contested-region-indonesia-diversifies-arms-imports/
4. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/indonesias-j-10-fighter-buy-from-china-a-geopolitical-play-with-capability-risks-experts/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
5. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2025.2527088
6. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/09/what-indonesias-retail-approach-to-defence-modernisation-means/
7. https://www.globalmilitary.net/air_forces/idn/
8. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adding-a-fighter-type-is-not-the-answer-to-indonesias-defence-needs/
9. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/air-force-modernisation-southeast-asia-deterrence-or-danger
10. https://www.key.aero/indonesian-air-force
11. https://theaviationist.com/2025/10/17/indonesia-j-10c-fighter-jet/
12. https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-china-fighter-jets-purchase-deal-fd8fda417ddbb059d7e3be917d1e9fb1
13. https://simpleflying.com/indonesia-9-billion-deal-china-j10-fighter/
14. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2619345/amp
15. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-indonesia-buying-secondhand-chinese-fighter-jets-ps-101825
16. https://theaviationist.com/2025/09/20/indonesian-rafale-first-flight/
17. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/indonesia-confirms-chinese-j-10-fighter-deal-amid-rafale-and-kaan-orders
18. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-targeted-rafale-fighter-jet-disinformation
19. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/indonesia-reveals-first-rafale-fighter-as-crews-train-in-france/164160.article
20. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-signs-contract-with-turkey-buy-48-kaan-fighter-jets-2025-07-29/
21. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/indonesia-turkish-kaan-fighter/
22. https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2025/07/28/turkey-indonesia-sign-multibillion-dollar-warplane-frigate-deals/
23. https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/indonesia-signs-contract-48-tai-kaan-fighter-jets
24. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/indonesia-south-korea-sign-revised-kf-21-development-agreement/
25. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/indonesian-air-force-affirms-kf-21-interest-after-test-pilot-sortie/164793.article
26. https://www.hill.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1389746/us-air-force-completes-delivery-of-24-f-16s-to-indonesia/
27. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/12/08/f-16-fighter-jets-to-begin-journey-to-indonesia-following-us-regeneration-work/
28. https://aviationweek.com/defense/budget-policy-operations/two-indonesian-super-tucano-turboprops-crash-killing-four
29. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/su-30.htm
30. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsrussia-delivers-last-su-30mk2-fighters-to-indonesian-air-force/
31. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/t-50.htm
32. https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/indonesia-six-t50i-fighter-jets-2025-delivery/
33. https://www.key.aero/forum/modern-military-aviation/111873-t-50-for-25-million-cheap-or-expensive
34. https://www.jakartadaily.id/explainers/16211939644/deadly-and-durable-why-indonesias-hawk-200-remains-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with
35. https://www.flightglobal.com/indonesia-completes-hawk-deal/6520.article
36. https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/hawk/
37. https://www.twz.com/37904/the-untold-story-of-how-indonesian-and-australian-jets-nearly-came-to-blows-over-east-timor
38. https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=131310
39. https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/07/indonesia-keeps-options-open-with-bewildering-fighter-smorgasbord-foc/
40. https://aviationphotodigest.com/boeing-ups-the-ante-for-indonesias-f-15ex-procurement/